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This study argues that American views of Korea during the period of Japanese colonial 
rule (1910–1945) shaped U.S. policy toward Korea in the colonial period and after, 
setting the stage for direct U.S. involvement in Korea‘s post-liberation years after 1945. 
Korean nationalists perceived the U.S. as a special ally and a model country, and 
expected it to play a positive role in resolving Korea‘s colonial status. In fact, American 
views of Korea in the early twentieth century were mixed, and depended greatly on the 
respective observers‘ relationship to Korea—whether as missionary, as scholar, or as 
diplomat. At the same time, Japan played a crucial role in mediating American views, 
reflecting the Asia colonizer‘s interest in winning international approval for its 
imperialist project. 
When Korean-American diplomatic relations began in the late nineteenth century, 
Americans observers typically regarded Korea as an uncivilized but distinct Asian 
country. This perception of backwardness persisted into the early twentieth century, even 
as Korea lost its status as a nation-state with the Japanese annexation of 1910. Awareness 




journalists and missionaries conveyed news of the March First Movement to the 
American public and Korean nationalists countered Japanese government efforts to 
influence international opinion. Nationalist efforts to influence U.S. policymaking in the 
1920s and 1930s were persistent but never fully successful, in part because of Korean 
factional rivalries, changing Japanese strategies of colonial control, and American 
diplomats‘ desire to protect U.S. colonial interests in the Philippines. Although Korean 
nationalists failed to accomplish their ultimate goal of participating directly in the U.S. 
government‘s wartime discussions on Korea in the early 1940s, they nevertheless 
succeeded in making the American public aware that Korea was a cultural and racial 
entity distinct from Japan. This awareness would lay a foundation for American direct 
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 Both the beginning and end of colonialism in Korea (1910-1945) happened within 
international settings. Because of the country‘s geopolitical position, Korea was a center 
where powerful neighbors‘ interests intersected until Japan proclaimed its sole dominant 
influence over the Korean peninsula at the turn of the twentieth century. When Korea was 
finally emancipated from Japanese colonialism in 1945, the two emerging powers of the 
Cold War period, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., decided on the division of Korea into two 
zones and each occupied one. From the outset of Korea‘s colonization and liberation to 
the post-liberation period, the U.S. has been deeply involved, whether intentionally or 
not, more than any other foreign power in modern Korean history. The present study 
examines how Americans have formed the discourse of Korea and shaped the specific 
perspective on Korea during the country‘s colonial period and therefore prepared the U.S. 
government‘s direct involvement in the division (1945), the establishment of the South 
Korean government (1948) and the Korean War (1950-53).  
Korea‘s name as a nation-state was erased from the world map upon the 
annexation in 1910, and replaced by the name ―Chosen,‖ a colony and a province of 
Japan. With the annexation, all Korea‘s international relationships seemed to be extinct. 
Nevertheless, because of the Korean people‘s persistent aspiration for independence, 
Japan‘s unique status as the only non-Western colonizer and Korea‘s historical and 




particular, because the Korean people perceived the U.S. both as a special ally and a 
model country and therefore expected the U.S. to play a special role in resolving Korea‘s 
problem, Americans, at both official and unofficial levels, attentively observed Korean 
problems related to colonial Korea, and were major participants in the discourse of 
Korea.1 
 That there were no diplomatic relations does not mean that no interaction between 
the two countries existed. Rather, the U.S. and Korea had several points of interaction 
during the Korean colonial period. From the American side, American missionaries and 
residents in Korea, Foreign Service officers in Korea and East Asia, officials of the State 
Department, and American intellectuals observing the Korean people‘s nationalistic 
cause represented various American views on Korea. From the side of the Koreans, 
Korean immigrants, and nationalist groups in the U.S. and other countries actively played 
roles as agents speaking for their lost and ―invisible‖ country. 
 Previously, two time frames have dominated historical accounts about Korean-
American relations of the modern period. First, studies of the late nineteenth to early 
twentieth centuries focused on how Korea was ―opened‖ to the outside world and the 
United States in particular. In this period, Korea experienced internal and external 
turmoil. Internally, a sense of crisis was pervasive among the Korean people, who were 
generating various notions of progress and reforms for the country. Externally, while the 
West‘s new technologies and knowledge poured into the country and spurred ―a 
                                               
1 By ―Korean problem,‖ I refer to the issue of colonial Korea, about which Korean nationalists and pro-
Korean opinion makers intended to provoke discussion and the following resolution. Participants in 





reconfiguration of state-society relations,‖2 Korea‘s neighboring powers—China, Japan, 
and Russia—were competing over their interests in the Korean peninsula. Rivalry among 
these powers finally resulted in two international wars surrounding Korea: the Sino-
Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). As a victor in both 
wars, Japan‘s interest in Korea was recognized by the international community through 
its alliance with Britain in 1902 and an unofficial agreement with the U.S. in 1905, by 
virtue of which it became the sole dominant power on the Korean peninsula. Japan finally 
annexed Korea in 1910.  
In the midst of this turmoil, the United States occupied a unique position which 
gave the country a relatively positive image of Koreans, since America‘s expansion in 
East Asia was seen as relatively more private and peaceful than that of the other 
imperialist powers.3 This rather favorable relationship derived from Washington‘s largely 
ignorant and indifferent attitude toward Korea, which Patterson referred to as ―friendly 
disinterest.‖4 The private activities of missionaries, businessmen, and individual 
diplomats were seen as benefiting Korea, providing the country with modern education, 
medication, and modern technology to build an electricity and rail infrastructure.5 Studies 
of this period usually end with the Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905, in which the U.S. 
government secretly recognized Japan‘s sphere of influence in Korea, in exchange for 
                                               
2 Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002), 
24. 
3 Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1972), 11. 
4 Wayne Patterson, The Korean Frontier in America: Immigration to Hawaii, 1896-1910 (Honolulu, HI: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 177. 
5 Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (New York: Macmillan, 1922); Fred Harvey Harrington, God, 
Mammon and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884-1905 (Madison, 




Japan recognizing the influence of the U.S. in the Philippines, and the formal annexation 
of Korea in 1910. 
 The second time frame that most historical accounts of U.S.-Korean relations 
have focused on is the post-liberation period. Studies of this period have raised questions, 
such as who was responsible for the division, where the Korean War originated, and 
whether the Korean War was an international or a civil war. Recent scholarship has 
extended attention to a variety of perspectives including those of the Soviets, Chinese, 
and Koreans in the North and the South, as well as the Americans.6  
Only a few historians have studied the Korean-American relationship during the 
colonial period, and when they have done so it has been usually within a limited time 
frame. Due to the sensation that it made internationally, the March First Movement of 
1919 has been a primary focus of such studies. The studies usually cover the period of the 
Movement and subsequent years, the latest being end point the early 1920s, when the 
Syngman Rhee group failed to participate in the Washington Conference.7 Even the few 
studies of the history of U.S.-Korean relations from the beginning to the postwar period 
tend to skip the 1920s and 1930s. As a consequence, previous studies have tended to 
                                               
6 Charles Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate 
Regimes (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, 1983); Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2: 
The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); James I. 
Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu, HI: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1985); Pak Myông-lim, Han’guk chônjaeng ûi palbal kwa kiwôn (Outbreak of the Korean 
War and Its Origins), 2 vols (Seoul: Na‘nam, 1996); William W. Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: 
American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1981); Chông Yong-Wook, Haebang chônhu miguk-ûi taehan chôngch’aek (America’s Korean 
Policy Before and After the Liberation) (Seoul: Seoul University Press, 2003). 
7 Frank P. Baldwin, Jr. ―The March First Movement: Korean Challenge and Japanese Response,‖ Ph.D. 
diss., Columbia University, 1969; Nagata Akifumi, 日本の朝鮮統治と国際関係, 1910-1922 (Japanese 
Rule of Korea and International Relations) (Tokyo: Heibunsha, 2005); Erez Manela, The Wilsonian 
Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York, NY: 




focus on surface phenomena only, failing to discuss continuities and changes in 
American attitudes and policies towards Korea from a long-term point of view.  
The present study takes a precisely such long-term perspective, paying attention 
to how the American government and opinion-makers had an interactive relationship 
with Korean nationalists and how the discourse of Korea generated outside the Korean 
peninsula provided the foundations of U.S.-Korean relations in the postwar period. 
Especially because there were no diplomatic relations between Korea and the U.S. during 
the Korean colonial period, this study stresses interrelations among people at both official 
and non-official levels in constructing the discourse on the country‘s (de)colonialization, 
questioning the dichotomy between official and unofficial aspects of foreign relations. 
 The Korean colonial period was significant in different ways for the U.S., Japan, 
and Korea. It involved issues such as the growing rivalry between the U.S. and Japan in 
the Pacific region, the West‘s encounter with unfamiliar ―Oriental‖ imperialism by Japan, 
racist bias and the anti-immigration movement in American society, and the conflict 
between colonialism and anti-colonialism. On the American side, colonial Korea was an 
issue that at times candidly disclosed seemingly contradictory aspects of the American 
position in foreign relations of the period preceding the Cold War. On the one hand, the 
U.S. claimed itself to be unique and exceptional as a civilized as well as a moral power. 
American missionaries‘ activities in underdeveloped countries at the private level and the 
country‘s image of being a ―powerful but benevolent power‖ at the diplomatic level all 
contributed to the making of this exceptionalistic position. The Wilsonian principle of 
―self-determination‖ during the First World War and the Atlantic Charter‘s declaration 




government would be restored to those who had been forcibly deprived of them‖8 during 
the Second World War, symbolized America‘s distinct position in international relations. 
This was the very aspect that inspired Korean nationalists to appeal for America‘s help 
with the Korean independence movement. As Iriye points out, what was exceptional 
about the United States‘ policy toward the Third World9 was that it assumed that ―[the 
U.S.] did have a chance, that it could make a difference in the destiny of Third World 
countries, and, therefore, that it was possible to steer them toward a less violent and more 
constructive direction of change.‖ The United States ―developed an approach that sought 
to extend American economic and cultural influence in such a way as to help promote 
that country‘s nation-building efforts.‖10 In this sense, American colonial rule in the 
Philippines was seen differently from other imperialist moves and Korean nationalist 
leaders generally agreed on this claim. 
On the other hand, despite there being several American supporters of Korean 
nationalism, the general American public and official attitude was closer to a ―civilizer‖ 
of the uncivilized world than to a supporter of Korean independence. The United States 
was one of the great powers that enjoyed special privileges in colonial and semi-colonial 
countries and was in a relationship of growing rivalry with Japan in the Pacific region. 
For the United States, competition and cooperation among powers took priority over 
sympathy toward colonized peoples. In dealing with issues related to Korea, in particular, 
                                               
8 Third clause of the ―Atlantic Charter‖ announced by the U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, on August 14, 1941 
9 Although the term ―Third World‖ was coined during the Cold War to define undeveloped countries that 
were considered as markets and sources of ideological support for the Capitalist and Communist blocs of 
countries, here it designates undeveloped countries that were often colonies or semi-colonies controlled by 
great powers in earlier period. 
10 Akira Iriye, ―The United States and Japan in Asia: A Historical Perspective,‖ In The United States, 




American relations with Japan could strongly sway American attitudes. This explains 
why the United States government remained silent at the annexation of Korea and the 
continuous appeals of Korean nationalist groups for help. Because Korean nationalist 
groups expected that the U.S. would be a different imperialist power from those of 
Europe and Japan and appealed to the moral and philanthropic aspect of the U.S., these 
two seemingly contradictory but complementary aspects of the American position were 
displayed in the most obvious way with regard to the issue of Korea. At the same time, 
the official American position of non-intervention related to the Korean problem was at 
times obscured by American officials‘ personal attention to conditions in Korea and 
sympathy toward the colonized people. Korean nationalists exposed cracks and ruptures 
in the utopian image of Japanese imperialism that led in turn to changes in the American 
view of Japanese imperialism.  
For Japan, Korea was a long-awaited colony constituting the Japanese empire. 
Along with Taiwan, southern Manchuria, and South Sakhalin it was expected ―to assist 
the home country economically and militarily.‖11 ―As Europe, the United States, and 
Japan collectively established their superiority over the rest of the world,‖ great powers 
began to recognize Japan as belonging to ―the top group at the turn of the twentieth 
century, because it was ―civilized‖; and it was ―civilized‖ because it was powerful.‖12 
Yet, there existed a biased view from the West about the fledgling power, Japan. Japan 
was careful to prosecute its use of military power in wars with ―meticulous adherence to 
                                               
11 Ibid., 32-3. 
12




the laws of war and then publish books about this achievement.‖13 Meanwhile, Korea was 
substantial evidence for Japan to prove that it was powerful as well as civilized enough to 
conduct a modernizing mission in this historical but backward colony. As Iriye argues, 
although the U.S. and Japan shared self-identification as being among the most powerful 
and the most advanced countries, they began to diverge on the question of ―whether the 
two nations should jointly try to respond to the awakened nationalism of Third World 
countries, especially China.‖14 Since Korea was a less serious issue than China for both 
Japan and the U.S., the different positions of these two countries towards Korea were 
overlooked until these two came to directly confront each other. As growing competition 
and conflict developed between the U.S. and Japan, Japan‘s answer for the undeveloped 
countries in Asia was fixed as pan-Asianism from the 1930s. The Sino-Japanese War was 
―justified as an attempt to end the West‘s long suppression of Asian aspirations‖ for equal 
relationships and to help liberate Asians from Western colonialism.15 Seen in this light, 
colonial Korea was mobilized by Japan‘s aggressive move.  
The Korean nationalist movement during the colonial period faced a constant 
struggle to challenge Japanese propaganda boasting of its legitimate rule in Korea and 
modernistic development in the colony, as well as to challenge the American geopolitical 
attitude toward Korea. Like other Asian peoples, except for a few collaborators, Koreans 
were ―under no illusion that Japan‘s replacement of Western colonialism would hasten 
their independence.‖ Rather, for nationalist leaders, ―the defeat of Japanese imperialism 
                                               
13 Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 2008), 155. 
14 Iriye, ―The United States and Japan,‖ 33. 
15




was an essential condition for attaining their goals.‖16 Relying on the humanistic nature of 
American beliefs in foreign relations, the majority of Korean nationalist leaders 
anticipated that America would assist their country‘s independence, because of the 
seemingly exceptional position of the U.S. and also because of its influence as an 
emerging power. By this interpretation, they hoped it would transcend legal restrictions, 
realpolitiki, and the traditional balance of power relations. Nevertheless, the Koreans‘ 
reliance on American public opinion and the U.S. government‘s favorable position 
towards the Korean nationalistic cause was not effective until the U.S. actually needed 
anti-Japanese Korean people in order to counterattack Japan in the Pacific War.  
The central aim of the present study is to analyze the intertwined relations among 
the U.S., Japan, and Korea, with a focus on how these relations impacted American 
understandings of Korea: the colonialism and nationalism of Korea, which is to say, the 
―Korean Problem.‖ In order to delve into informal but visible changes and 
transformations of the American view of Korea, this study examines how Korea was 
described, illustrated, and analyzed in the mass media, such as journals and daily 
newspapers. I intend to examine the public opinion of Americans on Korea through these 
mass media, partly because of the absence of an American official position towards 
Korea during the colonial period and also because Korean nationalist leaders in the U.S. 
were eagerly oriented towards awakening the American public to the significance of the 
Korean problem, hoping that public opinion favorable to Korea‘s independence would 
have an influence on government policy. In this sense, the present study is a case study of 
how and to what extent public opinion works in having an influence on foreign policy-






making in the U.S.17 I also analyze official documents of the U.S. government on Korea, 
especially American diplomatic officials‘ reports from Korea and other East Asian 
countries. These officials reported to Washington about how the Korean people 
responded to colonial modernity and how they personally thought about it from the actual 
spot, contributing both to the creation of and changes to the American government‘s 
attitude toward Japanese imperialism. 
The issue of race and immigration in American society in the early twentieth
 
century is another subject that this study tries to illuminate. Race was one of the most 
significant issues in the relationship between Japan and the U.S., as was also the issue of 
illegal immigration to the United States. As Mae Ngai has commneted, accretion of 
illegal populations in Asian and Latino communities ―contributed to the construction of 
those communities as illegitimate, criminal, and unassimilable.‖ ―The association of these 
minority groups as unassimilable foreigners‖ led to ―the creation of ―alien citizens‖—
persons who are American citizens by virtue of their birth in the United States but who 
are presumed to be foreign by the mainstream of American culture and, at times, by the 
                                               
17 Although public opinion had once been seen as ―largely ignorant, characterized more by ‗moods‘ than by 
well-reasoned opinions‖ (G. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy [New York: Praeger, 
1960], quoted in Philip J. Powlick, ―The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials,‖ 
International Studies Quarterly 39 [1995]: 427-51), recent studies have viewed it as both rational and 
stable, or ―pretty prudent‖ (B. I. Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in 
Americans’ Policy Preferences [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992]; B. W. Jentleson, ―The Pretty 
Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force,‖ International Studies 
Quarterly 36 [1992]). It is believed that foreign policy officials are attentive to public opinion and that 
public opinion matters to their decisions (P. J. Powlick, ―The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to 
Public Opinion among American Foreign Policy Officials,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 [1991]; 
Douglas C. Foyle, ―Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating Variable,‖ 
International Studies Quarterly 41 [1997]). In addition, public opinion tends to precede policy and 
substantial congruence exists between opinion and policy. Therefore, public opinion changes are viewed as 
important causes of policy change (Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, ―Effects of Public Opinion on 
Policy,‖ The American Political Science Review 77 [1983]: 175-90). In particular, the importance of the 
news media as a source by which officials ―operationalize‖ public opinion has also been demonstrated 




state.‖18 Growing anti-immigration sentiment in American society was marked by such 
legislation as the national origins quota system and a series of immigration exclusion 
acts, typified by the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924. As a doubly marginalized community, 
being both colonial subjects and a racial minority, Korean-Americans struggled to 
represent themselves and to distinguish their status from that of Japanese in the U.S. The 
present study explores Korean-American people‘s understanding of their marginalized 
position.  
Chapter 1 of the dissertation explores the earliest encounters that Americans had 
with Korea and the Korean people. Starting as a traveler‘s view, Americans‘ vague 
interest in Korea developed into a more sophisticated form as time went by. The chapter 
also investigates how Japan‘s efforts to promote the justification of its occupation of 
Korea were effective and how Korean intellectuals responded to international changes 
and a reconsidered position of their country at the turn of the twentieth
 
century.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the effect and aftermath that the March First Movement of 
1919 had on the international discourse regarding Korea. The Movement, a nation-wide 
independence demonstration of the Korean people against the Japanese occupation after 
the first decade of colonialism, made an international sensation. This chapter explores 
how news of the Movement became a turning point for American views of Korea. The 
Movement also impacted U.S.-Japanese relations. The initial American reaction to the 
March First Movement stemmed from Christian sympathy towards the weak, victimized, 
and especially Christian Koreans that Americans saw as having been inhumanely and 
religiously persecuted. American public opinion sympathizing with Koreans was 
                                               
18 Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ: 




enhanced by humanitarianism. Therefore, American public opinion generally called for 
civil reform in Korea by Japanese colonizers, rather than for the complete independence 
of Korea.  
The March First Movement, however, extended the audience for news of Korea. 
This condition now provided Koreans with an international stage on which to raise their 
own voice. Chapter 3 looks into how Koreans struggled to represent themselves outside 
their occupied country. Whether Koreans could culturally, ethnically and legally 
represent themselves separately from the Japanese was a critical issue for the Korean-
American community and Korean nationalist groups. I argue that Korean-Americans in 
the racially biased environment for Asian immigrants in American society in the 1910s 
and 1920s prioritized the struggle to achieve the right to ethnically represent their identity 
as Korean over their desire to complain about racism. Meanwhile, Korean nationalist 
leaders appealed to emotional sympathy and a sense of justice on the part of the 
international community in order to condemn Japan‘s unjust rule in Korea and to finally 
liberate Koreans from colonial rule. The chapter articulates the points that Korean leaders 
presented, as well as the rhetoric and images that they employed to proclaim the 
legitimacy of international society‘s intervention in and resolution of the Korean 
problem.  
Chapter 4 turns to changes in American public and official views on Korea 
between 1924 and the 1930s. After the sensation of the March First Movement calmed 
down and Japanese authorities announced their reform policy in Korea, American articles 
specifically dealing with the Korean problem diminished. Nevertheless, the present study 




period encouraging for U.S. official understanding. Amidst growing conflicts between 
the United States and Japan due to immigration and racial issues, Korea‘s case provided a 
good source for American observers to understand the character of Japanese imperialism. 
The chapter argues that while analyzing the conditions of Korea and the Korean people, 
American officials began to raise questions about the effectiveness and suitability of 
Japanese colonialism in Korea. 
Finally, Chapter 5 scrutinizes how Korean nationalist voices and the U.S. 
government‘s official position changed during the Pacific War years. This chapter pays 
especially close attention to how some Korean nationalist groups astutely understood 
realpolitik and the American view on the matter, changing their strategy in contacts with 
the State Department. By looking at interactions between U.S. governmental agencies 
and Korean nationalist−movement leaders, this chapter analyzes how active encounters 
of these two sides during wartime led to American decision-making about post-colonial 
Korea, regardless of whether or not American decisions coincided with what those 
Korean leaders intended. Rather than digging into detailed stories of competitive 
relationships among various Korean nationalist groups or discussions of postwar plans by 
the great powers, this study focuses on how America‘s earlier understanding and position 
related to Korea laid the foundation stone for its major decisions at the last stage of the 
Pacific War, especially the trusteeship plan and the joint occupation of the liberated 
country by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. By comparing reports by William Langdon, a former 
American consul in colonial Korea and official of the U.S. military government, the 
chapter tries to synthesize how constant and changing factors of the American view about 





Note: For Korean names, Romanization is based upon the McCune-Reischauer system. 
For Korean and Japanese names, family names are placed before given names, according 
to the practice in Korea and Japan, with the exception of Syngman Rhee and other names 
that have traditionally appeared in English with the family names last. In the case of 









CHAPTER  ONE 
 
Initial Encounters: American Views of Korea in the Late Nineteenth 





The name Korea has been erased from the map of the world and its disappearance marks 
the final failure of an ancient people to isolate themselves from the rest of humanity. On 
August 23, 1910, Korean territory was annexed by Japan. The late emperor Yi became a 
Japanese prince without political power. A Japanese governor-general took into his 
capable hands authority misused by a long dynasty of autocrats. 
 
- The Right Rev. Bishop Frodsham, ―The Land of Morning Calm: A Japanese 




Westerners‘ visits to Korea began in the sixteenth century, as European 
expeditions to parts of the world started in this period. Korea‘s name, however, was not 
well known to European and American public until the late nineteenth century. 
Increasing attention to the country corresponded with internal and external crisis of Korea 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Ironically, the weaker geopolitical 
status of Korea as a country became, the more cultural curiosity about the country from 
the other side of the globe was growing. American observers, the most attentive ones of 
Korea from outside, witnessed the sudden emergence of the name ―Korea‖ and soon its 
dramatic disappearance in the early twentieth century. Korea‘s status as a nation-state 
ended at its annexation by Japan in 1910, and the process leading to its colonization 




Korea to Western eyes in the eighteenth century became to constitute an entity of 
descriptive and analytical observation of Korea at the turn of nineteenth to twentieth 
century. The present chapter examines the formation of a Western discourse on Korea 
from the late nineteenth century. It pays attention to how American observers viewed this 
―Far Eastern‖ and unknown land, amidst rapid changes of international relations with 
Korea from the late nineteenth to the first decade of the twentieth century.  
Korea began to participate in modern-style commercial trade by opening trade 
ports to Japan in 1876. Increasing rivalry among powers surrounding the Korean 
peninsula resulted in two international wars, the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). These international conflicts attracted sudden and 
weighty outside attention to Korea‘s geopolitical status and its internal issues. When the 
first Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed in 1902 and Japan defeated Russia in 1905, 
Korea‘s fate seemed to fall into Japanese hands. In 1905, Japan declared Korea a 
protectorate country, and in 1910, Japan official annexed Korea.  
 
1. Emerging Western Views of Korea 
 (1) Western Travelers‘ Eyes 
As the Western world became more familiar with Korea in the 1880s, it began to 
call Korea with the nicknames ―Land of Morning Calm‖ and ―Hermit Kingdom.‖1 By the 
                                               
1 From the nineteenth to early twentieth century, ―Hermit Kingdom‖ and ―Land of Morning Calm‖ were the 
two of Korea‘s most frequently used nicknames in the English world . The former nickname was a popular 
and symbolic description of the Western image of Korea‘s isolation from the international society. The 
term became popular since Griffis‘ book Corea, the Hermit Nation came out in 1882. The latter nickname 
was a literary translation of the two characters of the Korean dynasty‘s name, Chosôn, and first used by 
Percival Lowell in his book Chosôn, the Land of the Morning Calm, in 1886 (William E. Griffis, The 
Hermit Nation: I. Ancient and Medieval History; II. Political and Social Corea; III. Modern and Recent 




time the Korean government opened its trading ports to Japan and then to the United 
States and European countries, a growing number of Westerners—missionaries, 
businessmen, travelers, scholars, soldiers, and diplomatic officials—had visited Korea 
and experienced its far-from-modern society. Their writings in the mass media, 
travelogue publications, and postcards from the hidden land gained popularity among the 
Western public. This trend became the start of Western discourse on Korea. 
 The predominant form of English writings on Korea in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries was travel writing, which effectively depicted Korea as an object of 
curiosity for American readers. These early travel writings on Korea became fashionable 
in Europe and the United States and resonated with the popularity of European travel 
books about non-European parts of the world that were already in vogue.2 In later years, 
these early writings would become a model for outside views of Korea. 
 At the dawn of the seventeenth century, Western travelers‘3 accounts usually 
included descriptions of Korea‘s landscape, its customs, and the physical characteristics 
of the Korean people. Since the very earliest description of Korea appeared in the West, 
the country was seen as a place almost unreachable from the Western world, both 
geographically and culturally. The immediate interest in the country was centered on its 
natural surroundings, such as its landscape, animals, plants, mineral resources, and native 
                                               
2 European travel accounts of the non-European world created what Mary Louise Pratt calls ―contact 
zones‖ as well as ―the domestic subject‖ of European imperialism among metropolitan reading publics. 
Pratt uses the term ―contact zone‖ rather than ―colonial frontier,‖ aiming ―to foreground the interactive, 
improvisational dimensions of colonial encounters so easily ignored or suppressed by diffusionist accounts 
of conquest and domination.‖ It refers to the space of colonial encounters, where people who are 
geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and have interactive relations 
(Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation [New York, NY: Routledge, 
1992], 4-7). 
3 By the term ―Westerner‖ or ―West,‖ I refer to the common view in the West, regardless of whether it is 
held by European or American writers, as seen in their early travel accounts. This also shows that American 
travelers‘ views were basically derived from those of Europeans. The emergence of a view specific to 




people.4 The interest in the natural scenes of exotic countries was the extension from the 
earlier trend: Europeans in the eighteenth century tried to systematize nature as a 
European knowledge-building project that created a new kind of Euro-centered planetary 
consciousness.5  
As Mary Louise Pratt asserts, these accounts created a utopian, innocent vision of 
European global authority.6 Western descriptions of exotic lands paralleled initial 
descriptions of Korea. Western travel writings about Korea were typically adventure 
stories of an unknown land and narrators tended to exaggerate and highlight the 
mysterious and exotic aspects of the country without basing them on factual evidence.  For 
example, Martino Martini, an Italian Jesuit missionary to China in the seventeenth 
century, described Korea as a land of abundant gold, silver, and pearls, without ever 
having visited Korea.7 The utopian view was also clear in the famous seventeenth century 
story of Hendrik Hamel, which was about the author‘s real experience in Korea. Hamel, a 
shipman from the Netherlands, was taken captive with other seamen in Korea for 
fourteen years after a shipwreck. After returning back to his homeland in 1668, he 
published his story in Korea. The story had many versions of publication and was 
translated into many languages including French, English, and German. Hamel‘s story 
                                               
4 To name a few, Basil Hall, Account of Voyage of Discovery to the West Coast of Corea, and the Great 
Loo-Choo Island (Philadelphia: Abraham Small, 1818); Henry Balfour, Waifs and Strays from the Far East 
(London: Trubner & Co., 1876); Ernest Oppert, A Forbidden Land: Voyages to the Corea (London: S. 
Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1880); E. Bretschneider, Botanicon sinicum, 2 vols (Shanghai: Kelly 
& Walsh, 1881-1893); Elisée Reclus, The Earth and Its Inhabitants - Asia, vol. 2 (New York: Appleton & 
Co., 1884). 
5 Pratt, 29.  
6 Ibid., 39. 
7 It is understood that Martini stayed in China for many years, but never visited Korea. Martino Martini, 
Novus Atlas Sinesis (A new atlas of China), vol. 6 (Amsterdam, 1655), 168-69, quoted in Yi Chi-ûn, 





became the first book to introduce Korea to Western Europe.8 While publishing several 
different versions of the story, editors at times added unsubstantiated but entertaining 
stories, along with illustrations, such as one in which crocodiles were depicted as eating 
human flesh.9 In other words, Hamel‘s story did more to entertain readers than to present 
facts about Korea. These fantastical images, such as a treasure land and cannibalism in 
exotic settings, regardless of their credibility, coincided with readers‘ expectations of 
spectacular stories and actively constructed a discourse about Korea as the exotic world. 
Pictorial images of Korea in books and postcards presented the (imagined) 
―otherness‖ of Korea to European and American audiences.10 Images of Korean people 
appeared in travelogue articles and books on East Asia, inserted in commercial 
advertisements for food products,11 or published as a series of stereo-view cards.12 The 
                                               
8 L. George Paik, The History of Protestant Missions in Korea, 1832-1910 (P‘yongyang: Union Christian 
College, 1929), 30. 
9 There were several different published versions of Hamel‘s diary. The one mentioning the story of 
crocodile was the Saagman-edited version in 1669. Hendrik Hamel, Story of the Hunt the Sparrow Hawk 
and the Befall of Shipwrecked on the Island Quelpart and the Mainland Korea (1653~1666) (Verhaal van 
Het Vergaan van Jacht de Sperwer En Van Het Wedervaren Der Schipbreukelingen op Het Eiland 
Quelpaert en Het Vasteland Van Korea), quoted in Yi Jieun, 71-77. 
10 For discussion about how photography functioned as a culturally constructed ―way of seeing,‖ rather than 
the unencumbered vision of objective historical eyes, see the Introduction of James R. Ryan, Picturing 
Empire: Photography and the Visualization of the British Empire (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1997). Beyond the publications of illustrated or pictorial images, what satisfied the European and 
American people‘s desire to look at exotic and ethnic characters in the most extreme way was the live 
displays of the so-called savage peoples at international exhibitions in the late nineteenth century. The 
public went to these exhibitions in London, Paris, and Chicago expecting to see the spectacle of 
ethnographical specimens. As Maxwell argues, the idea of displaying the colonized peoples in exhibitions 
was ―not just to expose the masses to the spectacle of racial difference, but also to make people of the white 
Anglo-Saxon nations feel mentally, physically and morally superior to the colonized, using a language that 
the public would understand – a language of stark oppositions‖ (Anne Maxwell, Colonial Photography and 
Exhibitions: Representations of the "Native" and the Making of European Identities [London and New 
York: Leicester University Press, 1999], 2).  
11 The Liebig, a German company, issued many sets of chromo cards in many languages from the 1880s. 
The trade cards were published for a department store to distribute illustrated cards to consumers as 
advertisements. Illustrations on the cards were often images of exotic flowers and plants, and ethnic views. 
On the development of postcards, see Frank Staff, The Picture Postcard and Its Origins (London: 




most striking images of Korea were ethnic scenes that depicted real people, such as a man 
wearing an A-frame carrier (jige) [Figures 1 and 2], a woman in traditional dress 
exposing her breasts [Figure 3], an old man wearing a traditional white gown, top-knot, 
and horse-hair hat (kat), smoking a long pipe on the street [Figure 4], and boys with 
traditional pigtail hair styles. Unfamiliar garments, headdresses [Figure 5], and 
superstitious customs frequently became subjects of curiosity. These popular visual 
spectacles of Koreans symbolized and represented the differences, backwardness, and 




Figure 1. A food vender 




                                                                                                                                            
12 A series of Stereoviews, Underwood & Keystone, Japan, China & Korea was published during the years 
1860 to 1930. 
13 These images were parallel to early Western images of China and Japan. Although China ―seemed to 
have riches aplenty – spices, silk, silver, gems, and opium – this great wealth had no discernible impact on 
China, which was often described as a nation static and stuck in time‖ (Michael L. Krenn, The Color of 





Figure 2. Carriers carrying swine to market 
Source: William W. Chapin, ―Glimpses of Korea and China,‖  









Figure 3. The land of the happy pedestrian [original caption] 






Figure 4. A gentleman of the road—His social status is not made so evident by his attire as by the fact 
that he carries nothing [original caption]. 






Figure 5. National hat and house hat [original caption]. This article introduced twenty six different 
hats and headdresses. 
Source: Foster H. Jenings, ―Korean Headdresses in the National Museum,‖  









Figure 6. Road gods worshiped as protectors against devils along the highway [original caption]. 
Source: Alice Tisdale, ―The Feet of the Mighty,‖ Asia 20 (Sep, Oct 1920): 794. 
 
 
These images also projected Koreans as subjects in need of the enlightened European 
standards of transportation, sexual sensibility, sanitation, and diligence. For example, 
European observers used a picture of Koreans worshipping ―road gods‖ (Ch’ônha 
daejanggun in Korean) on the street [Figure 6] as evidence of ―unenlightened‖ Korean 
customs.  
 
(2) Positioning Korea in the World 
What was popular and curiosity invoking to readers in writings on Korea were 
descriptions of the native people and their customs. In the process of describing the 
Korean people and their society in the early period, Western viewers disclosed their euro-
centric perspective on Korean civilization. This perspective positioned Korea within the 
hierarchy of the modern international system. In contrast, Western observers viewed that 




style of a modern nation.‖14 It is notable that Western observers usually compared Korean 
characteristics to those of Japanese, rather than to those of Westerners. 
The earliest account of alien Korean social customs to Western observer was 
often misguided and exaggerated, and even developed into unfounded, strange images of 
the culture, such as allegations of a lack of civil laws and rules in the Korean society. 
Hamel fabricated a story about Korea‘s penal system: 
If a woman kills her husband, she is buried alive up to her shoulders in a highway 
that is much frequented, and by her is laid an axe, with which all that pass by, and 
are not noble, are obliged to give her a stroke on the head till she is dead.15 
 
The story in another part read: 
…they punish murder: After they have long trampled upon the criminal, they pour 
vinegar on the raw body, which they then pour down the offender‘s throat through 
a funnel, and when he is full they beat him on the belly with cudgels till he bursts. 
Thieves are trampled to death; and though this be a dreadful punishment, yet the 
Coreans are much addicted to stealing.16 
 
Stories of these cruel and barbarous methods of punishment parallel today‘s Western 
sphere‘s image of Islamic customs. These images implied that Korean society had no 
reasonable and civilized laws or customs. This Western view of Korea was separated 
from the European way of gazing at the rest of the world through a lens based on the idea 
of the European self and others: the stark contrast between the superior ―us‖ and the 
inferior ―them.‖ In this sense, European imperialism, as a pervasive and persistent set of 
cultural attitudes towards the rest of the world informed to varying degrees by militarism, 
                                               
14 Alexis Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power (Honolulu, HI: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2005), 29. 
15 Henrik Hamel, Narrative of an Unlucky Voyage and Shipwreck on the Coast of Corea, translated in 
William Eliot Griffis, Corea: Without and Within (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1885), 
126. 
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patriotism, racial superiority, and loyalty to a ―civilizing mission,‖ was plainly reflected 
in the Western view of Korea in this early stage of encounters. 
As more Westerners visited and observed Korea by the late nineteenth century, 
observers attentively noted the physical and racial traits of the Korean people. 
Interestingly, these observers clearly distinguished Koreans from other Asian races from 
the beginning. As for appearance, Koreans were often described in a positive way: 
handsome and physically strong, compared to other Asian races, as seen below: 
 
…they [Koreans] are strikingly dissimilar from both their nearest neighbors, the 
Chinese and Japanese; that there is a remarkable variety of physiognomy among 
them; that they have straight and aquiline as well as broad and snub noses, with 
distended nostrils, and dark, or, more often, russet brown hair, … that their eyes, 
though dark, vary from dark brown to hazel; that their cheekbones are high, their 
brows frequently lofty and intellectual, their ears small and well set on, their usual 
expression cheerful, with a dash of puzzlement, and that, in short, the Korean 
physiognomy indicates in its best aspect quick intelligence rather than force or 
strength of will. 
 
…The men are very strong, walk remarkably well, and carry heavy weights. As a 
rule, they are strong and healthy, …17 
 
Often these positive external features of Korean people were contrasted to their 
neighbor‘s negative physique: 
…they [Koreans] are much better-looking and different in every way from the 
Japanese or Chinese. Tall, well featured and well built, they seemed a very 
superior type to the busy little Japs who had come on board and who were already 
at work on the cargo. But these fine-looking men in such dirty white clothing, 
listless and lazy though they at first seemed to be, held their own when it came to 
lightering the ship…18 
 
                                               
17 Isabella Bird Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbors (New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell 
Company, 1905), quoted in ―Korea, Isabella Bird Bishop‘s Recent Travels in That Country,‖ NYT, Jan 29, 
1898. 
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Ironically, this relatively favorable depiction of Koreans‘ physical traits provoked readers 
to wonder why the country had such poor conditions despite the natural advantages 
enjoyed by its people. One commentator asserted that the most prominent characteristics 
of the Korean people were their extraordinary apathy and an aversion to work in any 
form, in other words, laziness,19 and gross and unnatural immorality.20 The discord 
between Korean people‘s advantageous physical traits and their negative attitudes and 
character was frequently contrasted to the physically weaker, but sanitary and diligent, 
Japanese people. An article in Harper’s Weekly in 1897 said, 
As a race the Koreans are considerably larger men than the Japanese and at the 
same time incomparably slower and more clumsy [sic] in their movements. They 
have none of the rapid energy, either of body of mind, which so eminently 
distinguishes the native of Japan, …21 
 
An article quoting Bishop‘s book wrote, 
 
An aristocratic class without dignity; a useless, idle, extortionate upper class; an 
official middle class, insolent, vulgar, rapacious, and dissolute; a commercial 
class reduced to the level of mere hawkers from hamlet to hamlet; a peasantry 
with bone and muscle enough, but fleeced and dispirited; women despised, 
overworked, isolated; children educated in superstitious terrors and a handful of 
mischievous prejudices, such are the constituents of the Korean nation. Nowhere 
is there vigour, independence, home-life, hope, or happiness.22 
 
One observer described Korean people as being good natured but lacking energy and 
moral sense: 
                                               
19 ―[the Corean] shirks his work if employed and does a boy‘s task if his own master. … he avoids 
manufactures and is as lazy and idle as it is possible to be without starving or freezing to death.‖ 
(Margherita Arlina Hamm, ―Mongol Triad: Japan, Corea and China,‖ Overland Monthly and Our West 
Magazine XXV, no. 146 [Feb 1895]: 137). ―Generally speaking, Koreans are constitutionally lazy. It is 
born and bred in them. … The Koreans are probably the laziest people among nations occupying a cool 
zone.‖ (W. L. Swallen, ―Types of Korean Christian Character, Missionary Review of the World 25 [Mar 
1902]: 192) 
20 Arthur H. Lee, ―Korean Notes,‖ Harper’s Weekly 38 (Dec 1, 1894): 1134. 
21 ―Korea and Its People,‖ Harper's Weekly 41 (Jul 24, 1897): 728-9. 
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…Korea‘s case is one of degeneracy as to both civilization and stamina. Finer-
looking than the Chinese, taller than the Japanese, these men in white coats 
starched to a luster that excels our shirt fronts, and in big hats and with long pipes, 
are jolly and good-natured fellows for the most part. Yet they lack moral fiber, 
having neither the grit of the canny islanders nor the patient industry of the 
persistent continentals. Let the Japanese to-day thank their stars for the thousand 
years‘ drill of the feudal system as ―a stage of progress.‖23 
 
 
Figure 5. Korean coolies and loafers in front of a Korean house [original caption]. This kind of 
picture of sitting on the street and smoking pipes was a symbolic image of “lazy” Koreans. 
Source: Arthur J. Brown, ―Politics and Missions in Korea,‖  
The Missionary Review of the World 25 (March 1902): 182. 
 
Interestingly, many writers yet viewed that laziness and lack of stamina were not 
because Korean people lacked intellectual ability. One commentator in Fortnightly 
Review in 1894 said as follows: 
The Coreans, it must be understood, are lazy and depressed, but they are by no 
means stupid. … when they wish to learn anything, they are wonderfully quick at 
understanding even matters of which they have never heard before.24 
 
 Many agreed that laziness was the major reputation of Korean people. In their view, the 
laziness necessarily begot the filthy conditions of the Korean cities and people, which 
frequently became a criterion in determining the uncivilized nature of Korea. A British 
visitor to Korea said, 
                                               
23 Williams Griffis, ―Kim the Korean,‖ Outlook 76 (Mar 5, 1904): 544. 
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Travelling in Korea can hardly be described as luxurious. The Korean is not 
lavish of home comforts for himself, and he certainly provides a minimum of the 
same for the travelling foreigner. The average Korean hotel compares unfavorably 
with a modern pigsty, and one has to sleep as best one can in the midst of 





Figure 8. Traveling missionaries in Korea. Western travelers usually rode on palanquins and horses, 
accompanied by a Korean guide. 
Source: Horace H. Underwood, ―My Korean Friends,‖ Asia 44 (Jun 1944): 260. 
 
And this filthiness of cities and people in Korea was also strikingly contrasted to those of 
Japan. The same author said, 
The chief subjects of remark in Korea are the laziness of the general population 
and the filthiness of the lower classes. It is well to keep to windward of the 
Korean coolie, but there is no keeping away from the squalor and smells of the 
native dwellings. Fusan, however, is of but passing interest, and a great portion of 
it is Japanese, therefore clean. We shall see more of Korean dirt and methods of 
living as we come nearer to the capital… One leaves the port with mingled 
feelings of approval and disgust [;] approval of the neat Japanese buildings with 
their cleanly spotless interiors, and disgust for the filthy hovels in which the 
Koreans eke out their slothful, aimless existence. …26 
 
 In short, the early Western view of Korea transformed over time: the early 
European writing prior to the eighteenth century described Korea as a mysterious place, 
whereas their view in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries evidenced naked 
curiosity over the ―strange‖ country. At the same time, the audience for these writings 
                                               
25 Ibid. 
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shifted gradually from elites to the general public.27 In addition, these two changes 
paralleled the growing interest in systematic means of measuring racial differences 
among ethnologists and scientists in the nineteenth century. Ethnologists who supported 
racial pluralism in the nineteenth century tried to find the origins of racial differences, 
making use of ―aesthetics,‖ phrenology, cultural attainments, and linguistics. For 
example, J. C. Nott, an American ethnologist and racial theorist, argued that the 
pyramidal-shaped head of the Chinese and their ―primitive‖ language indicated racial 
inferiority. According to his biological research, ―the inadequacies of the skulls of 
Mongol, Indian and Negro, and all dark-skinned races,‖ were ―especially well marked in 
those parts of the brain which have been assigned to the moral and intellectual faculties.‖ 
The subsequent conclusion was that the ―dark-skinned races‖ were biologically incapable 
of imitating Caucasians.28 Although it is arguable how much the scientist community 
accepted this trend of polygenesis, both pluralists and monists assumed the inferiority of 
the colored races.29 The increasing attention to the different races was easily connected to 
the cultural imperialist view of the non-Caucasian peoples. 
                                               
27 This change coincides with Tchen‘s periodization of American Orientalism over China. He argues that 
representation of Chinese things, ideas, and people to European Americans shifted dramatically from 1776 
to 1882 according to the economic, cultural, and political development in the United States. First (from the 
early decades of the United States) was the ―patrician form,‖ which appeared when American elites sought 
to possess Chinese luxuries and vaguely admired Chinese civilization; second was the ―commercial form‖ 
(antebellum to the end of the Civil War) that commodified the Chinese people, their culture, and products 
to fulfill the public‘s desire for spectacle; and third (since the nation‘s reconstruction) was the ―political 
form‖ so that the ―Chinese Question‖ became the focus of national politics, with debate on the Chinese 
Exclusion Act passed in 1882. For more details, see John Kuo Wei Tchen, New York before Chinatown: 
Orientalism and the Shaping of American Culture, 1776-1882 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999). Based on this transition of Orientalism, Western view of Korean society in the nineteenth 
century was a mixture of the first and second forms of orientalism in Tchen‘s explanation.  
28 J. C. Nott and George Gliddon, Indigenous Races of the Earth; or New Chapters of Ethnological Inquiry 
(Philadelphia, 1857); J. C. Nott, Two Lectures on the Connection Between Biblical and Physical History of 
Man (New York, 1849), quoted in Stuart Creighton Miller, The Unwelcome Immigrant: The American 
Image of the Chinese, 1785-1882 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 154-57. 
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2. Japan Speaking Out to the World 
 At the turn of the twentieth century, Korea garnered increased international 
attention as the country was considered as a ―bone of contention‖ in the East Asian 
region.30 If the earlier Western view mostly stemmed from curiosity about a strange land, 
the newly increasing interest around the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-
Japanese War (1904-1905) was more of political character. Naturally, the political 
attention on Korea was closely related to Japan‘s motives in East Asia. The United States 
was one of the most cautious observers of Korea‘s future and Japan‘s intention in East 
Asia. 
 On Japan‘s side, Japanese officials, after the sweeping Meiji reforms from 1868, 
were still making efforts to let the Western world know that the nation‘s civilization was 
becoming more modern—that Japan was no more the ―uncivilized‖ country that had been 
forced to sign unequal treaties with the Western powers because of the allegedly inferior 
social system of Japan. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Japanese policy-makers 
responded by conducting internal reforms to its judicial system, which allowed it to 
emerge as the most modernized country in East Asia. Against doubtful eyes, Japan 
claimed the position of colonizer so as to present itself as possessing all the prerequisites 
necessary to civilize others. The nearest and easiest target to claim Japan‘s ―civilizing 
power‖ was Korea. As Robert Valliant points out, Japan attained its position as a world 
power firstly by defeating a major Western power, Russia, in 1904-1905 and secondly by 
initiating a calculated press campaign ―to persuade the West that Japan was its equal and 
                                               
30




deserved a place among the more enlightened nations of the world.‖31 By claiming 
dominance over Korea, as Dudden says, Meiji Japan intended to take ―charge of defining 
its Korean policies to the world community in what can only be described as the self-
conscious language of colonial power.‖32  
 
Figure 9. David and Goliath [original caption]. This image of Japan as David against Goliath, 
symbolizing Russia, displayed small but smart and powerful Japan, defeating big and dull Russia. 
This cartoon had been originally printed in Jiji Shimpo in Tokyo and then in an American 
periodical. 
Source: ―Korea, Japan, and Russia,‖ The American Review of Reviews 30 (Jul 1904): 95. 
 
Furthermore, it is notable that Japan projected its claims as a power mainly 
toward American audiences. Andre Schmid argues that Japanese officials likely viewed 
themselves as in competition with the United States in the Pacific area, which was 
exacerbated by the American colonization of Hawaii and the Philippines and also by 
debates on immigrants‘ exclusion acts in California. They were afraid, Schmid says, that 
there would be another conflict if another issue provoked American religious and 
economic leaders.33 Furthermore, Japanese officials and elites believed that Japan was 
―stalking a large game, a very large game,—nothing less than a triple understanding 
between the United States, Great Britain, and Nippon [Japan.]‖ In their judgment, this 
                                               
31 Robert B. Valliant, ―The Selling of Japan: Japanese Manipulation of Western Opinion, 1900-1905,‖ 
Monumenta Nipponica 29, no. 4 (Winter 1974): 415-38. 
32 Dudden, 19-20. 
33 Andre Schmid, ―Colonial Japan‘s Promotional Activities in the United States,‖ in The Foundation of the 




understanding between powers was ―strong enough to form a despotic tribunal which will 
be able to dictate the peace of the Far East, whether anybody else wishes it or not.‖34 In 
this conviction that agreement with the U.S. and Britain would guarantee Japan‘s 
occupation of Korea, Japan concentrated its advertising activities about its superiority and 
power in producing English-language literature. Its campaign peaked in 1905 with the 
announcement of Japanese protectorate rule in Korea.  
To demonstrate that Japan was legitimately helping with the development and 
modernization of Korea, the Japanese government published English-language reports on 
the progress of Korea since the Japanese advance since the early 1900s. The most 
important English-language publication was the Annual Reports on the Progress and 
Reforms in Korea, which the Japanese authorities in Korea issued continuously from 
1907 to until the end of colonial period. The obvious theme of the series was that Japan, a 
modern power, was improving Korea. The Report‘s format was usually a ―before and 
after‖ presentation with statistics, text, and pictures of the changes and progress that 
Japan had accomplished on the peninsula, statistics about financial development, 
increases in agricultural productivity, and so on; those reports presented pictures of 
hygienic conditions and road systems, judicial courts, and even bridges in contrast to the 
formerly backward conditions.35 
The most striking aspect of the Report was that it ―flaunted Japan‘s efforts in 
Korea as a wholly civilizing endeavor, a mission civilisatrice [Italics original],‖ as 
                                               
34 Adachi Kinnosuke, ―The Japanese in Korea,‖ The American Review of Reviews 36 (Oct 1907): 472-75. 
35 Government-General of Chosen, Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen (Korea); Schmid, 




Dudden points out.36 Japan‘s English-language publications about Korea firstly intended 
to demonstrate to the world that Koreans were unfit to rule themselves and therefore 
could not participate as subjects in international terms,37 and that Japan had an inevitable 
burden of civilizing the country for the benefit of both countries. Topics that the Japanese 
authorities in Korea‘s English-language publications covered were various, from a 
booklet about the relationship between the government and Christianity in Korea to a 
picture book of Korean scenery and guidebooks of Korea for foreign visitors.38 
As there were almost no other English-language works about Korean history or 
society than publications by the Japanese government, Japan‘s English-language accounts 
about Korea were viewed as the most convincing and trustworthy source of information 
about Korea. Based on Japan‘s publication about its rule in Korea, an editorial in an 
American journal, Nation, wrote that Japan was thoroughly developing Korea: 
Regarding the question whether Korea and Manchuria offer such opportunities 
[for emigration] to Japan, there has been a great deal of contradictory assertion. 
So far as Korea is concerned, we may answer the question with a fair degree of 
accuracy on the basis of the annual reports issued by the Governor-General of 
Korea, of which the latest volume, for the years 1912 and 1913, is now at hand… 
 
The thoroughness with which the Japanese Government has set to work at the 
development of the country [Korea] is exemplified on every page of this official 
report. It is a record of enlightened and painstaking endeavor of which the results 
are already visible. No field of governmental effort has been neglected, from the 
preliminary operations of land survey and census enumeration to public sanitation 
and hygiene, public education, agricultural and industrial development, railway 
building, afforestation, mines, fisheries, and the fostering of trade and commerce. 
                                               
36 Dudden, 20. 
37 Ibid., 21. 
38 The series of publications by the government-general‘s official organizations includes the following and 
many other books: Kiyoshi Nakarai, ―Relations between the Government and Christianity in Chōsen [sic]‖ 
(1921); Bank of Chōsen, A Brief Review of the Work of the Bank of Chōsen (1918); Bank of Chōsen, 




The volume before us tells a story of scientific experimentation applied in every 
direction…39 
 
 Through the English-language travel guides and pictorials with English captions, 
the Japanese authorities tried to describe Korea‘s traditions, while positioning themselves 
as objective observers. Their presentation of Korea‘s traditions frequently paralleled the 
Westerner‘s gaze, which viewed Korea as a spectacular subject. Using an objective tone 
and scientific evidence of the changes, such as statistics of stabilized finances and 
pictures of before/after a steel bridge crossing the Han River, furnished the Japanese 
authorities with the suitable power of colonizing Korea.40 Another channel for Japan to 
publicize its position internationally was by writing in American periodicals. Japanese 
opinion makers published extensively many articles in American periodicals in the 1900s 
and 1910s. Some Japanese periodicals, such as Taiyō, had English-language sections. 
There were also all English-language periodicals, such as The Japan Magazine, published 
in Japan. Being written in English, these articles were directed to the international public, 
rather than the Japanese readers. 
Japan‘s account of the history of Korea and Japan was typically a field wherein 
Japanese writings in English successfully influenced the Western accounts. From the 
                                               
39 ―Japan as Colonial Administrator,‖ Nation 100 (Jun 24, 1915): 702. 
40 Among the Japanese governmental publications regarding conditions in Korea during the colonial period 
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early 1890s, Japanese elites who had studied in the United States contributed to American 
magazines and argued for a history that claimed Korea had been under the power of 
Japan since ancient times. Kuma Ōishi‘s article in an American magazine, Arena, in 1894 
is the very first example of English writing that mirrors the Japanese historical view. The 
article read, 
Japan in olden times twice invaded that Kingdom [Corea], and compelled her to 
pay annual tributes, though Corea did so only reluctantly and irregularly. Situated 
between the two powerful nations, Japan and China, like a maiden courted by two 
admirers, for neither of whom she cared much, Corea had no alternative other 
than to smile, sometimes on one, sometimes on the other, sometimes on both, as 
the case required. It was Japan that finally rescued her from this awkward position 
by recognizing her independence in 1876.41 
 
The historical interpretation seen here that Korea was a historically submissive 
country, being colonized several times by Japan and China beginning in ancient times, 
was a common account of Japanese writers. It is also notable that submissive Korea is 
being described as feminine. Like a maid who always looks for someone to smile at and 
depend on, the author said, Korea needed to be ―rescued‖ by Japan. Because of this 
narrative of submission, Japanese writers further argued that Korea was now looking to 
the United States and American Christian missionaries in a submissive and dependent 
mindset with the hope of expelling the Japanese from their country. Japanese magazine 
Taiyō, in its English-language section, published an interview with Sadakichi Tsuruhara, 
former Chief Civil Administrator of Korean Residency General. In this interview, he said 
that Korea‘s history was ―a repetition of dependence on a third country and continual 
agitation.‖ He said [Italics added], 
The Koreans are imbued with hereditary instincts for submission to the strong. 
The history of Korea attests to the fact that she had always been under pressure by 
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a powerful foreign country, submitting to her and trying to gain her favour… Her 
history is a repetition of dependence on a third country and continual agitation…. 
They had once relied upon Russia then upon China, just as they are now doing 
upon Japan…. What country is to replace Japan is a problem which is hidden in 
the recesses of the head of every Korean. The reason why there are great numbers 
of anti-Japanese Koreans among the native Christians is because they hope to 
expel the Japanese with the aid of American influence, the country of their 
missionaries.  
 
It is a fact that there are many anti-Japanese element [sic] among the Korean 
Christians. Their antipathy is not due to simply their being Christians, but to their 
desire to utilize the influence of the foreign missionaries as well as of their 
country of origin.42 
 
The author here was implying that the popularity of Christianity in Korea stems not from 
pure spiritual conversion, but from political motivations to use the missionaries‘ 
influence. 
Andre Schmid says that this kind of Japanese interpretation of the ―submissive 
and static‖ Korean history quickly dominated the English-language accounts of Korean 
history in this period, even before the emergence of many English-language studies of 
Korea or Korean nationalist accounts. Schmid highlights that the Western observers‘ 
uncritical acceptance of the Japanese historical account is seen in their unquestioning use 
of Japanese theories of Mimana.43 Mimana was the term designating Japan‘s colony in 
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ancient Korea, according to Japanese historical record. Japanese commentators 
mentioned Mimana as evidence of Japan‘s historical dominant rule of Korea. As Schmid 
says, the tendency to see Mimana as an early episode of colonialism foreshadowed 
contemporary events.44 
 Underlying the Japanese presentation of its historical account for the world 
audience was the historical research of Tōyōshi (Oriental history). Facing the dilemma of 
―how to become modern while simultaneously shedding the objectivistic category of 
Oriental and yet not lose an identity,‖ Japanese historians tried to reinterpret the past and 
the present of Japan and the Asian countries through a new lens. For example, as if 
responding to George Kennan and other American writers‘ criticism of Confucian 
tradition, Hattori Unokichi, a leading Confucian scholar in Japan, separated Chinese from 
Japanese Confucian values. In sum, he argued that there were two forms of the Will of 
Heaven, one passive and the other active, and that the former corresponded to China 
while the latter referred to Japan. According to this separation, the form in Japan 
contained not only benevolence and justice, but also a progressive spirit.45 This separation 
classified Korea as belonging to the Chinese form of Confucian tradition, passive and 
stagnant, and therefore it needed to be in the hands of the new possessor and authority of 
the Orient, Japan.46 The earlier Western traveler‘s impression of Korea as lazy, dirty and 
poor combined with this Japanese historical account of ―stagnant‖ Korea and resulted in a 
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synthesized understanding of Korea as an uncivilized and hopeless society. Japanese 
authors also used visual images of Korean submission. Illustrations inserted in Adachi 
Kinnosuke‘s article in The American Review of Reviews, excerpted from the Japanese 
magazine, Tokio Puck, depicted the scene of signing on the agreement of Korea‘s 
protectorate [Figure 10]. In the cartoon, the Korean official, or possibly Korean king, is 
dressed in traditional garment for high official and is sitting on his knees on the ground 
and putting the royal seal on the treaty of the protectorate, in a seemingly voluntary 
manner. In contrast, Japanese officials in modern uniforms are sitting in chairs, looking 
down at the Korean. Despite their military uniforms, they are not seen as forcing the 
Korean to agree on the treaty, but as just silently waiting for the Korean to put the seal on 
it. In the heavens above them were the spirits of the legendary empress Jingo and the 
other heroes of Japan. Excerpted paragraph along with this illustration from Tokio Puck 
explained that the ancient Korean king had promised to pay tribute to Japan. It stated, 
millions of Japan‘s sons were sacrificed for this cause in the Sino-Japanese War. Now, 
with the treaty, Korea was brought under Japan‘s control, and the caption commentated, 
―the spirits of the great Empress Jingo and of all the other departed heroes of Japan rest in 
peace satisfied in their heavenly abode.‖47 In this way, it visualized the protectorate and 
annexation of Korea as the accomplishment of a long awaited task, finally completed but 
peacefully and voluntarily. By using the images of Japan‘s legendary figures, the 
illustration claimed that Japan had the sacred and inevitable burden of ―absorbing‖ 
Korea. 
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Figure 10. Tranquillity in Korea at last—A Japanese view of the “absorption” [original caption]. 
Source: Adachi Kinnosuke, ―The Japanese in Korea,‖  
The American Review of Reviews 36 (Oct 1907): 473. 
 
As the annexation of Korea became immanent in the 1900s, Japanese opinion 
makers knew that they needed to convince powerful countries that the powers would 
have commercial benefits and unchanged legal privileges of tariffs and extraterritoriality 
after Japan colonized Korea. Asakawa wrote in an American magazine, Atlantic Monthly, 
in 1905, 
The reforms in currency and transportation, in navigation and trade, and even in 
agriculture, would even tend to enrich foreign entrepreneurs faster than the 
Koreans themselves.48 
 
Motosada Zumoto, in an American Magazine, Independence, in September 1910 also 
said, 
None of the foreign Powers with any interests in Korea need in any way be 
disturbed by the change that has taken place in the political status of Korea, for 
the Japanese Government will scrupulously protect all foreign interests…Small as 
is the actual amount of trade which the foreign Powers have with Korea, it would 
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be seriously injured if Korea were brought under the sway of the Japanese tariff, 
which is much higher than that now in force in Korea. But the intention of the 
Japanese Government, as I am reliably informed, is to keep Korea outside of the 
Japanese tariff limits and maintain the existing rates applicable to goods imported 
from all countries, including Japan.49 
 
Kiyoshi Kawakami, a Japanese journalist who was also well known in the United States 
for his contributions to American magazines, wrote in an American magazine World To-
day in November 1910, 
The apprehension entertained by a section of the American people, that under 
Japanese rule there will be a wholesale discrimination against foreign interests in 
Korea, seems hardly justifiable in the light of the measures actually adopted by 
the Japanese administration. While it is not given to Japan to sacrifice her own 
interest in order to promote that of other nations, her methods in competing with 
western nations will always be legitimate.50 
 
Despite Japanese opinion makers‘ assertion that Korea had been under the control of 
neighboring countries whose commercial interests would not be harmed by Japan‘s 
occupation, the critical question still remained: did Japan have a legitimate reason to 
colonize Korea? In order to answer this question, Japanese writers tried to persuade 
international readers that Korea would require foreign interventions in order to survive 
and that that colonizing power should be Japan. They stressed that, because of Korea‘s 
weakness and inability to defend itself, Japan had already fought two wars to maintain its 
independence.51  
Japanese authors invoked two justifications the Korean occupation: firstly for 
national security of Japan and secondly for Japan‘s obligation of civilizing the 
neighboring country. Ōkuma Shigenobu, who served as Japan‘s Foreign Minister and 
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Prime Minister from the 1890s to 1910s,52 was one of the main speakers who employed 
the first justification. Through frequent contributions both to Japanese and American 
periodicals, he represented the position of the high officials of the Japanese government 
toward the English-reading public. His main argument was that Japan did not have a 
choice in occupying Korea, not because of its territorial ambitions, but because of the 
Korean government‘s weakness, which posed an indirect threat to Japanese security. In 
1906, in a contribution to an American journal, Forum, he emphasized that occupying 
neighboring countries for Japan was a matter of necessity for national security, not a 
matter of ambition; otherwise, he went on, it would mean the ―national death‖ of Japan, 
as the power occupying Korea would seek to advance to Japan as well. Beyond ensuring 
Japan‘s survival, he implied that it was Japan‘s duty to civilize Korea‘s corrupt and weak 
national system, which had been a harmful burden on its neighboring countries including 
Japan: 
It is not a question of ambition, but a matter of necessity, that Japan should 
become a great power on the Asiatic continent. Should she fail in that, there is but 
one thing left for her—national death. Our very existence depends upon her 
attainment of this object. It is forced upon us as a means of self-defense… 
 
…For many years, the failure and impotency of the Korean government have 
been the root of all the political troubles in the Far East. The neighbors of Korea 
have always been the victims of her lamentable weakness, the sufferers from her 
abuses and blunders. This is true particularly of our own country…it is more than 
a mere measure of self-defence on the part of Japan; it is a matter of world-wide 
significance. Should Japan succeed in the task of cleansing the Far East of its 
political sins, she will be entitled to the respect and gratitude of the world, for 
permanent peace in this portion of the globe will thereby be established. Korea 
will then, in truth, become an independent state.53 
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Here Ōkuma hinted that Korea could be independent only Japan‘s help in its reformation, 
which would finally ―cleanse‖ the political sins of the Far East.  
Other commentators agreed that instability of Korea‘s status was because the 
country lacked an ability to govern itself.54 They argued that Japan‘s protectorate rule of 
Korea gave the country a chance to modernize and learn self-governing skills, but ―a fatal 
unwillingness or incapacity on the part of Korea to seize the most unique opportunity 
ever offered her for her regeneration and advancement along the line of modern 
civilization.‖ They asserted that this made Japan the ―undisputed and legitimatized 
protector and guardian of Korea.‖55 In other words, Japanese commentators asserted that 
it was the incompetence of the Korean government rather than Japan‘s aggressive 
expansionism that was to responsible for Korea‘s fall.  
 Japanese opinion makers invoked the second justification for gaining control of 
Korea by underlining Japan‘s duty to civilize ―uncivilized‖ Korea. Ōkuma Shigenobu 
argued, 
…under a wise administration they [Koreans] can be transformed into good 
citizens…they are not such a hopeless people by nature. Once going to a freer 
country, they become a different people. Japanese and Koreans have descended 
from the same ancestor…Therefore, there is no reason why they can not develop 
themselves and enter on the path of civilization as their insular relatives have 
done…The betterment of administrative system…will offer to Koreans the chance 
to develop themselves.56  
 
Ōkuma‘s speech was translated into English in Taiyō in its 1906 issue, 
If the time comes when the annexation of [the] Korean Empire to our country is 
beneficial to the people of the former, we will not hesitate to destroy the 
independence of that kingdom and transform it into a part of our Empire.57 
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Japanese elites who were familiar with Western criticism of Japan, such as Kiyoshi K. 
Kawakami, and some of the Western writers used English-language Japanese magazines 
to argue for the advantages that the annexation presented for both Korea and Japan. In 
articles in Taiyō in 1906 and early 1910 Kawakami said, while Japan had been faithful to 
the treaties promising Korean independence, the course of events showed that 
independence would completely ruin the country. He argued that Korea‘s independence 
had already been granted in name, and the best alternative would be to unite Korea and 
Japan into one empire so that the ―masses of Korea [would] enjoy the benevolent rule of 
His Imperial Majesty.‖58 Even politically, one commentator expressed in Taiyō that 
Korea‘s independence had now been permanently safeguarded with the annexation.59 The 
same author compared Japan‘s colonization of Korea to colonial rules of other imperialist 
countries: Great Britain in India, the United States in Hawaii and Philippines, and France 
in Indo-China. He bluntly added that every state is egoistic [Italics added]: 
Every state is egoistic to some extent as every individual. So long as any state 
proceeds with a good object, she should endeavour to catch an ample opportunity 
to carry out her ambition. So long as her ambition is not in defiance of the broad 
interest of other countries, but is for the general peace of the world, anybody is 
not entitled to raise serious objections. Any alliance and entente cordiale is to 
mutually preserve their self-interests, bedsides the common welfare of the world. 
That Japan has now been enabled to annex Korea for the sake of her own 
existence and for the peace in this part of the world is largely due to Great 
Britain‘s epoch-making alliance with Japan and the ententes concluded with 
France, Russia, and the United States. All these compacts are based on the 
preservation of the mutual interests and rights. So long as they stick to this 
principle, there will be no serious trouble at any time. Japan‘s policy in 
Manchuria might not be necessarily ideal, but it is certainly improper to hastily 
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criticize her policy, from an [sic] usual foretelling that a victorious country acts 
arbitrarily.60  
 
In this process, Japanese writers differentiated Japanese rule in Korea from European 
control of its colonies by emphasizing Japan‘s policy of assimilation. For the sake of its 
―benevolent‖ assimilation of colonial peoples, Japanese writers argued that, under certain 
circumstances, even violence and oppressive control could be condoned.61 Kawakami 
argued that the hostility of colonies against colonizers was a common and predictable 
phenomenon. Yet, he continued, ―the Filipino‘s dislike of the Americans does not 
necessarily mean American maladministration in the Philippines, and the disaffection in 
India and Egypt is no indication of British outrages in those countries.‖62 
 Similar to the narratives of progress that were reported in official Japanese 
reports, Japanese opinion makers responded to international skepticism by publishing 
articles about the myriad benefits of the occupation: Japan built railways, established 
experimental associations to grow cotton, started enterprises, cultivated soils in 
developed ways, developed mines, established banks, and reformed the administration 
and the military.63 
 Over time, Japanese authors began to frame the assimilation policy as part of a 
grander vision for the powerful Japan, not just for territorial expansion and material 
development. Japanese writers were conscious that Japan‘s success in assimilating Korea 
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would determine its competence as a world power. Ōkuma‘s speech was translated into 
English: 
The Great Powers of the world are watching our act with jealous eyes. We will 
lose the sympathy of the world unless we are very cautious in our Korean 
policy…Korea is a touch-stone for Japan to test whether she has this assimilating 
power. When we can not assimilate Korean people…we can not aspire to become 
a great people.64 
 
To highlight that Japan was civilized enough to colonize other countries, Ōkuma in 
another article asserted, ―a nation‘s place in the race for high civilization is not 
determined by any racial quality peculiar to it, but by its habits, customs, character and 
the absence or presence of mistaken thought.‖ Ōkuma contended that it is not a matter of 
race but a matter of how well a country is civilized itself and said, ―such a vital difference 
between Japan and China is not due to any inherent racial peculiarity but to habits, 
customs and circumstances that are permitted to interfere with China‘s good.‖ While 
admitting that Japan‘s traditions were rooted in the Chinese civilization, he stressed that 
the two countries differed, as Japan was now ―civilized‖—in the Western and modern 
ways. 65 Again, facing the theory of ―yellow peril‖ and a Western view of Japan as a 
militaristic country accepting only military and material aspects from Western 
civilization, Japanese writers asserted that Japan loved peace morality than military.66  
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Japan‘s flurry of propaganda was effective in the 1900s. As there was no English-
language account of conditions or history of Korea, Western observers easily accepted 
Japanese authorities‘ English-language account, which projected Korea as an uncivilized 
country that needed colonial rule. In addition, European and American observers 
respected modern and reformed Japan‘s ability as a fledging power. Therefore, the 
comparison between Korea and Japan was an essential part of emerging American views 
on Korea from the 1900s.  
 
3. American Ways of Seeing Korea 
(1) The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations 
The American government contacted Korea in the late nineteenth century in the 
hopes of opening commercial trade relations. The first official government contact with 
both Japan and Korea began in February 1845, when U.S. Congressman Zodoc Pratt 
submitted an amendment to a bill entitled ―Extension of American Commerce—Proposed 
Mission to Japan and Corea.‖ The amendment specified that it was in ―the general 
interests of the United States that steady and persevering efforts should be made for the 
extension of American commerce,‖ and it was resolved that ―it is hereby recommended 
that immediate measures be taken for effecting commercial arrangements with the empire 
of Japan and the kingdom of Corea.‖67 The U.S.-Korea Treaty of 1882 marked the 
realization of the U.S.‘ economic interest in Korea. The Treaty was the first official 
agreement that Korea had with a Western nation. By the turn of the twentieth century, 
Korea had become more open to foreign countries, especially the United States, which 
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they viewed as rich and powerful, while maintaining what Wayne Patterson called a 
―friendly disinterest‖ 68 in territorial expansion.69 From the 1880s until Korea became a 
Japanese protectorate in 1905, an increasing number of American missionaries and 
businessmen began to visit and reside in Korea. The influx was so great that Americans, 
especially American missionaries, outnumbered residents from all other Western 
countries combined.70 During this period, American observers began to develop their own 
way of seeing and understanding the Korean people and culture; as distinguished from 
the European view of the earlier period, the idea of American exceptionalism permeated 
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the American view. American exceptionalism is the idea that the United States has a 
moral superiority rooted in its exceptional ideals in politics, economy, and religion. In 
addition to the European conception of having a civilizing mission toward the rest of the 
world, the ideals of democracy and capitalism permeated the American gaze. Among 
some Korean nationalist groups who believed in the United States‘ role as a peacemaker 
in the world, these ideals stimulated hope that America would help them to attain  
independence from Japan. 
The U.S. and Korea had different interests in one another from the beginning: as 
Coleman points out, Korea‘s interest in signing a treaty with the U.S.—its first treaty 
with a Western country—was in ―acquiring a Western political and military ally to check 
Japanese, Russian, or Chinese potential aggression.‖71 The treaty also guaranteed 
protection of Korean students in the U.S. The fact that the U.S. was not a colonial power 
in the Asian region, Coleman argues, supported America‘s case for a treaty with Korea.72 
In contrast to Koreans, American observers were primarily interested in Korea‘s 
economic value. Before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, the U.S. had a 
substantial and continuously growing economic interest in Korea. American businessmen 
considered Korea as a potentially lucrative market for commercial trade with the U.S., a 
site for developing natural resources, or for gaining mining or railroad concessions.73 
American businessmen signed lucrative contracts for gold mines, electric lights, railways, 
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and so on. They even commoditized Korean immigrants as a potential source of labor in 
Hawaii.74 For instance, for American businessmen in the electricity industry, the Russo-
Japanese War was a new opportunity to extend their market to Korea if Japan won the 
war. Consider the words of a contemporary commentator [Italics added]:  
Particular attention is called to the development of the electrical industry in Asia 
by the present war between Russia and Japan, and especially to that part of it 
which Americans have established. American engineers and capitalists were the 
pioneers in Korea and Japan in introducing electrical plants for lighting and power 
production, and even throughout southern Manchuria… The effect of the war 
upon Korea must inevitably prove momentous, and Far Eastern representatives of 
American electrical concerns are anxiously watching the progress of events.  
 
In the event of Japan proving victorious, Korea will undoubtedly become a fertile 
field for the exploitation of American electrical machinery. Japan, instead of 
discouraging American manufactures in Korea, would distinctly favor their 
introduction. […] Should Japan defeat Russia and hold Korea, the peninsula 
empire would become one of the most fertile fields for electrical development in 




Figure 11. The power house 
Source: R. A. McLellan, ―Electric Light and Power in Korea,‖ Cassier’s Magazine 22 (Sep 1902): 599. 
  
                                               
74 For more about American interest in Koreans as a potential source of labor for plantations in Hawaii, see 
Patterson, Korean Frontier in America. 
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Figure 12. The power house interior 





Figure 13. A passenger car 
Source: R. A. McLellan, ―Electric Light and Power in Korea,‖ Cassier’s Magazine 22 (Sep 1902): 600. 
 
As American businessmen hoped, American companied could develop electric 
light and power and other infrastructure. This kind of economic view generally had a 
vested interest in the continued Japanese domination of the Korean peninsula. A British 
commentator, Alfred Stead, agreed that Japanese possession of Korea would benefit the 
world economy, as colonized Korea would provide a profitable market: 
Japan has assumed the responsibility of Korea, and it rests with her to do the right 
thing by it, even in the face of the world, but the world can afford to be generous 
in this case, since a reformed administration will mean an enormously extended 
market for all manner of goods, an international benefit …76 
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 American observers became to focus more intently of the problems of Korea‘s 
governmental system. The unanimous opinion was that there were incurable problems in 
the old Korean system and therefore ―old Korea must soon die.‖77 The problem most 
frequently cited was the incompetence of the Korean government and the pervasive 
corruption of its officials. Writers frequently characterized Korean King Kojong, in 
particular, as incompetent, weak-kneed, ridiculously irresolute, and dependent on foreign 
advisers;78 some even called him the worst ruler in the whole East Asia.79 They also 
applied these identical traits to the next king, Sunjong.80 Not only did they see the king as 
bad ruler, but also the government system and factionalism as extremely unstable. The 
incessant news of conspiracies to overthrow the government reflected this view.81  
 Although Americans were initially interested in Korea‘s economic value or 
governmental corruption, as time went, American observers began to delve into the 
origins of these conditions. From the early 1900s, American readers witnessed the 
appearance of more knowledgeable commentators who demonstrated a deeper 
                                               
77 W. E. Griffis, ―Korean and Her Bosses,‖ Harper’s Weekly 39 (28 Dec, 1895): 1244. 
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difficulty, however, is the inaccessibility of the Emperor, who locks himself in his palace and refuses to 
agree to any proposal of whatever nature. The result is much disorganization and instability of 
government... The Emperor consults a fortune teller at every emergency, and, in spite of the abundance of 
official declarations proclaiming the amicable intentions of Russia and Japan, continues to be disquieted…‖ 
(―Korean Emperor Scared; Shirts Himself up and Will not Negotiate with Foreigners,‖ NYT, Oct 24, 1903). 
―…the Emperor, however, refuses to return, [after the fire of Kyong Bok Palace] saying that the palace is 
haunted by the ghost of the murdered Queen.‖ (―Korea‘s Ruler Fears Ghost,‖ NYT, Apr 17, 1904). 
79 ―Its King is the worst type of ruler to be found in the whole East, and an interview with him and his son 
is a suggestion of society of Gomorrah‖ (H. Norman, ―Question of Korea,‖ Living Age 203 (Oct 6, 1894): 
52. 
80 ―‗The biggest idiot in Korea,‘ was the description of the new Emperor given by Joseph de la Neziere, a 
French painter now residing in Paris, who spent several years in Soul. He says: ‗He used to follow his 
father about like a dog, never showed the slightest energy or initiative, and is just the right kind of ruler for 
the Japanese...‘‖ (―Says New Korean Ruler Is a Fool,‖ NYT, Jul 28, 1907).  
81 ―Fresh Uprisings in Korea - Russian Officials Leave the Country for China‖; ―Threats against Korea: 
Plot to overthrow the government was unraveled at Pekin‖; ―New Conspiracy in Korea‖; ―A Conspiracy in 
Korea - Series of Dynamite Explosions Directed Against the Premier and Royal Household Department; 




understanding of Korea‘s context. Lacking knowledge in language and history of Korea, 
American commentators heavily relied on English-language Japanese account.  
The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) determined protectorate status of Korea 
and drew attention to geopolitics of East Asia. American readers were already aware that 
Korea had been ―the bone of contention‖ in Asia for centuries, with Japan and China both 
claiming it as a vassal state.82 Being the battleground for the age-old and age-enduring 
jealousy between the two neighboring big countries, observers regarded the geographical 
position of Korea as ―lamentable.‖83 Not only had this happened in the past, but it was 
also continuously occurring in the contemporary period. As J. S. Gale, a Canadian 
Presbyterian missionary to Korea, commented, ―A whole Eastern question is pending, in 
which Korea is the storm-center, and from all decision in which she is hopelessly shut 
out.‖84  
At the heart of the debate over Korea was the perception that it had been under the 
control of a tutelage or tributary system, if not colonization, by neighboring countries for 
the majority of its history.85 This historical understanding—that Korea had been 
historically passive among the great powers—caused many readers to assume that 
another colonization was natural for Korea in the contemporary. For instance, Speer said, 
It may have seemed strange to some people that Korea herself has been ignored in 
the Russo-Japanese quarrel as though entitled to no voice. But history tells that 
Korea has for centuries known nothing but tutelage. And she is fit for nothing 
else.86 
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Another observer, E. B. Rogers said, 
…still rubbing her eyes after a sleep of centuries, Korea has awakened to find 
herself famous, to discover that her geographical position has invested her with an 
importance that her native merit would never have brought her, and what 
observers of Eastern events have long foreseen has now come to pass…The 
nation is poor, it has no navy, and its cities are defenceless.87 
 
The historical view seen here indicates that the metaphor of ―sleeping Korea‖ which had 
been used by earlier Western visitors was still dominant. When Japan won the war 
against China for control of Korea in 1895, American viewers attributed the victory 
Japan‘s acceptance of modern military skills from the West.88 Because of this, they no 
longer considered China a match for Japan, which may even represent civilization in 
contrast to China, which represented ―antiquity and ideas which no longer survive in 
modern life.‖ 89 Writers often described Japan as small but smart, brave, wise, and quick-
witted ―Jack‖ opposing to China, big but dull and asleep ―Giant‖90: 
…she [Japan] is a plucky little nation, not afraid of her bigger neighbours, full of 
energy and enterprise, showing a wonderful power of assimilating modern 
knowledge and civilization, and a natural genius and aptitude in warfare both by 
sea and by land. An alliance between England and Japan…would be so 
formidable that, without fighting, it could command respect for their rights and 
interests…91  
 
The view of Japan as a dominant power in East Asia, in part a result from the passionate 
propaganda by Japan mentioned previously, became pervasive and prevalent by the turn 
                                               
87 E. B. Rogers, ―Korea,‖ Harper’s Weekly 38 (Aug 4, 1894): 727. 
88 ―…Because the Western civilization was superior to their own in many respects, therefore, argue they, it 
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of the twentieth century. American commentators began to recognize Japan as standing 
apart from the other (uncivilized) Asian countries as a true world power, equal to, and 
possibly even better than, some Western countries: 
It is no exaggeration at all to say that in the future, when distinguishing between 
the nations of Europe and those of Asia, Japan must be classed for all practical 
purposes with the former.92 
 
Of Japan, her achievements are the best witnesses. She will soon be, if she is not 
already, one of the Great Powers. In all probability she will enter the Twentieth 
Century the equal, intellectual, industrial and material of any of the family of 
nations. Or it may be that she will wisely refuse to follow the bad example of the 
Christian nations and so develop her people in peace and prosperity.93 
 
 Before and during the Russo-Japanese War, the English-language authors were 
more sympathetic to the Japanese side than to the Russian one in the conflict. On the one 
hand, the majority of Western commentators agreed that Korea was of more vital 
importance to Japan than to Russia, as Japan drew much of her food supply from Korea; 
the blood of Japan‘s soldiers had been shed to preserve Korea‘s independence, and Japan 
was looking to Korea to supply her with territory for its ever-increasing population. On 
the other hand, writers argued that Korea was ―the rounding off of the Asiatic Empire‖ 
for Russia: there was barely a valid excuse for Russia‘s aggressive policy.94 In addition to 
its utility as a commercial and population outlet, most writers agreed that Japan needed 
Korea for security reasons. If Japan yielded Korea to Russia, it would mean exposing 
itself to peril along the whole western side of its territory. Given that ―Japan [had] 
struggle[d] to lead China and Korea out into civilization,‖ one commentator argued, it 
would not be acceptable for Japan to see the ―Russian glacier slowly moving across both 
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of them, walling her out from her natural destiny and barring before her any entrance to 
the continent of which she has dreamed that she was to be the savior.‖95 Most writers thus 
agreed that Japan had the more legitimate right to control Korea because of its historical 
hegemonic efforts and, more significantly, for its national defense.  
On the other hand, it is important to remember that American interests in Korea 
―were of no comparison to the U.S. economic interest in Japan and in Manchuria.‖96 As 
Seung-young Kim argues, the main priority of U.S. policy in East Asia in the early 
twentieth century was to maintain a favorable balance of power in the region for its 
economic benefits. According to Kim, Theodore Roosevelt‘s administration ―found a 
common interest with Japan and Britain in suspending Russia‘s encroachment of 
Manchuria.‖ Therefore, Roosevelt administration supported Japan, regarding it ―as 
playing America‘s game in keeping Manchuria open when the United States was not 
ready to use force for such a purpose.‖97 Kim argues that the Roosevelt administration 
expected that a confrontation between Russia and Japan ―would keep Japan away from 
expanding toward the ocean and conflicting with the United States,‖ when the U.S. was 
not ready to use force in the East Asian region.98 This context of American interest in 
East Asia helps us understand why the U.S. government took no action when Japan 
annexed Korea in 1910. By condoning Japan‘s colonization of Korea, the U.S. chose to 
support a balance of power in East Asia for its own interests. Still, because of its 
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geopolitical position, colonial Korea remained a significant subject of observation for 
Americans.  
 
(2) Expert Commentators − Calling for Change 
From the early 1900s, several American commentators representing different 
groups became known as experts on the Korean problem. Their expert writings were 
distinguished from the earlier English-language writings on Korea, which were stories of 
intermittent visitors of the country. These commentators were usually scholars, Christian 
leaders, journalists, and politicians. Like the earlier travelogues about Korea, the newly 
appearing experts also demonstrated negative and condemning views toward Korean 
society and government. Now as they had compiled more knowledge about the country, 
their assessment of Korea became more specialized than the earlier writers. Most of them 
agreed that the problems in Korea were so profound that a drastic change was necessary. 
However, the particular problems and solutions varied depending by writer. Another 
characteristic of this new wave of commentary was the frequent comparison of the 
colonizer-colonized relationship between Japan and Korea to that between the U.S. and 
the Philippines. While they were critical of some of Japan‘s policies concerning Korea, 
they usually sympathized more with the position and issues of the colonizer, Japan, than 
the colonized, Korea.  
Here we will explore writings of three opinion makers—Arthur J. Brown, George 
Kennan, and George Ladd—, whom represented the views of religious leaders, 
journalists, and scholars, respectively. Arthur J. Brown was an author, a missionary, and 




on Korea, which were based on his experience as a missionary in East Asia, were 
influenced by American Protestantism, especially the idea of noninterference between 
religion and politics. George Kennan, a journalist, was a severe critic of Korea‘s 
governmental system and social conditions. Kennan, in particular, assured American 
readers of the importance of the Korean issue, because of its implications regarding 
American colonial rule in the Philippines. George Ladd was a scholar in philosophy. As a 
close adviser to Ito Hirobumi, one of leaders of the Meiji Restoration and Resident-
general of Korea, Ladd was an ardent supporter of Japan‘s rule of Korea. 
 Arthur J. Brown was an influential Presbyterian minister who had abundant 
experience as a missionary in East Asia and a distinguished Christian opinion maker in 
the United States.99 Brown began to write about Korea from 1904. As a missionary, 
Brown found the Korean people to be potentially intelligent but their educational system 
was in shambles due to government corruption. Therefore, under the assumption that 
changing individuals will help develop their society, he stressed the necessity of 
educating the Korean people, which included their conversion to Christianity. As a high-
level leader in the American Presbyterian Church, Brown argued for separation between 
politics and religion in Korea.  
In his article in 1902 about Christian missions in Korea, Brown wrote that 
Korea‘s problems derived from the weakness of its corrupt government and the 
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conflicting ambitions of Russia and Japan.100 In addition to the Korean people‘s 
weakness, ―lacking the energy and ambition of the Japanese and the industry and 
persistence of the Chinese people,‖ Brown thought, the country‘s geopolitical position 
between powerful neighbors kept the Korean people from determining their own fate. He 
said, ―no possible development of their own resources could make the Koreans 
independent of their stronger neighbors, so that long ago they helplessly acquiesced in the 
inevitable.‖101 
 Brown maintained that the Korean people were naturally peaceable, kindly, and 
not lacking in intelligence. He believed that they held the potential to develop into a fine 
people if given a good government and a fair chance.102 However, due to their weak, 
effeminate, and corrupt officials and governmental system, and the prevailing poverty in 
the country, he had a less than cheerful view on the future of Korea if it were to remain 
independent. For this reason, Brown was a supporter of Japan‘s domination of Korea: 
Too weak to be independent, and with subjugation to a foreign nation inevitable, 
the outlook is not cheering…  
 
Still, the future under either Japanese or Russian domination can hardly be worse 
than the present. The government lacks the moral fiber needed at such a critical 
time, and official corruption is well-nigh absolute.103 
 
While admitting that Koreans were antagonistic toward Japanese control, Brown 
expected that Japan had the ability to develop Korea. Although there was criticism about 
Japan‘s rule in Korea, he argued that when it came to nation building, some mistakes 
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were inevitable.104 In expressing his sympathy with Japan as a ruler, he projected the 
Anglo-Saxon‘s status as colonizer onto Japan‘s position in Korea: 
…They [Japanese] manage the Koreans with the brusqueness of the Anglo-Saxon 
rather than the suavity of the Oriental; ignore ―face,‖ which every Asiatic 
sensitively cherishes; and, in general, deal with the Koreans about as Americans 
deal with the North American Indians and as the British deal with their subject 
populations. The Anglo-Saxon is therefore hardly the person to criticise the 
Japanese… The army necessarily occupied the country during the war and for 
some time after its close. Military rule is strict everywhere. It has to be in the 
more or less lawless conditions which follow a war; but it is none the less galling 
to civilians. We know how Filipinos and Americans alike chafed under the rule of 
the United States army in the Philippines,…105 
 
Keeping in mind that some missionaries were supportive of the independence of 
Korea, Brown assertively concluded that the United States should assist Japan in order to 
improve the situation in Korea:  
…We shall not help the Koreans by reviling the Japanese, but by co-operating 
with them. The anti-imperialists are simply aggravating our situation in the 
Philippines, and the alleged friends of the East Indians who are fomenting discord 
in India are only intensifying the very conditions which they profess to lament. 
Japan is in Korea to stay, and we cannot aid the Koreans by cursing their rulers.106 
 
As a Christian missionary, Brown believed that the ―Gospel always has and always will 
be a revolutionary force in a corrupt nation,‖ but opposed the church‘s involvement in 
Korean political movements: 
…What we desire in Korea is not the dethroning of the emperor or the 
degradation of any official, or the interference with any proper law or custom. We 
simply seek the regeneration of the individual man, and through him the purifying 
of society and the reign of that justice and honesty and morality which are 
indispensable to the stability of all government and to the welfare of a people…107 
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His point here was clearly that Christian missionaries should not be involved with any 
political ideas or movements. What mattered to him was the spiritual change in 
individuals, so that they could ultimately change the society. Nevertheless, given that 
Brown himself was an advocate of Japan‘s domination of Korea, it can be said that his 
view was not neutral either.  
George Kennan, a journalist and Russian specialist, was another prolific writer on 
Korea.108 Also known as an expert of Russia, Kennan wrote many articles on Japan and 
Korea while he served as a war correspondent in Japan and Manchuria during the Russo-
Japanese War (1904-1905) for a monthly journal, Outlook. Writing articles from Japan, 
Kennan‘s view was supportive of Japan. Kennan assessed that Korean culture and system 
was ―rotten‖ and they were incomparable to those of prospering Japan. While Brown 
sympathized with Japan‘s position as a colonizer, Kennan was more straightforward and 
blunt in supporting Japan‘s colonization of Korea. From a comparative view, Kennan 
assessed that Korea was ―ages behind its wide-awake, energetic, and progressive 
neighbor,‖ Japan, ―in all the characteristics that are the outgrowth and flower of human 
endeavor,‖ while ―so far as climate and fertility of soil were concerned, Korea [equaled] 
and perhaps [surpassed] Japan.109 One of critical yardsticks of his differentiation between 
progressive Japan and backward Korea was the sanitary condition of each country. For 
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Kennan, the unsanitary conditions in Korea were proof of the backwardness of the 
people, as evidenced by his words in Outlook: 
To one who comes fresh from the perfect order and immaculate neatness of Japan, 
the choked drains, the rotting garbage, the stinking ponds, the general disorder, 
and the almost universal filthiness of Korea are not only surprising and 
disgusting, but absolutely shocking. … American friends who have spent in the 
peninsula more years than I have weeks tell me that the Korean, as a man, is 
intelligent, courteous, teachable, kindhearted, and superior in many ways to the 
Japanese; but, in the first place, he is so abominably dirty in his personal habits 
and his environment that I find it almost impossible to credit him with a spark of 
self-respect. … He remains dirty either from laziness or from choice, and not 
from ignorance of better methods of living…110 
 
Although he admitted that the Korean people had a somewhat positive nature, being 
intelligent and teachable, he implied that their filthiness demonstrated their incompetence 
and laziness. In another article, Kennan again related dirtiness in person and 
circumstances with lacking keenness of perception in social or emotional senses: 
Koreans strike a newcomer as dirty in person and habits, apathetic, slow-witted, 
lacking in spirit, densely ignorant, and constitutionally lazy.111 
 
This view, one that considers cleanliness as the most significant standard for judging the 
extent of a country‘s modernization, became common by the late nineteenth century. For 
example, Mark Harrison points out that the gradual spread of aristocratic standards of 
personal hygiene in European society led the European [British] colonists to view the 
sanitary habits of natives [Indians] with a more critical eye.112 As Harrison says, the 
consequence of this ―civilizing process‖113 was that ―the ‗great unwashed‘ came to be 
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regarded as a danger to health and public order.‖114 The consciousness of the threat 
regarding sanitary conditions and disease posed to Europeans by indigenous peoples of 
colonies paralleled to American perception of sanitary conditions in Korea. Although the 
significance of Korea‘s unsanitary conditions had were commonly seen in earlier 
European and American travelers‘ writings, Kennan‘s writings embodied the perspective 
Japan should proceed ―civilizing process‖ in Korea.  
Kennan asserted that Korean civilization, like that of China, was utterly stagnant. 
He said, ―Korea presents a case…of disintegration and decay.‖ Due to the incompetence 
of its ruling class, ―its civilization has not become stagnant, it has rotted‖115: 
He [Emperor of Korea] is unconscious as a child, stubborn as a Boer, ignorant as 
a Chinaman, and vain as a Hottentot…. The atmosphere that surrounds him is one 
of dense ignorance, and consequently he is as timid as a fallow deer. He is 
extremely superstitious... He has never advanced one step in the way of true 
reform… He is absolutely incapable of forming a correct judgment with regard to 
men and events, and in consequence of this mental disability he is deceived by his 
courtiers and robbed and cheated by all who have business dealings with him… 
the Emperor of Korea is not only bad, but weak and cowardly.116  
 
[The Korean government] regards the ―squeezing‖ of the population with 
indifference, so long as it does not lead to violence and disorder… Ministers, 
sorcerers, and high officials sell the provincial offices… the palace ring of 
eunuchs, fortune-tellers, and courtiers is engaged in robbery on its own 
account…117 
 
…conservatism is not the yangban‘s [ruling class] worst failing, and with all his 
good nature he is capable of horrible cruelty and ferocity. Regarding him either as 
citizen or ruler, his worst vices are selfishness, laziness, untruthfulness, 
dishonesty, treachery, and greed… the yangban is intensely obstinate and 
conservative, and seems to be no more capable of adapting himself to a changed 
environment… The most competent foreign observers in Korea attribute the 
intellectual degeneration of the yangbans largely to the benumbing and paralyzing 
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effects of Chinese education… Limitation of education to a mere knowledge of 
the Chinese classics may explain satisfactorily the intellectual decline of the 
yangbans, but it does not account for their moral degeneration… Idle, ignorant, 
conceited, superstitious, selfish, greedy, and often cruel, the yangban would seem 
to be an absolutely impossible person to do anything with or make anything out 
of…118 
 
By describing the Korean Emperor and yangban (ruling class) as extremely incapable, 
corrupt, and intellectually degenerate, Kennan implied that Korea‘s endangered position 
during this period was primarily attributed to the incompetence of its rulers. Furthermore, 
he attributed the incapability of the ruling class to an education based on Chinese 
classics, and the vices of the Korean people to ignorance and savagery. Like most of the 
other Western commentators, Kennan believed that Christian, modern, and Western 
education could solve many of these problems by transforming the people into intelligent, 
trustworthy, and patriotic men.119 
 In contrast, Kennan admired Japan‘s attempt to civilize itself and its neighbors. 
He noted that Japan‘s civilizing influence in Korea was an unusual phenomenon of non-
Western country ―transforming‖ others: 
For the first time in the annals of the East, one Asiatic nation is making a serious 
and determined effort to transform and civilize another… no Oriental nationality 
ever made a conscious and intelligent attempt to uplift and regenerate a neighbor 
until Japan, a few months ago, took hold of Korea…There can be little doubt, I 
think, that she [Japan] is about to assume the leadership of the so-called Yellow 
Race.120  
 
In addition, Kennan anticipated that Japan‘s domination would relieve Korea 
from the Russian threat. It already built railroads; it lent the Korean government three 
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million yen and laid the foundations of a financial reform; it made encouraging attempts 
at modernization, such as preparing textbooks and getting teachers for schools, improving 
sanitation, increasing shipping facilities at seaports, and reorganizing the army.121  
 
 
Figure 14. One of the modern buildings erected by the Japanese in Seoul, The Bank of Chosen 
[original caption]. Pictures of modern architecture— buildings, railways, and railroads—functioned to 
vividly display Japan’s modernization of Korea. 
Source: ―What Japan is Doing on the Mainland,‖ The American Review of Reviews 49 (Feb 1914): 229. 
 
 
Figure 15. The Bridge across the Yalu River at Antung leading from Korea into Manchuria  
[original caption]. 
Source: ―What Japan is Doing on the Mainland,‖ The American Review of Reviews 49 (Feb 1914): 230. 
 
Kennan viewed these as ―a gigantic experiment,‖ substituting ―modern 
enlightenment for the gloomy darkness of semi-barbarism.‖ 122 He added that Americans 
should regard the Japanese efforts in Korea with the deepest interest and sympathy, 
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because they themselves were trying a similar experiment in the Philippines.123 It is 
notable that American commentators in this period compared American and Japanese 
colonization. Although fear and suspicion about Japan‘s expansionism in the later years, 
Kennan and others‘ writings indicate that this period from the 1890s to 1910s was a high 
moment of favorable view toward Japan in the Western hemisphere. This favorable view 
toward Japan must be in part a result of Japan‘s aggressive advertising activities using 
English-language media, as detailed above.  
Kennan moreover encouraged Japan to assimilate Korea more aggressively. He 
wrote in November 1905, right before Japan and Korea signed a protectorate agreement, 
that Japan‘s mistake was to attempt ―to reconcile Korean independence with effective 
Japanese control.‖124 Kennan suggested, ―Japan should abandon the pretense of treating 
Korea as if she were really a sovereign and independent State.‖125 His opinion was that as 
soon as Japan considered Korea as a colony, assimilation would ensue, which would aid 
in the modernization of Korea. Quoting Saburo Shimada‘s article in the Japanese 
magazine Taiyō, Kennan showed an outlook that the Japanese and the Koreans might 
become like one nation ―by education, intermarriage, and hearty cooperation in various 
enterprises.‖126 In sum, Kennan not only agreed that Japan should colonize Korea, but 
also hoped that it would rapidly assimilate the country. Japan‘s experiment of 
modernizing Korea through improved material, financial, and sanitary conditions would 
prove meaningful for the U.S., which was controlling another backward, non-modern, 
                                               
123 Ibid. 
124 George Kennan, ―The Japanese in Korea,‖ Outlook 81 (Nov 11, 1905): 609. 
125 Kennan, ―What Japan Has Done in Korea,‖ 672. 
126




Asian-Pacific country, the Philippines. As discussed above, most American expert 
commentators viewed Japan as a pioneer, rather than a competitor, in the East Asian 
region, but this would change in later years. 
  George Ladd was a theologian, philosopher, and professor at Yale University and 
one of close acquaintances and unofficial advisers to Ito Hirobumi. He published several 
books on Japan and gained a reputation as an American intellectual with extensive 
knowledge of Japan and the situation in East Asia.127 Ladd viewed the Japanese 
occupation most favorably. In addition, he continued to publish this pro-Japanese view in 
major periodicals even after Japan occupied Korea and was criticized for its radically 
oppressive policies.128 Ladd‘s pro-Japanese opinion was in many ways similar to that of 
George Kennan. Both contrasted Japan and Korea and considering the former developed, 
modernized, and positive, and the latter backward, degenerated, and in need of reforms. If 
the standard for evaluating the two countries was their sanitary conditions for Kennan, for 
Ladd it was their attitude toward foreigners: 
…[in Japan] the most eager interest in the subjects upon which the prospective 
audiences wished to be addressed, and the attitude of an open mind and even of 
warm personal attachment toward ―friend of Japan.‖ 
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… in Korea, however, all the influences would be of precisely the opposite 
character—indifference, deficiencies, hindrances, if not active opposition, so far 
as the native attitude was concerned.129 
 
In addition to this closed mindedness of the Korean people, Ladd pointed out that its 
corrupt politicians eroded the little hope that Korea had for maintaining its 
independence.130 He summed that it was Japan‘s responsibility to reform these conditions, 
as Japan already sacrificed itself fighting two wars to take on this burden [Italics added]: 
…inasmuch as Japan had already fought one internal and two foreign wars, at a 
cost of millions of treasure and thousands of lives, on account of the political 
weakness and misrule of Korea, it could not possibly, with a wise regard either for 
its own interests or for those of the Korean people themselves, allow the repetition 
of similarly disastrous events. The two nations must learn to live together in amity 
and with their common interests guarded against invasion and injury from 
without. History had amply shown that this end could not be secured under 
existing conditions by Korea alone. The most sacred obligations, not only of self-
interest, but also of a truly wise regard for the Emperor and his subjects, bound 
the Japanese Government to establish and maintain its protectorate over 
Korea.131 
 
Ladd noted that some Koreans were looking to foreign countries, especially the 
United States, to interfere with the Japanese administration.132 However, he believed that 
no foreign nation, including the United States, would be likely to intervene between 
Japan and Korea.133 Like other American writers, Ladd concluded that modern education 
and the spread of Christianity would finally reform Korea.134 
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(3) An Optimistic View − Homer Hulbert 
 Homer Hulbert was a rather minor, but unique, expert commentator, in that he 
advocated Korean nationalism.135 Hulbert served as a Christian missionary in Korea from 
the 1890s and went to the White House and the State Department to transmit King 
Kojong‘s secret letter asking aid from the U.S. government in 1905 and 1906. He became 
one of a few foreign supporters of the independence of Korea even after the annexation 
of Korea. As Andre Schmid argues, Hulbert was also generous about Japanese control in 
Korea in the future as other commentators in the late nineteenth century, but his support 
for Korea‘s independence became fixed since 1905. Schimid highlights that Hulbert‘s 
opposition to Japanese control in Korea was not against colonialism itself but specifically 
against the colonialism conducted by Japan.136 Hulbert‘s support for Korea‘s 
independence and his opposition to Japan‘s colonization were closely related his 
experiences in Korea and his belief in Christian evangelism. 
Like other commentators, Hulbert maintained that Korea had been continuously 
under the influence of foreign powers throughout its history: 
Never since the year 1122 BC137 has she known complete independence until 
within the past few months…there was never a time when her allegiance was not 
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demanded by one or other of her neighbors, and when influences and forces, over 
which she had no control, were not moulding her to their own designs…138 
 
In his early writings, Hulbert was hardly different from Kennan, Brown, and other writers 
in deploring the evil influence of Chinese civilization on Korea.139 But Hulbert 
distinguished himself by separating the Korean people from their government. He once 
said: 
The trouble [of the Korean people] lies, not in lack of energy, nor in innate 
laziness, but in crass ignorance and in suspicion bred of long centuries of 
indirection.140 
 
What further distinguished Hulbert from the other opinion makers is that he took one 
more step and asserted that Korea must be independent: he said, Korea ―must be digged 
from his clay prison and set upon his feet‖ and ―Korea must be liberated from her moral 
and intellectual thralldom.‖141 
 This relatively optimistic outlook for Korea by Hulbert derived from his positive 
assessment of Korean people: 
Intrinsically and potentially the Korean is a man of high intellectual possibilities, 
but he is, superficially, what he is by virtue of his training and education. Take 
him out of this environment, and give him a chance to develop independently and 
naturally, and you would have as good a brain as the Far East has to offer.142 
 
His compliment about Korean people‘s potential was far from the usual stereotypes of 
their laziness, indifference, and hopelessness as seen in the writings of George Kennan or 
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George Ladd. This might be partially attributed to Hulbert‘s personal experience as a 
teacher and missionary in Korea, which made him actually interact with Koreans and 
discover their positive characteristics.  
A few more commentators in this period were impressed by the Korean people. 
Nevertheless, none but Hulbert, argued for Korea‘s independence. On the contrary, a 
British writer suggested that because its people were teachable and loyal, Korea should 
be considered as a possible British colony.143 In this sense, Hulbert‘s comment about 
Judea had distinguished implication from other Western accounts about Korea‘s future: 
Perhaps we may apply to Korea the words used by Pere Hyacinthe, in speaking of 
Judea: ―The Little States: They are constituted by the hand of God, and I trust in 
Him that they never will be removed. He has placed them between the Great 
States as a negation to universal empire, a pacific obstacle to the shocks of their 
power and the plots of their ambition.‖144 
 
About Korean people‘s characters compared to other neighboring peoples, 
Hulbert argued: 
[t]he temperament of the Korean lies midway between the two [Japanese and 
Chinese], even as his country lies between Japan and China. This combination of 
qualities makes the Korean rationally idealistic. …a most happy combination of 
rationality and emotionalism. And more than this, I would submit that it is the 
same combination that has made the Anglo-Saxon what he is.145  
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These idealized qualities placed Koreans, as distinct from other Asian people, in 
the same league as Anglo-Saxons. Furthermore, Hulbert argued that the rapid spread of 
Christianity throughout Korea was evidence of the noble characteristics of its people. 
Whereas Hulbert viewed the Japanese as assimilating only the material aspects of 
Western civilization, he believed that Korea could become a civilized Christian county 
and could even help to evangelize the whole Asian region. Therefore, Japan‘s 
colonization was seen as a threat to Korea‘s evangelizing power.146 In short, Hulbert‘s 
rare position of opposing the Japanese colonization stemmed from his observation of 
each country‘s receptivity to Christian evangelism, which caused him to extol Korea‘s 




Figure 16. Little Korean girl with her Bible. For writers such as Hulbert, the spread of Christianity 
among Korean youth was the basis of a hopeful perspective on Korea. 
Source: Walter C. Erdman, ―The Bible in Chosen,‖  
The Missionary Review of the World 40 (Sep 1917): 677. 
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Figure 17. Koreans at evangelist Kim’s meeting in Songdo, Korea. 
Source: John N. Mills, ―the Cause of Changes in Korea,‖  
The Missionary Review of the World 45 (Feb 1922): 117. 
  
 In the same context, Hulbert understood that the moral stagnation of Koreans had 
not originated in the intrinsic characteristics of the people, but in ―the ponderous load of 
Chinese civilization‖ since the formative stage of the country.147 Therefore, he suggested 
that the only way to prevent destruction of Korea was to educate ―the people up to a point 
where they can prove themselves the equals of their conquerors and, by the very force of 
genuine manhood, exert an influence which shall counteract the contempt which the 
Japanese feel.‖148 Hulbert urged the American public to watch carefully the course of 
events in Korea and to personally serve or financial support to educating the Korean 
people. Hulbert added protecting Korea from foreign powers would be beneficial to 
America‘s commercial interests in East Asia: 
Japan began and carried through this whole matter by the clever use of 
misinformation and broken promises, which successfully hoodwinked the 
American public. For this reason I urge with all the power at my command that 
the course of events should be carefully watched by those who are interested in 
the preservation of the principle of an open door in the Orient, and the 
preservation of rights which, though only partially utilized as yet, are full of 
potentialities for the future; and I urge that immediate steps be taken to forestall 
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the concession to Japan, by the executive department of our government, of the 
right to dominate the persons and the interests of American citizens in Korea. 
…The trouble is that Americans do not realize that the tender feeling of Japan 
toward us politically is based upon the fact that we are giving her every 
opportunity to kill us commercially in the Far East.149 
 
On the other hand, Hulbert stressed the active role of American missionaries in 
Korea under the Japanese control as early as the year of 1908, when Korea was a 
protectorate but had not yet been officially annexed. Hulbert‘s opinion about the active 
role of missionaries in alleviating Korea‘s social problems clearly contrasted with Arthur 
Brown‘s emphasis on the neutrality of churches. Taking umbrage at the Japanese 
authorities‘ consent that morphine could be sold to Koreans, Hulbert argued that it was 
time for missionaries to speak out about the Japanese wrongdoings in Korea. He expected 
a possible clash in Korea between Christianity and Japanese civilization: ―Christianity 
can not endorse the present regime in Korea without stultifying itself and betraying its 
scared trust.‖150 
 The emergence of expert commentators on Korea‘s problems in the early 1900s 
indicates that American intellectuals paid much attention to Russo-Japanese War and 
Korea‘s geopolitical position in its aftermath. As seen in commentators from various 
backgrounds, such as religious leaders, journalists, and scholars, usual American 
perceptions about Korea and its fate in this period were gloomy and pessimistic. 
Therefore, it was common to expect Japan‘s complete occupation within a short period. 
Hulbert‘s optimistic and positive outlook about Korea‘s future and his call for Korea‘s 
independence was not a general view about the country. In later decades, Hulbert became 
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one of the major supporters of Korean independence movements in Korea and the United 
States. 
 
4. The Korean Enlightenment Movement: A View of the Self 
The American and Japanese discourse on Korea at the turn of the twentieth 
century presented Koreans as numb and passive to what was happening in and about their 
own country. These discourses tended to intentionally and unintentionally exclude 
Koreans‘ representation of themselves, which according to Schmid ―shaped the 
parameters and content of nationalist thought.‖151 Contrary to contemporary outsiders‘ 
assumptions, groups of Korean intellectuals and reformers had developed complex ways 
of thinking and writing about their nation by the turn of the twentieth century. In contrast 
to the view of Japanese officials and the majority of Western and American viewers, 
Korean intellectuals argued that their country had long been independent and self-
sufficient. Admitting that the country needed immediate changes, Korean opinion makers 
suggested that their own government could initiate reforms, while also reaching out to 
external audiences. This section examines how Korean intellectuals represented their 
country and to what extent that representation interacted with outside views of the 
country. 
 As Western, American, and Japanese observers unanimously pointed out, Koreans 
themselves also perceived the necessity of reforms and changes for their country. Various 
groups of Koreans reacted differently under the pressure of change.152 Among the 
                                               
151 Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 3. 
152 As Schmid summarizes, the history of Korea from the 1890s to its annexation is recounted along three 




different streams, this section focuses on the writings of the intellectuals of the so-called 
Enlightenment Movement, especially those of the Independence Club and its main 
figures, such as Sô Chae-p‘il and Yun Ch‘i-ho, through the periodicals they published. I 
intend to analyze the Enlightenment Movement‘s response to the outside view on Korea, 
as this group was the most interested in Korea‘s new position in the world, in making 
resolutions for the country‘s future, and in interacting with the outside world. Also this 
group became foundation of a Korean nationalist group which would struggle to 
represent their country in the international stage, a topic discussed in later chapters. The 
Enlightenment Movement actively accepted Western values as they sought to configure 
their own nation during the period of colonialism and imperialism. They reconsidered 
their nation‘s position corresponding to the recent discussion of civilization, which ―had 
become the foundation of international law and, with its claims to universality had 
become the central tenet of an international modern discourse.‖153 Their writings about 
self-knowledge and aspects of change in Korean society through the printed mass media 
corresponded to American and Japanese writings concerning Korea‘s problems. Here we 
especially examine Tongnipsinmun, or The Independent, a Korean newspaper published 
in both vernacular Korean (Ô nmun) and English in Korea.154 The publication of this 
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bilingual newspaper uniquely shows how a Korean intellectual group tried to 
propagandize their cause toward the foreign community in Korea and the international 
readers. Although the primary readership of Tongnipsinmun was Korean intellectuals, we 
may assume that the paper‘s English-language version attracted many readers as well, 
especially among foreign residents in Korea. 
 Reading Korean newspapers of the late nineteenth century seemed to take almost 
the opposite view of Korea that the contemporary outsider viewers that we have 
examined in earlier sections. They contrasted most strongly over the issue of where to put 
Korea in terms of civilization and in which direction Korea should look to in order to 
escape its current crisis. As we have seen in the earlier sections, the Western viewers 
categorized China as symbolizing negative Oriental traditions, as an embodiment of the 
uncivilized and of failed modernization; this was in contrast to Japan, which was viewed 
as civilized, progressive, and modern. They often blamed many of the disease-like 
problems that Korean society was suffering from on the evil influence of Chinese 
civilization throughout its history. If the outside view classified Korea as belonging to the 
same old, isolated civilization as China, Korean intellectuals in newspapers in the late 
nineteenth century endeavored, as far as possible, to separate Korea‘s position−in terms 
of civilization and social reforms−from that of China: 
Qing people [the Chinese] have thought for thousands of years that China is the 
most enlightened, the strongest, and the richest country in the world, so they have 
admired the laws and customs and size that were made thousands of years ago. 
Then they fought with the English and Beijing was all burned; China 
compensated thousands won to England; and some ports were stolen by the 
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English… If any Korean, regardless of being an official or common person, sees 
this example of China but still recommends us to follow China‘s example, he is 
the enemy of our country.155 
 
[Chinese classics] must be of benefit for Chinese people, but they are not for 
Koreans today. But also, you will know that they are greatly harmful for the 
Chinese today also, if you see China today. Even though there are many more 
people in China who know well about the Four Books and Five Classics 
[Confucian canons] than in Korea and its land is bigger and the population is 
bigger… even a European country whose size is one-tenth of China is warmly 
received ten times more than China in the world; and its government and the 
people are one-hundred times stronger and richer than China. The very reason is 
because all people in Europe learn in schools for about ten years, while they just 
study the Four Books and Five Classics in China. As a result, China is always 
defeated by foreign countries, as civilized and enlightened people know how to 
train troops, how to make trains, railroads, telephones, comfortable clothes, sound 
food, clean accommodation… In contrast, Chinese do not learn one of these, the 
people are weak, vulgar, stupid, dirty, and have no respect of their country. Even 
if they get disdainful treatment, they don‘t recognize it as disdainful; even if they 
are neglected, they don‘t resent it.156 
 
Adopting Western and Japanese views of civilization and modernization, Korean 
intellectuals agreed that traditional Chinese teachings were outdated and inappropriate for 
then-contemporary Korea. Just as the contemporary Japanese historians tried to separate 
Japanese civilization from Chinese one with the new historical interpretation of Tōyōshi, 
Korean intellectuals made efforts to distinguish the nature of the Korean people from that 
of the Chinese. The editors of Tongnipsinmun said, 
The Koreans are quite unlike Chinamen in the matter of patriotism. They are truly 
loyal to His Majesty and patriotic to their native land, but they have never been 
taught how to show their feelings in a public demonstration. The handful of 
Christians of Seoul took the initiative in the public celebration of their National 
Holiday and demonstrated to the world that they love their King and their native 
country. It was not a suggestion of foreigners, but they got it up voluntarily.157 
 
                                               
155 Tongnipsinmun 1, no. 52, Aug 4, 1896. 
156 Tongnipsinmun 1, no. 9, Apr 25, 1896. 
157




 The editors stressed that Koreans, in contrast to the Chinese, are actually patriotic; 
they just did not know how to express their patriotic feelings. Therefore, it was not a 
matter of the Korean people‘s qualification as modern citizens, such as nationalism and 
patriotism, but a matter of the skills required to manage and demonstrate those virtues, 
which can be learned. The editorial also implied that Korean converts to Christianity 
were beginning to use the modern political skills they had acquired from the West, and 
that they were practicing these skills voluntarily. 
 Beneath the Korean writers‘ acceptance of the Western view of China as an 
exemplar of barbarity158 and a country not to emulate, there had been a far-reaching 
endeavor to separate their country from China, that Andre Schmid calls ―the decentering 
of the Middle Kingdom.‖159 In particular, China‘s military loss to Japan in the Sino-
Japanese War (1894-1895) was seen as the final alarm informing the world that the old 
knowledge was succumbing to the new knowledge.160 By contrast, the Korean writers saw 
Japan as standing alongside Western countries at the apex of civilization.161 This reflected 
a shift in the definition of civilization, and a shift away from one hegemonic system 
toward another, centered on the West, among Korean intellectuals.162 This new 
perspective, which had existed before Japan colonized Korea, considered Japan as an 
exemplar and China as the opposite. It was pervasive among Korean intellectuals, many 
of whom were calling for modernization. 
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 In Japan, the shift in understanding the criteria for becoming ―civilized‖ brought 
with it the dilemma of how to position the nation, of how to modernize while maintaining 
its identity, as we have seen in the earlier sections. Similarly, feeling endangered by 
foreign powers and necessary for immediate changes for the nation compelled Korean 
intellectual groups to reinterpret their national history. National history of Korea and 
history of Western countries in Korean newspapers enjoyed unprecedented popularity. 
The editors of most of the newspapers including Hwansôngsinmun attempted to discover 
―in the Korean and East Asian pasts cases of enlightened practices‖163 to show that the 
whole civilizing process and reforms in fact followed principles inherent in a global 
history; not just for the West, but also for East Asia and for Korea. 
 Another use of history for the Korean editors was to prove their criticism of the 
notion that Korea had always been subordinate to China. As if refuting the Western and 
Japanese comments, the Korean editors stressed that Korea had always been independent 
even before this was recognized by modern treaties. Korea, an editorial argued, had 
always been on friendly terms with China, and China had never interfered with the 
internal affairs of Korea. Rather, the editorial said that it was only in recent years that 
China had tried to exert her influence over the Korean government and that because of 
that, China had lost its popularity by exporting its corruption to Korea.164 
 The criticism of the problems of Korean society in Korea‘s local newspapers was 
not strikingly different from that of outside commentators. The self-criticism includes 
complaints about corrupt government officials, lack of sanitation, and lack of modern-
style education in the country. On sanitary conditions, it is notable that an editor pointed 
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out that the neglect of sanitary regulations and disregard of hygiene laws were harmful 
not only for Koreans, but also for foreign residents‘ health. He added that the filthy 
conditions were injuring the reputation of the country in the eyes of many foreigners.165 
Korean editors frequently pointed out that lack of education was responsible for many 
serious problems in the country. The importance of education—in particular, modern 
education—was one of the most common topics of editorials. The following editorial 
highlighted that the spread of proper education should precede reform and progress 
[Italics added]: 
Zealous reformers and ardent patriots need sometimes to be reminded that 
civilization is not made by law. It is not a garment to be donned like clothes of a 
different pattern, but is the product of cultivated minds. It is in short the outcome 
of sound education…we have to look to educational except the Four Books and 
the Five Classics is maintained by the Government just so long must people wait 
to see some progress made in Korea. It is all very well to blame the unsympathetic 
apathy of the masses. That is only a symptom. Underlying all the inertia, in fact 
the very cause of it, is the stupendous ignorance and dense superstition in which 
the nation is steeped. The only remedy is the unceasing and steady diffusion of 
knowledge of facts about things, the persistent education of the people by every 
means at our disposal… Education is the most potent lever for reform and 
progress and by its means alone will the status of the country and the condition of 
the people be permanently improved.166 
 
One of the harmful effects of the inadequate educational system was that the 
Korean people were indifferent to their country‘s future. Newspaper articles continuously 
emphasized the necessity of awakening the people,167 while arguing that the Korean 
people ―lacked not in patriotism but in incentive to use.‖168 This view paralleled some 
                                               
165 The Independent 2, no. 44, Apr 15, 1897. 
166 The Independent 1, no. 53, Aug 6, 1896. Also see Tongnipsinmun 1, no. 9, Apr 25, 1896; 1, no. 37, Jun 
30, 1896; The Independent 1, no. 18, May 16, 1896; 2, no. 55, May 11, 1897. 
167 Tongnipsinmun 1, no. 52, Aug 4, 1896. 
168




American commentators‘ evaluation of the Korean people — that they had intelligent 
capability but had no fair chance to use it. 
However, in opposition to the outside view of the necessity of foreign powers to 
intervene, Korean opinion makers perceived that the Korean government was initiating 
reforms. An English-language editorial in The Independent complained about the outside 
opinion that affairs in Korea were standing still: 
We would sum up the work of the last three months then as follows. Vigorous 
work on the part of the army detachments in the country; the rehabilitation of the 
Financial Department; the cleaning out of the pay department of the army; the 
contract for a Seoul-Chemulpo railroad; the founding of a school; the important 
work of street repairs; the refitting of the printing bureau. 
The man who calls this standing still must be an American ―hustler‖ from 
Nebraska.169 
 
 The editor here asserted that Korean society had achieved great progress, which 
included building infrastructure and spreading education. In contrast to the view of many 
outside observers, the editors of Tongnipsinmun maintained great expectations of Korea‘s 
progress in the future, while it still needed reforms. This optimism came not only because 
of recent reforms, but also from the potential of the Korean people, especially educated 
youths.170 
 In publishing both Korean and English-language versions, editors of 
Tongnipsinmun had different readers in mind for the two versions. In short, the Korean-
version Tongnipsinmun sought to inform the Korean people about the problems of their 
society and what must change to enlighten the readers, so that the country could be strong 
and rich. On the other hand, the English version The Independent frequently aimed to 
propagandize Korean progressives toward the international readers. One discovers this by 
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looking at the fact that the editors of the paper often laid out different contents for the 
Korean and English versions of the same issue, although some issues of the paper carried 
the same contents translated in both languages. 
 For example, the Korean version of the May 28th, 1896 editorial dealt with a 
recent article in a Japanese newspaper about possible negotiations between Japan and 
Russia regarding Korea. While hoping that the two countries agreed upon the autonomy 
of Korea, the editor commented: 
We believe that Japan and Russia will be consistent with reason (tori) and Korea 
also needs to be consistent with reason now. At this time, when Korean people are 
consistent with reason, then help from others will be effective and they [foreign 
countries] will like to help us more. If Korean people are not consistent with 
reason; merely trust others; have power games with each other according to the 
old custom; try to put any friends or relatives on official positions regardless of 
his qualifications; hate each other; are jealous of each other; deal with matters 
obstinately without thinking of the people‘s benefits but their own interest…this 
would be like selling the country to the others.171 
 
 The editor tried to persuade his Korean readers that it was the Korean people‘s 
duty to change the wrongdoing of their society before asking for foreign powers‘ help. 
On the other hand, the English version of the same issue commented on Siam. 
 The February 18 1897 issue is another example. In the Korean version, the 
editorial lamented Korea‘s powerlessness and argued for the Korean people to throw out 
‗the old customs‘ and to seek enlightenment and progress. The English version of 
editorial, however, argued that Korea had always been independent, throughout history, 
from China.172 At times, the English editorial was used to refute articles in Japanese 
newspapers about Korea.173 In this sense, Korean intellectual groups used the English 
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version of the paper to reach out to foreign and international readers, and to represent and 
appeal Korea‘s independent position to them. However, this goal was not fully realized 
due to the limited readership of the newspapers. Despite repeated efforts to interact with 
the international society, it was not until decades later that the Korean voice would begin 
to be heard and have an impact on the outside view of Korea. 
 
5. American Reactions to the Korean Annexation (1910) 
 After almost five years of protectorate rule, Japan formally declared its 
annexation of Korea by signing the Annexation Treaty on August 22, 1910. Until right 
before the formal colonization, Kojong‘s tried to ―play the other foreign powers off 
against the Japanese, a tactic he had pursued since the opening of the country in the 
1870s.‖174  He sent his message that Korean desire to remain independent was being 
forced by Japanese through Homer B. Hulbert to the U.S. government in 1905 and 
dispatching delegates to peace conferences at the Hague in 1907 to bring Korea‘s case 
before the international community. Under pressure of Japanese, Kojong abdicated in 
July 1907. Beginning in 1905, Japan enjoyed unrestricted freedom to reform and 
modernize Korea. As we have explored in earlier sections, from 1905 to 1910 Japanese 
authorities disseminated propaganda about their modernizing results in Korea to the 
international community. As a result, most American opinion makers acknowledged 
Japan‘s status as a potential world power.  
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The American media hastened to transmit news of the Japanese annexation.175 
Considering that the signing of the treaty meant the dissolution of a country with a 4,000-
year history, the news maintained a nonchalant tone, as if the event had long been 
expected. American commentators mostly confirmed their earlier attitude toward Korea: 
that Korea needed help from the outside and that Japan was ideally situated to make the 
necessary changes. When Japan declared Korea a protectorate country in 1905, 
commentators saw complete annexation as a natural and ―inevitable‖176 course for the 
country. Once again, opinion makers noted the unique nature of the colonization: Japan 
was the first Asian country to colonize another.177  
American writers suggested Japan‘s reforms since 1905 as evidence that Japan‘s 
annexation would help Korea by giving a new opportunity for liberty and progress for the 
Korean people.178 Edwin Maxey, a professor of public law and diplomacy at University of 
Nebraska, wrote that the balance of power in Asia was of vital interest to America and 
the world. Therefore, Japan‘s task in Korea became of world interest and also a serious 
one. He assessed that Japan proved its high qualities as a civilized power in undertaking 
educational, sanitary, economic, administrative, and legal reforms in Korea. The 
annexation was necessary because ―the maintenance of the forms of Korean sovereignty 
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hampered the world of the Japanese.‖179 Because of the history of conflict in the Korean 
peninsula and Japan‘s demonstrated improvements, most writers thought it was ―best for 
Korea, for Japan, and for the peace of the world, that what had to happen should happen 
at the earliest moment.‖180 Editors of The Nation commented, ―annexation may give the 
Korean the privileges and immunities of Japanese citizenship without burdening him 
more heavily than he is burdened at present.‖ The editorial ended with an interesting 
implication: ―The peaceful assimilation of a people whose numbers are estimated at 
anywhere from eight to seventeen millions is a task that is sure to keep Japanese 
statesmanship busy for many years to come. To that extent it will save us from the world-
wide schemes of Japanese aggrandizement which the strained jingo eye discerns in the 
most insignificant daily event of Tokio politics [Italics added].‖181 This comment 
confirms Iriye‘s argument that as long as the direction of Japanese imperialism was 
toward Korea and Manchuria, which pushed it away from the Philippines or the many 
British colonies, it had the blessing of London and Washington.182 
Writers did not hesitate to say that world powers including the U.S. welcomed the 
annexation, as seen in a travelogue in The National Geographic Magazine’s November 
1910 issue: ―so far as revealed, Japan‘s intentions seem satisfactory to the powers and 
ultimately to the advantage of the people of the Mikado‘s new province, Cho-sen.‖183 
Similarly, it was not a secret that the U.S. did not object the Japan‘s plan of colonizing 
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Korea, although it could have raised objections based on the ‗good offices‘ clause of the 
1882 treaty.184 Rather, as in earlier years, American commentators confirmed that 
American commercial interests were safe even after the annexation.185  
 
Conclusion 
 From the late nineteenth century until the annexation in 1910, American interest 
in Korea transformed from a mere curiosity about an unknown land to an ambivalent 
perception of a troublesome but pitiable country. American views became more 
sophisticated at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. 
Accordingly, the center of American attention to Korea was connected to its interest in 
Japan, as the newly rising imperial country from the beginning. Not only American 
interest in Japanese movements in East Asia and the Pacific grew throughout the early 
twentieth century, but it was also concerned Japan‘s adoption of imperialistic rhetoric in 
its own interpretation of the political landscape. All of this contributed to development of 
question about the American role in East Asia and its effectiveness in the future. 
 Japanese officials‘ campaign to present Japan as a colonizing power helped shape 
American views of Korea. By establishing itself as a colonizer, Japan sought to enter the 
civilized world along with Western powers, which it had hoped for long since the 
humiliating moment of unequal treaty in 1854. Korea was the easiest target to experiment 
and propaganda Japan‘s power. As we have examined, Japanese authors contrasted 
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―backward Korea‖ to ―modern Japan.‖ They also built up Japan‘s legitimacy in 
colonizing Korea, especially from the perspective of national security. Our analysis of 
various American writings on Korea in this period has demonstrated that these American 
observers unquestioningly accepted the Japanese account. Therefore, the Korean 
annexation in 1910 was not at all surprising, nor was it cause for concern among most 
American opinion makers. Although Korean intellectuals asserted the autonomy of their 








CHAPTER  TWO 
 






Within a decade of the Japanese annexation of Korea, America‘s attitude toward 
Korea fundamentally changed from that of a distant spectator to that of a rather 
inquisitive observer. The critical turning point came during March and April of 1919, 
when over half a million Koreans participated in the March First Movement, which was 
the first nationwide movement against Japanese colonial rule.1 As discussed in Chapter 1, 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Western world viewed Korea as a 
backward and uncivilized country that was ruled by the incompetent old Chosôn 
government. Less than ten years after the annexation of Korea, Korean nationalists 
initiated a series of demonstrations against Japan. The March First Movement, in 
particular, became known internationally and caused the American public to reconsider 
and reexamine their understanding of Korea and the ―Korean problem,‖ which, 
ostensibly, had not mattered for the Western world. If in 1910 the most common 
perception was that the Korean people were indifferent toward their own country‘s fate or 
to the civilized world, by 1919 Korea was seen as politically active and problematic: ―not 
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an extinct but an active volcano,‖ or ―the Ireland of the Far East.‖2 In other words, 
Koreans‘ nationalistic movement from 1919 and onward provoked outside observers, 
especially American ones, to view conditions in Korea as ―problem.‖ 
The Movement occurred in a particular context. Japan‘s rule of force in the first 
decade of colonial rule, the so called ―Military rule‖ (budan seiji in Japanese; mudan 
t’ongch’i in Korean), had provoked the Korean people to rise up against the foreign 
colonizers. Japanese authorities employed extremely forceful policies during these years, 
mainly because of the ―sharp resistance at their accession to power in the period 1905-
10.‖3 It was literally a military rule: the first Governor-general, Masatake Terauchi, was a 
military man; gendarmerie forces was established; officials and even classroom teachers 
wore uniforms and carried swords; and Koreans were not permitted to assemble or 
publish. Yet, signs of the rising Korean nationalist spirit appeared everywhere both inside 
and outside of the Korean peninsula.  
Along with the Korean people‘s protests during these early years of colonialism, 
debate over World War I presented an opportunity for American supporters of the Korean 
cause to criticize the United States‘ inaction against Japan‘s rapacious actions in Korea. 
Wartime discussion led to the debate over the position of the United States in the world—
a world transformed after the first major war among great powers. In particular, 
Woodrow Wilson‘s attempts to form the League of Nations were evidence of his vision 
of a peaceful world order under the civilized and puritanical American ideals. Especially, 
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his idea of ―self-determination‖ had a fundamental and deep impact on the Korean 
nationalist movement itself as well as on American‘s perception of Korea in this period.4 
As recent scholarship has maintained, it is important to distinguish between ―mass 
opinion,‖ on the one hand, and ―public judgment,‖ on the other. According to Daniel 
Yankelovich, ―mass opinion‖ refers to the volatile, confused, ill-informed, and 
emotionally clouded public responses to an issue when underlying value conflicts remain 
unresolved. ―Public judgment,‖ on the other hand, refers to the public‘s viewpoint once 
people have had an opportunity to confront an issue for a time and have arrived at a 
settled conviction. It is the sum of people‘s second thoughts after they have pondered an 
issue deeply enough to resolve conflicts and tradeoffs and to accept responsibility for the 
consequences of their beliefs.5 In this sense, the March First Movement caused the 
American perception of the Korean problem to transition from ―mass opinion‖ to ―public 
judgment,‖ particularly for intellectuals and opinion makers. This chapter explores how 
the March First Movement and its aftermath precipitated this transition. 
  
1. Prologue of the March First Movement 
(1) The 1911 Conspiracy Case: Persecution of Christianity? 
Although the Korean problem did not draw worldwide attention until the March 
First Movement in 1919, the anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea had already been made 
known to the American public through mass media, daily newspapers, and magazines.  
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News about the so-called ―Conspiracy Case‖6 in 1911 was the first sensational incident to 
be transmitted to the outside world and known among the American readers since the 
annexation in 1910. In December 1911, Japanese authorities had arrested 105 Korean 
Christian leaders, falsely accusing them of conspiring to assassinate Terauchi Masatake, 
the first Japanese Governor-General of Korea.  
At first, the Japanese police arrested about 700 people for the charge, and held 
123 for public trial. Among 123, 105 people received a verdict of guilty. After more than 
two−years of hearings, a hundred of the accused were acquitted. There was no conclusive 
evidence against them other than the confessions of guilt that they were said to have 
made in the course of the preliminary investigation. Six accused, including Yun Ch‘i-ho, 
were convicted in October 1913 by the Taegu Court of Appeal and sentenced by the 
Supreme Court to six years of penal servitude. Sixteen months later, in February 1915, 
the six who had been convicted were finally released through amnesty. 
Historians have usually understood the ―Conspiracy Case‖ as part of a Japanese 
effort to dissolve a secret society, the New People‘s Society (Sinminhoe in Korean). The 
Japanese suspected that the society was a terrorist group opposed to its rule in Korea. The 
New People‘s Society became a target because of its regional base in northwest Korea, 
which was assumed to be rebellious toward the central administration. In addition, the 
Christian influence among its members was thought to encourage anti-Japanese activities. 
Throughout the course of the trial, Japanese authorities accused 24 missionaries from the 
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United States and Britain as assisting conspirators. The Conspiracy Case was a result of 
an effort by the Japanese authorities to make an example of how strictly they would deal 
with any hint of suspicious activities, not only those among Koreans, but also among 
foreign citizens in Korea. The focus here is how Americans saw the case and how the 
American audience, mainly intellectuals, viewed and reacted to the news, rather than the 
nature of the case or trial. 
What made the case sensational in the United States, far away from the place 
where the incident occurred, were the large number of accused, the suspicion that the 
Japanese used torture to elicit confessions, and the involvement of American 
missionaries. As known throughout news reports, the majority of the prosecuted men 
were Christians, most of whom had connections with the American Presbyterian or 
Methodist missions in Korea.7 The case, regardless of its nature or background, naturally 
became a subject of debate among American opinion makers as to whether or not the 
Japanese were persecuting Christians and whether American missionaries were 
endangered. 
American missionaries were the first to transmit the news of the case to the 
United States. Facing the situation in Korea, especially the unexpected charges against 
them, the missionaries in Korea requested a hearing with the Governor-General.8 But 
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after failing to reach any agreements with Japanese authorities,9 they formally asked for 
help from their mission headquarters in the United States,10 while informally transmitting 
the situation to their fellow Christians in the United States. A July 1912 editorial in 
Missionary Review of the World, a renowned missionary magazine, mentioned that it was 
receiving many correspondences from missionaries in the Far East who described the 
case and the conditions of the Korean Christians.11 
 
 
Figure 6. Christian Koreans worship. American audiences viewed such images as typical of the 
Korean people’s devotion to Christianity. 
Source: W. A. Noble, ―Christianity in Korea To-day,‖ Missionary Review of the World 44 (Sep 1921): 
687. 
 
Accordingly, mission boards in the United States contacted the U.S. government 
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and Japanese diplomats in the U.S. Notably, Arthur Brown initiated actions on the part of 
the missionary groups against the Japanese‘s handling of the case. Brown was the 
secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions at that time and author of a 
number of significant volumes about political, social, and religious problems in Asian 
countries. As we have examined in Chapter 1, he had advocated the Japanese annexation 
of Korea before 1910, arguing that since the Korean people had been unable to maintain 
their independence, they would be unable to do so in the future. However, as the 
secretary of the mission board, he was in a position that needed to react to the pleas of 
missionaries. He and other member of the missions went to Washington D.C. and met 
with Japanese First Secretary, Masanao Hanihara, Charge d‘Affaires, and the 
newly−appointed Ambassador Viscount Chinda in order to request Japanese authorities‘ 
favorable handing of the case in February 1912, but without resolving any issues. While 
he and other members of the mission boards were making vain efforts to appeal to 
Japanese diplomats, Brown published highly detailed reports of the case in November 
1912, as ―the outcome of a conference of representatives of all the missionary 
organizations of the United States which [were] conducting work in Korea.‖12  
Another American group that advocated on behalf of the accused Koreans came 
from personal were friends of Yun Ch‘i-ho, the main figure of Sinminhoe.13 Three 
senators and bishops of the Southern Methodist Church met with Japanese Ambassador 
Chinda, while those three and other friends of Yun sent a letter on Yun‘s behalf to 
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Japanese embassy.14 Meanwhile, as Brown wrote in his booklet, ―conditions in Korea 
grew worse and became public through other channels, as was inevitable in this age of 
travelers, telegraphs and newspapers.‖15 Whereas American news media had previously 
focused on how Korea was backward and had become the object of international 
competition in the East Asian region, in the period from 1911 to 1915, the Case and its 
meaning became the main focus when discussing Korea.16 As mentioned above, the 
American media‘s main concern in their coverage of the Case was Japan‘s alleged 
persecution of Christianity in Korea.  
Articles in American newspapers and magazines mostly were sympathetic toward 
the oppressed Koreans, giving the American readers an impression that ―the real impulse 
to the terrific dragonade [sic] [was] a fierce aversion to Christianity and a determination 
to stamp out the Church in Korea.17 When all of the convicted withdrew their confessions 
in open court, saying that the police had cruelly tortured them and forced them to confess, 
Americans became increasingly convinced that Japanese was actively persecuting 
Christianity.18 
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Facing this public attention from abroad, the Japanese authorities hurriedly 
justified their policy. Japanese officials admitted to the American missionaries and 
missionary boards in the United States that many of the arrested were Christians, but 
denied that torture had been used. More importantly, they emphasized that their response 
had nothing to do with religion. Japanese asserted that they guaranteed religious freedom; 
their stated principle was that politics and religions should not be mixed, but always kept 
separate from each other.19  
The main advocates for Japanese policy writing in the U.S. were private Japanese 
intellectuals. For example, in his contributions to periodicals in the United States, 
Kiyoshi K. Kawakami further emphasized that ―Japan decided not only to allow foreign 
missionaries in Korea unrestricted freedom of religious propaganda, but to make them 
virtual coworkers in the grand undertaking of the regeneration of Korea.‖ On the other 
hand, he warned, ―the missionaries were given to understand that Japan would not 
connive at the acts of those who, under guise of spiritual work, would not scruple to 
instigate the natives to oppose Japanese measures,‖ adding that it was but a thinly veiled 
secret that those Koreans who were engaged in sedition and conspiracy against the 
Japanese protectorate were under missionary influence and had made Christian churches 
and schools their havens of retreat. Therefore, he made it clear that given the 
missionaries‘ unfriendly attitude toward Japanese rule, the presence of so large a number 
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of foreign missionaries in Korea created a situation that demanded serious attention on 
the part of the Japanese authorities. 
As Tupper and McReynolds observed via American mass media, ―only a few of 
the church group‖ accepted the Japanese explanation that ―the charges against Japan were 
false, and that Japan was not working against the interests of the Christian missions.‖20 
There were still pro-Japanese writers: George Kennan, a journalist who used to describe 
pre-colonial Korea as backward and barbarian, asserted that the charge against the 
Japanese was a result of prejudice. He added that the report of persecution of Korean 
Christians was not trustworthy, as ―the average Japanese is more likely to tell the truth, 
perhaps, than the average Korean.‖ 21 Sidney Gulick, an American missionary to Japan 
who was well-known for his campaign against California‘s anti-Asian legislations in the 
United States, wrote that ―Unless Japan is false to her record for the past forty years, she 
is not persecuting Christians or Christianity, but merely seeking to root out what is 
believed to be disloyalty, sedition, and anarchism.‖22 These pro-Japanese opinion makers 
agreed that native Korean violent ―bandits‖ led the authorities inevitable to use harsh 
policy.  
Most American commentators, however, were critical of the Japanese harsh rule 
in Korea. The booklet written by Brown mentioned above shows the major opinion raised 
about the case among the American elites. One of the main points he tried to make was 
that the accused Koreans were not of the criminal or irresponsible class of society, but 
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intelligent and self-respecting figures of the highest standing, most of them Christian.23 
He criticized the Japanese criminal code under which the Government-General could 
convict people merely for having entertained political opinions antagonistic to Japan. The 
hostile and unjudicial attitude of the court, he wrote, became more and more apparent as 
the trial proceeded, and even the Japanese media questioned the justice of Japan‘s 
methods in Korea.24 He claimed that the mission boards were ―not asking consideration 
for the accused Korean Christians because [they] believe them to be guilty, but because 
[they] believe that their guilt has not been reasonably established. [They] are therefore 
not imploring pardon, but urging thorough investigation.‖25  
Nevertheless, speaking on behalf of Christian mission boards, Brown was careful 
in his comments on political issues. He stressed that the American missionaries were not 
anti-Japanese, but agreed with the Japanese colonization of Korea, because ―it would be 
better both for Korea and for the world.‖ He implied that what the mission boards were 
against was the recent actions of the gendarmerie, not the colonization of Korea itself, 
especially the civil government that Ito Hirobumi had established.26 Similarly, other 
                                               
23 According to Brown, two of the accused were Congregationalists, six Methodists, and eighty-nine 
Presbyterians. Of the Presbyterians, five were pastors, eight were elders, eight deacons of churches, ten 
leaders of village groups of Christians, forty-two baptized church members, and thirteen catechumens. 
Brown, ―The Korean Conspiracy Case,‖ 13. 
24 Jiji Shimpo, an influential Japanese daily newspaper, criticized the trial court for having a prejudicial and 
narrow-minded dealing with the case ―due undoubtedly to the fact that the Court had too much fear of the 
Governor-General to assert the true dignity and inviolability of the judicial administration‖ (Ibid., 19-20). 
25 Ibid., 17-21. 
26 ―The American missionaries were outspoken in praise of Prince Ito‘s policy and did everything in their 
power to influence the Koreans to accept it as best for their country‖ (Ibid., 3-4).  It was a common opinion 
in the United States that the iron rule in Korea was due to Koreans‘ violent resistance, as seen in the Ito‘s 
assassination in 1909. Even an editorial in the Missionary Review of the World, the representative 
missionary journal, said that ―it is also said that Koreans do not look on assassination with the same horror 
with which it is regarded in America, but consider it a legitimate weapon with which the weak may 
remonstrate against oppression‖ (―Editorial: The Japanese and Koreans,‖ The Missionary Review of the 
World 36 [Jan 1913]: 59). In this context, the editor of the magazine Independent commented that after Ito 




commentators used a mild tone in determining whether Japan was persecuting Christians 
or not, saying the Japanese were suspicious of Christians, not because they were 
Christians, but because they happened to come from the more intelligent, independent 
classes of Korean society.27 Moreover, many of Japanese high officials in Korea were 
Christian, according to an American newspaper correspondent in Tokyo. But the trouble 
was that none of them was really in power in Korea, as the whole civil administration 
was ―completely overshadowed by the military establishment.‖28 The underlying idea was 
that the Conspiracy Case was a possible temporary deviation from the normal, 
reasonable, and modern system run by the Japanese authorities. The Case was a unique 
situation, whereby potentially violent and disorderly Koreans required swift and decisive 
action, necessitating the domination of the military gendarmerie over the civil 
administration. 
In general, American opinion makers still maintained the belief that the Japanese 
system was reasonable as well as modern.29 Some writers brought up news of the 
acquittal of all but six accused of the Case in 1913 to show that the Japanese Government 
had no prejudice against Christianity in Korea and to compliment its judiciary system.30 
From this viewpoint, Brown believed that the Japanese policy in Korea was a 
                                                                                                                                            
figure, Terauchi. The editor added, ―the Japanese authorities should be suspicious and watchful,‖ and it was 
not strange that they ―should suspect the Christians of secret plottings.‖ He concluded, ―It is to be hoped 
that the trials will be hastened after the long delay, and the guilty punished, the innocent freed, and 
conditions revert to those of confidence and peace. We have sufficient faith in Japanese justice to believe 
that this will be the case‖ (―Editorial: Korean Christian Arrests,‖ Independent 72 (Jun 13, 1912): 1339-40). 
27 ―Stirring Letters from Korea,‖ 505. 
28 An article in The Continent, quoted in ―Japan‘s Clash with Korean Missions,‖ Literary Digest 44 (Mar 
16, 1912): 536. 
29 The editor concluded, ―It is to be hoped that the trials will be hastened after the long delay, and the guilty 
punished, the innocent freed, and conditions revert to those of confidence and peace. We have sufficient 
faith in Japanese justice to believe that this will be the case‖ (―Editorial,‖ Independent 72, 1339-40). 
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little harsh, but Japan will overcome difficulties in the colony soon. He concluded that 
American friends of Japan should help Japanese by frankly telling them about their 
wrongdoings:  
The real friends of Japan at this juncture are […] those who frankly tell their 
Japanese friends that ―the recent course of the Gendarmerie in dealing with the 
people of Korea has awakened grave misgivings as to its justice, its effect upon 
the unhappy Koreans, and also upon that reputation for the humane and 
enlightened rule of a subject race which the Japanese have shown that they rightly 
value.‖ […] Japan undoubtly has a hard task in Korea, and the mission Boards 
earnestly desire to avoid anything that might make it more difficult. We cordially 
recognize the many splendid things that the Japanese have done, and we lament 
only that this unfortunate affair has done so much to prevent them from exerting 
their full beneficent effect. We are convinced, as we have been from the 
beginning, that as soon as the central Government in Tokyo and the Japanese 
nation as a whole know how their true purposes regarding the Koreans have been 
distorted by the Gendarmerie and the Judges of the lower Court in Seoul, they 
will take such action as will prove to all the world that the name of the era of the 
late Emperor, Meiji (Enlightenment), and that of the new Emperor, Taisho 
(Righteousness), are not empty names, but that they represent the real spirit and 
intent of the Japanese nation toward a subject race.31 
 
In sum, while appeals from missionaries and efforts of mission boards in the 
United States to help ―the innocent Koreans‖ spread news of Japanese military rule in 
colonial Korea, most American observers thought that civil government should replace 
the Japanese military rule, rather than decolonization. It was for both Korea and Japan.32 
The reactions from both Americans and the Japanese authorities to the Conspiracy Case 
foreshadowed the reaction from each later in the March First Movement.  
 
(2) The Korean Presence in the United States 
The Formation of a Korean Community 
                                               
31 Brown, ―The Korean Conspiracy Case,‖ 27. 
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The migration of Korean people to the United States began in the 1880s.  
Between 1903 and 1920, some 8,000 Koreans left Korea for the United States. The 
Korean migrants were from diverse backgrounds—farmers, common laborers, 
bureaucrats, clerks, students, and so on.33 Not only poverty and economic suffering, but 
also religious and political reasons encouraged many Koreans to immigrate to the United 
States.34 According to Takai‘s study, many Korean migrants left as political refugees, 
―escaping from Japanese-government persecution.‖ For them, Hawaii represented a 
haven from Japanese imperialism.35 For Koreans who suffered economic hardships due to 
famine and drought, emigration to Hawaii was attractive with promise of free housing, 
medical care, and sixteen dollars a month (a small fortune to Koreans) for only 60 hours 
of labor in plantations each week. They borrowed money for transportation and 
settlement from a bank in Korea that was financed by the Hawaiian sugarcane planters.36 
About seven thousand Koreans arrived in Hawaii in the period between 1903 and 1905, 
as laborers for plantations.37 Many of those who first came to Hawaii as plantation 
                                               
33 Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1989), 53. 
34 Some American missionaries helped recruit emigrants by encouraging their church members to join the 
emigration to Hawaii that was then taking place within the broader Korean society. As a result, the 
Christian influence was pervasive among the first group of Korean immigrants to Hawaii. (Patterson, 47-
58).  
35 Takaki, 53-54. 
36 Patterson, 99-100; Takaki, 47-48. 
37 The white sugar planters in Hawaii employed native Hawaiians on a contract-labor basis to work the 
sugarcane fields and, due to a shortage of labor, began to recruit foreign immigrant laborers from the 
1850s. As racial prejudice against the Chinese resulted in the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 
California in 1882 and the first legislative restriction limiting the number of Chinese allowed to enter in 
Hawaii was enacted in 1883, the planters turned to Japanese and Koreans for a sufficient supply of 




laborers, their relatives, or ―picture brides‖38 migrated again to the mainland of the United 
States after their initial contract expired, expecting better wages and better working and 
living conditions on the continent.39 The Korean population on the continental United 
States was counted as 1,224 in 1920, and 1,860 in the 1930 U.S. census, although it is 
assumed that the actual number was larger.40 In addition to economic reasons, educational 
and political reasons motivated Koreans to migrate to the United States. However, 
Korean immigration was decreased since 1905, when the Japanese protectorate 
prohibited Korean emigration to Hawaii ―in order to curb Korean labor competition with 
Japanese workers in Hawaii and to cut off the source of Korean-independence activities 
in the United States.‖41  
   In their geographical and occupational origins in the homeland and in their 
motives for migrating, Korean immigrants were rather heterogeneous compared to 
Chinese and Japanese immigrants.42 Nevertheless, the Koreans showed strong solidarity, 
even though they did not develop their own residential communities in early years as the 
Japanese and the Chinese did. As Takaki argues, the Koreans in the U.S. showed intense 
                                               
38 The picture bride system was marriage contracted between immigrant Korean males and females residing 
in Korea via the exchanging of photographs. The practice began among Japanese in the United States (H. 
Brett Melendy, The Oriental Americans [New York, NY: Twayng Publishers, 1972], 126; Takaki, 46-47). 
39 By 1907, around one thousand Koreans had re-migrated inland to Utah, Colorado, Arizona and Alaska, 
but over half of the Korean population in the U.S. settled in California (Takaki, 270). 
40 Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census: 1920, III, Population by State, 693; Bureau of the Census, 
Fifteenth Census: 1930, II, General Report, 88, quoted in Hyung June Moon, ―The Korean Immigrants in 
America: The Quest for Identity in the Formative Years, 1903-1918,‖ Ph.D. diss., University of Nevada, 
Reno, 1976, 97. 
41 As the Korean labor supply was cut off in 1905, the Hawaiian planters began to import laborers from the 
Philippines (Takaki, 27, 56-57). 
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ethnic solidarity due to a unique ―necessity,‖ that is, their sense of obligation to struggle 
against colonialism in Korea.43 
 The living and working conditions in the United States were disappointing for the 
majority of Koreans, since they had to work long hours in the highly demanding 
workplaces, like plantations, mining camps, and railroads. In addition, Korean 
immigrants, like other Asians, were seen as ―strangers from a different shore‖ and 
experienced racial prejudice and ―ethnic antagonism‖ from white workers.44 However, 
many Koreans who wanted to go back to their home country were afraid of the Japanese 
rule there. Their doubly marginalized status as a colonial people back in Korea and 
strangers in the host country gave them a strong, politically oriented national identity. 
The fact that the Japanese were restricting the right to speak imposed the burden of what 
Moon calls ―self-appointed-savior-mentality‖ on Korean immigrants.45 
 The sense that there was no one to protect them besides themselves inspired 
Korean-Americans to form nationalist organizations, such as Sinminhoe (The New 
People‘s Association, est. 1903 in Hawaii) and Kongnip hyôp’oe (est. 1905 in San 
Francisco, which became Taehan kungminhoe [the Korean National Association, or 
KNA] in 1909). While many other immigrant communities formed nationalist 
organizations to promote ethnic solidarity and a sense of security,46 Korean immigrants 
                                               
43 Takaki, 270; Moon, 132-36. 
44 Takaki, 271-72. 
45 Moon, 84, 161. A leader of the Korean group once said, ―Now our business should be for all Koreans and 
our activity should be based on the welfare of our mother country. Thus we are not sojourners, but political 
wanderers, and we are not laborers but righteous army soldiers‖ (Sinhanminbo, Dec 1, 1909, quoted in 
Moon, 161). 
46 Takaki explains that for Japanese immigrants, ethnicity was more significant factor to determine social 
relations in the mainland than class, which was prioritized in Hawaii. He argues, racial exclusionism in the 
mainland America ―defined the Japanese as ―strangers‖ and pushed the Issei [first generation of Japanese 




had another motivation: at the heart of these organizations was the struggle for Korean 
independence from Japan. As Takaki observes, the first generation of Koreans in 
America felt themselves as sojourners and found themselves suddenly becoming yumin, 
drifting people, after Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910. This self-identity as drifting 
people drove Korean immigrants to create and rely on those nationalist organizations. 
These organizations developed as the center of the Korean nationalist movement in the 
United States. A distinctive aspect of the Korean community in the United States was its 
interwoven relationship with church organizations. The high percentage of Christian 
converts among Korean-Americans47 and especially among nationalist leaders enabled 
this.48 The Korean immigrant group began to publish Korean-language newspapers 
almost immediately after they settled in the United States, as early as 1904.49 
As one of their nationalist activities, the KNA began a campaign to convince 
Korean immigrants to stop returning to Korea in the period right before annexation of 
Korea. The point of the campaign was that Koreans living in the United States, given 
much more freedom and more education and economic opportunities than they had had at 
home, should develop themselves here and contribute to the homeland‘s emancipation 
from the oppressors, rather than just returning to Korea. One resolution passed by the 
KNA general meeting in 1909 was meant to dissuade Korean immigrants from returning 
to Korea: 
                                               
47 It was estimated that by the early 1910s, Christian converts constituted more than half of the Korean-
American population (Kim Wôn-yong, Chaemi hanin osim nyônsa [Fifty Year History of Koreans in 
America], edited by Son Pogi [Seoul: Hyean, 2004], 44). 
48 Moon comments that the ‗mingling‘ of religion and politics was shown in the fact that ―membership in 
the Korean Christian churches did not create bonds of fellowship with the Japanese Christians,‖ because 
―the Korean Church, in a way, was a means to the expression of national spirit‖ (Moon, 233). 
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Koreans in Korea are not able to come to the United States even if they use 
fortune. Therefore, the Koreans in the United States should not waste 
opportunities. We dissuade the Koreans from returning to Korea unless they 
achieve scholarship or are financially successful.50 
 
An editorial in Sinhanminbo, a Korean-language newspaper based in California,51 
lamented, 
…If one says going back home, it is possible when he has a country and 
home. If not, one cannot say so. I hear that some Koreans in America have 
in mind to return; I believe that they should discern if they have a country 
and home or not. Do you think that you have a country because there is the 
king? The Ch‘angdôk Palace is just a prison.… Let‘s go back home only 
when the freedom bell rings and the independence flag is raised and we can 
only advance, not retreat.…52 
 
These Korean nationalist organizations gave financial and moral support for two 
Korean convicted prisoners, Chang In-hwan and Chôn Myông-un, who shot to death 
Durham White Stevens, an American diplomat and an advisor for the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry, in March 1908 in San Francisco.53 In 1904, the Japanese government appointed 
Stevens an advisor for foreign affairs of the Protectorate of Korea. Because Koreans 
regarded him as a ―faithful Japanese servant‖ and traitor to Korea, Stevens had been the 
subject of severe criticism by the Korean newspapers in the U.S. before his arrival in San 
Francisco. After the incident, Korean newspapers justified the assassination by saying, 
―the violence was hatched by a spirit of patriotism so it could not be judged by the law, 
nor by the community of civilized people; rather it was the case of a man who, himself 
                                               
50 ―Announcement of Resolution at the North American General Meeting of Korean National Association,‖ 
Sinhanminbo, Feb 24, 1909. 
51 The first Korean language newspaper published in the United States was Sinjosinmun in Honolulu. Since 
Sinjosinmun, Korean language newspapers and magazines flourished. In 1910, all Korean newspapers had 
failed or were merged into the Sinhanminbo in San Francisco and Kukminbo in Honolulu (Moon, 274). 
52 ―There Is No Country to Return If It Is Not Independent,‖ Sinhanminbo, Apr 14, 1909. 
53 Stevens was on his way to the United States on official duty and to visit his family. He died two days 
after the shooting. For a description of the incident, and Chang and Chôn‘s statements after the shooting, 




well-clothed, did not think of freezing; himself well-fed, did not consider the hungry.‖54 
At the news of the incident, Korean people within and outside of the United States 
donated money to support the defense of the trial.55 
Not surprisingly, the Korean immigrant group was sensitive to the responses of 
foreign countries to the news about Korea. This led them to have a realistic sense of 
international affairs. At the news of the annexation of Korea in 1910, the Korean 
newspapers in the United States not only expressed emotions of sorrow and grief, but 
also demonstrated a realization of the coldness and selfishness in the world of diplomatic 
relations. An editorial in Sinhanminbo asked, 
Why would foreign countries care that a country perishes, if they benefit 
from it? For this reason, Japan could not abolish the extraterritoriality and 
preceding tariff system of foreign countries [in Korea]. So international 
relations is not a matter of justice, but of advantages and disadvantages.56 
 
Another article on the same issue pointed out, 
 
Ever since Japan occupied Korea, there have been various opinions around 
the world…American and other countries‘ newspapers say that Japan and 
Korea had been in the same position, but Japanese people are successfully 
united and accomplished enlightenment. Korea could not do so, and fell 
back behind the others, and they ask how it was possible for Japan to 
occupy the country. Or they say that it does not matter if it does not cause 
damage to their countrymen‘s trade. Their tone is only cold.57 
 
Korean immigrants‘ will to struggle against Japanese colonialism, along with 
their enduring racial discrimination and hard working conditions, fostered a 
strong ethnic identity, which became a source of community.58 Korean-language 
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243-44). 
56 Sinhanminbo, Sep 21, 1910. 
57 ―Attitude of the Nations of the Annexation,‖ Sinhanminbo, Sep 21, 1910. 
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newspapers played a role of awakening the Korean immigrants‘ patriotism. 
Living as a minority group in the United States at times gave the Korean people 
chances to project their identity as Koreans toward the rest of American society. 
 
The Hemet Accident (1913): Koreans Protecting Themselves 
One day in June 1913, eleven Koreans arrived in a small town called Hemet, 
California. They visited the town to work as apricot pickers. However, the news of the 
arrival of the foreign workers from Asia angered the local workers. When the Koreans 
stopped to eat at a café a crowd gathered in front of the building. As the Korean workers 
came out, the crowd threatened the Koreans and asked them to leave. They left the town 
on the next train.59 After this ‗Hemet Accident‘ was reported, the Secretary of State 
ordered an investigation into the incident and the Japanese consulate office suggested 
legal protection over the mistreated Korean workers. Nevertheless, the Koreans rejected 
the interference of Japan, saying that they were satisfied with the indemnity paid by the 
rancher. Moreover, they declared that they were not Japanese subjects, as they had left 
their native land before it was annexed by Japan.60 
Although what happened in Hemet on that day was a short episode, it marked the 
first time that the Korean community in the U.S. publicly positioned itself as separate and 
independent from Japanese authority. In the beginning, the occurrence in Hemet became 
                                               
59 For details about the Hemet incident, see the following articles: ―Drive out Orientals,‖ Los Angeles Times 
[LAT], Jun 27, 1913;‖Drive Asiatics from Town: Californians Thought Japanese, but Found Them 
Koreans,‖ New York Times [NYT], Jun 27, 1913; ―Drive out Koreans: Citizens of Hemet, Cal, Load Fruit 
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Washington Post [WP], Jun 27, 1913; ―Hemet Mayor Worried, Disclaims Responsibility,‖ LAT, Jun 28, 
1913.  
60 ―Hemet Inquiry Is Dropped: Korean Fruit Pickers Not Japanese Subjects,‖ LAT, Jul 2, 1913; ―Japan 




a hot issue in American society, and was linked to a larger discussion of anti-Asian 
immigrant sentiments on the Pacific Coast.61 To understand the significance and meaning 
of the incident, one needs to see the background of the anti-Japanese (and Asian) 
immigrant movement in American society. The number of Japanese immigrants to the 
U.S. mainland greatly increased at the turn of the twentieth century. The majority of 
Japanese immigrants came to work as farmers and peasants in the U.S., coming to play an 
important role in local agriculture, and began to compete with American farmers. As the 
numbers of these cheap and strange immigrants from Asia surged, they came to be seen 
as a threat to the American agricultural enterprise. As a result, there appeared 
conspicuous anti-Japanese movements among American laborers in communities along 
the Pacific Coast where the Japanese population was clustered, centering in organizations 
such as the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League in San Francisco (est. 1905). 
Furthermore, the hostile sentiments against Japanese immigration to the U.S. led to a 
series of policies on the part of California and the federal government.62  
Amidst the increase of anti-Japanese sentiments, American major newspapers 
reported the Hemet incident. Some misreported first that the Asian workers who were 
forced to leave were Japanese, but even after the correction that they were in fact 
Koreans, the news still remained sensational. The news soon provoked instant reactions 
                                               
61 The crowd who drove out the Korean workers in Hemet thought that the workers were Japanese. NYT, 
Jun 27, 1913. 
62 The California Board of Education passed a regulation that segregated Asian children into a separate 
public elementary school in 1906; the California state legislature passed a bill to ban land ownership by 
aliens in 1913; in a California referendum in 1920, two-thirds of the voters approved tightening up the 1913 
alien land law; although the Japanese government agreed to greatly restrict the number of Japanese 
immigrants to the U.S. in the Gentlemen‘s Agreement of 1907-1908, persistent anti-Japanese sentiment 
finally led to the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924 that completely barred Japanese immigration to 
the United States. For more about legislative actions and racial discrimination against the Japanese, see 
Izumi Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: Modifying the Exclusion Clause of the 1924 




from both the American and Japanese governments that linked the incident in Hemet to 
the sensitive issue of legislature about Japanese immigrants.63 The Secretary of State, 
William J. Bryan, ordered an investigation into the Hemet incident, requesting the 
Department of Justice to inquire into the circumstances of the case. The instant response 
from the American government was from anxiety that the incident would strengthen 
adverse sentiments between the United States and Japan. For Japan, this case might offer 
a timely chance to ask American government to guarantee equal and better treatment of 
Japanese subjects in the United States.64 The shared assumption here was that, since was 
―a province of Japan,‖65 the Koreans were under the protection of the Japanese 
government. 
However, the incident was concluded in an unexpected way: when the Japanese 
consulate officials in San Francisco met Korean representatives, Koreans made it clear 
they wanted no interference from the Japanese government. The reason was that they 
were Koreans, not Japanese, and they were responsible for themselves. They insisted that 
Japan had no reason to protest to Washington for the Koreans‘ troubles.66 Sinhan minbo, 
the Korean-language newspaper in San Francisco, complained that the Japanese 
unnecessarily made the incident a controversy that Koreans did not want. The implication 
of this comment was that the Koreans wanted to minimize the event, and they were 
satisfied that the Korean workers involved were already paid for expenses for traveling to 
                                               
63 One article commented, ―This act, coming at this particular time, when relations between the two 
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was regarded as especially unfortunate because of the adverse sentiment that will be aroused in Japan by 
the action of the California citizens‖ (―May Order Investigation,‖ LAT, Jun 27, 1913). 
64 ―Calls It Boys‘ Prank,‖ LAT, Jun 27, 1913. 
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and from Hemet.67 The Koreans did not intend to be involved in the tense relationship 
between Japan and the United States, but considered Japan as irrelevant to them.68 
Moreover, the President of the Korean National Association, David Lee (Yi Tae-wi in 
Korean) telegraphed the State Department: ―the Koreans involved were not Japanese 
subjects, because they had left their native land before it was annexed by Japan.‖69 It was 
a relief for the American government who concerned the Hemet incident as complicating 
the controversy over Japanese immigrants to the U.S. Secretary of State Bryan ordered 
the discontinuation of the investigation into the Hemet incident, quoting the Korean claim 
that they were not Japanese. For Japan, because of the strong opposition from the 
Koreans that they did not want Japanese aid or interference, ―it was difficult to use the 
incident without exposing their harsh colonial policy over Korea as well as their 
diplomatic maneuver with the protest of the Alien Land Law.‖70  
Despite the short time from the event to its conclusion, the Hemet incident 
revealed several significant and symbolic dimensions of Korean immigrants‘ political 
representation in the United States. Above all, it was the first case where a Korean 
immigrant group actively contacted the United States government and clarified their 
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 ―Letter from Mr. Ko Pyông-gwan.‖  
68 ―Seventy Dollars of Indemnity,‖ Sinhanminbo, Jul 4, 1913. 
69 ―Hemet Inquiry Is Dropped: Korean Fruit Pickers Not Japanese Subjects,‖ LAT, Jul 2, 1913; ―Japan 
Sends a New Note,‖ NYT, Jul 2, 1913. The whole text of Lee‘s telegram read: ―I have the honor to inform 
you of the recent expulsion of Korean laborers from Hemet, California, and to address you concerning the 
Japanese Consulate-General‘s demand for indemnity. We, the Koreans in America, are not Japanese 
subjects, for we left Korea before the annexation of Korea by Japan, and we will never submit to her as 
long as the sun remains in the heavens. The intervention of the Japanese Consulate-General in Korean 
matters is illegal, so I have the honor of requesting you to discontinue the discussion of this case with the 
Japanese Government representatives. If there is any financial question between the Koreans and the 
persons who expelled our laborers, we will settle it without Japanese interference. Yours most respectfully, 
David Lee, President, Korean National Association of North America, June 30, 1931‖ (Korean Information 
Bureau and the League of the Friends of Korea, Independence for Korea [Philadelphia, 1919], 9). 
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national identity. The Korean community‘s response to the incident clarified that they 
were to legally and diplomatically represent and be responsible for their own, without 
interference from the Japanese government. Through this specific case, the Korean group 
chose its identity as ―drifting people‖ rather than colonial subjects under the Japanese 
government‘s protection. Secretary of State Bryan was reported to have stated, ―United 
States official functions should, henceforth, deal directly with the Korean National 
Association on all matters concerning Koreans.‖71  
From then until the Korean Provisional Government was established in 1919, the 
Korean National Association dealt with de facto matters that were usually overseen by 
consulate offices in the U.S. The Association made arrangements with the American 
immigration offices to admit Koreans who arrived without passports. At times the 
Association even provided references to immigration offices for identities of Koreans 
who had no required documents or money could enter the ports.72 The KNA was 
incorporated as a benevolent organization in California in 1914 and it proclaimed that the 
organization‘s purpose was to protect and educate Koreans in North America.73 The 
organization went on to issue Korean membership certificates to Korean immigrants to 
use in lieu of a passport.74 The Korean community established vigilante town associations 
(Tonghoe) to protect women, to maintain law and order. Tonghoe also functioned to 
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72 Moon, 394-97. 
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solidify Korean immigrants for nationalistic cause.75 It symbolized the Korean 
community‘s desire of self-protectiveness and self-representation. 
 Second, how the Koreans reacted to solve the Hemet incident indicated that they 
were able and willing to come together around their national identity to struggle against 
racial discrimination in American society. Although it could have been financially 
advantageous if they had accepted Japanese citizenship, most Koreans did not even 
consider this as an option. Even if they felt racially discriminated against, Korean 
immigrants usually chose to Americanize themselves rapidly, rather than complain about 
how they were treated in the United States.76 
 The Korean people‘s response to the Hemet incident demonstrated a will to 
represent their own rights in American society. Occurring in the time when the United 
States and Japan were negotiating the Alien Land Bill, the event in Hemet itself became 
sensational and was viewed seriously in American media outlets and governmental 
reports. Accordingly, the unexpected conclusion of the incident by the Korean immigrant 
group made a deep impression on American readers. Before Koreans proclaimed national 
independence in the March First Movement in 1919, the Korean immigrant group in the 
U.S., through a small but portentous incident in Hemet, clarified that they had a strong 
will for self-defense, autonomy, and self-representation, and severely rejected of Japan‘s 
intention to include them in its sphere outside of Korea. It was a prelude to the earnest 
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and well-known nationalist movement by Koreans from 1919 onward. This newly created 
impression of the Korean group within American society later contributed to the U.S. 
government‘s recognition of their community as separate from the Japanese immigrants. 
Lastly, it is essential that the strong national display of Korean identity in the 
Hemet incident was possible because it happened outside of Korea during the period of 
Japan‘s military rule. Around the time of Korea‘s annexation and also at the end of the 
Great War, the KNA and other Korean nationalist groups in the U.S. sent delegates to 
postwar conferences to appeal for Korea‘s national independence. Although these 
nationalist activities did not make a huge sensation until the March First Movement, they 
influenced on the Declaration of Independence by Korean students in Tokyo (February 
1919). The declaration in Tokyo again provoked the March First Movement a month 
later.77 Because Japan‘s military rule in the first decade of colonial rule in Korea 
suppressed anti-Japanese protest, it was Korean migrant groups outside of their native 
country who ignited nationalist sentiments. Koreans abroad thus exerted a strong 
influence on start of the nation-wide protest in Korea against Japanese colonialism in 
1919. 
 
(3) The United States Reconsiders the Annexation of Korea (1915-1916) 
Within several years after the Conspiracy Case and the Hemet Incident, American 
opinion makers began to pay more attention to issues in Korea. From 1915 to 1916, the 
American mass media dealt with the background story of the annexation of Korea, even 
though there was no special news from Korea. It is worth noting that this occurrence 
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came at the same time as debate on American foreign policy during World War I. It was 
Homer B. Hulbert, supporter of Korean independence, who at first discussed the Korean 
annexation in relation to American foreign policy. As seen in the earlier chapter, Hulbert 
had been a missionary and special delegate of Korean Emperor Kojong in 1905 and in 
1907. After being compelled to return to the United States in May 1907 by the Japanese 
authorities due to his political activities in Korea, Hulbert continued to support the 
Korean nationalists‘ cause by giving public lectures and contributing articles to daily 
newspapers and journals. 
In his contribution to the New York Times on December 12, 1915, Hulbert 
indirectly criticized American policy concerning Korea‘s fate, comparing the Japanese 
annexation to the German invasion of Belgium in 1914. The German invasion of 
Belgium, the so-called ―Rape of Belgium,‖ was widely viewed as being in violation of 
the Treaty of London signed in 1839, which guaranteed the independence and neutrality 
of Belgium. This new state of affairs required reconsideration of the American place in 
the world, which imposed upon President Woodrow Wilson the dual task of bringing the 
United States into the world while maintaining moral purity and distance, especially from 
the War.78 Woodrow Wilson shared the majority view of American opinion makers in 
1914 that the United States should stay out of the war. But he also stated that the 
international system would have to be completely reformed under American leadership, 
which developed into his famous ―Fourteen Points‖ at the end of World War I. Still, 
Wilson preferred the United States to appear ―neutral so as to be able to play the role of 
the arbiter and get the belligerents to peace negotiations based on the premise of no 
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gains.‖ On the other hand, Theodore Roosevelt argued for immediate military 
preparedness to intervene, criticizing the German invasion of the neutral country, 
Belgium.79 Former President Roosevelt criticized President Wilson for his failure to 
protest Germany‘s attack upon Belgium. 
It was against this foil that Hulbert invoked the occasion to draw public attention 
to the ―Korean problem.‖ In his letter to the editor of the New York Times, he said that it 
was amusing to read former president Roosevelt‘s diatribe on the Wilson administration, 
because his words were even more ―applicable to himself and his own acts in 1905.‖ 
Hulbert said, Roosevelt spoke of Korea as unable to hold her own against Japan. Japan 
had guaranteed Korea‘s independence as Germany had for Belgium, but both powers 
violated the neutrality of the smaller nations. For Hulbert, ―Japan‘s acts were far worse 
than Germany‘s, for Korea consented to let Japan use her territory to strike at Russia, and 
in spite of this, Japan destroyed Korea.‖80 
He went on to say that it was the duty of America to protest against Germany‘s 
violation of Belgium‘s neutrality as well as against Japan‘s encroachments in Korea, and 
―precisely as the present Administration failed to protest in the case of Belgium, so 
Roosevelt failed to protest against the rapacity of Japan in 1905.‖81 He criticized the 
Roosevelt administration for not aiding Korea, despite the treaty between the United 
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States and Korea of 1882, the first clause of which promised, ―If other powers deal 
unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, 
on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing 
their friendly feelings.‖82 Hulbert‘s comments marked the first time that this ―good 
offices‖ clause was invoked publicly in support of the Korean cause. From then until 
1945, it became the common theme of the Korean nationalist movement in the United 
States when asking for help from the American government. 
Hulbert then stated that since the annexation of Korea was forced by the sword, 
this was explicitly an occasion in which the United States, as a country friendly to Korea, 
should have intervened and mediated. Instead, President Roosevelt and the State 
Department had refused a written message from the Korean Emperor requesting help 
from the United States. As the envoy of the former Emperor of Korea, who carried the 
message to the U.S., Hulbert revealed the story that the Secretary of State rejected to 
accept the message, asking, ―Do you want us to get into trouble with Japan?‖ He asserted 
that it showed the cowardly state of mind to which the administration was reduced by the 
distant possibility of a clash with Japan. Hulbert added, ―the last person in the world to 
complain of international timidity is Theodore Roosevelt, not Wilson.‖83  
In a more detailed article in March 1916 about the collapse of Korea and its 
request for international aid, Hulbert wrote the full story of how he brought the 
Emperor‘s letter to Roosevelt, condemning Roosevelt who denied that he was aware of 
the contents of the letter. According to Hulbert, in 1905 Korean Emperor Kojong asked 
the American government to intercede with its good offices to pacify the threat of 
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unlawful seizure of Korea by Japan. While Hulbert was on the way to Washington, ―the 
Japanese seized the palace in Seoul, filled it with gendarmes and police, blocked every 
approach to the Emperor, brought the Emperor and his Cabinet together, and 
peremptorily demanded that they sign the death warrant of Korean independence,‖ as 
reported to him by Prime Minister Han Kyu-sôl. While the Emperor and the Prime 
Minister never signed the agreement, three officials signed it and it was said that the 
Japanese stole the Great Seal of State from the Foreign Office, and they affixed it to the 
paper. The letter written by Kojong declared: ―The treaty was null and void, that it had 
been secured at the point of the sword, that it had been wrested from his Foreign Minister 
under duress, and that he himself had never signed it or acquiesced in its signature.‖84 
Hulbert arrived in Washington and secured the emperor‘s letter from a friend, to 
whom it had been sent in the legation mail pouch. However, as his earlier article 
revealed, both the White House and Department of State refused to receive the letter from 
Korea and in a few days, the American Government accepted Japan‘s unsupported 
statement that the protectorate had been secured to the satisfaction of the Korean court: 
Without a word of inquiry at the Korean Legation at Washington, without a word 
to the Emperor of Korea, without a single diplomatic formality in consideration of 
the Korean people and Government, the American Administration accepted 
Japan‘s bald statement, cabled the American Minister in Seoul to close the 
legation and broke off friendly intercourse with a treaty power, weak, to be sure, 
and needing all things, but a power to which we had been saying for twenty-five 
years that American stands for a square deal, for right as against mere brute force, 
a power that had given to Americans more opportunities for productive enterprise 
than to all other peoples combined, a power to which we had given our promise 
that if in her hour of need she should appeal to us we would exert our good offices 
in her behalf.85 
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As Hulbert‘s story became known, Robert Ritchie, who had been in Korea as a 
correspondent for Harper’s Magazine, also provided corroborative testimony of the 
conditions in Korea right before the Protectorate treaty of 1905. According to Ritchie, as 
Japan‘s intention to annex Korea became manifest, ―every foreigner in Seoul at all 
familiar with the Korean viewpoint and the attitude of the remnant of patriots still loyal to 
the Emperor shared with him the hope, almost amounting to conviction, that intervention 
to save the tottering sovereignty of the country must come from Washington,‖ due to the 
―good offices‖ clause in the treaty between the United States and Korea. As Hulbert 
stated, Ritchie was refused recognition by the Washington Government because he did 
not appear with formal credentials as a special emissary. Ritchie emphasized this point: 
[…] the Emperor of Korea did not dare intrust his personal appeal to President 
Roosevelt, signed as it was by his personal seal, to a Korean armed with the 
exequatur of a special ambassador, because the Japanese would never have 
permitted such a messenger to leave the country. His arrest and the discovery of 
the imperial appeal would precipitate extreme action on Japan‘s part. Mr. Hulbert 
the Japanese did not dare intercept, but Mr. Hulbert, being an alien, could not be 
invested with the powers of a special ambassador. Later the Emperor paid dearly 
for violating the rule of safety he adopted in Mr. Hulbert‘s case. The arrest of a 
native emissary to The Hague tribunal led to the last swift stroke of Japanese 
domination and the dethronement of the Emperor.‖ 
 
Ritchie also gave a supplementary account of the Japanese use of force in making 
Korea a protectorate:  
Because of his absence in Washington Mr. Hulbert did not see the drama set in 
Seoul on the night of Nov. 17, 1905. He did not hear, as I did, the tramp of 
infantry descending from the Japanese barracks to surround the palace and 
overawe with rifles the timorous people of the capital, while Marquis Ito went to 
the council chamber of the Korean Ministers, with a body guard of armed men, to 
force the signing of the treaty robbing the ancient empire of its prerogatives of 
sovereignty.‖86 
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Yale professor George T. Ladd, famous for his close relationship with Ito 
Hirobumi and his favorable view of Japan, rejected both Hulbert and Ritchie‘s accounts, 
arguing that it was not true that the Japanese government stole the Korean Seal of State. 
He said that the American government had acted with ―diplomatic wisdom and according 
to international usage and essential justice,‖ when it was approached by Hulbert with the 
Emperor Kojong‘s letter.87 Against this, Frederick McCormick, a correspondent in the Far 
East, again confirmed that the Korean Emperor acted under duress with full 
reservations.88 
Hulbert‘s effort to let the public know about how Japan had forced Korea into 
submission was successful to some extent, as the issue provoked debate not only among 
opinion makers but also in the U.S. Congress. The Senate, as a response to Hulbert‘s 
articles, adopted the resolution on February 21, 1916, which requested the President, if 
not incompatible with the public interests, to transmit to the Senate the correspondence 
between the official representatives of the Government of the United States and the 
representatives of the Government of Korea relating to the occupation of Korea and the 
establishment of a protectorate over her by Japan. The report of the Secretary of State had 
the approval of President Wilson.89  
The disclosed correspondences between the American Legation in Korea and the 
American government (the White House and the State Department) showed that an 
American representative in Korea, Horace N. Allen, sympathized with the Korean 
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government. However, Allen believed that it was not a good idea to invoke the good 
office of the United States, as it would only be an embarrassment to the Korean court. 
Also, Allen notified the U.S. government that the Korean Emperor ―confidently expects 
America will do something for him at the close of this [Russo-Japanese] War, or when 
opportunity offers, to retain for him as much of his independence as possible,‖ but the 
Secretary of State instructed him to ―observe absolute neutrality.‖ In October 1905, 
Edwin V. Morgan, Minster to Korea, cabled: ―The Emperor confides in me that the 
Japanese are pressing him to arrange a protocol. Although unwilling to do this, he may 
ultimately be constrained to agree. He desires particularly to maintain the present right of 
direct relations with foreign powers.‖90 
Even though there was no further development of the debate or comment in the 
Congress on the conditions in Korea and Korea‘s request for help from the United States 
in 1916, the disclosed correspondence and witness accounts confirmed that the American 
government was aware of the position of the Korean court. It chose to be neutral, which 
was in fact complying with the Japanese orientation toward colonizing Korea.91 
Notwithstanding, this was the first time that the conditions leading to Japanese control of 
Korea and the response of the U.S. government were made public in the United States.  
 
 2. American Reactions to the March First Movement (1919) 
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A terrible thing happened at --- about --- miles from ---. In a village there the men 
were ordered by the soldiers to go to the church on a Tuesday afternoon. About a 
dozen Christians and some twenty members of the Chundokyo responded. When 
they were in the church, the soldiers fired through the windows, killing and 
wounding the party. Then the church was set on fire. The flames set one-half of 
the village on fire, and the soldiers then set fire to the other half. All but three 
houses were destroyed.92 
 
On March 27th, at about 9 pm, a large body of young men gathered at Andong, 
Seoul, and shouted ―Mansei.‖93 The shouting had continued for a few minutes 
when a large force of police gendarmes and soldiers arrived and dispersed them. 
The above-name young man, like the others, was peacefully going home and 
alone, was walking along a small street when suddenly some one pushed him 
violently in the back, causing him to stumble and fall. His assailant was a 
policeman who had seen him in the crowd and followed him to the place where he 
thought fit to make the attack. After throwing him to the ground the policeman 
drew his sword and literally hacked at him ―like a woodsman would attack a 
rough old oak.‖ His skull was cut right through so that the brain was visible.94 
 
We were marching from the station toward Chongno, cheering and shouting 
―Mansei.‖ As we were nearing the Dok-su Palace, all of a sudden a Japanese 
policeman seized me from behind by my hair and I was violently thrown to the 
ground. He kicked me several times with his merciless foot. At this I was 
rendered almost unconscious…. I was led to the Chongno Police Department. 
[…] I was made to kneel down with my legs bound together, and each question 
and answer was accompanied alternately by blows in the face. They spit in my 
face. This with curses and invectives of the worst kind. He said, ―You prostitute, 
you vile, pregnant girl!‖ I was ordered to expose my breasts, but refusing, they 
tore my upper garment from me and I was told all sorts of inhuman things which 
shocked me terribly. They tied my fingers together and jerked them violently. 
[…]95 
 
Such shocking accounts of the March First Movement occurred from March 1, 
1919 in Korea made the front pages of the American newspapers. As American writers 
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expressed, this was a big change from four years ago when half the people in America 
did not know such a country existed.96 
Although the public demonstration on the streets in Korea since March 1, 1919 
was suppressed by the end of April, the movement continued outside of Korea—in Japan, 
Manchuria, China, the United States, Siberia, Moscow, Paris, and Britain—and the 
aftermath of the Movement was not easily destroyed. At first, it was reported that Korean 
nationalist groups had declared the independence of Korea and had appealed for help to 
the U.S. officials and government, claiming that the Japanese annexation of Korea was 
illegal, as Hulbert and other American supporters of Korean nationalism had claimed 
since the middle 1910s.97 The Korean National Association proclaimed the Constitution 
of the Korean Republic in June 1919 in San Francisco.98 Korean activists concentrated 
their points on the four thousand year history of Korean independence, the illegality of 
the annexation, and the immorality of the Japanese assimilation policy, referencing their 
arguments to American president Wilson‘s idea, the right of all peoples to ―self-
determination,‖ to freely decide on their sovereignty.99 In an article on Korean appeal 
based on the Wilson‘s idea, E. S. Bisbee said, ―The appeal related that the desire of the 
people was freedom from domination by Japan and the preservation of nationalism.‖ He 
went on, ―Korea, the Hermit of the Orient, is today crying for recognition by the Peace 
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Conference and for the right to that self-determination by small and subject nationalities 
which was made one of the most conspicuous of the Fourteen Points of President 
Wilson.‖100 To borrow Frank Baldwin‘s words, Korean perceptions of Wilson and their 
hopes for his support drew on longstanding views of the United States as an exemplar of 
modern civilization and the power most sympathetic toward colonial aspirations for 
independence.101 As Manela argues, this perception of the United States was more 
common and more deeply entrenched among Korean nationalists than among other 
colonial peoples, due to the impact of Protestant missions in Korea and the prominence 
among expatriate activists of men who studied and lived in the U.S.102  
The news of the March First Movement appeared in American newspapers within 
ten days,103 following the personal correspondences from missionaries in Korea to their 
friends, family, and mission boards in the U.S. It was reported that Koreans declared their 
independence in nonviolent protested of Japanese military rule.104 On the contrary, the 
Japanese authorities were oppressing the movement very cruelly, newspapers reported. 
The mass media presented the striking contrast between the nonviolent Korean 
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demonstrators and brutal Japanese soldiers. For example, The Missionary Review of the 
World reported, 
 …the Korean leaders issued an ―Important Announcement‖ calling on the 
―Respectable, Noble, Independent Korean Band not to insult the Japanese, or 
strike them with their fists, for these are the acts of barbarians.‖ They had no 
weapons and their method was merely to leave schools, close shops, march [sic], 
singing and shouting Manzai [sic] through the street. For this they have been shot 
down, maltreated and haled to prison.105 
 
The tone of the newspaper reports was at times extreme and emotional, as seen in titles 
such as ―Butchery in Korea,‖ ―Korean Women Stripped, Tortured by Japanese,‖ 
―American Women Beaten by Japs,‖ and ―Girl‘s Hands Cut off.‖106 These reports were 
often coupled with pictures, such as a scene of crucifixions of the ―Korean victims of 
Japanese militarism‖ [Figure 7] or the remains of churches burned by Japanese soldiers.107 
Despite the potential repercussions, Koreans continued to protest the Japanese militarism, 
which earned them international praise as a vigorous, courageous, and strong-willed 
people, traits which were rooted in a strong sense of nationalism, pride of their own 
history and traditions, and belief in humanity and justice.108 This was a very different 
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image of Koreans formed from that in the American press and literature up to the years 
around the Korean annexation. 
 
Figure 7. Crucifixions in 1919 - The Korean victims of Japanese militarism were placed in a kneeling 
position for execution, with arms extended upon a rude cross, as if to cast ridicule on the Christian 
religion [original caption]. 
Source: ―More Light from Korea,‖ Literary Digest 61 (May 31, 1919): 35. 
 
Ironically, because of the contrast between the violence of the Japanese police and 
the ―passive demonstrations‖ of Koreans, the news of the Movement easily spread, 
eliciting discourse about Japanese colonialism among American opinion makers. In 
addition to the organizing skills of Korean demonstrators, American readers were 
impressed by their nonviolent way of protesting, which exhibited ―a remarkable degree of 
shrewdness,‖ for ―it has served from the first to put Japan on the defensive before the 
world‖109; it was common knowledge that Japan was extremely sensitive to international 
opinions. A commentator expected in May 1919 that Japan would ―act very quickly when 
she knows the world‘s mind about Korea.‖110 
 
(1) American Missionaries and Christian groups 
                                                                                                                                            
The Koreans do not care whether they are killed or not because, they argue, death is better than the horror 
of their lot under Japanese rule (―Efforts of Japan to Crush Korea,‖ Current Opinion 67 [Sep 1919]: 220). 
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What made those shocking scenes of Korean demonstration believable to 
Americans as well as emotional—and possibly religious—was the witness of 
missionaries in Korea. As in the Conspiracy Case in 1911, but with much more 
desperation now, it was missionaries who started to transmit the news of Korea to their 
family, friends, mission boards, and the American public. Missionaries also tried to 
contact the Japanese officials in Korea, Japan, and the U.S., but were not successful.111 
Many missionaries reported that they witnessed, ―children beaten, old men ejected 
from their houses, and women struck with swords, and they could not keep quiet, for 
humanity‘s sake, whatever the cost to their missionary work and themselves.‖112 A. E. 
Armstrong, a Canadian missionary, after observing the situation, lamented, ―What I 
learned in Korea roused my indignation and sympathy—indignation at the cruel 
treatment given the Koreans by Japanese police and soldiers, sympathy for an oppressed 
and defenseless people crying out for justice.‖113 
The missionaries‘ accusations of Japanese cruelty led to the question again of 
whether Christians were actively being discriminated against and persecuted. News that 
Japanese soldiers had gathered Christian men in Cheam-ri village into the local church 
and then burned them alive provided strong evidence for such accusations.114 The 
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impression that the Japanese were unfairly dealing with the native Christians in the 
Conspiracy Case in 1911 led to the assumption that many innocent Koreans were being 
harshly treated because of their Christian religion in 1919. In addition, the news media 




Figure 8. Native Korean Christian preachers—whose efforts to change the religion of Korea are 
opposed by Japan. Bishop Harris, of the Methodist Church, stands in the center of the group 
[original caption]. 
Source: ―Uncensored News of Korean Christians,‖ Literary Digest 61 (May 10, 1919): 32. 
 
American Christian groups refrained from publicly commenting on the situation 
in Korea in the early stages of the movement, fearing that it would instigate anti-Japanese 
feelings in the United States.115 For this reason, missionaries in Korea, following the 
guidance of their consular officers, tried to remain politically neutral. However, they 
could not ignore the brutality of the Japanese authorities. Under the slogan ―No 
                                                                                                                                            
market town in Kyonggi Province in April 1919 and heard that Japanese troops had massacred the 
inhabitants and burned thirty-six of the forty homes of the village Cheam-ri. Underwood, Curtis, the 
American Consul in Seoul, and A. W. Taylor, a correspondent of the Associated Press visited the village 
and had a conversation with a Korean near the smoking ruins, learning that the Korean witnessed that 
Japanese soldiers ordered all the Christians – about thirty of them - to gather in the church and then killed 
them all. Underwood also provided two more accounts of the burning of the church at Chôngju in North 
P‘yôngan Province (―Japanese Atrocities in Korea Denounced by American Churchmen,‖ Current Opinion 
67, no. 3 [Sep 1919]: 176). After the incident was known all over the world, the American missionary W. 
A. Noble and the acting British Consul General in Seoul, William M. Royds also visited the village 
investigating the situation (Bergholz [Seoul] to Lansing, May 12, 1919, 895.00/642, IAK, 1910-19, roll 3). 
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Neutrality for Brutality,‖116 missionaries in Korea were sending more and more 
information about the real situation that would have been censored in the early days. The 
increasing worry about the security of Christians and missionaries in Korea caused the 
Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of 
Christ in America—the interdenominational organization of American Protestant 
churches—to release information about the Movement and recent events in Korea from 
July 1919, while contacting the Japanese Foreign Offices.117 
The Commission made it clear that it would not concern itself with political 
questions, that is, whether Korea should be independent or not; rather, its main purpose 
was to ensure that ―brutality, torture, inhuman treatment, religious persecution, and 
massacres shall cease everywhere.‖118 However, as political scientist Willoughby pointed 
out, the fact that the Council felt compelled to issue a public report itself was indicative 
of the extent of the atrocities committed, ―for it is well known how unwilling church 
bodies are openly to criticize the governing authorities of the lands in which they carry on 
missionary work.‖119 The Commission in its publications hoped that a sound and 
enlightened public opinion among Americans would strengthen the progressive and anti-
militaristic forces in Japan and secure justice and fair dealings in Korea.120 
It is notable that the Commission still did not avoid showing its personal opinion 
that the independence movement was hopeless and that ―some measure of self-
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government is the most that can ever be secured.‖121 The self-government, the 
Commission commented, would be possible through Americans‘ moral support of the 
progressive and anti-militaristic forces, as opposed to the reactionary and autocratic 
Japanese authorities.122 This rather moderate position of the Commission may have 
derived from the pro-Japanese stance of Sidney Gulick, the secretary of the Commission 
at that time, as Nagata argues.123 However, the Commission‘s moral criticism on the 
cruelty of the Japanese authorities in Korea was obvious in their vivid accounts of the 
situation. In its second booklet, the Commission claimed that Americans naturally and 
inevitably sympathized with the patriotic aspirations of the Korean people, but that the 
assimilation policy of the Japanese military government-general in Korea was futile and 
foolish. It stated that while Americans regarded the chief issue in Korea as essentially one 
of humanity and justice for Koreans, Japan and many Koreans regarded the chief issue as 
political. It stressed that the Korean question was not primarily an issue between 
paganism and Christianity, but a political issue. By saying this, the Council tried to 
express its neutral position politically while showing its indignation at the cruelties 
against Koreans. 
On the other hand, the Commission did not shut off the possibility of Korean 
independence. Although immediate independence would be undesirable, it suggested that 
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any ‗friends of Korea‘ remember that readiness for independence under a democratic 
form of government depends on the fitness of a people trained in self-control and 
educated for citizenship and that the local autonomy promised by Japan may be wisely 
utilized as a step toward the goal of complete independence. This was a comparatively 
rare optimistic view of the Korean independence. Also, the Commission showed a rare 
political comment. The Commission‘s statement demonstrates that despite their neutral 
position, the American churches could not ignore the interwoven relationship between the 
political and religious aspects of the Korean situation and its potential repercussions in 
the U.S. The Commission evaluated that Koreans displayed high-spirited and noble 
patriotism during the past year and it ―inspired all friends of Korea with new respect for 
the people and new hope for their future.‖124 That Koreans should take the opportunity of 
training themselves with self-governing skills in order to gain complete independence 
would become a common belief among American officials in later years. 
 
(2) Official Attitudes and the U.S.-Japanese relationship 
As Americans gained knowledge of the atrocities taking place in Korea, American 
organizations, churches, and citizens began to petition the State Department and the 
United States Congress for help in resolving the problem. Some petitions asked that the 
―US government keep a close, careful watch on things over there,‖ as ―there [were] good 
many Americans in that little country and at this time it seems that they [were] in a right 
perilous situation.‖125 Others were more radical. For example, one petition suggested that 
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the new government of Korea led by Syngman Rhee ―should be put in power‖ and this 
could be done by ―the United States taking it over after the fashion of the Philippine 
Islands for a period of say 25 years and during this time Korea could repay Japan for the 
money the latter country has expended in Korea during the time Japan has been in 
control.‖126 
What made the U.S. government react to the Korean situation, however, was 
Japan‘s policy toward foreigners in Korea rather than these petitions. Japanese authorities 
accused Western missionaries of encouraging a revolutionary spirit, including the 
conception of self-determination. For American officials, it seemed that the government-
general in Korea feared that inaugurating administrative reforms before it had pacified 
the country would be viewed as a sign of weakness or an admission of fault. Americans 
observed that there was ―a strong tendency in certain quarters [in Japan] to shift the 
responsibility to foreign influence and particularly to America.‖127 In other words, 
although the March First Movement was a strong expression of the dissatisfaction many 
Koreans felt toward military rule, they understood that the Japanese authorities and mass 
media instead looked for other ―outside‖ factors as the real causes so as to avoid 
admitting their responsibility for the disturbances. They identified two factors of 
American influence to provoke Korean resistance against Japan. According American 
officials‘ analysis, those factors were: Korean misunderstanding of the concept of self-
determination; and American missionaries‘ influence over Koreans.128 That was why the 
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Japanese authorities were making an effort to ―brand the uprising as a Christian 
movement,‖ although it was not true in American officials‘ opinion.129 
 To American officials in East Asia, it seemed ―desirable to restrain the 
missionary bodies in certain instances in the expression of undue sympathy for the 
natives, thereby causing the latter to be indifferent to the dictates of the Japanese 
Government authorities.‖130 The American Consul General already had requested that all 
American missionaries in Korea refrain from intervening in Korean domestic and 
political issues even before the Movement began.131 
The arrest of an American missionary, Eli M. Mowry, by the Japanese police in 
P‘yôngyang in April 1919 drew unique attention from the U.S. government as well as the 
American public: the fact that an American citizen received a guilty verdict in Korea for 
a political crime was itself sensational. His charge was that he had permitted several 
Koreans to use his premises for printing propaganda in connection with the Korean 
independence movement.132 He was sentenced to six months of hard labor and, after an 
appeal, bail was set in the sum of 300 yen.133 As Nagata points out, the reason why the 
Japanese authorities arrested Mowry and did not find him innocent in the courts might be 
that they wanted to demonstrate to Koreans the meaninglessness of their reliance on 
American missionaries and also wanted to show missionaries that Japan would not to 
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condone any hint of their participation in the independence movement.134 As we have 
already seen, this tendency that the Japanese authorities showed in 1919 was parallel with 
their attitude toward the western missionaries when they were mentioned as having been 
involved in the Conspiracy Case in 1911. For readers in the U.S., the fact that the rights 
of American citizens could be endangered by political charges from the Japanese police 
in Korea was understood as a warning which left a strong impression that Japanese rule 
in Korea was an atrocity.135 Although American opinion makers admitted that 
missionaries were responsible for instilling in Koreans the desire for progress, they 
consistently denied that the missionaries were responsible for any anti-Japanese 
movement.136  
However, the State Department was very cautious when responding to appeals for 
the U.S. to aid the Korean cause. It was impossible for the State Department to comment 
or show any opinion on the Korean political issue, which would be an intervention in 
another country‘s domestic issue, unless the security or rights of American citizens in that 
country were involved. In the same context, the State Department instructed the 
American Consulate Office in Korea to warn American missionaries in Korea to be 
extremely careful not to cause the Japanese authorities to suspect them of interfering in 
the political affairs of the country.137 American missionaries‘ involvement in the Korean 
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political issue, regardless of the extent to which they were implicated, could be 
troublesome for American consulate and the State Department.  
However, it did not necessarily mean that the officials personally did not feel 
sympathy toward the missionaries or Koreans. For example, although the American 
Consulate General in Shanghai, in his cable to the Secretary of State, said that 
missionaries should refrain from expressing their sympathy for Koreans, he also 
mentioned that he was very impressed after meeting with Rev. J. S. Gale in 1919. Gale 
was a Canadian missionary in Korea who had been well-known for his ultra-conservative 
and pro-Japanese stance, but who had become anti-Japanese, even loathing ―the 
procedure of the Japanese militarists in Korea in ruthlessly cutting down with sabers and 
firing upon with ball cartridges the Koreans who merely express patriotism for their 
country and the hope that independence might be obtained.‖ The Consul General 
commented about the change of Gale‘s view, 
…it would seem that a very broadminded and highly educated man, who has 
spent a lifetime in studying the Koreans, with a view to improving their lot, had 
ultimately come to the conclusion that the Japanese had failed in their 
administrative policies in that country.138 
 
This shows that although the officials were careful not to be seen as sympathizing 
with the Koreans‘ nationalist cause in their official policy, there was an impact of the 
movement and the series of petitions on the ways of personal thinking of American 
officials. Changes in the official policy of the U.S. government on the Korean problem 
over time and the relationship between policy and what officials‘ personal thoughts will 
be discussed in later chapters. 
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3. The Aftermath of the March First Movement − American Reevaluation of the 
Japanese Rule in Korea 
Once the March First Movement provoked the interest of the American public, 
American commentators continued to debate the origins of the nation-wide protest in 
Korea even after the Movement was quelled down. In addition to the criticism of the 
brutality that the Japanese soldiers showed in treating the demonstrators, the debate 
developed into the more fundamental question of how to evaluate the Japanese rule in 
Korea. Illustrations depicting Japanese as formidable and brutal vis-à-vis suffering 
Koreans began to appear in American periodicals. A cartoon [Figure 9] shows a Japanese 
soldier holding a leash which is wrapped around a Korean man‘s neck, while pointing a 
gun at another soldier. Similarly, a Japanese samurai in Figure 10 carries Korea, a child 
figure, on a fishing hook, symbolizing mistreated Korea and despotic Japan.  
 
 
Figure 9. Illustration from the sketch-books of Willard Straight 







Figure 10. Knott in the Dallas News. 
Source: ―Korea‘s Struggle for Independence,‖ Literary Digest 61 (May 3, 1919): 22. 
 
At the same time, Americans viewed Japanese militaristic censorship over 
Koreans the most outstanding character of the Japanese rule. Reports from Korea pointed 
out that they were denied political rights, such as freedom of speech, press, and assembly. 
In other words, Koreans were denied the fundamental elements of civil liberty, as 
Willoughby wrote.139 For many commentators, the impression was that the Japanese 
government and its colonial policy was a faithful copy of Prussian policy in Poland, that 
is, ―to crush out the national civilization of Korea, and to transmute the Koreans into 
Japanese.‖140 With all its brutalities and engendered hatreds, an article said, Japan‘s 
military subjugation in Korea had an inevitably bad odor from the beginning.141 Although 
the militaristic system was not sudden, American readers became aware of Japanese 
harsh rule in Korea since the March First Movement. Now it did not sound like an 
exaggeration that foreigners in Korea, including consuls, businessmen, and missionaries 
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were unanimous in their condemnation of the system which had ruled Korea since 
1910.142 American viewers saw the Japanese policy of prohibiting Koreans students from 
learning their native language and history even more heartless: they labeled the Japanese 
policy a ―death sentence,‖ an execution of their race, their culture, and their 4,000-year-
old civilization.143 Furthermore, Koreans were given relatively little opportunity than 
Japanese to obtain a higher education. 
Other commentators acknowledged the ultimate difference between Korea and 
Japan from history, and accordingly believed the compulsory but impossible assimilation 
policy of Japan over Korea as the reason for the recent disturbance. It did not seem that 
the agitation would cease, as the very efforts of the Japanese to instill patriotic ideas—for 
the Japanese empire—into Korean students was ―only firing his soul the hotter for his 
own country.‖144 Critics pointed out the hypocrisy of the Japanese policy that was 
stressing assimilation of Korean people into Japanese but treating the colonized people as 
an inferior race.145 Since American public gained more knowledge about the Japanese 
harsh treatment of Koreans, even traveler‘s writing now commented that the material 
improvements in Korea were largely for the benefit of the Japanese.146 Although 
American commentators at times compared the Japanese colonization of Korea to the 
American colonization of the Philippines, now they saw that the Japanese policy 
regarding Koreans was ―almost antithetical‖ to American policy in its colony. 
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Willoughby insisted that American rule in the Philippines, in contrast to Japanese rule, 
―incorporated the American ideals of political justice, substituted civil for military 
government, employed natives in the higher as well as lower branches of the 
administration, granted almost complete administrative and financial autonomy as well as 
almost complete local self-government, and the promise of absolute independence to the 
islands.‖147 
Nevertheless, as in earlier writings, a majority of commentators did not see how 
Korea would benefit from political independence. Its immediate independence would not 
guarantee a stable government, nor freedom to the individual.148 It was likely that absolute 
independence might be her ―further undoing.‖149 Commentators generally believed that 
Koreans, despite the skills and shrewdness that they had shown throughout the 
Movement, were still incapable of self-government. 
Therefore, what was desirable were reforms of the system in Korea initiated by 
the Japanese, especially replacing the military rule by civil rule. This basic tone that 
favored a secure rule in Korea but in a peaceful way had been consistent with the general 
reaction from American commentators to the Conspiracy Case in 1911. The difference 
was that now there was a more desperate calling for ending the militaristic rule that had 
unmasked itself throughout the first decade of the Japanese rule in Korea. Figure 11 and 
Figure 12 describe the American view that military rule in Korea, but not the 
fundamental conditions of colonialism, should change. Illustration of Figure 12 is more 
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symbolic with an American character: in this illustration, a missionary, the figure in the 
center who is holding a Bible, points to a mistreated Korean, who is pinned under the foot 
of a Japanese soldier. The missionary is whispering to a Japanese official seems to be 
seriously listening with a stiffened face. As the title of the article implies, the illustration 
seems to demand that Japanese authorities treat the Korean people in a more humane 
manner. 
 
Figure 11. How not to bring up the baby—grandpa Japan can never quiet baby Korea till he takes off 
that rattling saber [original caption] (from Jiji-shimpo). 










In this context, American commentators began to consider the Japanese plan for 
reforms that started with the assignment of a new Governor-General who had been a civil 
officer and pursued self-government in Korea a significant change.150 For American 
reviewers, who thought that Koreans were not yet ready to govern themselves due to lack 
of experience, self-government was a wise and appropriate policy through which Korean 
leaders could be trained ―in the practical work of administration according to the more 
advanced ideas of the suzerain power,‖ and it might eventually make currently colonized 
peoples like Koreans and Egyptians capable of ruling themselves. An editorial of the New 
York Times commented that both countries would benefit from a continuance of 
―enlightened rule‖ from the outside, with gradual progress toward self-government, 
which would also be in the best interest of the international community.151  
The March First Movement had an impact on the American understanding of, and 
relationship with, Japan. As we have examined in the earlier chapter, the American view 
of Japan revealed two opposite sides of the same coin—not only praise for its rapid 
modernization of Korea (and itself), but also suspicion of an expansionist move. 
Although the Japanese authorities framed the disturbance in Korea as a domestic problem 
of the Japanese empire, American readers viewed the Movement as evidence of 
expansionist ambitions.152  
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4. Japan Defends Its Position 
Facing the surge of international comments and criticisms regarding its control of 
Korea, Japanese authorities felt compelled to justify their position on the world stage. In 
the early 1920s, English-language publications by the Japanese government and 
government-general in Korea increased substantia`lly, and included pamphlets about 
newly designed reforms, statistics on economic development, and guidebooks on the 
attractions in Korea. At the same time, leading Japanese officials and other elites 
published articles in major American magazines. The purpose of these publications was 
to correct the misrepresentation of Japan‘s international image, especially to the 
American audience, who had harshly criticized Japan‘s treatment of missionaries in the 
wake of the March First Movement. The editor of the Seoul Press, the English-language 
organ of the Government-General in Korea, explained, ―the present campaign of slander 
against Japan will gradually disappear as the American people learn by degrees what 
Japan has been doing and will do concerning Shangtung [Shandong, China] and Chosen 
[Korea].‖ He continued,  
As, however, the sooner the sky is cleared up the better it is for both 
America and Japan, we must do all we can to correct these 
misrepresentations and exaggerations which have been so unscrupulously 
disseminated in the States by the enemies of Japan.153  
 
Japanese writers pointed out that many parts of the American criticism of the 
Japanese stemmed from misunderstandings and mistaken reports by the media. For 
example, an article in The Far East, the English-language magazine published in Japan, 
stated that the photo of the crucifixion of Korean Christians by Japanese soldiers reported 
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in The Literary Digest and The Public [Figure 7] was a fabricated image. It also denied 
that the Japanese were stamping out Christianity in Korea. It said that because this picture 
was carried by a first-class magazine in the United States, the picture made an effective 
pictorial misrepresentation of Japan, on which some actions should be taken.154 Japan‘s 
reaction showed that they were continuously very sensitive to the American public 
opinion on Japan.155 Many publications continued to emphasize the progress and 
development of Korean sanitation, industry, agriculture, transportation and 
communication since the annexation, complete with before-and-after pictures, which had 
been a typical propaganda method of Japan before the March First Movement.156 On the 
two main criticisms of the Japanese policy in Korea, the gendarmerie system and 
persecution of Christianity, Japanese writers stressed that the gendarmerie system was 
temporary but inevitable for peaceful annexation; and that the conditions of Christians in 
Korea were exaggerated, as Koreans had lied to American missionaries about their 
persecution. Moreover, they claimed, Japanese and foreign missionaries had the same 
purpose, that is, the progress of Korea.157 
If Japanese rule in Korea brought such developments to Korean society, why did 
the disturbances happen? It was the primary question that the Japanese writers needed to 
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answer. A typical answer was to blame the activities on exiled Koreans, who they 
claimed that misunderstood and misused Wilson‘s self-determination idea in provoking 
Korean demonstrations. Yamagata, the editor of Seoul Press, said, quoting an American 
missionary, Frank Smith, that ―without the instigation from outside, from America, 
Hawaii, Shanghai, and Vladivostok, no demonstrations would have occurred,‖ and that 
the movement was not nationwide, but took place at only a score or more of the chief 
centers.158 
The Japanese authorities publicized the fact that they were making reforms of 
Japanese rule in Korea. At the same time, they tried to stress that the changes and reforms 
were not made in response to Korean protesters, but were part of the continued efforts to 
improve conditions in Korea. Rather, they claimed, the March First Movement delayed 
reforms that were to be carried out, as it kept the authorities occupied with restoring 
order.159 The government-general had already pursued the aim ―of placing the Japanese 
and Korean peoples on a footing of equality, of promoting the welfare and happiness of 
the two peoples, and of securing the permanent peace of the Far East,‖ since the 
annexation. With the material progress and achievements in Korea, the government-
general insisted that they would propel further reforms in the same spirit. As to the 
specific content of the reforms, Japanese writers made several points. Above all, now 
civil officials, not only military officials, were made eligible for the post of governor-
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general, and the policing of the country was placed in the hands of the ordinary police, 
not the gendarmerie. They insisted that they had also abolished all discrimination 
between Japanese and Korean officials in terms of salary and available posts in the 
government-general. The new Governor-General, Makoto Saitō, wrote in his contribution 
to an American magazine, The Independent, that he desired to hear the opinions and 
complaint of Koreans and would mold his policy so as to satisfy their reasonable 
desires.160 With these reforms, Korea and Japan proper would form equally integral parts 
of the same Empire, and it was the ultimate purpose of the Japanese government in due 
course to treat Korea as in all respects on the same footing with Japan. Although this 
idealistic outlook on the Korean problem by the Japanese writers did not always seem 
realistic to American readers, it was enough to show that the Japanese authorities were 
making efforts to ameliorate the social conditions in Korea. 
Reports on the American rule in the Philippines by Japan‘s English-language 
magazines supplemented the justification of the Japanese control in Korea. For instance, 
an article in The Far East on the problem of Philippine independence mentioned that the 
American residents in the colony were almost unanimously opposed to independence. It 
went on to say that the American argument was that a strong, stable, and experienced 
government was the first essential prerequisite for the development of the resources in the 
Philippines, and that the Filipinos were physically and temperamentally unfit for national 
independence.161 The reference to the American rule in the Philippines was to find 
similarities between Japanese and American colonial rule and to earn American 
sympathy for Japan‘s struggle as a colonizer. 
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By early 1920, Americans who had known little about Korea became aware of the 
situation that the country was facing under the harsh Japanese colonialism. Based on 
information from the Japanese, Americans had previously considered Korea merely as a 
legitimate colony of the newly rising Japanese empire. But after the March First 
Movement, Americans became aware of Korea‘s plight under colonial rule. In other 
words, the American attitude toward the ―Korean problem‖ changed from indifference to 
concern and careful observation. 
In this process, the majority of American writers sympathized with the Korean 
people and requested the Japanese authorities implement more humanitarian policies 
toward Koreans, under the motto of ―No Neutrality for Brutality.‖ At the same time, the 
best resolution possible for the present conditions in Korea was civilian reform. Although 
American elites and officials were aware that Korean nationalists desired absolute 
independence, these Americans believed that it was not desirable for the order of East 
Asia and the world. This cautious view on the Korean problem from the American side 
remained and lasted until the end of colonial rule in Korea in 1945. Nevertheless, what is 
noteworthy in this period is that Korean nationalist activities eventually caused American 
elites, religious groups, and officials, that is, the opinion makers, came to have more a 
specific view on the Korean problem.  
As the ―Korean problem‖ up to the early 1920s was mentioned and debated 
among American and Japanese opinion makers, Koreans also began to raise their own 














CHAPTER  THREE 
 






In the wake of the March First Movement (1919) both Korean nationalists and 
outside observers began to view Korea differently. The Movement provoked many 
Korean nationalist and communist groups to emerge from the early 1920s. At the end of 
the First World War, Korean nationalists were full of hope that discussions of self-
determination and expressions of international sympathy for the Korean people would 
quickly precipitate Korea‘s independence. As outside observers showed more interest in 
the Korean problem from 1919, the changed outside perception of Korea provided 
Korean people with the opportunity to express their thoughts on the international stage 
almost for the first time. By raising their voices, Korean people living in the United 
States, in particular, began to inform American audiences of the conditions in colonial 
Korea. The post-First World War period from 1918 to 1921 marked a peak of American 
public interest in Korea‘s colonial situation. Korean nationalist leaders reorganized and 
systematized their propaganda activities to the American people, including politicians. 
They also organized a group of pro-Korean Americans during this period. Korean leaders 
focused on appealing to the American audience, much more than in other countries, 




well as in its relationship with Korea. This chapter explores how these Korean leaders‘ 
beliefs were presented to, and received by, American audiences in the post-First World 
War years. 
 
1. The Official U.S. Position 
(1) Officials in Charge 
 The Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State was the main U.S. 
governmental institution in charge of Korea-related issues during the colonial period.
1
 As 
an institution for handling the American federal government‘s foreign relations, the 
Department of State assigned Foreign Service personnel to nations maintaining 
diplomatic relations with the U.S. Under the 1882 U.S. and Korea Treaty, the first 
American ambassador arrived in Korea in 1883. However, the protectorate treaty was 
enforced on Korea on November 17, 1905, which caused American officials to withdraw 
the American legation on November 24, 1905.2 With this immediate action, the U.S. 
became ―the first country to announce the decision to withdraw its legation from Korea.‖3 
The withdrawal of the U.S. legation from Korea did not mean the immediate 
departure of all American citizens. American citizens could stay in Korea the same way 
                                               
1 The Division of Far Eastern Affairs (FE from now on) had ―general charge, under the Secretaries of 
Department of State, of relations, diplomatic and consular, political and economic, with China, Japan, and 
Siam, and with the Far Eastern possessions and territories of European nations and the foreign-controlled 
islands of the Pacific not included therein, and of such matters as concern [the State] Department in relation 
to the American-controlled islands of the Pacific and to the Far East in general‖; and had ―charge of such 
matters as concern State Department in relation to the control of the traffic in narcotic drugs‖ 
(―Organization of the Foreign Services,‖ U.S. Department of State, Register of the Department of State 
[Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1936], 10). 
2 From the Secretary of State (Root) to Seoul (Morgan), Instructions, Korea, M. 77, R. 109; From the 
Secretary of State (Root) to Seoul (Morgan), Nov 24, 1905, FRUS, 1905, 631; From the Secretary of State 
(Root) to Diplomatic Officers of the United States, Nov 25, 1905, FRUS, 1905, 626, quoted from Seung-
young Kim, 60-65. 
3




they were allowed to stay in Japan. For practical reasons, such as the protection of 
American citizens in the country, the U.S. also maintained its Consular Office in Korea, 
although there was no effective diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and Korea. At 
Korea‘s annexation, the U.S. Consular Office in Korea was absorbed into the U.S. 
Embassy in Japan. As Consular Officers, American diplomatic officials in Korea were in 
charge of dealing with ―every problem that enters into the relation of the U.S. with 
foreign countries, whether it be political, commercial, administrative or social.‖4 In 
addition to handling these diplomatic issues, an important task of officials in the 
Consulate Office was transmitting information about conditions in Korea to the State 
Department. Notably, Foreign Service officers who had served in Consulate Offices and 
embassies in East Asian countries were later assigned to the Division of Far Eastern 
Affairs in many cases, because of their experience in the region and language skills.5 
 American Foreign Service officers in colonial Korea collected, translated, and 
transmitted major news and issues of Korea to Washington. Because the State 
Department encouraged them to analyze and report on political and economic conditions 
and trends of significance to the U.S.,6 it was also common for officials in Korea to 
express their own opinions with detailed information on Korean domestic issues. Their 
major informants were the Japanese officials of government-general and American 
residents in Korea, mainly businessmen and missionaries. Due to officials‘ limited 
                                               
4 Register of the Department of State, 337-39. 
5 It is significant that many of the former consular officers in Korea, Japan, and other East Asian posts 
came to serve in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and participated in making decisions on liberated 
Korea after the Pacific War in the 1940s. Therefore, eyewitness observation and the following opinion on 
the Korean problem of these officials in the fields would be ultimately applied to the American official 





interaction with Koreans, American missionaries served as crucial informants, providing 
inside stories regarding the general sentiment of, or social and political changes among, 
Koreans.7 
 As the American Consulate was not responsible for diplomatic activities, but was 
charged with maintaining American citizens‘ status and security, U.S. officials in Korea 
were primarily concerned with the impacts that the annexation would have on American 
residents and businessmen in Korea. In June 1910, for instance, while reporting about 
Korea‘s imminent colonization, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs advised the Secretary 
of State: ―when annexation does take place, whether in the near future or later on, the 
points in which the United States are particularly concerned are the surrender of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and the customs tariff.‖8  
Likewise, in a report to the American ambassador to Japan on the Korean political 
situation in August 19190, the Vice Consul General in Seoul wrote, 
I judge that the Korean Emperor will request annexation and that annexation will 
be followed by an attempt to abrogate the existing treaties, with the customs 
tariffs and extraterritorial rights which they provide.  
Local British and German firms, it is said, have strongly protested to their 
respective governments against the probable abrogation of the treaties. To 
―temper the wind to the shorn lamb,‖ it is considered here possible that Japan will 
allow the treaties to continue fearing that the unpopularity of her Russian 
agreement and new tariff forbids any further annoyance to foreign powers at 
present.  
                                               
7 At the time of the March First Movement, American Consul Officers gathered information about Korean 
demonstrators and the Japanese suppression of them through contact with American missionaries, including 
D. M. McRae, of the Canadian Presbyterian Mission, S. A. Moffett of the Northern Presbyterian Mission, 
John Thomas, the head of the Oriental Missionary Society, Stacy L. Robert of the Northern Presbyterian 
Mission, and O. R. Avison, President of Severance Hospital. Consul General Bergholz in May 1919 
requested members of the Methodist and Presbyterian Missions to prepare a brief historical narrative of 
Korea and its relations to Japan and the various causes which led to the current uprising in Korea and 
transmitted the report to the State Department for information (From Seoul [Bergholz] to Secretary of 
State, May 22, 1919, 895.00/639, IAK, 1910-29).  
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He summarized, ―it may be pointed out that American interests will be in no way helped 
by the loss of our treaty rights,‖ adding, ―That the customs tariff should not be altered at 
present is the opinion of many Japanese as well as all foreign business men.‖9 As seen 
here, the major interest of American officials related to Korea in the 1900s was the 
practical one of the commercial rights of American companies, rather than the political 
one of Korea‘s fate as a nation. Officials were concerned about whether the annexation of 
Korea would nullify the privileges of Americans, especially the most favored nation 
status and extraterritorial rights for American citizens in Korea, which had been 
guaranteed by the U.S.-Korean Treaty of 1882.  
Although the U.S. Consular Office pursued the preservation of American 
commercial interests and legal rights in Korea during the colonial period, it was 
instructed to do only so as long as this did not lead to any disruption of friendly relations 
with Japan. One example was the ―Unsan‖ gold mine case. The American owners of the 
Unsan gold mine in Korea were granted a concession from the Korean royal household in 
1895 and developed it into one of the world‘s foremost producers of gold.10 By the 
middle of the 1930s, the mine was America‘s last remaining resource for economic 
profits in Korea. The U.S. Consulate received letters from the gold mine company asking 
it to mediate cases in which foreigners could ―no longer acquire mining rights in Korea, 
                                               
9 He also mentioned specific names of American companies that would be impacted by this change: ―The 
Standard Oil Company will be a heavy loser; the British-American Tobacco Company, large importers of 
American tobacco in manufactured forms, will, doubtless, be forced out of business; American cotton 
goods, at present competing successfully with Japanese fabrics, will have to abandon most of their market 
here, and many other American imports will find no ‗open door‘ of opportunity, if the Japanese tariff is to 
be applied here and if Japanese goods are to enter duty free…‖ (―Korean Political Situation,‖ From 
American Consulate General [Ozro C. Gould, Vice Consul General, in charge] to American Ambassador to 
Japan (T. J. O‘Brien), Aug 8, 1910, 895.00/493, IAK, 1910-29). 
10 By 1939, Unsan gold mine had become ―the most lucrative enterprise of its kind in Asia.‖ Spencer J. 
Palmer, ―American Gold Mining in Korea‘s Unsan District,‖ The Pacific Historical Review 31, no. 4 (Nov 




except by becoming Japanese juridical persons‖ with newly enacted mining regulations. 
When the Japanese authorities enforced an export embargo on gold in 1932, they 
―compelled all gold producers to sell their gold at a price fixed from time to time by the 
Imperial government‖;11 and controversy on the tax levy and the company‘s concession 
occurred in 1933-37. The Consulate Office in Seoul was instructed to be cautious and to 
maintain neutrality in dealing with these issues.12 
Another crucial role of the Consular Office was to collect and transmit 
information about conditions in Korea under Japanese rule. In addition to understanding 
the development of industries, commerce, and education in Korea, as well as political 
trends among the Korean people, the U.S. government utilized the Consular Office in 
Korea as a channel to understand Japanese intentions as an imperial power and colonizer. 
At the same time, as officials in Washington were hardly familiar with issues in East 
Asia, the State Department naturally recognized American officials in Korea as experts 
on the region.  
 
(2) An Ambivalent View 
 American officials in colonial Korea could have ambiguous position, due to the 
U.S.‘ diplomatic relationship with Japan, not Korea, while the conditions in Korea 
frequently called for the humanitarian and moralistic attention of Americans and the 
                                               
11 Ibid., 389. For details of these controversies, see folder 895.63OR4 of IAK, 1930-39. 
12 From Seoul (Neville) to FE, No. 992, 1934. 10. 2., 895.63OR4/43; from Seoul (Langdon) to Embassy at 
Tokyo, FE, 1934. 9. 25, 895.63OR4/44, IAK, 1930-39. The company, under pressure by government-
general in Korea, was finally sold to a Japanese mine company in August 1939. Palmer notes that the 
Japanese in 1937-38 ―showed themselves determined to expel foreign enterprise from Korea. They showed 
this by increasing annoyances and by placing various obstacles in the company‘s path.‖ The company sold 
concession rights, plants, equipment, and supplies to the Nippon Mining Company, a Japanese government-




direct and indirect support of American missionaries. In most cases, American officials in 
Korea and neighboring posts were instructed to maintain an impartial and apolitical 
stance in the field. Nevertheless, like other Americans living in Korea, they were 
personally sympathetic toward the Korean people, exhibiting a modernist view as well as 
a sense of American exceptionalism. Their personal perspectives on specific cases, 
through their reports to Washington, were later recognized as a useful means of 
understanding Japan and the Pacific War, contributing, over the long term, to the making 
of U.S. policy in Far East. Torn between official directives to maintain impartiality and 
their own personal sympathies toward the local people, American officials faced the 
following dilemma: Should the U.S. consider Korea part of Japan or an independent 
entity? 
 The U.S. Consular Office was instructed to maintain neutrality in principle when 
dealing with issues related to Japan‘s policy in Korea or Koreans‘ continuous appeals for 
aid to the American government. As we have seen in earlier chapters, the most frequent 
foundation on which Korean nationalist leaders appealed to the U.S. government 
throughout Korea‘s colonial period was the ―good offices‖ clause in the U.S.-Korean 
Treaty of 1882. Korean nationalist leaders and their American supporters almost always 
cited this clause to legitimate their appeals to the U.S. However, from the beginning, both 
parties of the treaty exhibited wide latitude in interpreting the clause. As Seung-young 
Kim‘s study shows, the good offices clause ―did not imply any special obligation or 
commitment to maintain Korean independence,‖13 but was rather a moral obligation for 
the U.S. government. In the early stages of the U.S.-Korean relationship, Kim argues, 
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there were cases when the U.S. played its good offices role to some extent; for instance, 
when there was a confrontation between China and Japan in 1882 because of a Korean 
military trainee riot, the U.S. ―deployed its gunboat to Korean waters with a view to 
facilitate its good offices role.‖14 Nevertheless, from the beginning, there was a chasm 
between U.S. and Korean interpretations of the clause. When American Minister Lucious 
Foote had his first audience with King Kojong to exchange the ratification of the U.S.-
Korean treaty in 1882, he said, ―In this progressive age, there is a moral power more 
potent than standing armies, and the weakness of a nation is sometimes its strength.‖15 
This statement with emphasis on non-aggression by the American Minister, on one hand, 
convinced the Korean King that the friendship between the two countries was firmly 
cemented and would be continuous.16 On the other hand, the differentiation between 
moral power and military and political power in Foote‘s statement implied that the ―good 
offices‖ clause would be restricted to moral issues and matters not involved in military 
interventions. In short, while these several actions and comments by the U.S. at the time 
of the exchange of the U.S.-Korea Treaty heightened Korean expectations of American 
assistance, the U.S. government tried to make sure that its friendly gesture toward Korea 
was not with practical implications. In the actual case, the U.S. tried to ―disengage itself 
from any kind of political involvement that might lead to military intervention.‖17  
Moreover, as soon as Japan formally claimed Korea as its colony, colonized 
Korea was no longer eligible to exercise sovereignty or any claims related to a treaty with 
                                               
14 Ibid. 
15 ―Foote Address,‖ Enclosures in Foote to Frelinghuysen, May 25, 1883, FRUS: 1883, 243, quoted from 
Kim, 16. 
16 Reply of the King to Mr. Foote, FRUS, 1883, 244, quoted from Kim, 16. 
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foreign countries, and the American government judged that ―good offices‖ clause null 
and void. This interpretation was clarified at crucial cases such as the March First 
Movement, which questioned whether the good offices clause was still in effect. The 
League of the Friends of Korea, a pro-Korean organization, asked for American 
diplomatic aid that was called for by the ―good offices‖ clause on the occasion of the 
March First Movement. On this, the State Department replied, ―a treaty between the two 
Governments is generally regarded as terminated by the absorption of one of the parties 
thereto into another nationality, and the consequent loss of power to perform its 
obligations under the treaty. Therefore, it would seem that any treaty rights or privileges 
which American citizens may have in Korea must be found in the existing treaties 
between the United States and Japan.‖18 In reply to the Friends of Korea, the State 
Department responded, ―the Department of State knows of no responsibility attaching to 
the government of the United States with respect to Korea and Japan other than that of 
securing to American citizens the full enjoyment of the rights and privileges which they 
may have therein under treaty provisions or by the law of nations.‖19 This was 
confirmation that the U.S. government had already severed all official ties with Korea as 
a state, and thus considered the Treaty of 1882 inoperative.  
The U.S. government firmly maintained that, as of 1910, Korea legally belonged 
to Japan. Whenever the White House received correspondence from the Provisional 
Government of Korea or the Korean Commission in Washington D.C. asking for 
recognition, the Secretary to the President requested advice from the State Department. In 
                                               







most cases, the State Department‘s advice was that ―their receipt should not be 
acknowledged,‖20 since no good purpose would be served in acknowledging 
communication with the Korean representatives.21 Similarly, when Fred Dolph and Henry 
Chung of the Korean Commission contacted the State Department and the White House 
in 1921, the State Department advised the White House not to acknowledge or meet with 
representatives from the Korean Commission. If the State Department or the White 
House received the representatives, the concern was that the reception would be 
interpreted as encouraging the movement by the Korean Commission.22 The Department 
also recommended not relying on Fred Dolph‘s view, assuming that Dolph ―would have 
difficulty in maintaining a position as a disinterested American friend of the Korean 
people,‖ because he was an attorney for the Korean Commission.23 The State Department 
emphasized: ―This department has steadfastly refused to receive any representations from 
the Korean Commission and in view of our relations with Japan it would be inadvisable 
that such a representative should be received by the President at this time.‖24 The position 
of the State Department about Korea‘s representation is clearly seen in the following 
short internal memo. In April 1921, an official of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs had 
a telephone communication with Henry C. Finkel, attorney of the Korean Commission. 
On the question of the extent to which the State Department could recognize a 
commissioner appointed by the Korean Provisional Government, the official responded, 
                                               
20 From the White House to Acting Secretary of State (Polk), Jun 14, 1919; From State Department to 
Secretary to the President (Tumulty), Jun 16, 1919, 895.00/635, IAK, 1910-29. 
21 From State Department to Secretary to the President (Christian), FE, May 16, 1921, 895.00/691, IAK, 
1910-29. 
22 From State Department (Hughes) to Secretary to the President, the White House (Christian), Jul 2, 1921, 
895.00/693a, IAK, 1910-29. 






―It would be impossible in view of the American diplomatic commitments to extend any 
recognition whatever to a Korean Commission of any kind; that the United States had had 
no diplomatic intercourse with Korea since 1905, and that since 1910, when the country 
had been annexed to the Empire of Japan, the United States had ceased to consider it a 
distinct political entity.‖ He advised Finkel that he was at liberty to leave papers 
regarding the commission‘s claims, but ―upon the distinct understanding that they were 
not in any sense official documents of which [the Department of State] could take any 
cognizance and that he could not expect to receive any answers to them.‖25 These 
communications between a representative of Korean nationalists in the U.S. and the State 
Department demonstrate that the U.S. government consistently maintained its principle of 
non-recognition of any person or group that represented Korean nationalists. 
In maintaining a neutral position on political issues regarding Korea during its 
colonial period, the American Consular Office was concerned especially with American 
missionaries‘ close relationship with Koreans, seemingly increasing the possibility of 
their involvement in political matters. The U.S. government was especially sensitive 
about this, as Japanese authorities had blamed American missionaries for inciting the 
March First Movement. In October 1919, half a year after the March First Movement, the 
Committee of the Federal Council of Protestant Evangelical Missions in Korea 
complained to the government-general in Korea about Japan‘s harsh treatment of the 
Korean people. When an American Consular Officer reported this to the State 
Department, the Department showed concern about the political nature of the mission 
groups‘ suggestion and instructed the Consular Office: 
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The greatest care should have been exercised with a view to avoiding the 
introduction of irrelevant suggestions, purely political in character, which might 
serve to foster in the minds of the Japanese a suspicion that the foreign 
missionaries in Korea are inclined to interfere in the political affairs of the 
country.26 
 
On this and other occasions, the American government warned American missionaries 
not to interfere in the political affairs of Korea, showing ―doubts as to the expediency of 
such communications,‖27 specifically regarding the mission board‘s suggestion to the 
Government-general. The U.S. government and its officials in Korea were not to show 
any political consciousness of matters internal to Korea. Officials in the field had to be 
extremely cautious not to give any biased impressions to either Japanese authorities or 
Korean citizens, as any trace of political inclination could be harmful for U.S. relations 
with Japan. 
 On the other hand, the official attitude of impartiality and non-involvement could 
not prevent American officials from having personal opinions on the conditions they 
were witnessing. Throughout the colonial period, American officials who dealt with the 
Korean problem generally considered Korea culturally and ethnically distinct and 
independent from Japan. This was most obvious when officials showed personal 
sympathy toward the Korean people, especially during the March First Movement and 
the subsequent brutal oppression by Japanese troops in 1919.28 But even after visible anti-
Japanese activities had been silenced, American officials were aware of Koreans‘ strong 
consciousness of ―Koreanness.‖ Perception of their distinctiveness led Koreans to have a 
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27 From State Department to Seoul, Dec 26, 1919, IAK, 1910-29.  
28 American officials in Korea reported cruelty of Japanese soldiers in treating Korean demonstrators and 





negative outlook on Japan‘s permanent colonization of Korea. For example, at the time of 
the nationwide Movement in 1919, the American Consul General in Seoul, Bergholz, 
voluntarily reported to the State Department several cases of brutality by Japanese police 
and gendarmes, many of them witnessed by foreigners. In his report to the U.S. Embassy 
in Tokyo, he emphasized the non-violence of the Koreans‘ demonstration [Italics added]: 
In connection with the reports as to the attitude of the police and gendarmes 
towards Koreans whether actively participating in demonstrations or merely as 
spectators, it must not be forgotten that in no case has it yet been asserted by the 
authorities that Koreans have been found with firearms of any description. From 
the outset the demonstrations have been entirely pacific and such acts of violence 
on the part of Koreans as the throwing of stones and the smashing of windows 
have been caused by the unnecessary resort to force by the police. 
 
The cases of violence by police and gendarmes, mentioned in the enclosures, will 
serve to show the extreme provocation given the Koreans and their great self-
control.29 
 
This indicates that American officials, like other foreign observers of the situation, were 
impressed by and sympathetic to the fact that the Korean demonstrators intended to avoid 
using violence for their cause.  
In another report, Bergholz described the incident in which gendarmes entered the 
Severance Hospital, an American institution in Korea, and removed three Korean 
patients, who were suffering from serious gunshot wounds inflicted by police or 
gendarmes, to the police station against the protest of the surgeon in charge. Bergholz 
called the incident ―a heartless disregard of the first principles of humanity.‖30 His 
correspondence indicates that the Consul General voluntarily investigated who had given 
the order for the removal of the patients from the hospital. He said, in a critical tone 
[Italics added], 
                                               






So far, whenever I have had occasion to call the attention of the Government to 
what I have considered a disregard of the complete and constant protection and 
security which Americans should enjoy for their persons and property, I have 
invariably been met with the statement that the action of the authorities concerned 
was done in strict compliance with the law. With no intention of criticizing the 
Imperial Japanese Government or of reflecting in the slightest upon the local 
authorities I cannot refrain from stating that, in case no law exists to cover a 
matter complained of, the Government General [sic] may make one overnight, as 
it has the power to do, to meet the exigency.31 
 
Despite his stated intention of not criticizing the Japanese government, Bergholz‘s 
personal criticism of their arbitrary use of laws for their efficient and high-handed rule, 
which may have violated the rights of American citizens, was clear. Although he was 
executing his rights as Consul General in order to protect American citizens on the 
surface, it was obvious that he intended to condemn the Japanese police‘s inhumane 
exercise of power over the Korean people. When transmitting the Government-general‘s 
report of the total number of criminal cases and clippings from the Seoul Press, the 
government-general‘s official organ, Bergholz commented, ―They cannot be considered 
altogether reliable as the Government General naturally exaggerates the resistance of the 
Koreans, while minimizing, or altogether omitting, the brutalities of the police, 
gendarmes, and soldiers, in numerous instances.‖32 Again, his depiction of the 
government-general‘s rule as despotic was plain. 
 By sending many other correspondences, American officials in Korea reported 
that Korean people were struggling with and suffering from the brutal control of the 
Japanese authorities, based on information gathered mainly from missionaries and local 
Korean sources. For example, they sent reports to Washington entitled ―Photographs of 
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Korean victims of the brutal Japanese method in repressing the peaceful popular 
demonstration‖; ― Photographs showing the result of beatings of Koreans by the police 
and court authorities‖; ―Brutal treatment of Koreans by police gendarmes and soldiers‖; 
―The killing of 37 Koreans at Cheam by Japanese soldiers, and the destruction of the 
village‖ and so on.33 These reports reveal that American officials felt sympathy toward 
the Koreans, as did many other American observers at that time. With inside stories and 
personal sympathy, American officials in Korea kept the State Department in Washington 
aware of the harsh and immoral aspects of Japanese rule. Even after the radical and 
visible activities of Korean nationalists stopped in the Korean peninsula, American 
officials in East Asia observed that Koreans were still generally against Japanese rule and 
that their cultural and ethnic identity was distinctly separate from that of Japan.  
Yet, even American officials who personally sympathized with the struggling 
Koreans sympathized with Japan as the power, occupier, and colonizer than with the 
colonized. In particular, they were conscious that both Japanese and American observers 
frequently compared the Japanese relationship with Korea to the American relationship 
with the Philippines. Unlike in the 1910s, American observers in the 1920s and 30s 
viewed the racial conflicts within the Japanese empire as very historical and fundamental; 
Japan‘s harsh treatment of Koreans from the March First Movement onward through the 
racial conflicts of the 1930s strengthened this view. In particular, American officials 
perceived American rule in the Philippines as benevolent and sympathized with 
Filipinos‘ desire for ultimate independence; this benevolent rule was symbolized by the 
establishment of the elective National Assembly in 1907 and the passage of the Jones 
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Law in 1916, ―designed to give the Filipinos a larger degree of autonomy.‖34 Therefore, 
negative images of Japanese imperial rule led American officials to differentiate it from 
American rule in the Philippines, thinking that the latter was benevolent and humanistic. 
The Military Attaché to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, in his report to the Department of 
War and Department of State, said, 
The difference between our position in the Philippines and Japan‘s position in 
Korea may be well shown by the fact that in our dealings the doctrine of 
sympathy was fundamental, and in the case of Japan called obedience. The 
Koreans are suffering from the lack of sympathy, though fundamentally the 
Japanese problem is more difficult than ours has been.35 
 
In their understanding, Japan‘s rule in Korea and American rule in the Philippines both 
involved powerful countries taking on the responsibility of ―developing‖ less powerful 
countries. The point at which these two rules conflicted was the matter of the ruler‘s 
humanism, as seen in the Military Attaché‘s statement.  
 
2. Raising Voices in the Public Sphere 
(1) Korean Nationalist Leaders 
 When Japan placed complete ban on nationalist activities within colonial Korea, 
many of the colony‘s nationalist intellectuals were driven out of the country. Their 
emigration and exile to foreign countries fostered patriotic organizations in Korean 
expatriate communities including Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. The March 
First Movement was thus a turning point not only for American perceptions of Korea, but 
also for the Korean nationalist movement. Before the March First Movement, 
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independence movements were dispersed and intermittent in various regions. Within 
Korea, some nationalists formed secret nationalist movement societies, while others 
continued campaign of educating and cultivating abilities of Korean people. Still others 
protested against cadastral surveys and against tax increases, and led labor agitations. 
Because Japan more firmly oppressed Korean people‘s rights of assembly and speaking 
in the 1910s, many nationalist leaders were exiled to, and began to organize nationalist 
movement groups in, Russia, China, and the United States. The end of the Great War and 
news of the Paris Peace Conference caused Korean nationalists all over the world to 
anticipate for independence for Korea. In particular, the American president Woodrow 
Wilson‘s rhetoric on self-determination of peoples at the end of the war spurred Korean 
nationalist movement.36 As Baldwin and Manela point out, Korean nationalists gladly 
adopted the Wilsonian vision of a new international order as an unprecedented 
opportunity for Korea to emerge as an independent and equal member of the community 
of nations. The Korean perception of Wilson and their hopes for his support ―drew long-
standing views of the United States as an exemplar of modern civilization and the power 
most sympathetic toward colonial aspirations for independence.‖37 As we have examined 
in the last chapter, the idea of self-determination was one of the most obvious catalysts of 
the March First Movement. At the same time, Korean nationalists felt that they had to 
inform the great powers of their nationalist cause, so that those powers might advocate 
for Korea‘s independence at the Peace Conference. 
 In a series of petitions, Korean nationalist leaders in the United States played an 
active and leading role in alerting world powers and the U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, 
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the advocate of self-determination, of the atrocities taking place in Korea. In this early 
period, there were three main streams of the Korean independence movement: (1) an 
armed struggle led by Pak Yong-man, (2) self-strengthening and education movement led 
by An Ch‘ang-ho, and (3) diplomacy line led by Syngman Rhee. Despite employing 
different methods to gain national independence, the movements did not seriously 
conflict with one another.38 Moreover, almost all Korean nationalists in and out of Korea 
unanimously agreed on petitioning to great powers at the Paris Peace Conference and 
Washington Conference. After the March First Movement failed to achieve national 
independence, nationalists felt that a more centralized structure would be necessary to 
advance Korea‘s independence movement. As a result, different nationalist groups 
established over eight different Korean provisional governments in Seoul, Shanghai, 
Northeast China, and so on.39 By September 1919, nationalist groups had agreed on 
having a united Korean Provisional Government (KPG), located in Shanghai, and drafted 
a Constitution based on republicanism and the separation of legal, administrative, and 
judicial powers. In November 1919, the KPG leaders announced the establishment of 
exiled government of Korea. 
 It is worth noting the broad range of support that Syngman Rhee received among 
Korean nationalists in 1919 and 1920. Each of the eight different Korean provisional 
governments suggested Rhee as the rank of prime minister or president in drafts of 
cabinet members‘ lists. This shows that Korean nationalists in Korea and China 
extensively supported Rhee, even though he was staying in the United States as of 1919. 
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Chông Pyông-chun explains that Rhee was popular because he possessed all the attributes 
that the Korean people sought in a leader. As Chông argues, the Korean people expected 
that a resolution would be passed at the Paris Peace Conference—based on President 
Wilson‘s influence, Christian humanism, or even a more secular sense of international 
justice—that would gain their independence. Not only did Rhee possess a traditional 
Korean education, but he had also obtained a doctoral degree from Princeton University 
as a student under [soon-to-be president of the free world] Woodrow Wilson. Such 
diverse experiences and extraordinary personal connections, along with the fact that he 
was a Christian and a longtime nationalist leader, caused Koreans to view Rhee as ideally 
situated to convince the international society that their nationalist claims were justified.40 
In August 1919, Syngman Rhee established the Korean Commission to America 
and Europe for the Republic of Korea (usually shortened as ―Korean Commission‖) in 
Washington D.C. Korean Commission represented the KPG in the U.S. The Commission 
had two goals: to represent the Korean people in diplomatic and propaganda activities, 
and to collect funds from Korean Americans.41 Once the Korean Commission was set up, 
it sent many petitions to the American government on behalf of Korea—the White 
House, the State Department and Congress.42 In the years of postwar conferences from 
the late 1910s to the early 1920s, Korean nationalist leaders pervasively hoped that 
appealing to the international society would ultimately result in national independence. It 
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was also during these years when the American public responded to Korea‘s claims. 
Because the sensational news of Japan‘s cruel oppression of the Korean demonstrators, 
the Korean community in the United States could raise their nationalist voice toward the 
wider audience. Syngman Rhee‘s group took the lead in spreading Korean discourse to 
American audiences.43 This study analyzes the relationship and interactions between 
Korean nationalist leaders and the American public and government, in other words, how 
Korean nationalists tried to represent the Korean problem and how Americans received 
their claims at this juncture. Therefore, it focuses on activities of Korean nationalist 
leaders, especially those of Rhee‘s group, who were in the United States and familiar 
with American audiences. In addition, as Rhee represented Korea‘s figurehead and would 
become the first president of the Republic of Korea in 1948, it is essential to see how his 
group‘s early activities influenced America‘s understanding of the Korean problem.44 
Building on momentum surrounding the favorable attention on Korea around 
1919, the Korean nationalist groups in the United States began to approach more 
aggressively to the American public. For the first time, Koreans spoke directly to the 
American public about their cause of national independence. Rhee and others contributed 
articles to American newspapers and journals and published books. By writing to the 
major American daily newspapers and magazines, the Korean leaders informed a wide 
range of American readers about the existence of Korean nationalist groups in the United 
States. These Korean writers from this period heavily resorted to Wilsonian language, 
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such as ―self-determination‖ and ―self-government.‖ Henry Chung, a colleague of Rhee 
and representative of the KNA, insisted in his letter to the New York Times that all the 
Korean people wanted at the March First Movement was a chance to prove their capacity 
for self-government. He criticized that a militaristic nation such as Japan should crush the 
aspirations people who were presumed to be incapable of governing themselves. If 
Americans sympathetic to Korea focused to blame Japan‘s cruel actions, Korean activists 
tried to further burden the U.S. with the Korean problem. Chung commented that if the 
allied powers ―permit Japan to keep on oppressing the Korean people on the presumption 
that the Koreans are incapable of self-government, then they are trampling under foot the 
very principles for which they fought‖ in the Great War.45 
 An opportunity where Syngman Rhee and Henry Chung were able to 
communicate their thought to American readers came when they debated the origins of 
the March First Movement in the New York Times with Yale University Professor George 
T. Ladd. Ladd, who had already shown his pro-Japanese view in earlier years as seen in 
Chapter 1, said in his full-page column on the New York Times that the March First 
Movement was the result of the propaganda of secret societies. He commented that those 
secret societies believed themselves as ―patriotic,‖ but in others‘ eyes, they were just 
―dangerous.‖ He also claimed that the Ch’ôndogyo group was disguising its dangerous 
revolutionary identity as if it was just a religious group. Without those groups‘ 
instigation, he asserted, the majority of Korean people would have remained content and 
peaceful. He also sneered at the Korean group‘s boasting that the country had been free in 
the past: 
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In none of the other cases is the political ignorance is so dense, or the 
long-continued submission to a Government intrinsically corrupt and 
disregardful of all the interests of its own subjects, and so really 
dominated by the lowest foreign influences (emanating from that 
inexhaustible fountain of political corruption, China,) as had been the case 
in Korea for 500 years prior to its occupation by the Japanese Protectorate 
under Prince Ito.46 
 
As he did before, Ladd insisted that the Korean people were unfit for self-government.47 
 As a reply, Syngman Rhee accused Professor Ladd of being irresponsible by 
writing such a polemical column without having sufficiently researched Korean history, 
especially since Ladd was in an influential position with the American public. Rhee then 
pointed out that Ladd misinterpreted nature of the Ch’ôndogyo and Korean nationalist 
organizations. He claimed that Koreans had never ―boasted‖ about their past freedom, but 
had merely claimed that the country had once been free. He added, ―it is not fair to 
compare old Korea with modernized Japan any more than to compare the old Japan with 
modernized Korea.‖48 Henry Chung, in another letter to the New York Times, complained 
that Ladd misstated facts regarding the Movement in Korea. Quoting American editors 
and missionaries who had witnessed the scenes in Korea, Chung said that the Movement 
was a wonderful passive resistance, and that foreigners marveled at the ability and 
thoroughness of Koreans‘ organization. They had also witnessed Japanese soldiers 
burning villages to the ground and massacring their inhabitants. By not recognizing these 
irrefutable facts, Chung commented, Ladd had failed to see that the Korean uprising was 
not the work of a few ―malcontents and rascals,‖ but the will of the entire Korean 
population. He then highlighted that the common people of Korea, regardless of sex, 
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religion, or age, were ―crying for the inalienable right of freedom from alien yoke and 
military oppression.‖49 Chung also stressed that Koreans planned the Movement in a 
peaceful and non-violent way.50  
 Responding to these criticisms, Ladd again wrote a letter to the New York Times, 
in which he said, ―the acts of outrageous cruelty were not on one side only.‖ Here Ladd 
implied that the Korean demonstrators must have also used violence, and citing a story 
that some demonstrators were paid for the action. He outlined the causes for the troubles 
in Korea: discrimination against the natives; extreme red-tape in the civil administration; 
excessive oppression of freedom of speech; compulsory methods of naturalizing the 
natives; and the propagation of the idea of racial self-determination among the natives. 
He suggested that the more democratic Japanese government in Korea promised to 
reform these evils.51 
 Rhee again refuted Ladd‘s argument and said that the Korean independence 
movement was did not represent the sentiments of a small but vocal minority, but the 
Korean people‘s overwhelming refusal to submit to the militaristic autocracy of the 
Japanese rulers. Moreover, the Movement did not intend to disturb the friendly relations 
between the United States and Japan. Rather than asking America to go to war, Rhee 
said, the Koreans just hoped that the United States could apply the principles of self-
determination to the Asiatic nations and set the Korean and Chinese people free without 
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resorting to arms.52 This back-and-forth debate published in a nationwide newspaper 
presented Korea as a controversial issue in world politics and in American foreign policy. 
From then on, Korean nationalist leaders used every possible means to propagandize their 
movement toward the American public. 
 
(2) Korean Voice at Post−First World War Conferences 
 The first aggressive action that Korean nationalist groups in the U.S. took in the 
post-World War I years was to appeal to international conferences on the new world 
order. In the post-war mood of 1918 and with hope for a ―more immediate and radical 
transformation of their status in international society,‖53 a Korean nationalist group, New 
Korea Youth Association in China, sent Kim Kyu-sik (also known as Kim Kuisic) to the 
Paris Peace Conference as Korean delegate. Kim, in petitions and addresses, asked the 
delegates to recognize the independence of Korea and proclaimed that ―Koreans never 
could be ‗denationalized‘ in spite of all the oppression and brutal force and cunning 
methods Japan employed to subject them to the military rule of the Asiatic Kaiser,‖ and 
that ―the Korean people were determined to struggle till the end.‖ Kim warned that Japan 
would soon threaten world peace, as the country was planning to drive out the Western 
powers from East Asia.54 Meanwhile, Syngman Rhee and Henry Chung applied in vain 
for passports from the U.S. to Paris, as the U.S. government rejected their application. 
They sent a message about the peace conference to President Wilson, asking to represent 
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the 1.5 million expatriate Koreans living in America, Hawaii, Mexico, China, and 
Russia.55  
Kim Kyu-sik later, as a delegate of the Provisional Government of Korea, sent a 
petition from the Korean people to President Wilson, although he could not participate in 
the conference as an official delegate.56 The major point of the petition was requesting the 
peace conference to recognize the Provisional Government of Korea as the legitimate 
body representing the entire people of Korea. It declared, 
This Provisional Government is the only Government which represents 
the will of the Korean people. From the date of Declaration of 
Independence any international agreement, engagement or contract 
which may be entered into by any other authority than that of this new 
Provisional Government, will not be recognized by the Korean people.57 
 
After declaring that the suffering of Korea under Japanese rule was worse than that of 
Belgium under the Germans, Kim, in an interview with The New York Times, clarified 
that ―substitution of a civil Governor for a military ruler in Korea would not improve 
conditions.‖58 
 Meanwhile, the First Korean Congress held in Philadelphia from the 14th to the 
16th April, 1919 symbolized the direction that Syngman Rhee and other leaders in the 
U.S. would take in their Korean independence movement. Main organizers of the event 
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were Syngman Rhee, Henry Chung, and Sô Chae-p‘il (Philip Jaisohn in English name).59 
At the Korean Congress, nearly 200 delegates from Korean communities in North 
America gathered to ―clarify and affirm their relationship‖ with the March First 
Movement60 and celebrated the declaration of Korea‘s independence. While the Congress 
is often seen as ―the March First Movement occurring in the United States,‖61 the Korean 
Congress also clarified one of its unique aims, that is, accentuating public information 
about the Korean problem. Speakers included non-Korean academic and religious leaders 
as well as Korean nationalist leaders. Notably, speakers used English,62 as if to emphasize 
that the Congress was addressed toward the audience in the United States and the world, 
rather than among Koreans only. The Congress expressed that ―the Korean Provisional 
Government represented the authentic sovereign of the Korean nation, embodying the 
will and spirit of Koreans not only in the homeland but also abroad as well.‖63 The 
Congress chose several resolutions and drafted ―An Appeal to America,‖ requesting 
American support and sympathy for Korea, because it is known that Americans love 
justice; have fought for their liberty and democracy; and stand for Christianity and 
humanity. The appeal also said, ―Our cause is a just one before the laws of God and man. 
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Our aim is freedom from militaristic autocracy; our object is democracy for Asia; our 
hope is universal Christianity.‖64  
The Congress was concluded with a parade of all participants joining together, 
carrying both Korean and American flags, marching to Independence Hall in 
Philadelphia, the site of America‘s Continental Congress. After Syngman Rhee read the 
Korean Declaration of Independence and announced the establishment of KPG, the 
assembly endorsed the Declaration and the new Korean government with three loud 
cheers for the Republic of Korea, followed by another three cheers for the United States.65 
As Manela points out, the ceremony expressed the unmistakable symbolism that ―the 
Korean movement against colonial rule was akin to, and drew inspiration and legitimacy 
from, the history and ideas‖ of the U.S. struggle for independence.66 
Korean nationalist leaders who propagandized toward the American public used 
public lectures, many of which were during church meetings and meetings of the pro-
Korean organization, the League of the Friends of Korea. Publication of an English-
language magazine, the Korea Review, by the Korean Students‘ Leagues of America and 
the Korean Commission, was one of the ways of ―awakening‖ the American public to 
Korea‘s issues.67 Editors reported updated news about activities of Korean nationalist 
groups and KPG, and published Korea-related articles in English.  
The Washington Naval Conference, from November 1921 to February 1922, was 
seen as the last chance in the post-First World War years for Korean nationalist leaders to 
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make their voices heard in international society in expectation of the great powers‘ 
political and diplomatic action on behalf of Korea. The conference, which was called by 
American President Harding, aimed to disarm the naval powers in the post-First World 
War period, and demonstrated that the power balance in the Pacific and the Far East, 
including the issue of the future of China, was of critical importance to the world powers. 
In addition, by holding the conference, the United States could show that Americans still 
had an interest in world affairs, after their rejection of membership in the League of 
Nations.68 Since the Paris Conference, leaders of the Korean Commission had eagerly 
anticipated firmer American leadership in the world.69 The Washington Conference, 
which was called by the United States with American-Japanese relations as its major 
concern, could be the place where the U.S. showed its emerging leadership and, 
hopefully for the Korean leaders, initiative in solving the Korean problem. Korean 
nationalist groups paid close attention to the proceedings and conclusion of the 
conference.70 
In the hope that the Washington Conference would deal with the Korean problem, 
the Korean nationalist groups launched a ―Korean Mission‖ to the conference. In its 
editorial, Korea Review, the Korean Commission commented that while it was true that 
Americans could not extend a formal invitation to Korea or Russia for this conference 
dealing with issues of the Pacific and East Asia due to ―the usual diplomatic obstacles,‖ 
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these two countries still ought to be represented at the conference in some manner, even 
if by an unofficial delegate. The editor continued, ―this is especially true in the case of 
Korea,‖ as ―the world knows that Korea is a nation.‖ The main object of the conference 
was for permanent peace, and ―if Korea be left to her present fate there will be no 
permanent peace in the Orient [Italics added].‖ The same article again appealed to 
President Harding to give Koreans a chance to present their case before the conference.71 
The Korean Mission appealed to the American delegation to submit the case of 
Korean colonialism so that a Korean delegation could participate in the conference and 
present their case. However, the efforts on the part of the Korean Mission proved to be a 
failure. The State Department did not respond to the petition, thinking that Korea ―had no 
international standing, and we [the United States] have had no diplomatic intercourse 
with that country since 1905.‖72 Being unable to attend the conference, the Korean 
Mission sent petitions directly to the Conference and open letters to the Japanese 
delegation, among others.73 Meanwhile, American supporters helped Koreans by sending 
appeals to the State Department and the American delegation.74 Without providing any 
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chance for the Korean Mission to present, the Washington Conference ended with the 
great powers signing treaties amongst themselves.75  
In fact, from the beginning, the Koreans‘ view of the Washington conference had 
not been very optimistic. Before the conference, in an editorial entitled ―Will Washington 
Conference Duplicate That of Paris?,‖ the Korea Review expressed anxiety that the 
international community was again to permit Japan‘s expansion in return for its 
willingness to reduce its armaments. It lamented, ―the market value of idealism is now at 
a low ebb. One who talks of ideals or fundamental principles of right is looked upon as a 
crank or nuisance in society.‖76 In another article in the same issue, a writer said that 
Koreans everywhere took the keenest interest in the Washington Conference and this was 
natural, for there were many valid reasons why the powers should change their attitude of 
indifference toward Korea. He asserted, ―every power represented there has not only 
recognized Korea‘s sovereignty by formal treaties but has actually pledged to safeguard 
that sovereignty in case a third party attempts to impair it.‖ Although a third party 
destroyed Korea as an independent state, ―none of the powers so far have fulfilled the 
treaty obligations by a direct protest to the perpetrator of the international crime or by 
assisting the Koreans to regain their legitimate rights.‖ Notably, the writer revealed a 
realistic observation of world diplomacy [Italics added]: 
The Korean people must realize that morality plays only a minor part in 
international dealings, and that international law is a live instrument only when 
both parties to a dispute possess the power to enforce it. If one of the disputants 
has not the necessary power the instrument has no binding force upon the party 
who has. Is it right for the strong to impose his will upon the weak?… 
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Such conduct between individuals is strongly condemned in civilized 
communities and generally prevented by public opinion, but such procedures in 
dealings between nations are looked on with more or less indifference, because 
they are difficult to stop and public opinion is impotent in such matters. We are 
sure that what Japan has done to Korea, China and Siberia in recent years is much 
deplored and condemned by all those who understand the facts, but their 
condemnation does not deter Japan from doing what she believes to be to her 
interest… 
 
…America desires Japan to change her course and so do the other powers, but 
none of them are willing to force her. The conference is nothing more than a 
friendly meeting to discuss different problems with the hope of relieving the 
present tension which exists in the Far East, but there is no apparent sign on the 
part of America or any of other powers to bring about a fundamental change in 
international policy or to revolutionize international morality.77  
 
The article nevertheless clarified that Korean independence must be won through the 
efforts of its own people and therefore, ―whatever the conference may do the Koreans 
must keep up the fight for righteousness and liberty,‖ and that ―the success or failure of 
the conference ought not to alter in the slightest degree the determination of the Korean 
people to be free.‖78 
 Watching the Washington Conference coming to an end, editors of the Korea 
Review wrote a general overview of the conference, admitting their disappointment when 
the Conference ignored the petitions filed by the Korean Mission. An editorial said, 
although it was believed that most of the American delegates felt that Korea had been 
wronged by Japan and they would have liked to see Korea given justice, they faced two 
obstacles which overbalanced their sense of fair play: 1) that America took a false step in 
1904 in watching Japan ravish Korea without a word of protest, and 2) the current 
American policy of maintaining peace, with Japan in particular, almost at any cost. He 
commented that it was practical statesmanship of ―the end justifies the means,‖ while it 
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was not based upon the principle of Christianity.79 Another editorial said, ―the American 
people are not sufficiently interested in the Far East to risk a quarrel with any one which 
may entail some sacrifice on their part.‖80 The Korea Review quoted Frank H. Simonds‘ 
review of the Conference. In part the reviewer said [Italics added], 
You may think of the Washington Conference as a great outpouring of idealism; 
certainly it did call forth a great expression of idealist hopes. The same was 
equally true of Paris. But if you analyze either conference you must see that what 
was actually accomplished represented not idealistic experiments, but sound 
business transactions accompanied not by generous gestures, but by unmistakable 
bargaining. 
 
[…] The Washington Conference did not promote peace in the world—it only 
registered that desire for peace which already existed. To do this was an 
exceedingly useful thing, but something far different from the notion generally 
held as to the present and future meaning of the first American international 
Conference.81  
 
As seen, feelings of disappointment at the two international conferences for the postwar 
world order led the Korean nationalist movement leaders to raise a critical view on the 
ways great powers exercise foreign policy in the realpolitik.  
 
(3) The Right to Represent Oneself 
 As Koreans in the United States had intended to extend their nationalist activities 
since the end of the Great War, an issue appeared regarding Koreans living abroad or 
participating in international events was whether or not the Korean people were eligible 
to represent themselves, and, if so, which group of Koreans would represent them. The 
existence of Koreans abroad at times created an undefined space in the actual national 
representation of the people as well as an obligation on the part of the nation-state over its 
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citizens in foreign lands, because their legal status was assumed as Japanese subjects. As 
seen in the Hemet case, the Korean immigrant community in the U.S. during the colonial 
period considered the issue of representation as very sensitive, connecting it to their 
national identity. 
 The legal ambiguity of Koreans‘ status when abroad was revealed when Syngman 
Rhee and Henry Chung, two Korean nationalist activists residing in the U.S., applied for 
U.S. passports in order to participate in the Paris Peace Conference. Their application was 
declined, with the explanation that they, as Japanese subjects, needed to obtain passports 
from Japanese authorities.82 Koreans‘ national status was also questioned at conferences 
or any other international events where Korean political or intellectual figures were to 
participate. Because of strict censorship by the Japanese authorities, Korean nationalist 
elites tried to use these events as opportunities to express their pursuit of national 
independence abroad. For instance, at the opening session of the Pan-Pacific Educational 
Conference held in 1921 in Honolulu, the Japanese delegate introduced Sin Hûng-u 
(Hugh Cynn), a Korean representative and director of the Korean Educational 
Association, while introducing the list of Japanese representatives at the conference. But 
Sin did not move when he was introduced. An American reporter observed that later Sin 
―calmly introduced himself as the delegate from Korea.‖ Although there was ―no 
comment on the Japanese leader‘s assumption that Korea was a part of Japan and Mr. 
Cynn‘s silent assertion of the integrity of the former ‗hermit kingdom,‘‖83 the report 
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implied that the international audience fully observed in his statement the struggle to 
express the national consciousness of the Korean people. 
A more vivid picture of the Korean elites‘ struggles for the right to represent their 
―nation‖ on the international stage can be found in the example of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations (IPR) conferences. IPR was one of the very first non-government organizations 
in the Asia-Pacific region that tried to institutionalize Wilsonian internationalism in the 
region. Although it was not a formal diplomatic organization, IPR provided political, 
economic, and cultural connections across nations and regions, especially in the 1920s, as 
the world powers after the First World War were showing interest in the Asia-Pacific 
region.84 Korean delegations participated in the IPR conference three times—in 1925, 
1927, and 1931. 
The liberalism of the IPR allowed colonies in Asia such as Korea and the 
Philippines to participate as members in its early stages, which provided them with a rare 
opportunity to voice anti-colonialism. However, Tomoko Akami argues that the great 
powers‘ ―double standard‖ about liberal democracy at home and colonies in the non-
Euro-American periphery85 doomed the IPR to obscurity. In particular, considering the 
IPR‘s agenda and goals, its vision was distinctively American, pursuing American-led 
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Internationalizing the Pacific: the United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and 
Peace, 1919-45 [London: Routledge, 2003], 10). 
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regional order in the Asia Pacific. This vision required the U.S. to negotiate with Japan,86 
which appeared as a threat not only to security but also to trade and investment in the 
Pacific region. As a consequence, the IPR worked as a novel framework in international 
relations, which set U.S.-Japanese relations as its center. This character of the IPR 
naturally limited the activities of Korean and Filipino representatives.87 
Despite the limited space that IPR allowed Koreans, Korean nationalists had 
participated in the founding of the Korean Council of the IPR and hoped that they could 
use the IPR conferences to express their cause for independence to the global 
community.88 From the beginning, Korean participation in the IPR was controversial. It 
was not exactly because Korea was a colony, given that the Philippines was also on the 
list, but because Japan and its supporters opposed their participation. The East Coast 
experts at the Yale Club meeting in February 1925 opposed separate Korean 
participation, ―because they felt that it might harm ‗good‘ U.S.-Japan relations,‖ which 
was assumed to be fundamental to the success of the IPR project.89 
Korean representatives at the international IPR conferences appreciated the non-
governmentality of the IPR, which allowed them to enjoy the status of a ―racial group,‖90 
                                               
86 ―Canadian Affairs,‖ The Round Table, vol. 1 (November 1910 to August 1911): 494. 
87 Furthermore, by the mid-1930s, key IPR figures wanted IPR operations to be more world-oriented and 
for the focus to be on the state rather than society. The global perspective and the state orientation of IPR 
operations were accentuated through the two major wars in the Pacific Asian region: the Sino-Japanese 
War and the Pacific War. 
88 Participants in the Korean Council of the IPR were nationalist groups, including the YMCA, and a 
Korean independence movement group in the United States, which was competing with socialist groups for 
initiative in the independence movement. Among Koreans in the United States, Sin Hûng-u, Helen Kim 
(Kim Hwal-ran in Korean), and Sô Chae-p‘il participated in the IPR conferences. 
89 Masahide Shibusawa M., Taiheiyō ni kakeru hashi: Shibusawa Eiichi no shōgai (Bridge to the Pacific: 
the life of Shibusawa Eiichi) (Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1970). 
90 Miss Helen Kim, ―Pacific Relations from the Viewpoint of the Korean Group,‖ Problems of the Pacific, 
Proceeding of the Second Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 15 to 29, 




but their inclusion in the IPR organization continued to be controversial. The Japanese 
Council of the IPR objected to the Korean Council‘s separate representation. Some North 
American members showed sympathy toward Korean representation,91 but most opposed 
Korean inclusion, prioritizing the U.S.-Japan relation.92 
The problematic provisions of the IPR constitution regarding whether Korean 
representation could be included or not were Sections 2 and 3 of Article III as follows: 
Section 2. A national unit … shall be a National Council organized for the 
purpose of the Institute, or an organization of similar purposes, in any 
sovereign or autonomous state lying within or bordering the Pacific Ocean 
or having dominion, colonies, dependencies, territories, mandated or 
otherwise, in the Pacific area, subject to its being approved and admitted 
to membership by the Pacific Council as hereinafter constituted. Each 
constituent country shall have one National Council or equivalent 
organization, … With the approval of the Pacific Council, independent 
Local Groups may be organized in an eligible country which has not 
created a National Council. 
 
Section 3. To encourage at Conferences of the Institute the fullest self-
expression of distinct racial or territorial groups existing within an eligible 
country as defined in Section 2 of this Article, the Pacific Council and the 
Secretariat may, with the assent of the National Council of such country, 
enter into direct relations with such groups in making arrangements for 
their representation and participation in Conferences.93 
 
This relatively democratic element expressed here, opening membership to colonized 
countries, was unusual for international non-governmental organizations in the period.94 It 
was still a limited opening on the side of the colonial countries, as local groups had to 
accept that they belonged to a nation-state/empire, and they needed their sovereign 
                                               
91 Lawrence Woods, ―Canada and the Institute of Pacific Relations: Lessons from an Earlier Voyage,‖ 
Canadian Foreign Policy 6, no. 2 (1999): 122. 
92 Akami, 99. 
93 ―Appendix III: Constitution of the IPR,‖ In Problems of the Pacific: Proceeding of the Second 
Conference of the Institute of the Pacific Relations, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 15 to 29, 1927, edited by 
Condliffe (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1928), 607. 
94 Lyman C. White, International Non-Governmental Organizations: Their Purpose, Methods, and 




power‘s accord to join. The representation of a local group then had to be accepted by the 
Pacific Council, which was initially composed of representatives of ―independent‖ 
countries.  
Right before the Third IPR Conference in Kyoto, Japan, in 1929, the Korean 
group requested an amendment of the constitution, Article III, Section 2, to confer the 
status of a fully autonomous group upon district racial groups existing within the territory 
of a sovereign power having a National Council in the Institute.95 The criticism raised by 
the Korean group was over the full potential of the original agenda of the IPR, that is, 
representation of non-official individuals. They also pursued the notion of ―political 
equals‖ of the Pacific Community to an extent which questioned the colonial status quo.96 
At the same time, the Korean group highly criticized the lack of representation of 
colonies in the Pacific Council. Although the Korean group was invited to the 
conference, Koreans‘ request for amendment of the Constitution was rejected, and the 
Korean group was not eligible to deliver a statement or participate in roundtable 
discussions at the conference. The Pacific Council of the IPR instead amended Section 3 
of Article III as follows. 
To encourage at Conferences of the Institute the representation of distinct 
racial or territorial groups existing within or under the jurisdiction of a 
country having a National Council of the Institute, the Secretariat may be 
unanimous vote of the Pacific Council enter into direct relations with such 
groups in making arrangements for their representation and participation 
in Conferences.97 
                                               
95 ―Minutes of Meetings of the Pacific Council,‖ In Problems of the Pacific, 1929, Proceedings of the Third 
Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Nara and Kyoto, Japan, October 23 to November 9, 1929, 
edited by J. B. Condliffe, D.Sc. (Chicago, 1930), 650-51. 
96 ―If the IPR intended to remain a non-political organization for the purpose of study and understanding of 
the Pacific people, not to become another League of Nations, why [did] it set up an artificial standard of 
membership?‖ (―T. H. Yun et al. to Members of the Pacific Council,‖ 19 Oct 1929, A-1/PC 1929, AUH). 
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The Korean request seemed to be rejected because it had significant implications for 
other colonial powers. In other words, the Pacific Council felt the pressure that the 
colonial framework should be protected. It was obvious that even some key members 
who agreed to support colonies‘ representatives viewed the representation within the 
colonial framework.98 While the Philippine group accepted the framework, the Korean 
group finally decided to withdraw from the IPR in 1931, rejecting its framework, 
deeming it to support colonialism. 
Because of its double-faced attitude toward colonial peoples, many Korean 
commentators criticized the IPR and their country‘s participation in it. Sinhan minbo, the 
Korean-language newspaper published in California, argued that if membership was 
limited to nation-states, the IPR would be degraded into a means for noble and 
imperialistic politics.99 In the Korean peninsula, pro-socialist commentators criticized the 
nature of the IPR, calling it ―imperialistic gangs.‖100 As a result of the controversy, the 
Korean Council of the IPR was dissolved in 1931. 
 The Korean group in the IPR questioned the notions of the Institute, such as 
liberalism and liberal democracy, by proposing an amendment to the IPR‘s Constitution. 
However, its ultimate failure disclosed the limitations of the Korean nationalist group‘s 
so-called diplomatic way, strategy to use diplomatic relations in order to achieve national 
independence. Those international stages, such as the Paris Peace Conference and the IPR 
conferences, were founded upon the assumption that the imperialism and colonial rule of 
its key powers should be preserved. It proved too rosy for the Korean nationalist group to 
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expect that public sympathy on the Korean situation would influence the international 
order at the official and diplomatic levels. Nonetheless, their indefatigable insistence on 
preserving their right to represent themselves outside of Korea contributed to the 
perception that Koreans were resisting the Japanese authorities and struggling for 
independence.101 
 
(4) Arguments of Korean Leaders 
While the Korean nationalist group in the United States sought various ways to 
appeal for their cause, they highlighted some points more than others, especially for the 
American audience. Above all, their foremost point was that, legally, Korea should be 
independent. They stressed that when King Kojong signed the protectorate and 
annexation treaties between Korea and Japan, in 1905 and 1910 respectively, he did so 
under duress and therefore the colonization of Korea was illegal and void. Moreover, the 
Korean group argued the annexation process was unjust because Japan had guaranteed 
Korea‘s independence in treaties with Korea and other great powers. They asserted that 
Korea ―never voluntarily waived or surrendered any of [its] rights as an independent and 
sovereign nation.‖102 By emphasizing the illegal and unethical actions that Japan had used 
                                               
101 The American impression of the Korean plight can be deduced from a report that was for the 
confidential use of American members of the 1927 conference. Goodwin Watson‘s research studied the 
American attitude toward Asian peoples and questions. In a questionnaire for the research, the researcher 
asked ―How do you feel about Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans?‖ with multiple choices. It is interesting to 
see how the choices were different depending on the country. For Japanese, the choices were 1) alert and 
progressive, 2) untrustworthy, 3) courteous, 4) ingenious, 5) conceited, and 6) politically ambitious. For 
Chinese, 1) laundry, 2) cruel, 3) strange, 4) highly cultured, 5) beauty-loving, and 6) dependable. For 
Koreans, 1) oppression, 2) need missionaries, 3) poverty, 4) struggling for independence, 5) dirty, and 6) 
most Christian country in Asia (Goodwin B. Watson, ―Orient and Occident: A Preliminary Study of 
Opinions and Attitudes of Groups of Americans Regarding Oriental Peoples and Questions,‖ Report 
Submitted to the Research Committee of the American Group of the IPR [Jun 1927]). 
102 ―Proclaims Korea a Free Republic, ‗President‘ Rhee Renounces Japanese Sovereignty and Asks for 




during the annexation process, Koreans sought to annul the colonization by pointing out 
that Japan was ineligible as a colonizing power. 
After the March First Movement, the emotional appeal to humanitarianism began 
to catch public attention. As the sensational reports revealed how brutally the Korean 
demonstrators were treated by the Japanese police force, the Korean activists tried to 
extend the readers‘ attention to the more general unjust conditions for Korean people—
for example, no free speech, no press nor assembly were permitted.103 It was in the same 
context that the Korean activists pointed out that the Japanese authorities were trying to 
―extinguish the soul of Korea‖ by destroying collections of the works of Korean history 
and literature, and by employing Japanese as the official language in government and in 
schools.104  
Another way of evoking humanistic attention to the Korean problem was to 
contrast the violent and unmerciful Japanese occupation and the non-violent and peaceful 
Korean demonstration for independence. In appealing to humanitarianism, it was often to 
highlight that Korean women were victimized by harsh Japanese rulers. The following 
pictures [Figures 13, 14, and 15] all showed scenes of Korean school girls, who were 
symbols of purity, innocence, and vulnerability, being arrested for desiring national 
independence. Their hands were tied with rope and their heads covered with prison 
hoods, images which surely provoked sympathetic feelings and doubts on the justice of 
Japanese authorities. 
                                               
103 ―The Situation in Korea: An Unprejudiced Narrative of Facts,‖ Korea Review I, no. 10 (Dec 1919): 11. 
104 Henry Chung, ―Korea Today: A Korean View of Japan‘s Colonial Policies,‖ Asia, Journal of the 
American Asiatic Association 19 (May 1919): 471-72. Syngman Rhee called Japan‘s education policy a 
mixture of czarist Russia and Germany (Syngman Rhee, ―The Case for Korea,‖ The Public, A Journal of 





Figure 13. The arrest of Korean school girls 
Source: Korea Review II, no. 8 (Oct 1920): 11. 
 
 
Figure 14. The arrest of Korean school girls 




Figure 15. The arrest of Korean school girls 






Appealing to humanism is also well portrayed in an illustration in the Korea 
Review [Figure 16]. Here Korea is again depicted and represented by a woman figure. 
Korea, a beauty in a western dress and hair, has collapsed on the floor of a courtroom, her 
heart pierced by a sword. Her hand points in accusation at Japan, which is represented by 
an ugly, short, and cunning-looking man in Japanese style clothing and hat. The jury 
includes foreign powers, such as the U.S. and China. The word ―justice‖ is inscribed on 
the stand, upon which is a statue of a goddess symbolizing justice and humanism. The 
goddess of justice is carrying scales and a cross, instead of the sword that Lady Justice 
usually carries. It seems to imply that the victim, Korea, will ultimately win the trial 
based on justice and Christian value, in front of the world community.  
 
Figure 16. Will Civilization Listen to Her Plea? [original caption] 
Source: Korea Review III, no. 6 (Aug 1921): 3. 
 
Related to the humanistic and emotional appeals, Korean nationalist opinion-
makers in the United States intended to evoke American compassion for Koreans on the 




and becoming rapidly more so,‖105 that Christian churches in Korea have been ―the center 
of a barbarous persecution,‖106 and that ―methods of suppression have been especially 
rigorous in the case of Christians.‖107 As Richard Kim analyzes, by appealing to Christian 
sensibilities, the Korean nationalists sought to make the quest for Korean independence 
an issue based on ―universal humanitarian values represented by Christian principles, 
thereby highlighting the congruities between American and Korean interests and 
goals.‖108 If Koreans used the so-called ―good offices‖ phrase in the U.S.-Korean treaty of 
1882 to make a legal and diplomatic request for aid from the U.S. government, they 
pointed to Christian persecution to evoke the moral and emotional indignation of the 
American public. One Korean author in a journal for missionaries asserted that under 
Japanese rule all forms of vice, such as opium smoking, were encouraged, and Koreans 
had fallen backward in their moral progress. He emphasized that the Japanese were 
reluctant to recognize Christian ministry among Koreans because of the religion‘s 
potential effects of waking Korean people‘s political and moral consciousness [Italics 
added]: 
The Japanese know that Christianity will stiffen Korea’s moral fiber, 
awaken the dormant intellectual life and revitalize the manhood of the 
dead nation. The most progressive, self-reliant and efficient of all Koreans 
are the Christians…They submit to injustice, and they show how 
Christians can die for the sake of righteousness, but they will not deny 
their faith… 
 
Japan has no prejudice against Christianity as a religion, but she does 
oppose the effects of it upon the Korean people—the awakening of 
                                               
105 ―Dr. Rhee‘s Speaking Tour,‖ Korea Review I, no. 9 (Nov 1919): 9. 
106 This was a comment by Ahn Ch‘ang-ho, the chairman of the Korean National Association (―Korean 
Appeal to America,‖ Nation 108 [Apr 19, 1919]: 228-29). 
107 ―The Situation in Korea,‖ 11. 
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national consciousness, the rapid growth of intellectual and moral life and 
building up of genuine manhood.  
 
[An American writer said,] ―It is not religious persecution of Christianity, 
but it is political persecution of the Church.‖109 
 
Many Korean nationalist authors in American media stressed that Christianity 
spread by American missionaries brought ―a high ideal of life and the dignity of virtue,‖ a 
modern education system, and the rise of women‘s status. They implied that these 
changes by Christianity constituted a ―modernizing process,‖110 while denying that these 
improvements in Korean society were due to Japan‘s efforts. After explaining how 
Christian churches in Korea were suffering from Japanese religious persecution, Ahn 
Ch‘ang-ho in his appeal asked readers, ―Can the Christian church in America stand 
passively by without even raising a voice in protest?‖111 In sum, Christianity provided 
moral justification for Korean independence to American observers,
112
 and as was the 
Korean nationalists‘ intention, appealing to Christian sensibility worked very effectively, 
drawing the immediate attention of an international audience. 
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Figure 17. Ahn Ch’ang-ho was described as Director of the Labor Department of the Korean 
Provisional Government. 
Source: Korea Review II, no. 1 (Mar 1920): 12. 
 
The next step for the Korean nationalists was to convince the American audience 
that the Korean people could govern themselves. Contrary to Japan‘s propaganda, they 
stressed that Korea had always been independent for over four thousand years before the 
annexation. Moreover, Korea had a proud history and a significant culture of thousands 
of years and it ―is he who handed the torch of Asiatic civilization to his neighbor, the 
Japanese.‖113 This was a refutation of the systematic propaganda long employed on the 
side of Japan, using history to justify Japan‘s annexation of Korea. The Korean voice did 
not deny that the old Korea right before the annexation had been in a bad condition in 
terms of its economy and governmental system, and that there had been improvements in 
some areas of the society since the Japanese rule began. However, it maintained that the 
improvements since 1910 were nominal, as most of the changes were intended to benefit 
only the Japanese. Henry Chung commented that the physical improvement of Korea 
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under Japanese rule could not ―compensate for the loss of primary civil and political 
rights on the part of a people with a distinct history and civilization of its own.‖114 The 
historically independent Korean people, the Korean authors insisted, had a right to 
determine a future of their own, corresponding to Wilson‘s self-determination principle. 
Syngman Rhee declared: 
We are told by Japanese propagandists that the Koreans are not fit for self-
government. The answer is that we were fit enough to govern ourselves 
for over forty centuries, and maintained and organized a highly developed 
government while Japan was divided and subdivided into numerous petty 
states. If Japan itself is fit for self-government, Korea is even more fit. All 
we ask of Japan is that she let us alone, whether we are fit or unfit. We 
have found out that no other people can do our work for us better than we 
can. We ask the right of self-determination, which is the fundamental 
principle of world democracy.115 
 
The Korean nationalists emphasized that the Korean people were capable of 
pursuing development on their own. In fact, many Koreans, both inside and outside the 
country, had already received a modern education, a necessary precursor to 
industrialization. Here again, it was stressed that modern education for Koreans was 
founded on Christian values. 
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Figure 18. Pupils learning woodworking trade at Industrial School of Benedictines, Seoul, Korea. 
The pulpit that adorns the Seoul Cathedral was made by native boys at this school [original caption]. 





Figure 19. Korean Christian Institute of Honolulu, H. I. 
Source: Korea Review III, no. 2 (Apr 1921): 10. 
 
As their next point, as seen in Rhee‘s argument above, Korean nationalist 
opinion-makers overwhelmingly supported American ideals, including the Wilsonian 
idea of self-determination, which they felt would be exactly applicable to Korea. While 
they hoped that the international society would accept Korea‘s efforts to determine its 
own fate, the Korean nationalists acknowledged that they would likely need the 




This belief that the United States was a strong but gentle helper of small nations 
led Korean nationalist activists to emphasize the cordial relationship between Korea and 
America when they spoke with or wrote to the American audience. For example, 
Syngman Rhee in his letter of notification from the government of the Republic of Korea 
to President Wilson reminded that individually many of the executives of the Korean 
Provisional Government, including himself, had graduated from Universities and 
Colleges in America.116 In a communication to the U.S. Department of State, he 
mentioned, ―our beliefs, our education and our training are all in accord with you and 
your form of government.‖117 
 
Figure 20. Dr. Henry Chung’s Commencement at American University.  
The editors of Korea Review stressed that Chung is shown sitting to the left of Mrs. Harding and to 
her right was President Harding. They also mentioned that Ambassador Jusserand of France and 
Hon. N. W. Rowell of Canada, and Bishop Hamilton were seen in the group. 
Source: Korea Review III, no. 5 (Jul 1921): 3. 
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Chae-p‘il after the March First Movement,‖ In Sô Chae-p’il kwa kû sidae [Sô Chae-p‘il and the Period], 
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Korean groups emphasized that the new Korea‘s legal and political structures 
were modeled ―as near as may be after‖ the American system.118 Richard Kim argues, 
―the adoption and promotion of American democratic values became central rhetorical 
and political strategies‖ for the Korean nationalist leaders in the United States, 
particularly as America was beginning to show its leadership in global affairs after World 
War I.119 Some outside observers found it surprising that KPG modeled after the 
American-styled democratic republic, rather than seeking to restore the old Korean 
monarchy. Although the Korean nationalist activists had rarely blamed the old Korean 
King Kojong for the nation‘s colonization, there was tacit agreement among different 
groups of nationalists that the new Korea should depart from the old political and social 
structure, including the monarchal system of old Chosôn. When Yô Un-hyông, a Korean 
independent movement leader, spoke on Koreans‘ movement in Japan, a Japanese man in 
the audience asked what kind of a government Korea would propose and whether a 
prince from the Old Korean royal family would be put on the throne when independence 
was recognized. Yô replied, ―the Koreans will have a democracy fashioned on the most 
approved principles—a government of the people, for the people, by the people,‖ not a 
monarchical system.120 In this sense, the establishment of the KPG and the announcement 
                                               
118 Fred A. Dolph, Briefs for Korea (Washington, 1919), 8. This document was written by Dolph, legal 
advisor and counselor to the Information Bureau, or Korean Commission, and presented to the Foreign 
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to have a government modeled after that of America, as far as possible, consistent with the education of the 
masses‖ (―Korea‘s First Congress,‖ quoted in Lew, ―Vision of the New Korea of Sô,‖ 372.) 
119 Kim comments that this phenomenon was displayed apparently in the Korean Congress in Philadelphia 
(Richard Kim, ―The Globalizing of America,‖ 207). 
120 ―Korean Leader in Tokyo,‖ Korea Review I, no. 12 (Feb 1920), 10, quoted from Japan Advertiser (Nov 
27, 1919). Yô‘s address in front of a Japanese audience in Japan was possible, as some Japanese Christians 
in China invited him to visit Japan to inform the Japanese public of where the Koreans stood. According to 




of the governmental structure and ideals symbolized by modern and Western democracy 
marked ―a sharp departure in the political history of Korea.‖121 By disseminating the news 
of a ―new Korea,‖ the Korean nationalist group sought to showcase the emergence of a 
new political consciousness among their people,122 which they hoped would case the 
international society to recognized Korea‘s legitimacy as a modern, civilized, and 
democratic nation-state. 
 
Figure 21. Temporary headquarters of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in 
Shanghai [original caption] 
Source: Korea Review II, no. 1 (Mar 1920): 12. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
compromise from the side of the KPG ―shattered the Japanese hope of conciliation,‖ and invoked an 
―indignant outburst of some of the leading Japanese newspapers‖ (―Korean Leader in Tokyo,‖ Ibid., 11) 







Figure 22. Members of the Korean Provisional Government 
Source: Korea Review III, no. 2 (Apr 1921): 10. 
 
Pictures displayed the Korean Provisional Government as modern, civilized, and 
rational in both its system and in the appearance of its members, the exact opposite to the 
earlier image of Korean people reflected writings and pictures in the contemporary 
American periodicals: naïve, indifferent, and uncivilized. At the same time, Korean 
nationalists actively asserted that the model of this modern and civilized structure for the 
new nation-state of Korea was specifically an American one.123 Sometimes, they even 
denounced critiques of the American government and society [Italics added]: 
There seem to be many foreigners and some Americans who are dissatisfied with 
American institutions and the system under which they are living in this Republic. 
They may have the right to criticize them, and it is their privilege to contribute new 
and better ideas which will help to reconstruct the nation during this period, but 
they have no moral or legal right to advocate any theory or action that will create 
violence and destruction of the existing laws. They must recognize the fact, that 
after all is said and done this country [the United States] is the only nation where 
the masses are enjoying the blessings of political, economic and religious freedom, 
more than any other land in the world. If any one attempts to destroy the American 
                                               
123 This is shown on many occasions when Korean nationalist activists expressed their plans for a new 
governmental system. For example, Sô Chae-p‘il, in an address before a Chinese group, said that Japan‘s 
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the United States, she will be in a position to reform the whole world, so that it would really be safe for 




institutions by violence or otherwise, either directly or indirectly, he is a fool who 
―kills the goose that lays the golden eggs.‖ Let us foreigners who are in this country 
give thanks to god for the privilege of living in this land of freedom and prosperity, 
and let us wholeheartedly support this government which rests upon the principles 
of democracy and Christian religion…I trust the men and women of our Korean 
race, living under the Stars and Stripes will always be loyal to the laws and 
Government of the United States, and always beware of all irresponsible talk of 
radicalism, and any other doctrines that are not conceived of the spirit of humanity 
and justice.124 
 
Korean nationalists thus argued that Koreans had earned the right to govern themselves 
due to their compliance with, and support of, the American spirit of government. 
Although some Korean independence movement groups in Korea and North China 
rejected America‘s values as a model for Korea, groups in the United States remained 
loyal to the American ideals and nonviolent view. As a supplementary point, which had 
been argued for over a decade, Korean nationalists continued to stress that under the 
U.S.-Korean treaty of 1882, America was legally obliged to exert good offices to fight 
injustice or oppression by other powers.125 Koreans‘ strong belief in their special 
relationship with the U.S. is also evidenced by the fact that they had not invoked on the 
nearly identical ―good offices‖ clause in their treaty with Great Britain.126 
                                               
124 ―Students‘ Corner,‖ Korea Review I, no. 11 (Jan 1920): 16. 
125 ―Conditions compel us to officially inform your Government that Korea, and the 20 million of Koreans 
that are citizens of our Nation, are being unjustly and oppressively dealt with by the government of the 
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Syngman Rhee in his speaking tour to Trenton in 1919 explained that not only had the United States 
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―Korea has always kept her treaty obligations with the United States, and should not the United States now 
in our extremity do the same?‖ (―Dr. Rhee‘s Speaking Tour,‖ Korea Review I, no. 9 [Nov 1919]: 9-10). 
126 The clause in the British-Korean treaty reads, ―In case of differences arising between one of the High 
Contracting Parties and a third Power, the other High Contracting Party, if requested to do so, shall exert its 
good offices to bring about an amicable arrangement‖ (Article I. 2. of ―Treaty of Friendship and 
Commerce, November 26, 1883,‖ quoted from Korean Treaties, compiled by Henry Chung [New York: H. 




As much as they stressed the friendship and closeness between the United States 
and Korea, Korean nationalist opinion-makers sought to portray Japan as a probable 
threat to the security and commercial interests of the United States, and to the order of the 
international community. Even from a financial perspective, the Korean Commission‘s 
legal advisor Fred Dolph, in his article on Japan‘s debits and credits, concluded that 
Japan had already spent her money, and that every dollar that Japan spent, invested, and 
would spend thereafter must be ―borrowed money.‖ While Japan spent her money in 
managing China and Korea at a loss, he predicted, ―the whole turmoil must necessarily 
settle down in the Far East,‖ which meant ―an end to [Japan‘s] autocracy.‖ He concluded, 
―It is inevitable that Japan must get out of China and that she must give back to Korea her 
independence, because she is operating in both countries at a loss, on ‗Borrowed 
Money.‘‖127 As such, opinion-makers for Korea‘s independence denounced Japan‘s 
imperial system as economically, legally, and morally corrupt. In other words, they 
sought to persuade readers that Japan was a threat to the world‘s peaceful and secure 
order. 
In contrast, Korean nationalists in the U.S. tended to refrain from criticizing 
American social systems. Those Korean nationalist writers noted that the legislation 
excluding Japanese immigrants in California as a counterattack against Japanese 
authorities‘ discriminating policy toward Koreans under their jurisdiction. Since Japan 
had demanded equal rights for its people in the United States and Britain at the Paris 
Peace Conference, Henry Chung called this ―an ironic inconsistency,‖ suggesting that 
                                               





there was no racial discrimination in those countries.128 In contrast to Japanese complaints 
about life in the United States, Korean-American leaders stressed that it was their duty 
―to uphold the honor, glory and welfare of Uncle Sam whenever he calls upon us to do 
our duty.‖129 They used similar logic to compare American colonial rule in the Philippines 
with Japanese rule in Korea. Japanese writers in their propaganda supporting colonial 
rule called it a parallel phenomenon to the American control of the Philippines, that is, an 
advanced country developing an under-modernized country. Korean nationalists, 
however, argued that these two colonial rules were in contrast. Frequently, Korean 
authors stated that Korea was ruled by a military and autocratic authority, while the 
secretaries of executive departments in the Philippines under U.S. rule were all Filipinos 
appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the Senate. Such a thing as the 
franchise, enjoyed by the Filipinos, was unknown to the Koreans under Japanese rule.130  
 Furthermore, the Korean nationalist writers warned American readers that Japan 
was a potential enemy in the Pacific. They especially predicted that war between the 
United States and Japan was imminent. As observed in the earlier chapters, American 
public had vague fear of the ―yellow peril,‖ a growing perception of Japan as a 
militaristic and threatening power. While Japan‘s governmental propagandists and pro-
Japanese opinion-makers tried to appease the fear, Korean speakers tried to evoke anti-
Japanese sentiments, hoping that the United States would confront with Japan.  
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Use of this rhetoric stemmed from the Korean nationalist leaders‘ belief that, 
realistically, Korea could be only liberated when Japan was at a war with other powers. 
Kim Hôn-sik (also known as Seek Hun Kimm) of the Korean Patriotic Association of 
New York, in an interview right after the annexation of Korea in 1910, expressed his 
hope for a war between the United States and Japan, where Koreans abroad could 
participate and fight for Korea‘s independence.131 Kim Kyu-sik, after the Paris Peace 
Conference, also predicted that the complete success of the Korean independence 
movement was many years off, unless Japan came into sharp conflict with other great 
powers so that war would follow. He added that he believed ―it probable that there would 
be conflict and that eventually the Far East would be reconstituted, Korea would be 
reestablished as an independent State, and Japan would be confined to close limits of 
expansion.‖132 
While American writers in the early period before the annexation showed their 
exceptionalistic view when discussing Korea and its problems, Korean nationalist leaders 
in the United States capitalized on the fact that, prior to the annexation, American writers 
had taken an exceptionalistic view when discussing Korea and its problems; invoking the 
same exceptionalism, they tried to convince the American public that their country had a 
moral obligation to assist the Korean people. The image of America as fighting for liberty 
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and democracy was commonly employed in Koreans‘ writings.133 Symbolically, the 
Korea Review, the organ of the Korean Commission, declared on its back cover that the 
magazine stood for ―moral leadership of the United States in the world‖134: by saying this, 
they expected that the U.S., as the moral leader of the world, intervened in the Korean 
problem and help its national independence. Furthermore, Korean nationalist leaders tried 
to show that the Korean people participated in international organizations such as the Red 
Cross, thus showing their commitment to humanitarian virtues. 
 
 
Figure 23. Korean Red Cross ladies marching at Missionary Memorial Centennial Day, Honolulu. 
Source: Korea Review II, no. 4 (Jun 1920): 3. 
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These political maneuvers were to rely on American exceptionalism and idealized 
American-style democracy and Christianity. These maneuvers were strengthened by 
activities which converge into several leaders who shared a vision—Korea‘s 
independence through war between Japan and the United States, and a new Korean 
government following the American model. Although their vision did not gain 
unanimous agreement among the various Korean nationalist groups, as a result of 
vigorous propaganda activities three major figures of so-called diplomatic group—
Syngman Rhee, Henry Chung, and Sô Chae-p‘il135—became the ambassadors of Korean 
nationalism to the American audience. They organized Korea‘s First Congress in 1919 in 
Philadelphia and led the Korean Commission, which claimed to represent the Korean 
Provisional Government in the United States. 
 In sum, in these years right after the Great War and the March First Movement, 
Korean nationalist opinion-makers in the U.S. appealed to the American government and 
public for 1) America‘s immediate and official intervention in the Korean problem, 
beyond a polite request to the Japanese authorities,136 and 2) the complete independence, 
not partial or temporary reform, of Korea.137 In appealing these points, the Korean 
nationalist leaders in the United States tended to use the Wilsonian ideas on the new 
international order, the growing anti-Japanese sentiment in American society, and the 
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traditional American exceptionalist perception of itself as the helper and protagonist 
spreading the values of democracy and moral justice. 
 The Korean nationalist opinion-makers, whose activities in the United States were 
represented by the Korean Commission and Syngman Rhee, prioritized their propaganda 
work, hoping to gain sympathy and diplomatic aid from the United States over other 
activities. This strategy heavily impacted on American views of East Asian order, 
especially when salient events occurred from outside, such as the March First Movement 
or the outbreak of the Pacific War. On the other hand, the same strategy restricted its 
longstanding effects. As recent scholarship has pointed out, once provocative news about 
Korea tricked to a stop, the American public‘s interest in the Korean situation decreased 
substantially and, despite the best efforts of the Korean Commission and Syngman 
Rhee‘s group, Korean nationalists were unable to garner further attention to their cause.138 
Another criticism about this strategy, as Richard Kim argues, is that ―although 
globalization processes, led by U.S. power and influence, situated Korean immigrants at 
the forefront of the nationalist movement, the same processes also ironically subordinated 
Korean voices and agency to a hegemonic American subjectivity that envisioned a new 
postwar international order modeled in its own image.‖139 American indifference in the 
interwar years was a result of this tendency.  
 Despite Korean nationalist leaders‘ great expectations for the American role in 
solving the Korean problem, the failure of the Korean Mission to present its case at the 
Washington Disarmament Conference in 1921-22 demanded a new strategy. Experience 
of the apathy by the great powers taught the Korean leaders a sense of realpolitik that 
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politics among great powers were based on practical considerations, rather than 
moralistic premises. As evidenced by their writings at the end of the Washington 
Conference, the Korean Mission and its supporters had adopted more realistic rhetoric. 
Now the reason why the powers should not ignore, but resolve, the Korean problem was 
that the Japanese occupation would ultimately disturb Far Eastern peace140: an editorial in 
Korean Review insisted, ―as long as Japan can use Korea as her military base there will 
be no peace in the Far East.‖141 The disappointment after the Paris and Washington 
Conferences, along with start of Japanese ―Cultural Rule‖ in Korea in the 1920s, split 
Korean leaders on methods to gain national independence. Chapter 4 will detail the 
development of the Korean nationalist movement from the 1920s.  
 
3. American Responses 
 While the sensation of the March First Movement had subsided by late 1919, the 
Movement and its aftermath heightened U.S. awareness of the situation in Korea, 
positioning it as a crucial issue in the East Asian region. Editors of the Korean Review 
believed that many Americans were beginning to listen.142 If the initial response from the 
American public was temporary, now Americans who were interested in the Korean 
problem participated in church meetings and nonprofit organizations, listening lectures 
and discussing the issue. Many American organizations sent letters and resolutions that 
asked the U.S. Congress to help the Korean people oppressed by Japanese rule. That 
predominantly Christian groups responded to the Korean appeal—mostly mission boards, 
                                               
140 ―Petition Presented to the Conference on Limitation of Armament and the Far East by the People of 
Korea,‖ Korea Review III, no. 11 (Jan 1922): 3. 
141 ―Korea and the Coming Conference,‖ Korea Review III, no. 7 (Sep 1921): 1. 
142




churches, and Christian student groups—was almost natural, given that the Korean 
opinion-makers heavily relied on the American people‘s Christian compassion toward the 
situation in Korea. Although the religious character of those groups certainly motivated 
them to pass resolutions and release petitions, the contents of the petitions were not 
necessarily in religious color. For instance, members of the YWCA and YMCA of 
Pacific College, Newberg, Oregon, sent the following resolutions: 
Inasmuch as the Japanese are jeopardizing the political and religious 
freedom of the Koreans, and, 
 
Inasmuch as the Koreans are struggling for the inalienable rights of life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and, 
 
Inasmuch as the United States entered into a treaty with Korea, in 1882, to 
give mutual aid and protection, in case her rights were infringed upon; 
 
We, the members of the Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. of Pacific College, 
Newberg, Oregon, in joint session, do respectfully request that the United 
States Government use its influence in behalf of Korean independence; 
We further believe that Korea is entitled to be free and independent, that 
Korea shall develop as a strong Christian democratic republic in the Far 
East.143 
 
From 1919 to 1921, this was typical content of American people‘s petitions to the U.S. 
government. The meetings and resolutions of church communities and other 
philanthropic organizations across the United States were reported in both American and 
Korean-American media outlets.144 Philanthropic organizations such as the Korean Relief 
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Society and cultural societies such as the Korea Society of New York emerged in this 
period.145 In addition, speakers for the Korean cause were invited to cultural societies and 
given opportunities to appeal to the broader American public, beyond the small group of 
Americans who actively supported independence for Korea.146 
  
(1) The League of the Friends of Korea 
 The spread of sympathy among Americans for Koreans struggling under Japanese 
rule prompted the formation of the League of the Friends of Korea from 1919. In this and 
later years, several American organizations and campaigns emerged in support of the 
causes of other East Asian countries, such as Sidney Gulick‘s campaign against 
California‘s anti-Asian legislation and also from Henry Luce‘s so-called ―China Lobby,‖ 
which supported Chiang Kai-shek. In contrast to that American opinion makers organized 
those pro-Japanese and pro-Chinese movements, Korean nationalist leaders, rather than 
American supporters, had organized the Friends of Korea, an organization of pro-Korean 
Americans.147 Korean nationalist leaders in the U.S. initiated to form the League of the 
Friends of Korea, thinking it as a part of their public activities toward Americans. Sô 
Chae-p‘il initiated to form the first branch of the League of the Friends of Korea in May 
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1919 in Philadelphia, right after the Korean Congress held in the same city. Their 
headquarters was established in Washington D.C., and Rev. Stephen A. Beck, a former 
missionary in Korea, was assigned as the League‘s Executive Secretary.148 As Ko 
explains in his book, local branches of the League were usually created by Korean 
students or Korean-Americans who would their American pastors or college professors if 
they hold a general interest meeting for those people who were interested in hearing 
about the situation in Korea. Speakers such as Syngman Rhee, Henry Chung, Sô Chae-
p‘il, and American supporters of Korea, such as Rev. S.A. Beck and Professor Homer 
Hulbert, would then deliver speeches at these gatherings, explaining the struggles of the 
Korean people. In many cases, a local league was formed after the meeting.149 If a league 
was formed, the members would elect executive members, who would then be listed in 
The Korea Review, which functioned as the bulletin of the League of the Friends of 
Korea. The Korean-American newspaper in the Korean language, Sinhanminbo, also 
frequently reported activities of the League of the Friends of Korea. 
 Similar to the Korean nationalist groups of Rhee and others, the League sought to 
inform the American public of the real situation of Korea and the Korean people. As for 
the Korean nationalist petitioning activities, the League of the Friends of Korea 
subscribed to the idea of American exceptionalism. The Friends of Korea aimed to create 
public support among Americans for spreading Christianity and democracy throughout 
the Far East. The League accordingly declared to take ―moral responsibility‖ for this 
cause with a special sympathy for the struggling Korean people, while saying that it did 
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not intend to intervene in political issues.150 Organizers of the League stressed that Korea 
should gain national independence and if there was any man or country who ought to 
help, it was the United States, because of America‘s duty to right wrongs.151 This 
particular aspect worked effectively in drawing public empathy. For example, their 
mission resonated with World War I veterans who attended a meeting of the Tiffin 
League in Ohio; they stated that they had fought for the liberty of Europe and were now 
willing to fight for the same cause in Asia. A reporter at the meeting commented, ―It was 
the typical American spirit which makes this nation the hope of mankind and protector of 
liberty everywhere.‖152 
 As of December 1920, the branches and presidents of each branch of the League 
of the Friends of Korea were as follows: 
 President: Dr. T.J. Bryson, League of Alliance, Ohio 
 President: Dr. W.C. Rufus, League of Ann Arbor, Michigan 
 President: Dr. L.H. Murlin, League of Boston, Massachusetts 
 President: Senator J.J. Barbour, League of Chicago, Illinois 
 President: Dr. Wm Houston, League of Columbus, Ohio 
 President: Dr. W.W. Geyer, League of Findlay, Ohio 
 President: Dr. F.A. Wilber, League of Fostoria, Ohio 
 President: Dr. Grant A. Robbins, League of Kansas City, Mo 
 President: Rev. T.R. Hamilton, League of Lima, Ohio 
 President: Dr. R.E. Tullos, League of Mansfield, Ohio 
 President: Dr. Chas. E. Gilbson, League of Newberg, Oregon 
 President: Dr. Chas. J. Smith, League of New York 
 President: Floyd W. Tomkins, League of Philadelphia 
 President: Frank S. Livinggood, League of Reading, PA 
 President: Dr. L.A. McAfee, League of San Francisco, CA 
 President: Dr. A.C. Shuman, League of Tiffin, Ohio 
 President: Admiral J.C. Watson, League of Washington, D.C. 
                                               
150 ―Structure of the Friends of Korea and Resolutions,‖ Sinhanminbo, May 27, 1919; ―League of Friends 
of Korea,‖ Korea Review I, no. 4 (Jun 1919), quoted in Ko, 364. 
151 ―Addresses of Washington Meeting,‖ Korea Review I, no. 5 (Jul 1919): 13. 





President: Rev. Calvin M. DeLong, League of Upper Perkiomen Valley, East 
Greenville, PA153 
 
As Ko notes, the League‘s activities were concentrated in the central and eastern states, 
such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Massachusetts, and New York. The size 
of the League is believed to have been 10,000 members in 21 cities and counties of the 
United States.154 As F. A. McKenzie‘s book, Korea’s Fight for Freedom, gained 
popularity in the United Kingdom, the Friends of Korea formed a London branch, 
comprised of mostly parliamentary members, at the end of 1920.155 
 The League of the Friends of Korea concentrated on sending petitions to the 
American government, but at times held mass meetings, all for the purpose of 
―enlightening‖ Americans about the Korean situation. Among the active members and 
supporters of the League were prominent and influential intellectuals, such as Dr. Lemuel 
H. Murlin, President of Boston University, and Senators Charles S. Thomas of Colorado 
and Sheldon P. Spencer of Missouri. This indicates that the Friends of Korea aimed to 
gain support among intellectuals, especially religious leaders, scholars, and influential 
politicians. This strategy contributed to the impression that the Korean issue was serious 
and critical for the United States. President Murlin of Boston University in his article on 
Japanese diplomacy criticized the country, saying ―in her rapid rise to a world power the 
present government [of Japan] has not been guided by those ethical principles that ought 
to prevail in the world‘s future diplomacy,‖ and ―Prussianized Germany has been her 
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[Japan‘s] ideal.‖ He pointed out that it was difficult to find honorable and fair means by 
which Japan had gained control of Shantung, Manchuria, and inner Mongolia. In Korea, 
he commented, Japanese conduct belonged to the ―diplomacy of exploitation and 
spoliation, wringing from Korea every advantage for Japan, and leaving Korea helplessly 
living on the crumbs that fall from Japan‘s table, loaded with supplies stolen from 
Korea.‖ Saying that Japan was never for one moment in ―sympathy‖ with her allies, he 
predicted, ―such a government will betray her allies when it suits her advantage to do 
so.‖156 At the commemoration of the declaration of independence of Korea in New York 
in March 1920, Murlin declared his support of the Korean people.157 
Other passionate members exercised individual actions by informing friends 
about the Korean situation. Dr. Harry C. Whiting, who had been a medical missionary in 
Korea, informed the editors of the Korea Review that he was sending a circular to friends 
all over the country ―in the hope that the American people will be ready to act when the 
time comes and demand that Japan should give up Korea.‖ Explaining that Koreans 
demanded their liberty and had launched a well thought out plan of passive resistance at 
the March First Movement, Whiting said, 
In this country and England societies of the Friends of Korea are springing 
up. In England a very strong society has been formed with an aggressive 
programme. 
 
The New York City society is especially active and has established a 
speakers‘ bureau and will supply lecturers or speakers for churches or 
clubs, qualified to speak authoritatively on Korea... My own efforts for the 
past three months have taken me into Illinois, Missouri, Kansas and Iowa, 
and everywhere I found people eager to hear the truth about Korea. Many 
                                               
156 Lemuel H. Murlin, ―What a Friend of Japan Thinks of Present Japan,‖ Boston Sunday Advertiser, Nov 9, 
1919, published in Korea Review I, no. 11 (Jan 1920): 9-10. 
157 ―Commemorating Exercises of the Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence by the Korean 




colleges, high schools and clubs as well as churches have been opened to 
me, and I am receiving many letters telling of the deep interest in Korea.158 
 
 A letter from a reader in the Korea Review shows how the Friends of Korea 
attracted supporters among American public interested in the East Asian and Korean 
issue. This reader said that he had never been in Korea nor known about the Asian 
countries until recently. While he was in Bermuda for a vacation, he had found a copy of 
The Korea Review on the library table and became interested in Korea. When he returned 
to New York, he read in the newspapers that the Koreans were to hold a public meeting 
in the Town Hall. He immediately purchased a subscription to the Korea Review and 
attended the meeting out of curiosity. For the first time, he saw Koreans and heard them 
speak in public. He became really interested in Asia from that time on and had a fairly 
complete library on the subject of Korea and Japan. Then he tried to gather some first-
hand information about Korea through mission boards, but failed, as ―they all seemed 
reluctant to express their views.‖ His impression was that they were very cautious and 
afraid to say anything that might displease the Japanese. Later he heard from a friend who 
was very active in church work that the apparent indifference toward the suffering 
Christians of Korea on the part of American mission boards was due to their policy not to 
offend the Japanese, for fear that their missionaries might be driven out of Korea. After 
asking about the conditions of American missionaries in Korea, this man concluded his 
letter by saying that he believed in justice for all people, whether they are weak or strong. 
According to him, ―Korea is not getting a fair deal from other nations now, but she will 
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when they know her story. Your journal has enlightened me on the subject and I have no 
doubt it has many others like myself.‖159 
 
(2) Korean Issue in the U.S. Congress 
With the spread of the realization about the Korean problem in the U.S., the issue 
reached to the doorstep of the U.S. Congress in 1919 and the early 1920s. The Korean 
Commission and Friends of Korea‘s activities were effective in this process. During 
debate in the House and the Senate, Congressmen who actively argued for Korea‘s case 
had a close and cooperative relationship with the Korean Commission and the League of 
the Friends of Korea. This was also a result of a shift in the focus of the debate about the 
postwar settlement and the corresponding shift in Korean leaders‘ concentration from 
Paris to the U.S. Congress.160 Senator Spencer, a Republican from Missouri, delivered 
several addresses at meetings of the Friends of Korea and contributed articles and book 
reviews on Korea. Spencer raised the issue of Korea in the Senate by submitting a 
resolution asking the State Department if the conditions between Japan and Korea 
warranted invocation of the treaty of 1882 between Korea and the United States.161 He 
also presented a copy of a statement by Homer Hulbert and a copy of the ―Brief for the 
Republic of Korea‖ prepared by the Korean Commission‘s legal advisor Fred Dolph to 
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the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The Committee ordered the brief to be 
printed in the Congressional Record.162  
Meanwhile, petitions by both Korean groups and American organizations and 
private citizens flowed into both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The 
Congressional Record shows that the senders of these petitions ranged from the Women‘s 
Missionary Society and the Westminster Guild to churches in Girard, Kansas and 
Aberdeen, Washington, the Students‘ Liberty Club of Harvard University, the Tiffin 
League of the Friends of Korea in Ohio, and the citizens of Ann Arbor, Michigan and 
Nebraska. These petitions repudiated the persecution of missionaries in Korea,163 
protested Japanese acts of cruelty committed in Korea,164 asked for Congress‘ help in the 
establishment of national autonomy for Korea or the withdrawal of the Japanese from 
Korea,165 and sometimes asked the U.S. to extend aid to Korea.166 Petitioners were not 
necessarily members of the Friends of Korea. At least, the fact that Americans who had 
not joined in the Friends of Korea also sent petitions demonstrates that the formation and 
activities of the organization functioned to spread knowledge and sympathy about 
Korea‘s situation to the American public, as the locations of the petitioners mostly 
corresponded to the geographical distribution of branches of the Friends of Korea. A 
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compilation of petitions for Korea to the U.S. Congress resulted in passage of a U.S. 
Senate resolution in October 1919. The resolution read, ―the Senate of the United States 
express its sympathy with the aspiration of the Korean people for a government of their 
own choice.‖167  
Korea‘s case came forth as one of the critical issues during the Congressional 
debates over the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations. Senators opposing the 
treaty and the League of Nations took the case of Korea, which was abandoned to 
Japanese rule, and the Shandong decision168 as two examples of the inequity of the treaty. 
Senator George Norris, a Republican from Nebraska, used the Korean situation as 
evidence of Japan‘s untrustworthiness; he stated that Japan could not be trusted to keep 
faith as to the privileges awarded her in Shandong, China ―any more than she can be 
trusted in Korea.‖169 He argued that the concessions for Japan made in the treaty belied 
President Wilson‘s claims to be fighting for world democracy, self-determination, and 
modern civilization.170 As Manela assesses, ―such condemnations of the wrongs done to 
Korea, like similar rhetoric attacking the Shandong decision or the British practices in 
Egypt and India, may have helped to defeat the treaty in the Senate.‖171 In 1920, Senator 
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Norris played an active role in favor of the Korean nationalist movements by holding the 
vice presidency of the Washington D.C. League of the Friends of Korea, addressing mass 
meetings for Korea, and submitting petitions from the citizens of Nebraska for the 
Korean case to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.172  
In March 1920, Senator Charles Thomas, a Republican from Colorado, at the 
Senate debate on the covenant of the League of Nations, offered an amendment to the 
reservation proposed by Senator Owen. The amendment read, 
The United States further understands that in fulfillment and execution of 
the great principle of self-determination of peoples and equality of all 
Governments pervading and underlying the covenant of the League of 
Nations Great Britain and Japan, respectively, will forthwith recognize the 
existence and political independence of the republic of Ireland and the 
ancient kingdom of Korea, and agree that they become members of the 
League of Nations with equal representation accorded to all other 
sovereign and independent Governments. 
 
Two days later, Thomas again offered an amendment to Senator Gerry‘s reservation on 
Ireland. The part concerning Korea in this amendment read, 
And the United States, also adhering to the principle of self-determination, 
declares its sympathy with the grievances and aspirations of the people of 
Korea for the restoration of their ancient kingdom and its emancipation 
from the tyranny of Japan, and it further declares that when so 
consummated it should be promptly admitted as a member of the League 
of Nations.173 
 
When submitting this amendment, Senator Thomas stated, 
… Korea occupies a position peculiarly appealing to the national sense of 
fairness and of right. I say that without in the slightest degree of reflecting 
upon the equities of other peoples. Perhaps they may be superior to those 
of Korea. In my judgment, however, Korea appeals to us from a different 
and a more important standpoint than any other subject peoples; because 
we negotiated a treaty with Korea in 1882, if the nation were still an 
independent one that treaty would be in force. I call the attention of the 
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Senate to its first article… That great American [President Roosevelt],… 
declined to exercise his good offices in behalf of that suffering kingdom 
[when Japan incorporated Korea into the Japanese Empire]…. If, 
therefore, we are to indulge in reservations of this character, which I 
protest as wholly foreign to the treaty, we owe it to our sense of justice, to 
the facts, and in my judgment to our sense of obligation, to recognize the 
present efforts of the Korean people for independence, to extend to her 
that recognition which this reservation proposes as an element in the 
ratification of this treaty. It is chiefly for this reason that I am constrained 
again to offer this amendment.174 
 
When the amendment was put to a vote, it was rejected by a vote of 34 to 46. The 
amendment was rejected not from lack of sympathy for Korea, but largely due to the fear 
that this and the Gerry reservation might complicate the treaty situation. However, the 
Gerry reservation, which expressed support of Ireland‘s independence, was adopted by a 
vote of 38 to 33. Interestingly, after the vote, Senator Borah of Idaho commented that the 
result was ―a proposition of the U.S. Senate with nearly 20,000,000 people in the United 
States of Irish blood, just at the beginning of a political campaign, applying the great 
principle of self-government to no one except those who can vote.‖ Then he asked, 
…have we lost all self-respect and all sense of decency toward the world, 
that we shall withhold from the subject peoples who are oppressed and 
with whom we are to deal in the future under this league this great 
fundamental principle which has been a part of our faith for 150 years and 
placed there by the blood and suffering of our forbears? Why, if for no 
other reason on earth than that we are afraid to face the situation 
politically in the United States and deny to these people who have the vote 
that which we refuse to those who have not the vote?175  
 
The similar implication that the U.S. Congress considered the issues of small 
populations in terms of domestic politics had already been disclosed one year earlier. 
After casting his vote against the resolution which expressed sympathy with Irish 
aspirations for independence, one senator asked [Italics added], 
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There are stories in the newspapers about Korea having national 
aspirations, but you have not yet introduced any resolution against Japan, 
providing for the independence of Korea, lately conquered and very much 
oppressed. Why? Because you know Great Britain will be good-humored 
with you and Japan will not be, and, while there are a lot of Irish-
American votes, there are no Korean votes in America.176 
 
Similarly, while commenting on the Irish resolution, Senator Thomas said of the Korean 
case, ―Korea has been knocking at the doors of the senate, asking that we pass some 
resolution; they have been appealing to the American people to recognize and sympathize 
with their cause. Has anyone introduced a Korean resolution here?‖ At this question, 
Senator Williams responded, ―There are no Korean-Americans, hyphenated Americans 
from Korea, with votes to re-elect senators and representatives.‖177 Senators Borah and 
Thomas‘ comparison between Korea‘s case and that of Ireland disclosed the limitation to 
the extent the U.S. Congress might have taken actions in regard to Korea‘s case. Korea‘s 
case before Congress was just one example of a ―small people,‖ and any practical action 
Congress might take toward the Korean problem could have entangled the U.S. in foreign 
policy decisions for other small countries as well.  
In sum, congressional debates about the Korean problem and their results clearly 
demonstrated the limitation of the pro-Korea independence movement in the U.S. Korean 
nationalists succeeded in attracting the attention of the American public, thus increasing 
the momentum of international interest in the March First Movement. In a sense, the 
congressional debate on Korea marked the peak of the pro-Korean independence 
movement in the U.S. before the Pacific War. Statements by American congressmen who 
favored Korean independence indicate that Korean nationalists effectively persuaded 
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American intellectuals and politicians about the premises of their nationalist cause—
America‘s obligation to exercise ―good offices‖ out of sense of justice, its special 
relationship with Korea, and so on. At the same time, congress‘s rejection of resolutions 
for Korean independence disclosed the limitations of the pro-Korean nationalist 
movement in the American political sphere. A senator‘s comment that there were ―no 
Korean votes in America‖178 has a symbolic implication that pro-Korean movement in the 
U.S. had limitation. Although there was an increase in the number of Americans who 
supported Korea, the Korean problem remained an international issue whose influence 
could not exert political pressure on American society. Therefore, as long as there was no 
more sensational spark from outside, the U.S. Congress would not take any actual action 
more than expressing humanitarian sympathy toward the Korean people.  
 
Conclusion 
Fred Dolph, legal advisor of the Korean Commission, prepared a report on the 
Commission‘s two-year activities in October 1920. According to him, American 
newspapers were sympathetic to Koreans and this sympathy came only from a 
consciousness of justice. Between March 1919 and September 1, 1920, there were over 
9,000 editorials and special reports dealing with the Korean problem in American 
newspapers and magazines. In contrast, Dolph assessed, there were about 50 articles that 
supported Japan. American people formed numerous organizations to investigate the 
Korean problem. Those organizations expressed sympathy toward the Korean people and 
passed resolutions for justice from their hearts. In Congress, two resolutions regarding 
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Korea were put forward in the Senate, and one resolution was put forward in the House 
of Representatives. The fact that the Korean issue was recorded in the Congressional 
Record as many as 64 times, showed that the American people had become inclined 
toward the problem of Korea, Dolph said. He concluded that, given that the ratio of Irish 
to Korean Americans was almost several thousand to one, this extensive attention toward 
the Korean problem was a source of hope and encouragement.179 
The burgeoning American interest in the Korean problem, regardless of whether 
the interest came purely from a sense of justice and humanitarianism or was engaged with 
other issues, such as discussion of membership in the League of Nations or vigilance 
against the ―yellow peril‖ of Japan, was phenomenal. Koreans in the United States had 
been known for their nationalistic and patriotic character from the early 1910s. The 
increase in interest in the Korean problem provided generous space and opportunities for 
Koreans themselves to voice their concerns. In contrast to Dolph‘s hopeful outlook, 
however, the Korean nationalist leaders in the United States, centering around institutions 
such as the Korean Commission and Friends of Korea, failed influence American foreign 
policy toward Korea or Japan. In the 1920s Korea-related articles and pro-Korean 
movements in America gradually faded away. The failure was unavoidable in a sense, 
given that what Koreans were asking of the United States would have deeply involved the 
American government in the East Asian region, placing it in conflict with Japan, an 
unthinkable option in this interwar period. As seen in the section on the U.S.‘ official 
position regarding colonial Korea, diplomatically and legally Korea was considered as 
being under Japanese jurisdiction. As long as the U.S. maintained a favorable relationship 
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with Japan, American intervention in Korea was not a feasible option. At the same time, 
pro-Japanese propaganda movements promoted friendly relations between the U.S. and 
Japan even at non-official occasions, such as at Institute of Pacific Relations conferences. 
The decline of international attention on the Korean problem was partially attributed to 
the methods used by Korean nationalist leaders. Their strategy to rely on America‘s sense 
of justice and humanism provoked by scenes at the March First Movement worked very 
well until the Japanese authorities announced that they were making ―cultural reforms‖ in 
Korea. Once Japan announced that it had put a stop to the harsh treatment of the Korean 
people, their American philanthropic interest in the Korean problem gradually decreased. 
Nevertheless, the Korean independence movement in the United States after the 
March First Movement, along with other independence movements in China, Russia, and 
Korea, opened the era of Korea‘s modern nationalism.180 At the same time, while Korean 
nationalist leaders succeeded in claiming Korean people‘s ethnic and national 
independence to the world, the logics of realpolitik denied their representation at postwar 
peace conferences or in American politics. Therefore, in the mid-1920s, they began to 
consider changing their strategy. These changes coincided with the emergence of 
conflicts between Japan and the U.S. on the issue of immigration and divisions among 





                                               









CHAPTER  FOUR 
 







Since Koreans‘ representation on the post-World War I international stage was 
denied, the number of news reports about Korea and active pro-Korean movements in the 
United States decreased dramatically. To American viewers, the Korean nationalist 
movement seemed almost inactive prior to the outbreak of World War II. The interwar 
years, especially from 1924 through the mid-1930s, were the years when no special 
incident directly regarding colonial or nationalist issues was heard of from Korea. 
Nevertheless, American viewers experienced drastic changes in their relationship with 
Japan and, accordingly, with its colony Korea, during the interwar period. 
Since the March First Movement of 1919, Japanese colonial authorities claimed a 
policy of cultural reform that lasted throughout the 1920s. ―Cultural rule‖ (bunka seiji in 
Japanese, Munhwa t’ongchi in Korean) was seen as a huge shift from the precedent 
―military rule‖ of the 1910s, which resulted in the mass anti-Japanese movement by 
Koreans in 1919. Under the catch phrase of ―cultural reform,‖ a new civilian Governor-
General, Saitō Makoto, was assigned and the gendarmerie was replaced with a police 
system. The new rule allowed limited freedoms of the press, publication, assembly, and 




colonial system.‖1 ―Print capitalism,‖ that is, Korean newspapers and Korean language 
publications, achieved rapid growth in the 1920s. However, the cultural rule period meant 
the sophistication of a colonial structure for the colonized Korea, rather than hopeful 
anticipation for independence. The 1930s marked, in Korean historians‘ classification, a 
period of ―policy designed to obliterate Korean culture‖ (Minjok malsal chôngch’aek in 
Korean). Division between nationalist and communist groups was deepened in the 1930s 
and a radical assimilation policy, Naisen ittai (naesôn ilch’e in Korean, meaning ―Japan 
(core) and Korea are one‖), paved the road toward the war mobilization system in Korea 
in the 1940s.  
During the 1920s and 1930s, as a consequence of the internal splits and Japan‘s 
claim to new policy, Korean nationalist activities had no powerful impact on outside 
audiences. Still, inside information about colonial Korea served as a useful source for 
American observers to understand Japanese imperialism. Understanding the conditions of 
Japanese imperialism became more significant for the United States throughout the 
interwar years, as the relationship between the United States and Japan experienced 
dynamic changes during this period. Until the early 1920s, the two countries worked in a 
framework of international cooperation ―embodied in the League of Nations and the 
Washington conference treaties and led by the United States and Great Britain.‖2 
However, the so-called ―racial equality‖ debate between Japan and other powers at 
debate for establishing the League of Nations became the first hint of upcoming 
confrontation. The Japanese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference after World War I 
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endeavored to secure recognition of the principle of racial equality in vain. The effort was 
brought out from the discrimination and humiliation that Japanese faced in the West, in 
relation to restricted immigration of Japanese to the United States and several other 
countries. The failure to insert the racial equality clause in the League of Nations 
Covenant became a turning point for Japan to move away from the international system 
initiated by the United States and Great Britain and their rhetoric of peace and 
international cooperation. Japanese writers reproached Western countries for not being 
humane, righteous, and honest. Shōji Fujii argued, ―it is this feeling of disappointment 
and suspicion that has made the Japanese now more determined than ever to promote a 
Monroe Doctrine for East Asia.‖3 Even before 1919, the Japanese acknowledged that 
anti-Japanese immigration sentiment along the Pacific Coast regions in the United States 
was growing. This uncomfortable sentiment against Asian immigrants in the United 
States resulted in a series of decisions, including the Gentlemen‘s Agreement of 1907, 
under which Japan agreed to restrict further immigration of Japanese to the United States; 
the California Alien Land Law of 1913, which prohibited aliens from owning land or 
property; and the Immigration Act of 1924, which completely excluded immigration by 
people of Asian origin.
4
 Japan‘s disappointment with the international system and the 
following criticism of the Western powers confirmed Japanese commentators‘ belief that 
Japan was the only hopeful, moral, and authorized leader for the East Asian region. 
On the part of Americans, as Hirobe argues, Japan‘s emergence as an imperial 
power coincided with the sudden increase of Japanese immigrants to North America and 
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led many to believe that there existed ―a Japanese scheme to conquer the United States, 
or at least the Pacific Coast.‖5 These threatening images of Japan were combined to 
create the idea of ―yellow peril.‖ The notion of ―suspicious Japan‖ even provoked the 
U.S.‘ governmental institutions to pay attention to Japanese activities in other parts of the 
Americas.
6
 As a consequence, as Iriye argues, beginning with the early 1930s, global 
interdependence and cooperation were no longer the prevailing rhetoric, as they had been 
in the years right after World War I.
7
 Now, Japan was planning programs for economic 
development and population resettlement in Manchuria and north China, which were 
under its control, forming the ―yen bloc.‖ It devised the pan-Asianist doctrine, which 
called for solidarity and cooperation among Asian peoples and resistance to Western 
imperialism.
8
 Japan‘s movements in 1931 were seen as a threat to China and the open 
door, against America‘s desire to maintain integrity of China. In addition, a series of 
Japanese military expansionist moves in the continent—such as Japan‘s attack on 
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Shanghai in February 1932, the attack of Manchuria in 1931 and the establishment of the 
puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932, and Japan‘s military attack on both North and central 
China beginning in 1937—also marked moments when American public opinion ―blazed 
forth against Japan in a nation-wide manifestation of hostile sentiment,‖ according to a 
contemporary analysis.
9 The gradually escalating confrontation in the diplomatic, 
economic, and cultural relationship between the United States and Japan during the 
interwar years ultimately resulted in the emergence of the Second World War‘s Pacific 
theater, beginning in 1941. 
 For American public, colonial Korea provided insightful and inside information 
about the Japanese empire. Because of the power relationship between the colonizer and 
the colonized in Korea and the changing relationship between the United States and 
Japan, colonial Korea could show two sides of the same coin: on the one hand, due to the 
fact that Korea officially belonged to the Japanese, American observers largely accepted 
the view of ―the colonizer‘s insistence on difference[s] from the colonized, establishing a 
notion of the savage as Other, the antithesis of civilized value.‖10 The U.S. government 
repeatedly confirmed its impartial attitude in regards to the Korean problem, prioritizing 
friendly relations with Japan. On the other hand, as the United States began to take a 
suspicious look at Japan‘s moves during the early 1930s, Korea, which had been known 
as anti-Japanese, became a useful source for understanding the Japanese Empire, a soon-
to-be enemy and threat to the United States. Emerging academic writings analyzed the 
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Korean situation from sociological, historical, economic, and political perspectives, 
indicating this trend.  
Beginning in the 1930s, American observers, and State Department officials in 
particular, concentrated on finding an answer to the question of whether Japanese 
imperialism was successful or not by looking at the Korean problem. Along with the 
increasing conflict between the United States and Japan, the growing attention on the part 
of the State Department indicates the increasing possibility that the United States would 
play a significant role in the end of Korea‘s colonization. Keeping this background in 
mind, this chapter examines changes in Japanese rule over Korea and how the American 
public and officials viewed these changes during the 1920s and 1930s, the period 
preceding the direct and full-scale confrontation between the United States and Japan in 
the Pacific.  
 
1. Changes in Colonial Rule and Divisions in the Korean Nationalist Movement 
(1) Cultural Rule and the Korean Nationalist Movement of the 1920s 
 The sensation of the March First Movement and foreign reproach about Japanese 
repression of the nationwide movement forced Japanese colonizers to seek a new policy 
for Korea. The New Governor-General Saitō claimed an imperial ―cultural policy‖ as he 
took office in mid-1919. This new policy encouraged Koreans‘ ―cultural movements,‖ 
permitting relatively more relaxed restrictions on Koreans‘ freedom of speech and 
assembly to organize a variety of nationalist and political groups.11 According to Saitō‘s 
statement, Japanese authorities insisted that these so-called cultural movements would 
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make the Korean people realize the ―wrongness‖ of an independence movement and 
correspond to the ―great spirit‖ of annexation between Japan and Korea.12  
As Gi-Wook Shin argues, cultural rule was ―a policy of incorporation designed to 
subsume moderate nationalists into the colonial system.‖13 This aspect is also reflected in 
the term that Korean scholars use to refer to the cultural rule period: ―period of divide and 
rule (minjok punyôl chôngch’aek ki in Korean).‖14 It implies that Japan‘s new policy in 
Korea was to conciliate moderate Korean elites, making them collaborators in colonial 
politics and cultural policies, while suppressing radical and communist activities. Japan‘s 
reform policy, in effect, contributed to conflicts and splits within the Korean leadership.  
As Cumings summarizes, the largest split in the Korean leadership was between 
liberal idealism and socialism, which ―brought Korea into the mainstream of world 
history after World War I.‖15 After being disappointed with results of the March First 
Movement, the great powers‘ indifference shown during the Washington Conference was 
a shock for Korean nationalists. Some nationalists turned to the idea of raising Korean 
people‘s capacities to self-rule in the future, rather than working to pursue immediate and 
imprudent independence without appropriate capacities. The reformist and self-rule 
movements cooperated with Japanese authorities‘ self-government policy. However, as 
critics predicted and Japan‘s later policy of assimilation and war mobilization 
demonstrated, Japan‘s claim of giving a self-government system to the Korean people 
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turned out to be nominal propaganda. While the liberal idealists were divided between 
critics and supporters of conciliation with Japan, socialists rapidly gained ―a potentially 
large mass base‖ of Koreans.16 By the end of the 1920s, despite the Japanese policies of 
strong police repression and censorship, socialist groups led the Korean resistance 
movement, planting ―a deep core of Communist influence among the Korean people, 
particularly the students, youth groups, laborers and peasants.‖17  
The Korean Communist Party was founded in Korea in 1925, and other socialist 
groups were formed in the 1920s. Despite a short coalition between moderate nationalists 
and socialists with the formation of Sin’ganhoe, united Korean national independent 
front, in 1927, the gap between these two deepened in the 1930s. Meanwhile, Korean 
nationalists in the United States also experienced internal conflicts and the Korean 
Commission, the center of the Korean nationalist petitioning movement at the turn of the 
1920s, was closed. Syngman Rhee was estranged from the Korean Provisional 
Government (KPG) after his failure at the Washington Conference and its debate about 
the organization and ultimate goal of the KPG.18 Rhee stayed in Hawaii until his return to 
Washington, D.C. in April 1939, at which time he resumed leadership of the nationalist 
movement through the Korean-American Council. 
 
(2) Assimilation Policies of the 1930s 
                                               
16 Ibid., 159. 
17 Dae-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1967), 132. 
18 For details about the gap between Rhee and the KPG leaders in the 1920s and 1930s, see Chông Pyông-




 Since the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the Japanese forces‘ invasion of 
Manchuria, Japan clarified its plan to expand into Chinese territory. Japan aimed at 
intensifying its policy of ―Japanization‖ in Korea, placing the colony in a significantly 
new position in the areas of communication, economy, and the defense of the Japanese 
Empire. The assimilation policies in Korea implemented during the 1930s can be 
understood as a part of Japanese preparations for the upcoming war. Japan‘s education 
policy in Korea had a declared aim to teach the Japanese language, Japanese history, 
myths, and customs, and to ―completely destroy‖ Koreans‘ own characteristics, their 
ethnicity, and thoughts for national independence.19 In other words, it was policy of 
changing Korean people into subjects of the Japanese empire.  
The shrine issue is a symbolic example that showed the attitude of the Japanese 
policy toward Korea in this period. Though Shinto was the Japanese indigenous religion, 
beginning in 1932 the government-general in Korea required that all pupils and 
schoolteachers attend ceremonies at Shinto shrines and bow in homage to the spirits of 
Japanese national heroes. As Sung-Gun Kim argues, Japan needed not only the material 
resources and the strategic position of the Korean Peninsula, but also the ―native 
manpower‖ for conscription. The need for loyalty and the devotion of the Korean people 
to the Japanese empire became more urgent than ever before. As a means of making 
Koreans loyal subjects, the Japanese administration attempted to bring about the cultural 
assimilation of Korea by urging the colonial people to revere the Japanese emperor and to 
offer obeisance at Shinto shrines.20 As expected, the religiously involved shrine issue 
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became controversial among American missionaries, giving a clue for American 
observers to trace the direction of Japanese imperialism. 
The beginnings of war preparations presented as ―cultural reforms‖ during the 
1920s turned into instances of extreme control of political offenders in the 1930s. In 
response, there appeared a strong Korean guerrilla resistance that cooperated with the 
Chinese to fight together against Japanese imperialism beginning in 1931.21 Kim Il Sung, 
the future leader of North Korea, emerged as one of the most important anti-Japanese 
guerrilla leaders by the mid-1930s. 
 
2. American Journalistic and Scholarly Views 
(1) A Romantic Colony: Affirmation of Korea as a Colony 
As we saw in Chapter 1, imperial Japan took steps to propagandize its 
modernization process, in particular in the spheres of economics and commerce, 
beginning in the early stage of its colonization of Korea. From the 1920s onward, 
Japanese propaganda efforts extended to the promotion of European and American 
tourism in Korea. Japan advertised the natural beauties of Korea and called Korea the 
―Switzerland of the East,‖ although visitors found the likeness was not striking.22 At other 
times, the Japanese Tourist Bureau invited European and American journalists to Korea, 
selling the image of ―the Hermit Kingdom.‖23 
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Resonating with Japan‘s efforts, European and American travel writings were 
prevalent in this period, as in the earlier years. Travelers‘ guides and pictures in travelers‘ 
journals such as National Geographic and Travel introduced the places and customs of 
Korea to readers. Western travelers‘ writings in the late nineteenth century disclosed bare 
curiosity about an exotic land from an Orientalist view; and writings in the 1910s were 
increasingly inclined toward political aspects. Writings by visitors to Korea in the 1920s 
and 1930s showed another perspective: the salient image of Korea as a ―romantic 
colony.‖ As David Spurr notes, articles about Third World countries in travel magazines 
such as National Geographic produced similar images, as if every article was the same 
article about the same country. Natives of the far-off lands ―smile alluringly for the 
camera, and their attitude toward the writer is invariably genial.‖24 Western visitors 
praised the convenient highways, leading ―in every direction from the highway, so that an 
easy automobile-ride brings the traveler to the magnificent forests that clothe the slopes 
of the central range.‖25 Here, Korea provides modern transportation and technology 
alongside natural scenes that Western visitors could enjoy and appreciate. The image of 
modern cities developed by Japan suggested the viewer‘s admiration for the colonizer‘s 
epochal modernization of the most underdeveloped regions. The caption of a picture of 
well-organized roads and modern buildings of Pusan [Figure 26] reads, ―Korea is being 
modernized as rapidly as the apathy or opposition of the Koreans will permit. This view 
of the port of Fusan shows one of the city‘s new squares, one of the government 
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buildings and the harbor in the background. Fusan is the nearest port to Japan and it has 
been claimed by that country since its armies first landed there centuries ago.‖26 
 
 
Figure 24. Broad avenues have supplanted many narrow streets of Keijo (Seoul) [original caption] 
(photograph by W. Robert Moore) 




Figure 25. Many centuries of progress—against a mountain backdrop [original caption] (photograph 
by W. Robert Moore) 
Source: Deering, ―Chosen – Land of Morning Calm,‖ National Geographic 64 (Oct 1933): 427. 
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Figure 26. Korea’s principal seaport [original caption] 
Source: Ralph Gates, ―Land of Morning Calm,‖ Travel 65 (Aug 1935): 19. 
 
 
Figure 27. The old rice mills of Korea, like this one (left) in the Diamond Mountains, were crude. In 
vivid contrast are the great modern public works by means of which 800,000 acres of waste land have 
already been made arable [original caption]. 







Figure 28. On Seoul’s main street Japan advertised to visitors the “progress” she brought to Korea 
(credited by Frederick L. Hamilton from Three Lions) 
Source: Willard Price, ―Jap Rule in the Hermit Nation,‖ National Geographic Magazine 88 (Oct 1945): 
434. 
 
The contrast between the old rice mill and modern dam seen in Figure 27, for example, 
represents the typical way that the Japanese colonial authorities advertised their 
modernizing process in Korea, as was examined in Chapter 1. As its caption clarified, the 
old construction was viewed as ―crude,‖ and projected in contrast to ―the great modern 
public works‖ constructed in the colony. 
The contrast to this new modernity was the ingenuous and unspoiled nature of 
Korea. Main destinations for Western tourists were the Diamond Mountain (Kûmgangsan 
in Korean, Kongo-san in Japanese) and the White Head Mountain (Paektusan in Korean). 
One traveler introduced the pleasures of the Kûmgangsan tour, as quoted here [Italics 
added]: 
The magnificence of this mountain [Kongo-san] group surpasses imagination and 
affords one of the most marvelous spectacles in the world. These mountains form 
a coronet of flame-colored basaltic peaks—a cloister of grand, weirdly carved 
pinnacles, a forest of enormous rock-spires with their points in the heavens and 






Of late years[,] Kongo-San has become a favorite resort for all Western couples in 
this part of the world and for Westernized Asiatics on their honeymoon. Some of 
the monasteries have substituted comfortable American beds for their old-time 
sleeping-mats, and have engaged Chinese servants and cooks, who serve 
detestable imitations of European food. The tourist season is in the autumn…27 
 
In this kind of traveler‘s writings, the prevalent images were those of peaceful 
contentment and a calm colony, beautiful scenery, the wonderful progress of modern 
cities, and happy and pure people.28 The mode of the Western visitors of colonized Korea 
corresponded with that of the journalist-explorer to the Third World in nineteenth-century 
literature and journalistic discourse.  
European and American travelers‘ depictions of Korean scenery conform to Mary 
Louise Pratt‘s identification of the three parts of the rhetorical convention of colonizing 
discourse. Pratt analyzes that the rhetorical convention is based on the sweeping visual 
mastery of a scene: the landscape is aestheticized, then it is invested with a density of 
meaning intended to convey its material and symbolic richness, and finally it is described 
so as to subordinate it to the power of the speaker.29 By appreciating an ingenuous 
landscape, which was allegedly enabled by the establishment of modern transportation 
and accommodation of the modern colonizer, Japan, the view of Western travelers 
confirmed the power of the colonizer. The author of the above writing also plainly 
designated ―all Western couples‖ and ―Westernized Asiatics‖ on the scene as the 
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surveyors of the Korean scene. By doing this, the author confirmed the power 
relationship between the surveying Western, or at least, Westernized people, and the 
surveyed people—backward, traditional, and non-Westernized. Art history writings 
highlighted the aesthetic aspects of historical and delicate Korean arts from the similar 
perspective.30 
 In inverse proportion to the admiration of developments in urban planning and 
transportation, the image of naïve and pure Korean people seen in the late nineteenth 
century was revived in the writings of the 1930s. Usually, the reflection of the Korean 
people was separate from the modern advancement of Korea, as if implying that the 
advancement did not belong to the colonized. In travelers‘ eyes, the native people 
continued to live in a traditional way in terms of residential circumstances, clothing, 
superstition, and so on. This was visualized most obviously in the form of photographs.  
 
 
Figure 29. Infinite variety of form marks village homes [credited by E. M. Newman] 
Source: Mabel Craft Deering, ―Chosen – Land of Morning Calm,‖ National Geographic 64 (Oct 1933): 
439. 
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Figure 30. How to make ploughing difficult: One man inserts a long-handled shovel into the ground 
and two assistants pull it up and out by means of ropes attached to the blade. Whole rice fields are 
cultivated in this way [original caption]. 
Source: H. A. Franck, ―Opera-hatted Citizens of the Hermit Kingdom,‖ Travel 41 (Sep 1923): 7. 
 
 
Figure 31. The little gray home of the East is bamboo and mud. 
Source: Mabel Craft Deering, ―Chosen – Land of Morning Calm,‖ National Geographic 64  






Figure 32. Instead of ironing, Korean women club their clothes to smoothness. 
Source: Mabel Craft Deering, ―Chosen – Land of Morning Calm,‖ National Geographic 64  
(Oct 1933): 441. 
 
 
Figure 33. Freight train in Korea: human dray horses, the burden bearers of Korea carry 
merchandise and products of all kinds over the steep roads and narrow pathways of Korea. These 
fellows are laden with cargoes of crude Korean pottery piled high and secured with a network of 
rope [original caption]. 







Figure 34. Homage to the spirits: The crudely carved images that stand near the entrances to some 
Korean towns are an indication of the persistence of ancient superstitions among the peasants. These 
figures of good spirits are supposed to prevent evil spirits from entering the town. In addition to 
primitive animistic beliefs, both Buddhism and Confucianism have influenced the Koreans  
[Original caption]. 
Source: Source: Ralph Gates, ―Land of Morning Calm,‖ Travel 65 (Aug 1935): 21. 
 
 In spite of the amazingly rapid and extensive modernization of urban areas, 
Korean people were missing from the development. Rather, Koreans were seen as 
continuing to adhere to a traditional and underdeveloped way of living. As the pictures 
and captions reproduced here demonstrate, Koreans were observed as mysteriously 
unchanged, in spite of the dramatic changes of the surroundings. For example, the caption 
for Figure 30 read, ―How to make ploughing difficult,‖ implying the author‘s curiosity 
why the native people were still maintaining a traditional method of farming despite 
introduction of modern method. The caption for Figure 33, ―human dray horses,‖ depicts 





Figure 35. Japanese soldiers were being landed with clock-like precision [original caption]. 
Source: William Franklin Sands, ―The End of an Empire: Memoirs of a Diplomat,‖ Forum 84 
(Aug, Sep 1930): 319. 
 
 
Illustrations such as Figure 35 contrasted traditional and indifferent Korean people in 
traditional clothing to a ―clock-like,‖ and precise Japanese soldier in a modern, that is to 
say, Western, uniform. Abundant contrasting images between the modernized and 
backward, the colonizer and the colonized were common in this period. As in Figure 35, 
the contrasting view that strangers were successfully accomplishing the modernization of 
Korea without involving the native people‘s participation in the process was both implicit 
and explicit. It was not until 1944 when images of Korean people as modern citizens of 
urban cities who enjoy modern technologies and knowledge began to appear in pictures 





Figure 36. Seoul, the Korean capital, is a modern city [original caption]. 
Source: Andrew J. Grajdanzev, ―Problems of Korean Independence,‖ Asia 44 (Sep 1944): 418. 
 
 
Figure 37. A modern doctor interviews two old-timers in Presbyterian hospital, Taikyu  
[original caption]. 
Source: Willard Price, ―Jap Rule in the Hermit Nation,‖ National Geographic 88 (Oct 1945): 451. 
 
 
 These journalist-explorer writings seemed to be within the context of American 
visitors‘ views in the late nineteenth century. In addition, they indicate that, despite the 
scanty American attention paid to the Korean independence movement from the early 
1920s, the American public‘s view maintained an imperialistic perspective of Korea. In 




between Japanese as modernizers and colonizers and the Koreans as passive and 
colonized.  
 
(2) The Emergence of Technocratic Ideas 
Although the journalist-explorer writings persisted and news of political 
disturbance in Korea was now silenced, a new trend of looking at the Korean problem 
emerged from the 1920s onward: the analysis of Korean society from technocratic 
perspectives. Writers with attentive eyes on the Korean problem argued, ―we must look 
beneath the surface if we would understand Korea or any land,‖ looking beyond 
picturesque and pleasing sights.31 While earlier writings, those before the early 1920s, 
focused only on the occurrence and result of the presented Korean nationalist 
movements, such as the March First Movement, now the writings on Korea revealed 
more professionalized and deepened views held by academic scholars, missionaries, and 
diplomatic officers in colonial Korea. As in the earlier period, American missionaries, in 
particular, played a significant role in leading the American audience to look beyond the 
scenes that the Japanese colonizing power tried to show to viewers from outside by 
directly interacting with and providing channels for the Korean people to disclose 
ruptures within the Japanese Empire. 
 
On Economy and Agriculture 
 Concern about economic problems had not been a common topic in English-
language articles on Korea before 1920. By the mid-1920s, however, many commentators 
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were considering Korea‘s problems as not political or religious, but instead 
fundamentally economic.32 Economic problems seen in Korea during this period 
originated with Japan‘s colonial economic policies for the state. Japan began to organize 
colonial policies through the Company Law and the cadastral survey in the 1910s; in the 
1920s, Japan intensified its exploitive intention for Korea through ―the Program to 
Increase Rice Production,‖ in order to turn the colony into its main rice supplier of rice. 
As Kim Yong-sop argues, beginning in the 1920s ―Japanese landlords and capitalists 
invested in agriculture as well as in commerce and industry, aggressively engaging in 
land accumulation in order to manage their investments as an enterprise.‖33 As a result, 
Japanese and Korean landlords purchased land and set up agricultural estates (nongjang 
in Korean) ―solely for the purpose of exploitation.‖34 Land accumulation was prevalent 
among landlords, and as a result, small to medium Korean landowners and peasants 
became petty landowners or landless peasants. The hardship faced by tenant farmers 
working to survive under the landlord system, which claimed to use capitalist 
management but was ―in reality a system in which the tenant farmers were controlled and 
exploited as ‗hired tenants‘ who were comparable to laborers,‖ led to tenants‘ 
movements.35 Tenant movements became a serious social problem in colonial Korea from 
the 1920s to the 1930s.  
 American researchers noted economic hardships and agricultural problems in 
Korea beginning in the mid-1920s. Clearly departing from the earlier American view that 
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championed Japanese modernization and the progress Japan had achieved in Korea, most 
observers in the 1920s and 1930s agreed that the economic condition of the Korean 
people was worse than it had been before the Japanese annexation. They argued that, in 
spite of an increase of population and improvement in living conditions, the actual 
economic condition of the Korean people had grown worse. Willard Price, a traveler and 
journalist, wrote in his article, ―the secret of Japan‘s economic success in Asia is that she 
takes as much as she gives‖; ―Korea‘s resources are made to order for Japan,‖ and Korea 
―is still in a pitiable plight,‖ which he expressed through his conversation with a Korean 
―abbess,‖ supposedly a Buddhist nun.36 Missionary groups viewed Korea‘s economic 
condition even more critically. Delavan Pierson pinpointed, ―the material progress of 
Korea, with enlarged commerce and manufacture, reforestations and large irrigation 
schemes, [had] improved the country without directly benefiting Koreans.‖37  
The agricultural problem was even called a crisis. Regarding the hardships that 
Korean farmers were suffering, American observers understood that this was a result of 
the rapid change from a purely agricultural to a modern, industrial economy. 
Unprecedentedly, as regional studies on East Asia in American universities began to 
develop, academic scholars tried to determine who was responsible for the crisis, with 
more professional approaches. C. Martin Wilbur, a Chinese history professor, observed 
that the industrialization and the following changes in agriculture have ―been too quick a 
step for the average Korean farmer.‖ He observed, while most of a farmer‘s crops were 
grown for personal consumption two decades ago, today he was a small unit in the 
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complex economic organization of the Japanese Empire.38 As the outbreak of war neared 
in the late 1930s, observers pointed out that Japan continued to tax farmers ―to raise 
money to pay out in large grants to industries, especially those industries which gird 
Japan for the coming test of war strength in the Far East.‖39  
As historians have demonstrated, the greatest problems of the Korean economy in 
the 1920s and 1930s were the alienation of the land and resulting tenancy disputes. 
Robert Speer, a Presbyterian leader and foreign missionary executive, observed in 1927 
that the Japanese were slowly taking possession of the land and reducing Koreans to 
serfdom.40 Harold Noble, a history professor of the University of California, paid 
attention to the phenomenon that much of the best Korean agricultural land had passed 
into the hands of the Japanese. According his reliable source, as of 1925, 15 percent of 
the arable land in Korea was owned by Japanese individuals or by the Japanese 
government. This figure did not include mortgaged land, the greater part of which was 
also in the control of the Japanese. He analyzed that the process of the alienation 
movement was done very rapidly in southern Korea because of the greater fertility of the 
soil and the more salubrious climate. In parts of that district, he observed, more than 60 
percent of the arable land, the richest rice land in Korea, was owned by Japanese, mostly 
absentee landlords. As a result, ―the rapidity with which the Koreans [were] changed into 
a landless tenant class [was] a matter of very serious concern to all thinking Koreans.‖41  
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Figure 38. Jap landlord - receives bow from his Korean overseer. Most farmland and industry in 
Korea is owned by Japs. Some 12,000,000 Koreans are employed in the Jap war effort  
[original caption]. 
Source: ―Korea,‖ Life 17 (Sep 4, 1944): 66. 
 
Noble also noticed the ambitious agricultural scheme of the Japanese government 
to increase Korean productivity through large-scale irrigation projects. As of 1930, Japan 
had to import 15 million bushels of foreign rice in addition to that imported from Korea. 
He argued, ―Korea is the best and most logical place in the empire for the extension of 
rice cultivation so as to decrease foreign importation, and for this reason the government 
plans eventually to secure more than $150,000,000 for the irrigation and improvement of 
Korean rice land.‖42 He predicted that the project would result in great benefits for Korea, 
but its immediate effect was disastrous for Korean farmers because of the high rate of 
land taxes. Noble‘s rather pessimistic outlook for Koreans explains well of the irony of 
the colonial economy: ―forced to pay the heavier taxes, he [the Korean farmer] mortgages 
his property or sells his holding and becomes the tenant of a Japanese individual or 
corporation with enough capital to wait until the improvement brings in greater returns. 
The Japanese Empire will undoubtedly profit by an increase in the production of rice, but 
the Korean farmer will suffer an even more rapid alienation of his land as the scheme 
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progresses.‖43 In similar fashion, Benjamin Weems, a scholar in Korean studies, said in 
1941 that Japan‘s project to increase Korean production made Korea the principal ―rice 
bowl‖ of the Japanese empire.44 
Ta Chen, a specialist in Asian labor and migration, analyzed Korean labor 
conditions. In a study conducted in 1930, he analyzed both the industrial and agricultural 
labor situations. His study predicted that the government-general in Korea would place 
more emphasis on the development of agriculture than industry for the present, at least. 
The reason was that Korea lacked technical experts, capital, and industrial experience. 
Labor disputes and labor unrest in recent years, he explained, partially originated from ill 
feelings between Japanese employers and Korean employees based on nationality. Chen 
considered that unsatisfactory economic and social conditions paved the way for 
manifestations of social unrest in sections of Korea.45 Professional and academic studies 
paid attention to Korea‘s economic problems more so than to other issues during this 
period. Those in-depth studies disclosed that a more professional and intellectual view 
replaced the earlier period‘s broader public attention by Americans, since political 
disturbances were repressed in Korea. As examined, rather than the emphasis on material 
improvements that public and travel writings used to highlight, the professional view paid 
attention to the cracks and problems that plagued the Korean colonial economy.  
 
On Political and Ideological Issues 
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 The general expectation among observers when the March First Movement ended 
with Japan‘s promise of reforms in Korea was optimism about the peaceful assimilation 
and friendly relationship between the colonizer and the colonized in the future, once the 
reforms succeeded. Nevertheless, differently from the optimistic expectation, Western 
writers on Korea in the mid-1920s and 1930s found that a pervasive anti-Japanese 
sentiment persisted among Koreans, even after the momentum of the radical nationalist 
movement in Korea had passed. For instance, Arnaldo Cipolla, an Italian journalist who 
visited Korea in 1924, found the Korean peasants and laborers he met in the streets 
expected him to ―deliver a harangue against Japan.‖46 He also met a Chinese man in 
Korea who assured him that ―China would recover her unity, become the greatest military 
power in the world, and chase Japan out of Korea.‖47 Sherwood Eddy, an American 
protestant missionary and one of the leaders of the YMCA, realized that the educated 
Koreans who passionately desired independence numbered almost 99 percent of the 
population, and that the remaining 1 percent were those who were receiving material 
benefits of office or profit under Japanese rule.48 Kasimir Edschmid, a German writer, in 
his review of Younghill Kang‘s autobiographic novel The Grass Roof (Das Grasdach in 
German), wrote that the entire Korean nation was filled with national pride and hatred of 
Japan. He commented, ―the yearning for freedom and the lofty, deep-rooted national 
feeling of the Koreans confront the fanatical national consciousness of the Japanese. But 
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no indication is given as to what the outcome of this conflict will be, for only history can 
decide that…‖49 
 It is remarkable that there were writers now who had positive and supportive 
views of the Korean people‘s desire for independence. L. T. Newland, an American 
missionary in Kwangju, Korea, did not believe that Korean independence was attainable. 
However, he assessed the Korean people‘s nationalistic desire as positive, because it 
inspired them to be awake and modern. Newland considered that the Koreans‘ hope for 
independence ―galvanized the country into life,‖ prompting the young Koreans to study 
modern nations and modern statecraft zealously.50 
Sherwood Eddy, after explaining the Korean people‘s indictment against Japanese 
rule, commented, 
Koreans should not be asked to abandon their hope of ultimate independence, nor 
should they be oppressed because of it. No self-respecting Korean, as no true 
Japanese, could hope for less. On the other hand, the Korean people should not 
hold themselves aloof and despise small beginnings. They can place no hope in 
the use of organized force against one of the strongest military powers in the 
world. They should, therefore, meet halfway every sincere effort on the part of the 
Japanese toward autonomy.51 
 
Eddy remarked that a new day would come for both Japan and Korea, and he expected 
that the Philippines would gain its independence and India would win self-determination 
either within or without the British Empire. His outlook that a world of conscience 
against the exploitation of one people by another was being created led him to have an 
optimistic view of Korea‘s future. He also anticipated that a new and liberal Japan was 
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arising, having already achieved ―universal suffrage, the growth of organized labor, the 
probable development of proletarian parties, and the inculcation in the younger 
generation of ideals of economic justice and fair play,‖52 encouraging Korea‘s hope for 
growing autonomy. Eddy suggested that Japanese authorities permit Koreans to write 
their own history, preserve their own language, protect the heritage of their own 
traditions, and have economic autonomy. 53 It is notable that he advised the Korean people 
to compromise on ―small beginnings‖ and to meet the Japanese ―halfway,‖ by accepting 
autonomy first in local, then provincial, and finally central administration. 
 In the early 1930s, the influence of anti-imperialism among American 
intellectuals was visible. In earlier period, American commentators who supported 
Korean nationalists were opposed to the Japan‘s ―immature‖ rule, rather than imperialism 
itself, as we have seen in writings by Homer Hulbert. However, by this time there 
appeared opinion makers who clarified their opposition against all of the imperialistic 
moves of the great powers. Take correspondence exchanged between editors of the 
Tongailbo, a Korean nationalist daily newspaper in Seoul, and The Nation, a liberal 
American weekly magazine, for example to show the possibility that Korean nationalists 
against Japanese imperialism and American liberal and anti-imperialist intellectuals were 
of the same mind. Oswald G. Villard, editor of The Nation, sent a letter of greeting and 
congratulations on Tongailbo‘s tenth anniversary.54 In this letter, Villard declared that 
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The Nation devoted itself ―to the liberties of minorities, the right of all peoples to their 
own way of life, and to opposition from whatever source.‖55 He emphasized that they had 
never faltered in their belief that ―the Koreans were entitled to their own independent 
existence, precisely as we have violently opposed the imperialistic moves of our own 
country in Nicaragua, Haiti, and elsewhere.‖56 Expecting that the era of imperialism by 
the so-called superior races was approaching its end, Villard also predicted the imminent 
liberation of India and the American Congress‘ unconditional grant of freedom to the 
Filipinos, which the editors of The Nation had been seeking since the beginning of the 
colonization of that country in 1898. He also pointed out that a newspaper, his 
grandfather, William L. Garrison, had founded, The Liberator, contributed to bringing 
about the freedom of the enslaved African Americans in the United States. Saying that 
Garrison‘s struggle was harder than that of the Koreans but it succeeded, Villard 
encouraged the Koreans and the Tongailbo editors. He commented that these Korean and 
American periodicals shared ―the great cause of democracy, peace among nations, and 
the establishment of the true social democracy within all nations.‖57 By comparing the 
Korean people‘s struggle for freedom to that of the enslaved African-Americans in the 
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United States, Villard confirmed his position as an anti-imperialist and supporter of 
Korea‘s nationalist movement.58 
 In reply to Villard‘s letter, Hugh Cynn, president of The Korean Nationalist 
Weekly and leader of the Korean YMCA, wrote a letter published in The Nation 
informing Villard that the Tongailbo had been suspended indefinitely on April 15, 1930. 
The cause for the suspension was the congratulatory message that Villard sent to the 
paper. Cynn said, ―the Japanese authorities contend that the message was inciting and for 
that reason suspension was ordered not only for the issue in which the message had 
appeared but for an indefinite period,‖59 implying there was censorship of the mass 
media. It was unfortunate that the Korean people could not read the message from the 
editors of The Nation, Cynn said, because the message ―would have given them the moral 
support which cannot be expected from other quarters during these times of unspeakable 
atrocities and inexcusable oppression by the Japanese authorities.‖60 The Nation also 
published a letter from a Korean in P‘yôngyang in its next issue. The author of the letter, 
with the initials of J. C., reported that the Tongailbo was punished twice, that one issue 
out of every four was suppressed and confiscated, and that both the president and the 
editor served prison terms during the ten years since the newspaper had been founded. He 
continued,  
…Out of the fifty-seven issues of a native monthly magazine forty-three have 
been suppressed and confiscated… In Korea no one is allowed to speak in public 
                                               
58 Villard, in his article in November 1945 after the liberation of Korea, argued for giving Koreans 
immediate independence. As the United States gave a fixed date to the Filipinos for their emancipation for 
American rule, he insisted, it ―should do the same for the Koreans‖ and give them ―the sacred right to 
govern themselves … now‖ (Italics original) (Oswald G. Villard, ―We Must Free Korea Now,‖ Asia 45 
[Nov 1945]: 521). 
59 ―Correspondence: Freedom of the Press in Korea,‖ 653. 
60




unless he submits his speech to the local police and gets their approval 
beforehand.  
…a magazine must submit all manuscripts to the censors for approval. The words 
―independence‖ and ―revolution‖ are forbidden to be published in any connection, 
so we use two circles and two triangles respectively to express the meaning.  
Can anyone blame the Koreans if one day they become violent and use force to 
achieve their freedom?61 
 
The exchange of correspondence between editors of The Nation and Korean leaders 
informed American readers that Japanese censorship of the press existed and that 
freedom of speech in Korea was still seriously restricted. Moreover, it is notable that 
there was now a group of liberal American intellectuals who were opposed to 
imperialistic moves both by Japan and the United States and who encouraged the Korean 
people‘s nationalist desires. 
 Other commentators, especially among the missionary group and American 
diplomatic officials, were concerned about the spread of communist ideas among 
Koreans. They thought that political exiles were fleeing to Siberia and northern China 
and bringing back communist ideas. Herbert Blair, a Presbyterian missionary in Taegu, 
Korea, observed that there was an organized effort uniting socialist Japanese, Korean, 
and Chinese people with Russian leaders who were eager to spread communist doctrines. 
He said,  
The Korean jails are full of Socialists at times, and among these some Christian 
students often are found. In our church work we occasionally meet young 
socialistic inquirers. They want to know if Christianity can really solve their 
problem when it commands them to pray for the King, obey the powers that be, 
and turn the other cheek. They do not see much hope for the great eighty per cent 
of the poor tenant farmers of Japan, China or Korea ever attaining adequate living 
conditions or political liberty without a revolution.62 
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These viewers tended to attribute the influence of communism among Korea‘s young 
generation to economic hardships and Japan‘s oppressive rule in Korea. This tendency 
was similar to that of State Department officials, whose views will be discussed in a later 
section. 
 
On Religion and Missionary Work 
 Missionary work and the growth of Christianity were a continuous, essential topic 
of writings on Korea since the country was opened to the West in the late nineteenth 
century. One of the outstanding changes in missionary work dating from the 1930s was 
the participation of native Koreans in evangelical missions. Missionaries in Korea 
reported that the localization of evangelical works was successful, as seen in Korean 
college students‘ preaching in rural areas during school vacations.63 However, as 
explained earlier in this chapter, Christian missionaries and churches faced a new 
challenge, the shrine issue, a result of a new Japanese policy of spiritual assimilation.  
 Facing strong opposition from missionaries and Korean Christians, the Japanese 
authorities maintained that this act of obeisance was only a display of national patriotism, 
not a religious act. The shrine issue soon became a controversy among the various 
Christian churches and along denominational lines.64 As a result, large numbers of 
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missionaries withdrew from Korea beginning in the late 1930s.65 As this reaction attests, 
the missionary groups were critical of the Japanese policy. The negative view of the 
Japanese pressure on Christian missions and Japan‘s policies of sweeping reorganizat ions 
of religious institutions led many missionaries to feel that ―it is hopeless to attempt 
Christian work in a non-Christian state which follows to a considerable degree the 
totalitarian pattern.‖66  
Benjamin Weems, a scholar in Korean studies, viewed the shrine issue as part of 
the new Japanese program of ―Spiritual Mobilization‖ in Korea and elsewhere in the 
Japanese empire. He noted that it had become especially noticeable in the schools, with 
mass gymnastics and military training. All of these programs, he understood, were 
―designed to stamp out every cultural institution, custom or idea of the Koreans which the 
government views as an obstacle in the way of the realization of its dream of a ‗New 
Order in East Asia.‘‖67 Weems also pointed out that the New Order was against the 
pouring in of foreign ideas and influences, and that it was because the Koreans were a 
subject people with long-standing causes for grievance that the government authorities 
feared would bear the fruit of rebellion if allowed to continue their contact with foreign 
and democratic agencies. He added that the evacuation of American missionaries from 
Korea was due not only to the Japanese restrictions but also to the advice of the U.S. 
Department of State, which advised that Americans in East Asia should leave.68 
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If opinions were divided over whether or not the Japanese were persecuting 
Christians with the Conspiracy Case in 1911 and the March First Movement as we 
examined in Chapter 2, the Shinto shrine issue and the following pressure on the missions 
led to the almost unanimous view among American missionaries and commentators that 
Japanese rule in Korea was restricting religious freedom and becoming more totalitarian. 
 
3. Official U.S. Perspectives 
 (1) Race and the Japanese Empire 
 Racial issues were central both inside and outside the Japanese Empire, and were 
becoming increasingly serious in the 1920s and 1930s. American observers of conditions 
in Korea and the East Asian region naturally paid attention to the issue of race.69 In 
particular, American diplomatic officials were relatively more attentive observers of 
racial issues in Korea and Japan than others, partly because the issue could be directly 
related to the American ―domestic jurisdiction‖ and the Japanese immigrant issue, and 
also because it helped them determine to what extent Japan‘s pan-Asianist doctrine was 
feasible. 
The controversy over the restriction of Japanese immigrants in the United States 
in the early twentieth century almost obsessed the Japanese government. American 
government officials were critical of Japan‘s claim for racial equality in connection with 
immigrant issue. In contrast to the Japanese, who believed they now belonged to the 
civilized world as much as the nations of Western Europe and the United States did, the 
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American view still considered the Japanese a part of the ―yellow race.‖ It is clear in the 
following document that American officials had a completely different concept of race 
and equality than did the Japanese. An internal report prepared by Quincy Wright of the 
Office of Naval Intelligence in 1921 clarified that there should be a distinction between 
nationality and race and that ―the discriminations about which the discussion of the 
Japanese proposal has centered, have been based on race, rather than nationality,‖ thus 
―racial equality‖ would be the proper term for the Japanese proposal.70 It said, ―bearing in 
mind that political lines, cultural lines, and racial lines never coincide, it will be seen that 
discriminations based on race, or even on nationality in the ethnic sense, cannot be 
regarded as an affront to any particular state or nation in the political sense.‖71 The report 
provided legal grounds for the justice of discrimination of rights and duties based on the 
varying capacities of races, peoples, and classes. It cited the League of Nations Covenant 
that certain peoples ―are not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world,‖ and that ―the tutelage of such peoples should be 
entrusted to advanced nations [Italics added].‖72 For example, the East Indian subjects of 
the British Empire were not permitted to immigrate into all portions of the Empire; the 
nationals of the ―unorganized‖ territories of the United States, such as Filipinos, could 
not enjoy all constitutional guarantees, and neither did tribal Indians.73 The report 
concluded [Italics added], 
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This memorandum has attempted to show that in view of the diversity of 
civilizations and the capacities of peoples and races, a general assertion of racial 
equality in rights, obligations, privileges or responsibilities cannot be 
scientifically or practically justified, and that equality as defined by natural law, 
constitutional law, treaties, international law or the principles of the open door, 
does not bear witness to a general principle of racial equality, either recognized or 
gaining in acceptance, but rather to the necessity of adapting laws and institutions 
to the varying capacities of races and peoples, with a just appreciation of the 
equality in moral value of all human beings.74 
 
The U.S. government‘s response to Japan‘s claim for racial equality demonstrates that 
America‘s fundamental view of the Japanese was not separated from its view of 
incapable ―Oriental‖ peoples, in contrast to what Japan had expected. Furthermore, it 
confirmed the American perspective that peoples of ―unorganized‖ societies needed the 
tutelage of advanced nations. 
 If the issue of racial equality at the Peace Conference disclosed the external 
dimension of the racial problem of Japan, the U.S. government officials also paid 
attention to two cases involving racial or ethnic conflicts within the Japanese empire. In 
both cases, Koreans were involved at the center of the conflicts. Koreans were generally 
regarded as being of the same race with the Japanese, the Mongolian race. However, as 
seen in travelers‘ writings from as early as the nineteenth century, outsiders saw racial 
distinctions between Koreans, Japanese, and Chinese. In other words, as much as Asian 
peoples distinguished among themselves, Western observers did not miss the 
distinguishing intra-racial ethnicities in terms of their physical, historical, and cultural 
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aspects. American officials generally agreed on the groups‘ racial differentiation,75 but 
sometimes put more stress on the historical hostility and sentimental distance, despite the 
groups ostensibly being ―a kindred race‖ and of no difference in religions.76 
One incident that stemmed from racial conflict within the Japanese sphere 
occurred during the days of the Japanese earthquake in 1923. The Great Kanto 
earthquake, magnitude 7.9, devastated the whole Kanto region, which encompassed 
Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, and other prefectures. In the midst of the panic and chaos after 
the earthquake, false rumors emerged claiming that Koreans in Japan had looted Japanese 
homes and used violence on Japanese people. Some rumors were very specific: accusing 
Koreans of carrying bombs; marking places to throw bombs of choking gas; poisoning 
the drinking water in wells; and recording with codes their plans for violence, attacks, 
and arson to be visited on Japanese people and their homes.77 Upon hearing these rumors, 
many Japanese people organized themselves into armed bands of vigilantes. Koreans 
were singled out as the object of persecution, or, in Ryang‘s words, for ―extermination.‖78 
It is said that at least 6,000 Koreans were killed in Tokyo and Kanagawa alone.79 
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 The U.S. embassy in Tokyo reported about the incident in October 1923. 
American officials noted that no Korean was safe from the mob, and even persons who 
only resembled Koreans were afraid to be seen in Tokyo or Yokohama.80 In fact, it was 
reported, ―a number of Chinese were similarly killed in the confusion of the earthquake 
disaster.‖81 They analyzed that the persecution was an outcome of the old-time grudge 
that culminated into ―a definite idea that either the Koreans were responsible in some way 
for the disaster and for the pillaging that was going on, or that if so many ‗good‘ Japanese 
had been killed certainly no ‗bad‘ Koreans were going to escape.‖82 The U.S. government 
officials also reported further racial conflicts following the incident. Hearing the news of 
killings of Koreans in Japan, the Japanese government reportedly tried to quiet the 
resentment aroused in Korea by distributing films of the earthquake depicting the 
considerate treatment of Koreans and their establishment in special camps where they 
were provided food and shelter as soon as the military authorities assumed control of the 
situation.83 Other reports transmitted the situation in China, saying that anti-Japanese 
agitators there were using exaggerated reports of the incidents as weapons to attack 
Japan.84 The League of the Friends of Korea in the United States quoted the statements of 
foreign eyewitnesses in Japan telling of the killings of Koreans and called for the State 
Department to investigate the claim that an official Japanese order was given to ―kill as 
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many Koreans as possible.‖85 In reply to the Friends of Korea, the State Department 
simply stated that the information did not indicate that the Japanese government had ever 
issued or countenanced any order of that nature.86 
 Another case involving racial issues and the Japanese empire to which American 
officials in East Asia paid attention was the Manbosan incident of July 1931. Korean 
migration to Kando, in Manchuria, had increased since the 1909 Kando Treaty between 
China and Japan granted Koreans the right to reside and own property in Kando without 
becoming Chinese citizens. According to Hyun Ok Park‘s study, the majority of Korean 
migrants were ―landless peasants who wanted to escape poverty and debt‖87 in colonial 
Korea. By 1930, there were about one million Korean immigrants in Manchuria and in 
Kando, one part of the region, Koreans comprised more than two-thirds of the total 
population. Park argues that the Japanese, since the annexation of Korea, had hoped that 
these Korean migrants, as subjects of the Japanese empire, would neutralize Chinese 
resistance, ―making possible a gradual diffusion of Japan‘s power,‖ which she calls ―the 
politics of osmosis.‖88 Japan used the presence of Koreans in Manchuria as an excuse to 
assign Japanese officials, police, and sometimes even troops to Manchuria in the name of 
protecting its subjects.89 Therefore, although many Koreans left for Manchuria because 
they were opposed to Japanese rule and had nationalist considerations,90 their migration 
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to Manchuria, ironically and unintentionally, expanded Japan‘s influence in terms of its 
claims to sovereignty in Manchuria. American officials reported that, since Japan had 
begun to construct the railroads in Korea going toward northern China in the 1930s, 
conflicts between Korean immigrants and resident Chinese had become more frequent. 
This was just as American officials had predicted, the Korean emigrants to Manchuria 
―play[ed] not a small role both in the general process of [the] colonization of Manchuria 
and [in] multiplying and bringing to their full growth the problems which now merely 
seem to show their heads.‖91 
Manbosan (Wanbaoshan in Chinese) was a small town in Changchun, part of 
Kando in Manchuria. By 1931, over 100 Korean peasants had migrated and leased lands 
to cultivate in the town. On July 2, 1931, an incident began when Korean peasants came 
into conflict with Chinese peasants concerning a drainage construction project for rice 
fields. The Koreans had received unofficial permission from the Chinese landowners and 
governor, subleased through Japan, to construct drainage ditches, but the Chinese 
peasants in the area complained that the ditches would flood their land and demanded the 
evacuation of Korean peasants from the town. Soon, the Japanese police rushed to 
Manbosan and exchanged shots with a mob of Chinese farmers. The conflict led Chinese 
police and the Japanese consulate office to intervene, and finally developed to a 
diplomatic dispute between China and Japan. Local newspapers in Korea reported the 
incident with exaggerated casualty numbers of Koreans and emotional expressions, such 
as killing and injuring Koreans by Chinese, which had no foundation. The baseless 
reports incited Koreans to take revengeful attacks on Chinese immigrants and shops 






owned by Chinese on the Korean peninsula. In particular, in Inchôn, a port city with the 
largest Chinatown in Korea, Chinese were damaged during the month of July 1931. On 
July 10, 1931, the American Consul General in Mukden, known as Shenyang, China 
today, transmitted the news that a total of 100 Chinese had been killed and 167 seriously 
wounded during Korean riots.92 Much criticism was directed against the government-
general in Korea and much speculation arose as to the reasons for the lack of proper 
protection given the Chinese in Korea.93 
As Park sees, the Manbosan incident ―reflected an imagined antagonism between 
the Koreans and Chinese that originated in conflicts between Japan and China.‖94 State 
Department reports show that American officials were well aware of the complex nature 
of the Korean presence in Manchuria. They reported that the Chinese feared that the mass 
migration of Korean laborers to Manchuria would be the prologue of ―a Japanese plan of 
colonizing Manchuria with Koreans, Japanese subjects, which might be a step in deeper 
penetration of the country,‖ and considered Koreans to be ―the vanguard of Japan coming 
in for economic conquest of Manchuria.‖95 When the Manbosan incident occurred, the 
Japanese government-general in Korea called both for resolving unjust Chinese 
exploitation of Korean immigrants and for the eradication of the Korean independence 
movement in Manchuria. From its part, China saw the events as part of Japan‘s long-
cherished and ever-dreamed plan for rule over China. Moreover, the Chinese government 
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blamed Japanese authorities for failing to handle the matter properly, as it took ten days 
for Japanese authorities to suppress the Korean rioters against Chinese in Korea. While 
demanding an apology from Japan and compensation for damage to the Chinese in 
Korea, the Chinese government was also concerned with Japanese ambitions for 
expansion on the Chinese mainland.  
International reports largely blamed the Japanese authorities in Korea for not 
preventing false reports on the incident. American officials in China and Japan saw the 
exaggerated reports of the Manbosan incident in the Japanese press in Korea as largely 
responsible for the riots,96 and held that the Japanese police ―seemed from the first unable 
or unwilling to take proper steps to prevent outrages committed by Koreans upon 
Chinese.‖97 American Consul General in Mukden argued, ―The Japanese welcomed, if 
not encouraged, Korean expression and demonstration of anti-Chinese feeling as 
supporting their stand in Manchuria.‖98 The American Consul in Mukden questioned 
Japan‘s exceptional action in sending police into strictly Chinese territory to defend 
Korean farmers during the conflict in Manbosan, an area well outside of the Japanese 
railway zone.99 
American officials observed that ―racial issues‖ occupied a central position 
among external and internal issues of the Japanese empire in the 1920s and 1930s. Those 
issues, they believed, did not stem from racial and physical differences, but rather from 
the historically entrenched ethnic identities of East Asian peoples. For American 
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observers, the two cases of racial disturbances seen here were evidence of cracks and 
conflicts involving racial ethnicity inside the Japanese empire. This observation 
functioned as a counterpoint to the feasibility of Japan‘s attempts to assimilate Koreans 
and Chinese into the Japanese empire culturally under the motto of ―Monroe Doctrine for 
Asia‖ or Pan-Asianism.  
 
 (2) Koreans‘ Politics 
Once the Korean people demonstrated their political activism with the March 
First Movement, State Department officials began to take note of the trends in Korean 
politics. Officials at the American Consulate Office in Korea, in particular, functioned as 
informants for the State Department to understand Koreans‘ political characteristics. 
Reading American officials‘ reports from Korea indicates that they had a dim idea of the 
Korean nationalist movement and its splits in the 1920s and 1930s, as much of the 
nationalist movement had gone underground or abroad as time passed. However, their 
understanding of the trend of Korean nationalism shows that they had a quite accurate 
understanding of Korean politics. Moreover, American officials began to disclose a clear 
preference regarding Koreans‘ politics.  
American officials began to analyze Korean politics beginning in the years right 
after the March First Movement. American Consul General Miller, who was assigned to 
Korea in 1919 right after the Movement, learned about the new nationalist sentiment 
among the Korean people and prepared a report that expressed his personal view and 
outlook on the Korean problem after a thorough regimen of research among Koreans, 




colleagues. Miller confessed that he was surprised to see ―the depth and strength of the 
new [independence] movement in Korea.‖100 While having expected to find a high tide of 
sentiment in certain segments of the Korean population, mainly students and educated 
circles, Miller discovered that the aroused feelings ―had gone broad and deep into the 
lives of the people as a whole.‖101 He was also impressed by the degrees of organization 
among Koreans. In his understanding, there were two factions among the Korean leaders, 
one in favor of using forcible means of advancing their cause, and the other in favor of 
peaceable means. Miller saw that the latter were in control of the situation, which resulted 
in the peaceful nature of the March First Movement. He observed that the same line of 
cleavage ran through the whole movement abroad among Korean leaders in Shanghai, 
Vladivostok, the United States, and elsewhere in addition to Korea. He predicted that the 
continued prevalence of the peace party would depend upon the methods used by the 
government-general in dealing with the situation. In other words, if the promised reforms 
were promptly put into practice, and if the harshness of the police methods were 
ameliorated, the Koreans‘ peace party would continue to hold the upper hand. He 
believed that the reform program had begun and was already making some progress 
based on the sincerity of purpose that the new Governor-general had shown.  
Concerning the future of Korea, Miller expected that no program of reform that 
could be reasonably expected would satisfy a large section of the Korean people, arguing 
that ―the most that can be hoped for is that the new administration [of government-
general] may prove itself so enlightened that the peace party may continue to hold its 
present ascendancy and that things may be permitted to develop in a normal manner,‖ 
                                               






such as treating Korean people with respect, giving justice, and granting a fair 
opportunity. Miller summed up, ―many, of course, expect and will continue to demand 
more, nothing less than immediate political independence, but the above would form a 
basis upon which the other matters could be satisfactorily worked out. Less than this, 
however, will mean a resistance to the death on the part of a section of the Korean 
people.‖102 In short, Miller expressed his sympathy and positive impression of the Korean 
people‘s peaceful demonstration against the military governing of the Japanese. He 
believed that the ―peace party‖ of Korean movement leaders would continue to prevail 
over the opposition party favoring forcible methods. He preferred reforms by the 
government-general, as reforms would warrant the prevailing of the Korean ―peace 
party.‖ Miller‘s opinion demonstrates that American officials at the time viewed the 
Korean independence movement as being thorough and possibly ongoing until complete 
independence was accomplished. In this sense, they certainly agreed that the actual 
sentimental, cultural, and ethnic ―independence‖ of Koreans continued to exist, despite 
the political colonization and Japan‘s efforts to break the Koreans‘ independence 
movements. However, by agreeing to the reforms by the government-general in order to 
guarantee the so-called peace party‘s upper hand over the more radical party using 
violent means, the officials prioritized peaceful order in the colonial Korea as a result of 
reforms, over political autonomy, if not complete independence. 
A long and detailed report by the American Consul General, Ransford S. Miller, 
analyzed Koreans‘ politics as of 1925. Miller believed that the government-general‘s 
many rigorous measures, such as the strengthening of the police force, ―together with a 






conciliatory policy of promoting education and other cultural enterprises and of 
improving industrial conditions,‖ had resulted in an established and secure ―domestic 
peace in Chosen.‖ In his assessment, ―the chief grounds and outward manifestations of 
‗the divine discontent,‘ which still unquestionably existed, have gradually shifted from 
the political to the economic and social spheres.‖103 As a result, Miller reported, Korean 
leaders realized the ―utter futility of expecting to achieve their aim of political 
independence by force‖ and there were no radical and active political movements except 
occasional raids across the northern border. Instead, he observed that Korean leaders 
―gradually turned rather toward preparation for that high estate as a possible future 
event,‖ in indirect ways such as educating the young generation and encouraging people 
to do the best in their respective occupations.104 
 If the American officials considered the Korean people to be inclined toward 
passive and indirect resistance in the mid-1920s, they viewed average Koreans as 
―passively accepting‖105 the Japanese rule in the 1930s, along with the advancement of 
Japan‘s assimilation and war mobilization policies. The American consul general, Marsh, 
in his report from March 1938 informed the State Department that a newly passed 
Japanese ordinance intended to make possible the entrance of Koreans into military 
service as subjects of the Japanese empire. During this time of war, Marsh assessed that 
the Japanese were definitely and openly endeavoring to make the Koreans over into an 
integral part of the Japanese population, and that this would be successful ―with the 
passing of the older generation of Koreans.‖ However, he added, ―the Japanese look upon 
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the Koreans as an inferior race, while the Koreans regard the Japanese as being of inferior 
culture, there being but little intermarriage between the two peoples.‖ He also 
commented, ―the Japanese are strong, and the Koreans have definitely passed from active 
and even passive resistance to an attitude at least of passive acceptance.‖106 
 Nevertheless, American officials felt that, on the whole, Koreans widely shared 
anti-Japanese sentiments. One small incident in 1936 showed American officials the 
dimension of this passive but widespread nationalist sentiment among Koreans. At the 
1936 Berlin Olympics, a Korean marathoner, Son Ki-chông, participated under a 
Japanese name. Son won a gold medal and the news of his winning naturally became a 
sensation in Korea. Tongailbo, a Korean-language daily newspaper, published a picture 
of the medal ceremony for the Korean marathoner, but retouched the photo to remove 
Japan‘s Rising Sun emblem on his uniform.107 Edson of the American Consulate Office in 
Seoul commented, 
In the opinion of most foreign observers, the action of the newspaper in 
retouching the photograph, though rather childish, is indicative of the 
undercurrent of racial antipathy still prevalent throughout Korea; while the 
disproportionately severe penalty imposed by the police was equally childish, and 
will inevitable increase that antipathy. It is possible that the police desired to 
impress the newly arrived Governor General with their efficiency in suppressing 
―dangerous thoughts,‖…108 
 
The spread of socialism among Koreans was another significant issue in the eyes 
of American officials. Since the late 1920s, Korean laborers and peasants had resisted 
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against imperialism and class problems. As we examined earlier, the formation of Korean 
socialist groups was inseparable from the Korean anti-Japanese movement.109 Socialism 
spread, as student movements were becoming active. The Chosôn government-general 
magnified the sphere of the Security Law, which deterred people's movements, while 
encouraging nationalist and pro-Japanese cultural movements. From the 1920s on, 
discussion of the ―National United Front‖ among various Korean independence 
movement groups was embraced by both nationalist and socialist groups. While 
observing the persistent idea and hope for independence among the Korean people, 
American officials paid attention to the political division according to methods for 
gaining better conditions among Korean groups—whether they desired complete 
independence for the nation or not. As of 1925, American officials analyzed, ―the ideas 
concerning the form of independence to be desired began to divide themselves into 
various groups according as their holders‘ favored complete and absolute independence, a 
contingent independence corresponding to that of Canada and of the larger British 
colonies, or local self-government combined with representation in the Diet as an integral 
part of the Japanese Empire similar to the status of our [American] states and territories 
or to certain of the colonies of France.‖110 
 Miller, of the American Consulate Office in Seoul, pointed out in 1925 that the 
political and social organizations in Korea were confined largely to the small number of 
intellectuals, the young generation, popular religious sects, and tenant farmers who were 
struggling on economic grounds. Examining about 30 political organizations, he 
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concluded that there was a lack of cohesion and a pronounced tendency to ―multiply by 
division‖; that their existence was often ephemeral; and that inter-relation with various 
religious sects was still a prominent feature.111 In the mid-1930s, American officials 
became more interested in splits among political Korean groups. In 1936, the American 
Vice Consul in Korea, Paul Dutko, divided Koreans into three groups according to their 
political tendencies. Although it is long and detailed, his grouping and analysis of the 
nature of each group is worth quoting, as it discloses the fundamental way that American 
officials viewed the political character of the Korean people in the last two decades of 
Korea‘s colonial period.  
According to his classification, the first group comprised the irreconcilables, or 
―die-hards,‖ who refused to cooperate in any manner with the government-general and 
who continued to agitate whenever possible for complete independence. This group 
viewed the proposed plan for local self-government as ―nothing more than a scheme to 
advance the political and economic strength of the Japanese commercial and industrial 
interests in the peninsula.‖ He wrote that many of this group had sought refuge in China 
―from which they continue to fulminate against Japanese rule in Chosen.‖112 These 
émigrés were said to include men of ability and character, including writers, physicians, 
and educators. He added that many of the irreconcilables who remained in Korea were 
suspected of being influenced by Soviet political ideals, and by communism. 
 The second group consisted of those who acknowledged the loss of independence 
as an inevitable consequence of Korea‘s weakness, but who were bitter in their 
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opposition to the repressive and discriminatory measures of the government-general and 
believed that every opportunity offered by a gradual liberalization of administration in 
Korea should be seized upon to further the Korean people‘s interests. Dutko called them 
as ―nationally-minded as the irreconcilables and although seeing in the proposed plan a 
direct advantage to the Japanese in Chosen, [they] are agreed that it should be utilized to 
the utmost advantage[,] for any actual participation of the Korean people in the political 
affairs of the Peninsula is not a matter of the near future.‖113 
 The third group was those who believed that union with Japan was the best way 
out of the situation in Korea in the twentieth century. This group of people, he said, in 
spite of administrative mistakes, felt that Koreans should cooperate with the government, 
making use of every possible opportunity to further Korean interests ―as a unit of the 
empire.‖ Dutko commented that criticisms of these men were largely pro-Japanese and, 
for some, this criticism was true. On the other hand, he said, a growing number were 
seeing an ultimate amalgamation of Koreans and Japanese as the desired ideal. In fact, 
among members of this group there were many who were ardent admirers of Japanese 
culture, character, and customs. Should the self-government plan go into effect, ―it may 
be expected that Koreans accepted as officials and employees into government service as 
a consequence thereof will come almost entirely from this group.‖114  
 Due to the inherent traits of these groups, Dutko considered it extremely difficult 
to get any large group of Koreans to cooperate with another for long on any program. He 
alleged, ―the tendency is rather to disagree even where comparative non-essentials are 







involved.‖115 In this broad classification of the Korean people, the first group may be 
taken as a resistant nationalist movement group, including socialists. The second and 
third groups would correspond to reformists and ―assimilationists,‖ respectively.  
American officials thought that the activities of Koreans who were willing to 
participate in colonial administration, that is, the second and third groups, would 
determine whether Korea could have its own political leadership or not. Langdon, of the 
Consulate Office in Seoul in 1935, noticed that the political influence of Koreans was 
growing gradually and observed that these groups were taking the issues of self-
governing and enfranchisement seriously.116 Officers predicted that the realization of a 
self-government system in the 1930s depended upon "the wisdom and capacity with 
which the Koreans take advantage of the opportunity to participate in a small way in the 
control of the country," and how the system would facilitate the administration of Korea 
under the Japanese empire.117 The effectiveness of self-government was based on the 
condition of assimilation between Japan and Korea, along with the support of the 
Koreans who consented completely as ―assimilationists‖ or who cooperated as reformists. 
 On the other hand, the first group, the irreconcilables, drew the special attention 
of American officials because of the anticipation of this group‘s possibly radical methods 
for achieving complete independence. Although there were subdivisions within the 
group, American officials noticed that they represented a high ratio of the Koreans 
dissatisfied with the Japanese regime outside Korea. This idea had existed from the early 
years of colonial period and was based on views of the Japanese authorities. In 1914, the 
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American Consul General transmitted a publication of the Japanese government-general, 
entitled ―Results of Three Years‘ Administration of Chosen since Annexation,‖ and 
included a section on how dissatisfied Koreans living in the United States fomented 
agitation against the present regime in Korea.118 The report circulated by the Japanese 
authorities said, 
…there are some people labouring under misguided and bigoted ideas and unable 
to keep pace with the progress of the times who harbour hostile feelings against 
the Government. Many of these people, actuated either by selfish motives or 
sentiment, dream of recovering the independence of their county and from time to 
time indulge in seditious utterances or acts. Especially among Koreans living 
abroad are men to be found bitterly hating the new rulers of their native country; 
these men are mostly former officials and literati or their young relatives and 
living either in Vladivostok and vicinity, or Chientao or various places in the 
United States of America, have their organizations and constantly engage in 
fomenting seditious agitations, by publishing newspapers and magazines, in 
which they wantonly abuse the work of Japan in Chosen and insist on the 
recovery of Korean independence, as well as by maintaining secret 
communications with malcontents at home…. they are simply victims of a 
mistaken idea and are hostile to it on account of their ignorance of the trend of the 
times.119 
 
Accepting the view of the Japanese authorities, American officials came to see Korean 
immigrant groups as mostly being hostile to the colonizer. By 1919, there were frequent 
reports that Koreans in China and Manchuria were politically active and easily involved 
in political demonstrations.120 Even after the independence movement ceased to exist as 
an active force, several correspondences from other American embassies and consular 
offices reported that serious fighting between armed Koreans and Japanese troops had 
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taken place on the banks of the River Tumen, the boundary between Korea and Russia, or 
that ―Koreans in Siberia and Manchuria were gathered on the Korean frontier for the 
purpose of creating a disturbance.‖121 
 What especially interested American government officials was the possibility of 
communist influences among these dissatisfied Korean people, especially those who 
emigrated to China and Manchuria. For example, a report on the Kwangju student 
demonstration in 1930 prepared by Castle, of the U.S. Embassy in Japan, said that the 
recent demonstrations throughout Korea were reported to ―indicate not only desire for 
independence but communist influence as well,‖ based on information gathered from 
American missionaries in Korea.122 Although the immediate cause of the trouble was a 
trivial encounter between Korean and Japanese students, it was known that the 
government-general‘s investigation revealed communists had instigated the disturbances 
through a secret student communist party. Castle transmitted, ―communists then 
employed the Koshu disturbances, according to this report, to arouse students 
elsewhere.‖123 Although it was hard to confirm, missionaries in Korea were of the opinion 
that some details regarding the character of the trouble seemed to show a distinct 
communist influence. These missionaries also asserted that the students were, 
undoubtedly, encouraged by adults who were working for independence and who were 
using economic unrest, unemployment, and individual grievances against the Japanese as 
weapons to forward their ambitions. Some of these adults, according to the missionaries, 
were suspected of being in the employ of the Third International, the international 
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communist organization.124 For other cases, American officials reported news that Korean 
communists rioted or had been arrested in Korea, China, Manchuria, and Japan.125 They 
saw that some Koreans organized guerrilla groups and conducted attacks in a systematic 
way in these areas.  
In the 1930s, the American consular office reported several incidents of Korean 
communists attacking Korean villages whose inhabitants had refused to share communist 
views and participate in their plans. American officials showed concern about the 
subversive element of these communist activities. 
In Manchuria—and especially in the Chientao district—there have recently been 
several cases in which Korean communists have attacked and burned Korean 
villages whose inhabitants have refused to fall in with communistic views and 
plans, and reports are continually appearing in the press in Chosen purporting to 
describe various other communistic activities of Korean emigrants in that district. 
The greatest cause of anxiety to the Japanese authorities is, however, the 
subversive propaganda that has been and is being spread in Chosen itself by 
Korean tools of Soviet Russia, for, although but little news of it is permitted to 
reach the world, the amount of communistic propaganda being spread here is 
stated, by those in a position to know the facts, to be extensive.126  
 
What is worth noting in this American official‘s analysis are the causes of the wide 
spread of communism among Korean emigrants. In general, American officials 
understood that the poverty and economic and political hardships that Korean people 
were suffering were major reasons to draw them to communist ideas. In 1931, an 
American consul official in Korea said [Italics added], 
The reasons are not far to seek. The general prevalence of poverty, the 
overwhelming preponderance of the population consisting of tenant farmers 
whose lot at best is hard and unhappy, the recent economic depression and the 
                                               
124 Ibid. 
125 From Mukden to the State Department, Jul 9, 1930, 895.00/715; Mar 9, 1931, 895.00/716; to EE, Feb 
17, 1930, 895.00B/3; ―Re: Organization of Communistic Propaganda in Korea, China, Japan and the 
Islands,‖ Dec 15, 1930, 895.00B/4, IAK, 1930-39. 
126




strong though generally invisible discontent under Japanese rule, all combine to 
constitute the Korean masses a fertile and receptive field for the preachers of 
Utopia no matter how absurd and impractical their doctrines may be.127  
 
A similar view can be seen in a report prepared in 1934 by Langdon, the 
American Consul in Seoul. He informed the State Department of statistics and problems 
experienced by Korean immigrants to Japan. As in Davis‘s analysis, Langdon also 
perceived that the spread of communism among Koreans stemmed from their economic 
hardships:  
Having no homes or relatives in Japan, the groups of homeless and unemployed 
Koreans gave rise to social problems of various kinds which were aggravated by 
the arrival of fresh immigrants from Korea. Moreover, as the wage scale of 
Korean laborers is lower than that of Japanese laborers, and as unemployment, 
ambition and other causes were diverting them into new fields of labor, Korean 
laborers began to constitute a menace to Japanese labor.128  
 
Langdon quoted a Korean newspaper article, which said ―communists arrested in 
Japan during the past six years numbered 53,424, including 7,285 Koreans.‖129 Like other 
officials, Langdon pointed to the economic and social suffering of Koreans in Japan as 
origins of spread of communism among them. More importantly, American officials 
noted, some of the Korean emigrants imbued by communism were returning to Korea.130 
In general, American officials were concerned that these communist Koreans were being 
used by Soviet Russia as a tool for injecting communist ideas into the Japanese empire 
[Italics added]. 
Virtually all of the original agitators are Koreans who have been residing in 
Siberia or the Chientao district in Manchuria and who, although of course 
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ostensibly returning for other and legitimate reasons, have really come as 
emissaries of Soviet Russia or, to be technical, its alter ego the Third 
Internationale. Thus, the Korean emigrants instead of serving as instruments of 
Japanese imperialism in Siberia and northern Manchuria, are being utilized as a 
bridge over which communism is endeavoring to penetrate into a vital part of the 
Japanese Empire.  
…it is seemingly safe to conclude that, be they what they may, one of the factors 
that will play a not inconsiderable part will be the large number of Koreans whom 
the pranks of fortune have pushed from their native land to seek new homes in 
Manchuria and Siberia.131 
 
In this sense, Koreans residing abroad were the subjects of cautious observation by the 
U.S. government, as it assumed the emigrant Koreans were potentially subversive and 
ideologically dangerous.  
Looking at internal documents of the State Department and American officials in 
the East Asian region from the mid-1920s to 1930s leads us to conclude that American 
officers, in general, agreed with the Japanese claim that Korean society had developed 
and been modernized only since the colonization. They believed that those who were 
taking charge of solving all of Korea's problems were the Japanese authorities, not the 
Koreans. Koreans were seen as a passive and incapable people, in spite of the strong 
nationalist consciousness they had displayed. It is notable that the American position, one 
of a great power and colonizer in the Pacific area, made the American officials more 
sympathetic with the position of the colonizer, the Japanese, than the colonized people, 
the Koreans. While pointing out some of Japan‘s discriminatory policies and cases of 
brutal treatment of Korean people, American officials were, on a basic level, more 
familiar with the position of the dominating country and supported reforms for better 
conditions in Korea.  
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Different from conventional assumptions, it is also clear that American officials 
viewed Korean politics from an anti-communist perspective and cautioned against the 
influence of the socialist and communist movements in these early years, a few decades 
before the onset of the Cold War. Above all, what they worried about was socialism's 
effect on the public and the region. Officers agreed with the reformist views, assuming 
that socialism's threat would disappear if the economic situation improved and colonial 
oppression ended. There was a clear American point of view that saw socialist activities 
as wicked and deserving of suppression at every turn. Because of the diminished attention 
paid to the Korean nationalist movement and the silence on the part of Korean nationalist 
leaders who favored petitioning and diplomacy, the U.S. government lacked updated 
information about the Korean nationalist movement and the connections of its various 
groups. Nevertheless, official American documents from this period indicate that the 
State Department had a fairly accurate and macro view of Korean political groups and 
their splinters.  
 
(3) Was Japan‘s Rule a Success? 
While observing the social and political issues of colonial Korea, American 
officials in the 1930s began to question whether Japanese rule in Korea was a success or 
not. They began to ask how well Japanese authorities were handling persistent complaints 
expressed directly and indirectly on the part of Koreans and took a closer look at the 
country‘s deepening social problems. Worsening relations between the United States and 
Japan since the mid-1920s and the clear increase in American society‘s anti-Japanese 




perspective. Questions about the validity of Japanese rule profiting the colonized country 
arose from many fields. While reporting on the government-general‘s budget for Korea in 
1935-36, American officials pointed out that most public funds were used for 
administration, material development, and for public works. In contrast, only a small 
amount was allotted for relief projects, experiment stations, education, sanitation, and 
similar social and cultural work for the colonial people.132 Other reports made note of 
expanded budgets for Korea for the years 1936-37 to 1939-40, with the comment that the 
major purposes of the expansion were for the military defense of the Japanese empire, 
such as building additional railways and communication facilities, and the arrangement of 
police.133 American official reports implied that Japan‘s control of Korea was not 
benefitting most Koreans in terms of economics, politics, or social aspects and that these 
policies would raise Korean people‘s dissatisfaction with their colonizers. 
 Concerning Korea‘s social problems, American officials noted the discriminatory 
policy of the government-general in Korea when dealing with Koreans and Japanese as 
one of the causes of Koreans‘ expression of complaints. When the Kwangju Students‘ 
Independence Movement occurred in 1929, American officials declared that the Japanese 
police‘s discriminatory treatment of Japanese and Korean students after a ―trifling 
encounter‖ between the two groups, provoked Korean students‘ riots to expand to the 
whole country.134 An American consular officer in Seoul, Langdon, mentioned these 
discriminatory policies when he reported on the Korean situation in 1936. He noted that 
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the appointments of Koreans to high offices in the government-general were few (366 out 
of 2,031) and that the ratio of these appointments had declined since 1926. In addition, 
the compensation of Japanese officials was much higher than that of Koreans. Langdon 
said that the low representation of Korean people in the government was due to 
discrimination against or the incompetence of Koreans. ―In view of the substantive 
equality of political rights of Japanese and Koreans as Japanese subjects and of the 
guarantee of impartial and fair treatment contained in the imperial rescript of 1919,‖ 
Langdon argued, the present form of government with ―no provision for a central forum 
for the discussion of public matters and centralizing all law-making and administrative 
authority in the Executive‖ did not give effect to this theoretic equality.135 Langdon saw 
this as was not especially heartbreaking for the Korean people, because they had not had 
any sort of representative government in their history. However, he pointed out the 
contradiction in Japan‘s attitude toward Korean people, between slogans of assimilation 
between Japan and Korea and the actual, discriminatory policies of the Japanese. In this 
sense, Langdon concluded that the present form of government-general, in essence, was 
no different from the military rule established following the annexation.136 Other reports 
pointed out discrimination in the matter of schools and educational opportunities as ―a 
source of much irritation and of much bitterness to Koreans.‖137 
 Beginning in the mid-1930s, American officials viewed self-government plans 
from a critical perspective. In 1933, Davis reported [Italics added],  
The councilors will have the right to introduce bills for consideration, elect the 
Vice Speaker, et cetera. Thus, the provincial councils will, both in name and in 
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competence, be the highest organs of local autonomy. However, owing to the 
large powers vested in the provincial Governors of veto and of virtually 
substituting executive orders for the decisions of the Provincial Councils, the 
reorganized Councils are, like their Township and Prefectural precursors, in 
reality still merely advisory bodies. This fact has not escaped the attention of the 
Koreans, and, so far as the strictly regulated Korean press has been allowed to 
criticize, has been pointed out with some degree of bitterness… 
 
The most significant feature of the implementing of the Ordinance No. 15 of 
December 1, 1930, is that his has occurred much earlier than the Korean public 
seemingly anticipated. In fact, in the spring and summer of 1931 it was 
apparently the general belief that this ordinance had been issued more as a 
gesture than with any genuine intention of putting it into effect. It is probable that 
the trends of recent history in Manchuria and North China have played a 
considerable part in the decision to put it into effect earlier than was perhaps 
originally intended. For obvious reasons, when conducting a campaign of 
extension on the Asian mainland, it was highly desirable to keep quiet and 
contented the population of those territories already incorporated in the empire. 
Naturally the giving to the more politically minded of the native population a 
larger outlet for their political aspirations, is one of the best and most theatrical 
means towards this end.138 
 
 Provisions and the results of local council and prefectural elections, officials saw, 
also undermined the meaning of self-government. Because voting rights were based on 
tax payment qualifications, the Japanese enjoyed a safe majority in local and prefecture 
councils. In 1933, Davis commented, ―there is but little chance of Korean sentiment and 
desire being able to translate themselves into accomplishment, even if the complete 
power of veto enjoyed by the administrative officials is not exercised.‖ Therefore, the 
new reorganization of the local government system meant ―very little to the Korean 
desire to exercise some material degree of self-government in the immediate future 
through the local councils.‖139 
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American officials found motivation for Japan‘s extension of local self-
government plans in imperial Japanese expansionist plans for China: when conducting a 
campaign of extension on the Asian mainland, the Japanese aimed to keep quiet and 
mollify the population of Korea, whose territory was already incorporated in the Japanese 
Empire.140 In sum, after several years of observation, American officials concluded that 
Japan‘s plan of self-government was not a plan for actual ―self-governing‖ by Koreans, 
but rather a limited one motivated by political reasons and that Koreans were still in a 
disadvantageous political status under the new plan. For instance, the number of Korean 
representatives in the Diet and national suffrage were restricted, but local governments 
had no actual voting rights, only nominal consultative ones.141 Due to these conditions, 
American officials now agreed with Koreans‘ cynicism over the self-government plan 
and the following reforms in the governmental system in the sense that the ultimate 
object of the reforms were far from wide autonomy for Koreans. As evidence of the 
Koreans‘ tepid reaction, an official report quoted an editorial by a local Korean 
newspaper, Tongailbo, characterizing the plan as ―unworthy of comment‖ and ―only an 
empty shell at best.‖ The editor concluded, ―in summing up, it is not going too far to say 
that the so-called revised local-self-government system is good in name but destitute in 
substance, and invites the mockery of the intelligent, and is nothing more than a scheme 
of the Government to delude the people.‖142 Given that American officials had 
commented that Koreans needed to use self-government plan to participate in the colonial 
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administration and to gain their own leadership in an earlier period, this new attitude of 
American officials shows a shift toward skepticism of the Japanese policy.  
 
Conclusion 
 From 1924 to the mid-1930s, the Korean nationalist voice was not heard as it had 
been in the United States during earlier years. Schisms inside Korean nationalist 
movement groups, Korean leaders‘ search for new strategies for the nationalist claim, and 
changes in Japanese policies in Korea all contributed to this silence. Despite the 
diminished incidence of Korean riots and emotional responses, however, this chapter has 
documented that the technocratic and official view of the American side paid careful 
attention to Korea during this period. Their more professional view of colonial Korea 
was, mostly related to and overdetermined by American inquiries about nature and 
direction of Japanese imperialism. Unofficial writings discovered cracks and ruptures in 
colonial Korean society while confirming the power relationship between the colonizer 
and the colonized. In the 1930s, when the United States was moving toward a 
confrontation with Japan, there appeared a new synthesis of American perspectives 
coming from American officials in East Asia. That is, Japanese colonialism was a failure 
by American standards. Moreover, this chapter has demonstrated that the State 
Department had a somewhat vague but accurate picture of various Korean political 
groups.  
Despite the decrease in direct interaction between Koreans and the American 
public after the 1924 Immigration Act and extending to the mid-1930s, both the Korean 




changes during these years. These changes came to the surface in the Pacific theater of 









CHAPTER  FIVE 
 






 The Second World War, which began in 1937, and the outbreak fighting in the 
Pacific in 1941 finally brought to bear Korean nationalist speakers‘ long-held predictions 
about war between Japan and the United States. Colonial Korea fell under Japan‘s war 
mobilization system beginning in 1937. For Korean nationalists abroad, news of the war 
demanded urgent preparation for the liberation of Korea and the building of a new 
country. Many Korean writers in the United States warned American readers about 
Japan‘s purposes in the war, arguing that the case of colonialism in Korea demonstrated 
Japan‘s immorality in ruling colonial countries.1 Henry Chung and Robert Oliver asserted 
in 1943, 
What Japan has done in Korea she will do in the Philippines, in Burma, in the 
East Indies, in China, and in India, if she wins this war. She will do it in the 
United States if she makes good the boast of the Jap admirals who say they will 
―dictate the peace terms in the White House in Washington… 
 
Japan‘s most effective slogan in this war is that she is fighting for the freedom 
and prosperity of her Asiatic neighbors—―Asia for the Asiatics.‖ Millions of 
people in India, Burma, and the East Indies may have believed this slogan. I bid 
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them to look at Korea. […] Her true purpose is ―Slavery for Asiatics under 
Japanese masters,‖ and of that Korea is the living proof.2 
 
As earlier chapters have demonstrated, throughout Korea‘s colonial period, the 
Korean nationalist movement‘s efforts concentrated on gaining the right to represent 
Korean people in international occasions and in obtaining recognition of this right by the 
U.S. government. Korean nationalist leaders‘ approach to the U.S. government in the 
early colonial period was based on their belief and trust in the special and moral 
relationship between Korea and the United States, although the U.S. government 
employed a more practical and realistic view. Lessons in the earlier period and the 
urgency of wartime foreign relations required Korean nationalists to employ a new 
approach to the resolution of a postwar world order.  
 The war also changed American officials‘ position toward the Korean problem, as 
Korean nationalist organizations could be useful to the U.S. government in the war 
against the Japanese. Based on the U.S. government‘s information about colonial Korea 
and the history of Korea‘s geopolitics, it became clear to American officials that status of 
Korea would be a significant issue in determining the security of the East Asian region 
after the war. The Cold War view emerged in the last phase of the war and also had an 
impact on the Americans‘ view and resolution of Korean problem. This chapter explores 
how each side, the Korean nationalist leaders and the American officials, modified its 
position during the Pacific War years and what these changes implied for Korea‘s post-
colonial period.  
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1. Nationalist Interactions with the U.S. Government 
In the Hollywood movie, First Yank into Tokyo (1945), the U.S. government 
assigns Major Steve Ross (played by Tom Neal) to undergo plastic surgery to appear 
Japanese so that he can infiltrate Japan and help to free an American prisoner of war 
(POW) during World War II. Before going to rescue the American POW, Ross is trained 
to act and speak perfectly as a Japanese person. Interestingly enough, the trainer for the 
main character is a Korean named Haan-soo (played by Keye Luke). The pervasive racial 
bias and anti-Japanese elements evident in depicting Japanese characters is interesting for 
a wartime movie, but what is more striking is Haan-soo‘s character. The movie‘s premise 
of a Korean trainer of an American spy charged with infiltrating Japan was credible 
because of the unique position Koreans held in the eyes of the American audience. The 
Korean community in the United States was considered a minority, but one that had 
characteristics distinct from the Japanese or other Asians: Koreans look like Japanese, 
could speak Japanese, and, as people colonized by Japan, were familiar with Japanese 
culture and behaviors but regardless of whether they lived in Korea, China, or even in the 
United States, they were also well-known as haters of Japan. If outsiders saw the Korean 
people of the March First Movement as oppressed, miserable, and peace-loving under 
Japanese rule, this new reflection of Koreans described them as clever, aggressive, and 
actively cooperative with the United States‘ plan against Japan. The new image of 
Koreans reflected changes in Americans‘ understanding of the Korean problem and the 
activities of Korean nationalist leaders in American society throughout the interwar years. 
As such, outbreak of war in the Pacific provided another turning point for 




concern about and suspicion of Japanese people in American society finally ―nullified 
their citizenship, exclusively on grounds of racial difference.‖3 Although Koreans had 
been considered Japanese subjects and to be of the same Asian race, their continuous 
appeals of their hostility against Japanese colonialism in the previous decades astutely 
made the American audience recognize Korean-Americans‘ loyalty to American values 
and ideals and differentiated them from the Japanese. Corresponding to these wartime 
changes, Korean nationalist groups resumed their active independence efforts and 
directed their attention toward U.S. government agencies. This section investigates 
changes in attitude of both sides, of Korean nationalist groups and the U.S. government 
during the war in the Pacific. 
 
(1) A Useful Korea 
 Korean nationalist groups, including the Korean Provisional Government, 
Syngman Rhee and others, resumed their appeal for a cooperative relationship with the 
U.S. government once Japan entered war with China in 1937. Rhee, who had maintained 
several Korean-American organizations including Tongjihoe and Christian schools for 
Korean children in Hawaii, returned to Washington D.C. in April 1939. American 
officials perceived the Second World War, and especially the Pacific theater, as being 
close to the end of colonialism in Korea. The urgent need for a resumed active nationalist 
movement led various Korean-American organizations to unite as the ―United Korean 
Committee‖ (Chaemi hanjok yônhap wiwônhoe in Korean).  
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Based on the claim of ―special relations‖ between the United States and Korea, 
Korean nationalists endeavored to persuade the American government of the strategic 
usefulness of the Korean people. In a 1941 letter prepared by the premier of Cabinet 
Council of the Korean Provisional Government, Kim Ku wrote that, while the diplomatic 
intercourse between the two states had been forcibly suspended in 1905, ―the cordial, 
friendly spirit and good will existing between our two peoples has never been interrupted. 
Now the changed situation in the Far East warrants the restoration of that friendly 
relationship for mutual benefit.‖4 Syngman Rhee, in his letter to the State Department, 
argued that the situation had changed and that there was ―every reason for the United 
States to treat the Koreans as a friendly people.‖5 Korean nationalists now implied that 
because the United States was now in a hostile relationship with Japan, it would be 
advantageous to cooperate with the Koreans, who were apparently determined to fight 
against the Japanese. 
 This notion of ―strategically useful Koreans‖ was a new idea that Korean 
nationalists had synthesized in response to the failure to represent their cause at the Paris 
and Washington Conferences at the end of First World War. Earlier Korean-American 
nationalist activities, especially those of Syngman Rhee‘s group, centered on lobbying 
efforts to gain diplomatic recognition and support for the Korean Provisional 
Government from the American government and public. Kilsoo Haan‘s new strategy that 
he used in his contact with the U.S. government is noteworthy, as his activities 
contributed to the new idea of employing ―strategically useful Koreans‖ to develop. 
Kilsoo Haan was a second generation Korean-American from Hawaii who had been the 
                                               
4 From Kim Ku to President Roosevelt, Jun 6, 1941, 895.00/729, IAK, 1940-44. 
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representative of the Sino-Korean People‘s League since 1932 and was known to work as 
a secret agent of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence in the 1930s. By the early 1940s, 
Haan was considered a new rival to Syngman Rhee for leadership of the Korean-
American community. Throughout the 1930s, Haan lobbied the U.S. government in order 
to gain American military support, declaring that ―Koreans in Manchuria, Siberia, China, 
and the United States could be indispensable in aiding the United States against Japanese 
militarism.‖6 In 1933, Haan submitted a document to the U.S. government on Japanese 
activities in Hawaii. In it, Haan warned American officials that there were espionage 
groups within the Japanese community in Hawaii who were working in conjunction with 
the Japanese military, and that they ―could launch a surprise attack on Hawaii at any 
given moment.‖7 As we saw in Chapter 4, concerns about Japanese espionage activities 
among U.S. officials and citizens were developing as early as the early 1930s. Under the 
circumstances, Haan‘s assertion about ―suspicious Japanese‖ in Hawaii provoked the 
U.S. government to a greater level of concern.8 In an interview with a Federal Bureau of 
Investigation special agent, Haan explained, ―the Koreans being under Japanese 
domination are fearful lest the American authorities in the event of a war should consider 
                                               
6 Richard S. Kim, ―Managing the ―Foreign‖ and ―Domestic‖: Kilsoo Haan, Korean Diasporic Nationalism 
and the U.S. Liberal State, 1931-1945,‖ Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 19, no. 1 (December 2006): 15-
16. 
7 U.S. National Archives, RG 165, Military Intelligence Division (MIC) 1766-S-146-2, ―A Survey of 
Public Opinion among the Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii,‖ 3, quoted in Richard S. Kim, 24-25.  
8 According to Kim‘s analysis, authorities in Hawaii requested that the Department of Justice in 
Washington D.C. conduct a formal investigation into Haan‘s allegations of organized espionage activity 
among the Hawaiian Japanese community. Although investigators concluded that statements in Haan‘s 
survey were false and inaccurate, it is notable that the allegations effectively functioned to raise serious 




them alien enemies.‖9 In another document sent to the Secretary of War in April 1933, 
Haan assured military officials that a large-scale military conflict now directly 
endangered not only U.S. interests in East Asia, but perhaps more significantly the loss of 
American lives and property on U.S. soil, therefore, America faced ―the same enemy as 
Korea and China [were] facing.‖10 In addition, Haan proposed that Koreans could play an 
indispensable role in the fight against Japan in activities including armed resistance, 
military training, espionage, and propaganda work.11 As Richard S. Kim argues, Haan‘s 
lobbying efforts show the development of a new tactic to position Korean-Americans in 
the Korean nationalist movement and U.S. domestic society. By emphasizing the loyalty 
of the Korean people to American political and social ideals, Kim argues, Haan 
conspicuously positioned Koreans in the United States as ―ethnic Americans.‖12  
As was examined in Chapter 3, Korean immigrant community in the U.S. tried to 
give American public an impression of themselves as being favorable to American ideals 
and agreeing with America‘s law-abiding spirit from the early 1920s onward. However, 
activities by Korean nationalist leaders such as Kilsoo Haan reflect that this idea 
developed into a more sophisticated form in the 1930s, corresponding to changes in 
American views on Japan and East Asia, and finally in a realistic and feasible notion at 
the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan in the 1940s. Haan‘s rhetoric 
also reflected the notion that Korean-Americans should be considered separately from 
                                               
9 U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 1766-S-146-5, J. P. MacFarland, ―Report of Investigation in 
Hawaii – Survey of Public Opinion Among the Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii,‖ May 6, 1933, 20, 
quoted in Richard S. Kim, 36. 
10 U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 2657-H-392-2, ―Korea‘s Appeal,‖ April 20, 1933, quoted in 
Richard S. Kim, 26-28. 
11 Ibid., 28. 
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Japanese in the United States—both ethnically and legally—and that the U.S. 
government would finally recognize the Koreans as having an identity separate from the 
Japanese in 1942.13 Therefore, Korean nationalist leaders in the United States, including 
groups under Kilsoo Haan and Syngman Rhee, universally employed the new rhetoric of 
identifying Korean diasporic nationalism during wartime. 
Once war began in the Pacific, Korean groups frequently appealed to the State 
Department, arguing that Koreans would be useful in the fight against the Japanese. 
Jerome Williams and John W. Staggers, advisors to and friends of Syngman Rhee, 
mentioned when they met with an officer of the Department of State in 1941; ―it would 
be important to encourage Koreans to undertake activities detrimental to Japan and that 
encouragement of the part of the United States would accelerate such activities.‖14 In 
contrast to the U.S. government‘s firm position of neutrality on the Korean problem in 
previous years, the conditions of war permitted American governmental agencies to 
consider the possibility of using Koreans.15 
 Beginning with the early 1940s, the Pacific War led the Korean nationalist 
movement groups around the world to reconfigure and assemble themselves into a more 
cooperative mood, in contrast to the divided activities of nationalists and socialists during 
the 1930s and early 1940s.16 The Korean Provisional Government (KPG) was again at the 
center of these assembly efforts. In April 1940, the Korean Independence Party was 
formed, with Kim Ku as its chairperson. In September 1940, the Independence Army 
                                               
13 This issue will be covered in the next section.  
14 FE Memo, ―Korean Independence and Allied Questions,‖ Dec 23, 1941, 895.01/52-1/2, IAK, 1940-44. 
15 Ibid. 
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(Kwangbokkun) was established under the KPG. In 1942, the KPG embraced the leftists. 
Activist communist groups still existed in Manchuria and the Soviet Union.17 If in the 
earlier period Korean groups in the United States had sought to use various channels such 
as public lectures, contributions to newspapers and journals, and formation of pro-Korean 
organizations, from the early 1940s they prioritized contact with American governmental 
agencies, considering the situation urgent. By now, it was obvious that these main agents 
trying to contact the U.S. government on behalf of the Korean people were KPG 
representatives and Korean groups in the United States; it is notable that, at that time, 
Korean groups in China, and especially the KPG, began to contact the U.S. government 
direct through the American Embassy in Chungking, China.  
These groups called for America to take the initiative in solving the Korean 
problem, namely by liberating Korea from Japanese imperialism. Kim Ku, in the name of 
the President of the Central Committee of the Provisional Government, in a letter to 
President Franklin Roosevelt, said, ―It is our sincere wish to continue our long ceased 
diplomatic relations with your Excellency‘s Government and with your support and help 
to regain our independence and to establish a modern democratic nation. This not only 
will bring perpetual peace in the Far East but also will safeguard the interests of the 
United States.‖18 In this letter, Kim emphasized that, by helping Korea gain 
independence, America would benefit from secured peace in East Asia. Soon, Korean 
nationalist leaders began to petition for the U.S. government to include Koreans in the 
                                               
17 According to Cumings, there were four aspects to Korean communism: the ―domestic‖ group in Korea, 
activists in the Soviet Union, activists in China, and partisans in the Sino-Korean border region (Cumings, 
The Origins of the Korean War, vol. I, 33). 
18 From The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea to President F. D. Roosevelt, Feb 25, 1941, 




war. Syngman Rhee insisted that it was the U.S. government‘s necessity, almost its 
obligation, to recognize and help Koreans. In his letter to the Secretary of State in 1943 
he said, ―We have, Mr. Secretary, a national existence of more than 40 centuries and we 
are compelled to supplicate the world‘s greatest Democracy and to receive, in nearly 
fifteen months of war against a common enemy no word of encouragement, no deed of 
assistance, no sign that America, save for one fleeting reference by President Roosevelt, 
was aware of our existence, sympathized with us, wished to help us, or even cared to 
receive our offers of assistance.‖19 Added to this claim of a historically special 
relationship between Korea and America was the point of argument that Koreans had 
been in a ―moral struggle.‖20 American supporters, politicians, missionaries, and Christian 
groups again backed the Korean nationalists‘ voice by sending petitions to the 
government. Most of the American supporters in the 1940s were acquaintances of 
Syngman Rhee‘s group. Corresponding in many cases to Rhee group‘s claims, these 
American supporters tried to bring the U.S. government‘s attention to the matter of 
recognizing the independence of Korea in connection with the war against Japan.21 
Christian groups believed that Korea needed to be freed for evangelical reasons; they 
sought to stir American public opinion about Korea and ultimately influence American 
foreign policy to assist in Korea‘s liberation. A method frequently used to enlighten the 
government was petitioning senators and congressmen; for example, Paul F. Douglass, 
president of the pro-Korean organization The Christian Friends of Korea, wrote in a 
letter, ―Christianity in the Orient needs a free Korea. Korea needs the immediate support 
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of American public opinion. You can help today. How? By writing or wiring your 
Senators and Congressmen. Ask them to support every program for the recognition of the 
Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in the interest of Christianity in the 
Orient.‖22 
Claims made by Korean nationalists and their supporters during this period 
frequently portrayed America as a savior rescuing Korea. In a letter to the U.S. High 
Commissioner in the Philippines, Edward Lim of the Korean Volunteer Corps in China 
mentioned that ―the Koreans are still looking up the United States who will certainly 
come one day to rescue Korea, the once forsaken ally.‖23 Syngman Rhee also wrote to the 
State Department, ―It is proverbial that the Koreans are loyal to the United States and 
hereditarily inimical to Japan.‖24 Another rhetorical use of ―America as a savior‖ is seen 
in Homer B. Hulbert‘s speech at the Korean Liberty Conference in February and March 
1942.25 As was demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 2, Hulbert once served as personal 
adviser and confidential envoy to Kojong, the former King of Chosôn Korea, and was 
one of a few foreign supporters of an independent Korea throughout Korea‘s colonial 
period. After insisting that every government in treaty relations with Japan should have 
risen and prevented the annexation of Korea, he asked to the audience: ―Am I right? You 
                                               
22 Letter from P. F. Douglass, Feb. 9, 1943, 895.01/230, IAK, 1940-44. Paul Douglass was president of 
American University from 1941 to 1952. During the 1950s, he served as an adviser to Syngman Rhee 
during Rhee‘s presidential years. Geraldine Fitch, a missionary and friend of Rhee, also sent a letter to 
friends asking for support for the Korean nationalist movement. 
23 Letter from Edward Lim, Nov 7, 1941, 895.00/730, IAK, 1940-44. 
24 Letter from Syngman Rhee, Dec 9, 1941, 895.01/60-2-26, IAK, 1940-44. 
25 The Korean Liberty Conference was held at the Lafayette Hotel in Washington D.C. from Feb 27 to 
March 1, 1942. It was sponsored by the United Korean Committee in America and the Korean-American 
Council. Its main speakers included Yongjung Kim, George Fitch, Philip Jaisohn, Homer Hulbert, and 
James Cromwell. In the opening address, Syngman Rhee explained the purposes of the conference as 
celebrating the anniversary of the March First Movement, preparing a revolutionary plan for the future, 
asking the U.S. government to recognize the KPG, and demanding that Korean people‘s rights be ensured 




Koreans do not need to reply. I ask the People of the United States of America to 
answer.‖26 At the end of his speech, he said, ―God needs no winged angels to work his 
will on earth. He uses men. This messenger, charged with the duty of leading Korea out 
of the desert back into the family of free nations is The United States of America [Italics 
added].‖27  
The view of looking at the United States as a model and moral country for 
Korea‘s future improvement persisted as it did in earlier decades. Ilhan New, a Korean 
nationalist and businessman wrote in 1944, 
When the Koreans take over their own country on the expulsion of the Japanese, 
they will seek help in machines, equipment and trained personnel. They will look 
to the United States, as a nation with no territorial ambitions, whose capital seeks 
profitable investment, whose technology and production methods are far 
advanced.28 
 
Korean nationalists restored the comparison of Korea‘s independence movement 
to America‘s, which the Korean Congress in Philadelphia in 1919 had used. Cho So-ang 
(known as Tjosowang in State Department documents), Foreign Minister of the KPG, 
met with Clubb, of the American Embassy in Chungking, in November 1942; it was 
reported that Cho said the time was not yet ripe, but with the stimulation of hope and 
faith, a movement of revolt could be brought into being at the proper time. He also found 
similarities between the present situation of Koreans and that of the American colonies 
                                               
26 Ibid. 
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during the American Revolution and thought that aid to the Koreans now could achieve 
the same results as the French aid to the Colonies had then.29 
As the war advanced, Korean nationalist groups‘ requests became more 
straightforward. The primary request was for recognition of the Korean Provisional 
Government; KPG leaders had frequent meetings with officers of the American Embassy 
in Chungking, China, and also sent petitions directly to the White House and the State 
Department.30 Moreover, Korean groups in China, both the KPG and the Korean 
Voluntary Corps, asked for technical cooperation, economic aid, and arms from the 
United States through the American Embassy in China, considering these more effective 
forms of aid to the Korean war for independence.31 At the same time, the KPG asked the 
U.S. government to raise the question of Korean independence at the peace conference at 
the conclusion of the war and to see that KPG representatives were permitted to 
participate in all discussions.32 
 
(2) The Exemption of Koreans from the Category of ―Enemy Aliens‖ 
Since the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941, the U.S. government had 
imposed legal restriction on Japanese-Americans, which had a great impact on their daily 
lives. The legal decisions related to alien status in the United States show changes in the 
American view of Koreans, along with changes in the American perspective on Japan. 
                                               
29 From Chungking (Gauss) to FE, Nov 25, 895.01/199, IAK, 1940-44. 
30 Letter from The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea to President Roosevelt, Feb 1941, 
895.01/48; From KPG (Kim Ku) to President Roosevelt, Mar 10, 1942, 895.01/80, IAK, 1940-44. The issue 
of recognition the KPG will be dealt later in this chapter. 
31 Letter from KPG (Kim Ku) to President Roosevelt, Feb 25, 1941, 895.01/48; Letter from the Korean 
Volunteer Corps (Edward Lim) to U.S. High Commissioner, Manila (Sayre), Nov 7, 1941, 895.00/730, 
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These restrictions began to be prepared with the outbreak of the Second World War. On 
July 26, 1941, the assets of Japanese nationals in the United States were frozen by 
presidential order. General Order 5 prohibited Japanese people from owning firearms and 
other weapons, shortwave radios, and cameras. Classified as ―enemy aliens,‖ Japanese-
Americans were directed to carry the certificates issued to them under the Alien 
Registration Act of 1940.33 Restrictions on Japanese-Americans reached their peak on 
February 19, 1942, when Franklin D. Roosevelt signed and issued Executive Order 9066, 
leading all people of Japanese ancestry to be excluded from the Pacific Coast and to 
internment camps. About 120,000 ethnic Japanese and their descendents living in the 




Koreans residing in the United States were counted as 8,515 as of early 1940.35 In 
January 1942, the Department of Justice ruled to lift the official ban against individuals 
                                               
33 The Alien Registration Act, also known as the Smith Act, was passed in Congress on June 29, 1940. It 
made it illegal for anyone in the United States to advocate, abet, or teach the desirability of overthrowing 
the government. It also required all alien residents in the United States over 14 years of age to register with 
the government (18 U.S. Code § 2385 (2000)). In Pennsylvania, every registered alien was required to carry 
an identification card, which he (she) must produce upon demand by any policy officer or agent of the 
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card were punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both (―Aliens, Disability. Validity of State Alien 
Registration Act,‖ Virginia Law Review 26, no. 6 [Apr 1940]: 815-16). The Act is known for its use against 
political organizations and figures. 
34 Compared to other ―enemy aliens,‖ German and Italian nationals, the U.S. government considered 
Japanese nationals to be more dangerous; the Justice Department arrested 2,192 Japanese; 1,393 Germans; 
and 264 Italian nationals during the wartime. Ngai argues that the U.S. government‘s policy toward 
Japanese-Americans was differentiated from its views and treatment of persons of German and Italian 
descent, which was based on individual selection and investigation. It was presumed that ―all Japanese in 
America …[were] racially inclined to disloyalty‖ (Ngai, 175). 
35 According to reports by the State Department, in the United States as of April 1940, there were 8,515 
persons of Korean descent, of whom more than 5,400 were American-born and therefore American 
citizens. Of the American-born, all but 939 resided in Hawaii, and of the 3,116 foreign-born, 2,391 resided 
in Hawaii. Among these Koreans, the Department analyzed, most of those who were politically-minded 
appeared to support the KPG and its representative in Washington, Syngman Rhee (―Korean Nationalist 




of Korean nationality in the United States and to abolish their status as enemy aliens, 
separately from Japanese in the U.S. Therefore, those who had registered as Koreans 
under the Alien Registration Act of 1940 thereafter ―need[ed] not apply for certificates of 
identification unless they [had] voluntarily become German, Italian or Japanese citizens 
or subjects.‖36 In June 1942, Koreans, along with Austrian and Austro-Hungarian aliens 
in the United States, received permission to correct erroneous registrations as Germans, 
Italians or Japanese. With this change, Koreans who corrected their registration to 
―Korean‖ were exempted from travel restrictions and other controls aimed at enemy 
citizens.37 The action of the Governor of Hawaii, in connection with Executive Order 
8832 amending Executive Order 8389 (the ―Freezing Order‖), ameliorated the position of 
Korean aliens in Hawaii.38 
For the Korean-American community, these legal and official decisions 
symbolized the U.S. government‘s recognition of Koreans‘ ethnic, cultural, and even 
political independence. When Korean nationalist groups complained to the U.S. 
government about being unwilling to help Koreans gain independence in early 1940s, the 
State Department also referred to these legal decisions as evidence that officers of the 
State Department and other governmental agencies had given and were continuing to give 
careful thought to questions related to Korea.39 Looking at the elements that led to these 
decisions can help us see what influenced American officials‘ decisions on issues of 
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Korea and East Asia, as well as American officials‘ interests in dealing with Korean 
nationalist groups in and out of the United States. 
First, it is notable that the decisions to exempt Koreans from Japanese status were 
the first official recognition of Koreans‘ separate and independent status since the 
annexation of Korea, although they were limited to American territories. After long 
observation throughout Korea‘s colonial period, it was American officials‘ conclusion 
that hostile sentiment against Japan and hopes for national independence were pervasive 
among the Korean people, despite the fact that Koreans on the Korean peninsula had 
provided nominal and ―skin-deep‖ cooperation with Japanese rulers. Langdon, of the 
State Department, wrote in his report on the Korean problem in 1942 that Koreans 
reflected their ―enduring rancor toward the Japanese by unyielding resistance to 
assimilation.‖40 Another report interpreted that, because of Koreans‘ ―strong racial 
consciousness, their pride in their historic past and distinct culture, their resentment at 
being prevented from rising to any positions of importance in their own country, and the 
rough treatment to which they are not infrequently subjected,‖ ―the vast majority of 
Koreans would welcome independence.‖41 As Chapter 4 demonstrated, both Japanese 
authorities and State Department officials regarded the majority of Koreans living abroad 
as bitterly hating the Japanese colonizers.42 Moreover, the Korean-American community 
had gained a reputation of being strongly antagonistic against the Japanese, since the 
Hemet Incident in 1913, that we examined in Chapter 2, and other nationalistic activities. 
Given the vast attention paid by Korean nationalist groups in the United States in the 
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early 1940s to the issue of whether international society admitted representation of 
Koreans and followed the promise of national independence, these legal decisions by the 
U.S. government regarding Korean-Americans‘ status must be seen as guidance toward a 
promising and favorable future for Korean independence. 
Second, the legal exemption of Koreans from ―enemy alien‖ restrictions was also 
a result of continuous petitions by Korean nationalist groups and their American 
supporters, rather than a decision made unilaterally by the U.S. government. In 1941, 
Syngman Rhee sent a communiqué to the State Department saying that he had received 
telegrams and telephone messages from Koreans in Los Angeles and Chicago 
complaining about the fact that the local government had ordered them to close their bank 
accounts and stop their business in accordance with the Fund Freezing Acts. Rhee asked 
the Department to send instructions to local officers and to let these Koreans continue 
their business.43 Samuel W. King, a Representative from Hawaii and Governor of Hawaii 
in the 1950s, also supported Koreans‘ independent status in the United States in a letter to 
the State Department; he petitioned for the Korean nationals in America to be put into a 
category separate from Japanese nationals, and for the possibility of including them as 
one of the Governments-in-Exile.44 A 1944 memo by the Legal Adviser of the 
Department of State demonstrates that Korean funds were actually frozen due to the Fund 
Freezing Acts, and that a general license was soon granted.45 Based on circumstances that 
Koreans had been considered Japanese at first and that a correction was issued later after 
Koreans and pro-Korean Americans kept sending petitions, the 1942 decision was a 
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resulted of interaction between the U.S. government and Koreans, rather than a unilateral 
policy of the U.S. government. 
Lastly, it is also clear that the growing observation of the usefulness of Koreans in 
America‘s war against Japan gradually developed into a crucial, deciding factor for the 
U.S. government‘s policy toward Korea and Koreans. Korean nationalist groups 
expressed their willingness to cooperate with the Allies in military fighting against the 
Japanese as soon as the war on Japan was declared. In response, the State Department 
considered the possibility of utilizing Koreans in the war effort beginning with the early 
phases of the Pacific War. Until the 1920s, American officials had believed the Japanese 
assessment that Korean communities abroad were antagonistic against the Japanese and 
therefore potentially dangerous when it came to keeping order in the colonized Korea. 
However, because of these same Korean-Americans‘ strong antagonism against Japan, 
the Korean community in the United States was now seen as useful for American benefit 
during the War years. Langdon, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the U.S. 
Department of State, wrote a long report on the conditions and outlook of Korea in 
August 1942. In this report, he proposed that the U.S. government might positively 
support the Korean independence movement, depending on a number of factors. One of 
the factors was ―the capacity of the organization of united Free Koreans to work in 
positive ways for Korean independence and for the defeat of the enemy and the actual 
extent of its positive war efforts [Italics added].‖46 While discussing the possibility of 
recognizing the KPG as an exiled government of postcolonial Korea, an internal State 
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Department report on the Korean nationalist movement mentioned that, if a substantial 
number of Koreans rose up against the Japanese, as the KPG leaders insisted, ―then the 
advantages of recognition might well outweigh the disadvantages,‖ because the primary 
concern of the U.S. government was winning the war.47 These and other governmental 
documents disclose that American officials had begun to assess the usefulness of Koreans 
in the war effort. 
The fact that the U.S. government was inquiring into the specific possibility of 
using Koreans in military warfare is proven by records of incomplete plans made by the 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). The OSS mobilized Korean-Americans, Korean POWs in the Pacific War, and the 
Kwangbok Army in China, and prepared plans to infiltrate the Korean peninsula. 
Syngman Rhee devised an idea of forming a Korean military legion, operating either as 
part of the U.S. military or independently, and suggested this to U.S. government 
agencies such as OSS, the War Department, the State Department, and the Lend-Lease 
Administration in early 1942. At that time, the plan failed, as the U.S. government was 
reluctant to give the impression that it was recognizing any one group of nationalist 
Koreans.48 Later, beginning in early 1945, the OSS developed specific projects for 
                                               
47 ―Korean Nationalist Movement,‖ Aug 13, 1942, 895.01/98-1/2, IAK, 1940-44. 
48 According to Smith, Rhee contacted the OSS through his close relationship with M. Preston Goodfellow, 
Deputy Director for Operations of the OSS. ―Through Goodfellow‘s intercession, the War Department 
accorded Rhee limited recognition as liaison with OSS in recruiting a group of young Koreans for behind-
the-lines service in the Far East‖ (Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First 
Central Intelligence Agency [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972], 23). For more details about 
the relationship between Rhee and OSS projects, see Chông Yong-wook, 87-90; Ko Chông-hyu, Yi Sûng-
man kwa han’guk tongnip undong (Syngman Rhee and the Korean Independence Movement) (Seoul: 




recruiting and training Koreans to be used in the war.49 Internal State Department reports 
show that the U.S. government considered the possibility and probability of using 
resistance groups inside Korea, even before attempting to land in China, and infiltrating 
Korean personnel for the purposes of espionage, sabotage, and general support for armed 
activities to be conducted by U.S. task forces.50 In these projects, the OSS was in charge 
of commanding operations and supplying arms and funds, while Korean personnel were 
in charge of infiltrating the Korean peninsula and gathering information.51 Although these 
projects were never implemented,52 they demonstrate that the usefulness of Koreans 
during wartime was intertwined with the Americans‘ understanding and recognition of a 
distinctive and strongly nationalistic identity of the Korean people. 
 
(3) Non-Recognition of the KPG 
As we have seen, the majority of efforts on the side of Korean nationalist groups 
contacting the U.S. government during the Second World War years again centered on 
the issue of recognition of the KPG, petitions for which were in the context of their 
earlier calls for recognition of Korean representation from 1919 to 1922. As the Pacific 
War advanced, the State Department‘s main issue and source of information on Korea 
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came from its contacts with the two main Korean nationalist groups: the Korean 
Commission of Syngman Rhee and the Sino-Korean Peoples League, led by Kilsoo 
Haan. As examined earlier, the U.S. government was willing to lend its active support as 
an opponent of the Axis powers and was ―sympathetic to the plight of the Korean people 
under Japanese domination.‖53 However, the U.S. government also maintained its 
position of not recognizing any group, including the KPG, as representing the Korean 
people. The State Department repeatedly emphasized that it was ―not contemplating 
‗recognizing‘ any organization of Koreans as the primary movement for Korean 
opposition to Japanese oppression or making any commitment as to future recognition of 
Korea.‖54 The State Department maintained that its reply to approaches from Koreans 
outside Korea ―should be confined to assurance[s] of sympathy with effort[s] toward the 
realization of Korean aspiration for national freedom.‖55 According to this policy, when 
Syngman Rhee urged the U.S. government to recognize and cooperate with the Korean 
people during the war, the State Department responded by quoting an address by the 
Secretary of State on the general purpose of the American struggle in the war: that 
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Americans were fighting for the preservation of their freedom and sought to encourage 
and aid all who aspired to freedom.56  
This official position of the U.S. government on the issue of recognition was 
related with its way of comprehending the politics of Korean nationalist groups. In the 
early phases of the Pacific War, recognizing the KPG might have been sensitive for the 
United States, because any favorable actions toward the independence of Korea ―might 
have [an] unfavorable reaction in Japan to the detriment of the welfare of American 
nationals‖ who were still in Japan and Japanese-occupied areas.57 However, the issue 
developed to become the center of the U.S. government‘s relationship with Korean 
nationalist leaders and to involve the government‘s synthesized knowledge and 
perception throughout Korea‘s colonial period. We can approach the U.S. government‘s 
position on this matter from several different directions. Above all, the U.S. 
government‘s biggest concern regarding Korean ―representative‖ groups was that Korean 
nationalist groups were seen as being seriously factionalized. American officials‘ 
understanding of Korean politics in the 1940s was in the same context of the State 
Department‘s classification of political Koreans in the 1920s and 1930s. As seen in 
Chapter 4, State Department officials viewed Korean nationalists as being divided into 
two groups during the 1920s: a resistant movement group, including socialists, and a 
peaceful and reformist group. Officials understood this earlier division to persist into the 
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1940s. Furthermore, they saw Korean-Americans as also being divided into groups, those 
of Syngman Rhee and or Kilsoo Haan.58  
State Department officials linked the direct-actionist and military group to the 
Korean Volunteer Corps of Kim Yak San (also known as Kim Wôn-pong), and the 
peaceful group to Kim Ku‘s KPG. As Korean nationalist groups in the United States had 
been actively contacting the U.S. government since 1941, the State Department 
discovered and summarized the connection of each to these rival groups among Koreans 
in China and Korea as follows: the direct-actionist groups were supported by Kilsoo 
Haan‘s Sino-Korean People‘s League in the United States, while the KPG was 
represented in the United States by Syngman Rhee‘s group and supported by the Korean 
National Association (Kungminhoe) and the Korean Comrades Association (Tongjihoe).  
The U.S. government believed that the two viewpoints in ways of opposing 
Japanese colonialism had existed from the beginning of colonial period. The Coordinator 
of Information determined that these two groups had come into conflict over time 
because of disagreements over ways to achieve national independence: ―One group 
operated underground, secretly planning to kill, sabotage, strike and destroy the Japanese 
on every available occasion. They were the direct-actionists, the Korean guerrillas. The 
other group hoped for a more peaceful fulfillment of their aims, and in about 1919 
organized a refugee Provisional Government in Shanghai. Its main purpose was to enlist 
the support of other powers in resurrecting Korea. There was no conflict in the beginning 
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between those two groups; each was doing its part for Korea.‖59 They understood that 
although conflicts between the two had not been serious at first, when the provisional 
government was organized at Shanghai in 1919, unity ―between the physically and 
ideologically separated groups [had] never been more than temporary and nominal.‖60 
Personal rivalries and differing policies since the 1920s, an internal report of the State 
Department noted, made for frictions and jealousies.61 By the early 1940s, U.S. officials 
had witnessed many conflicts between the groups, both in China and in the United 
States.62 American officials analyzed the main difference as follows, 
There is apparently still a strong rivalry between the Provisional Government 
supporters and the Korean Volunteer Corps. The main differences are these: (1) In 
economic ideology, the Provisional Government is conservative and the 
Volunteer Corps is radical; (2) the Provisional Government is dominated by older 
men who hark back to the ―old‖ Korean philosophy and way of life, and are still 
inclined to depend upon aid from abroad, whereas the Volunteer Corps is young 
and vigorous and has very little use for old Korean customs and still believes in 
direct action; (3) personal affiliations and loyalties which have been strong for 
many years likewise separate the two groups.63 
 
In discussion with American diplomatic officials in the Embassy in Chungking, Kim Yak 
San stressed that the conservative groups supporting the Provisional Government hoped 
for a return to the old feudal order in Korea. In contrast, he added, the younger Koreans, 
who composed the Sino-Korean League and Korean National Front Federation, looked 
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for a more democratic society and for equitable land tenure.64 Among those who 
supported the KPG in the United States, they were again divided into two groups: the 
Korean Comrades Association, and the Korean National Association. The difference 
between these two was that the former had personal and regional reconnections and 
stressed the importance of diplomacy, while the latter focused on self-improvement and 
the education of Korean leadership.65 
 While splits among various Korean groups obviously existed, American officials‘ 
perspective on the division was sometimes seen as simplistic and dichotomous. In a 
sense, the competitive activities of Syngman Rhee‘s and Kilsoo Haan‘s groups in the 
United States contributed to the impression of serious and incurable factionalism among 
Korean nationalists. As contact with Korean groups in the United States increased and 
they became critical informants, the State Department developed the impression that the 
groups‘ opinions and activities were, at times, unreliable and insincere due to their 
internally competitive relationship among Koreans. The State Department noticed that 
they denounced each other when giving advice. For example, figures such as Kilsoo 
Haan and Soon Kyo Hahn told State Department officials that so-called revolutionary 
Koreans had been active against Japan and that Syngman Rhee‘s branch had been 
passive. Soon Kyo Hahn argued in a meeting with Salisbury of the Far Eastern Affairs 
Division in March 1942 that the revolutionary leaders would become the leaders of a free 
Korea and that Syngman Rhee and his associates would be of little importance. He added 
that, although Rhee‘s group regarded the revolutionary party as communist, there were no 
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more communists.66 More importantly, Hahn stated that he thought the U.S. government 
―might be eventually embarrassed if it recognized Dr. Rhee‘s group and then found at the 
end of the war that the revolutionary leaders were the real leaders of Korea,‖ and that 
―recognition of the Provisional Government at Chungking would very likely precipitate 
the establishment of a rival provisional government by the so-called revolutionary 
leaders.‖67 Hahn‘s argument that recognition of the KPG would embarrass the U.S. 
government because of the possibility of a rival governmental organization provoked 
exactly the point U.S. officials had been concerned about. The condemnations worked 
effectively, making the U.S. government highly sensitive to the source and credence of 
information about the Korean problem. The fact that this rhetoric worked in solidifying 
the U.S. government‘s policy of non-recognition of the KPG is demonstrated in the 
following report, prepared by Salisbury of the Far Eastern Affairs Division (FE) the day 
after his meeting with Soon Kyo Hahn [Italics added], 
FE is of the opinion that the Department should not make any further statement 
with regard to the ultimate independence of Korea until such time as a statement 
regarding Korea could be made either (1) as a part of a statement referring to 
certain other dependent Asiatic peoples or (2) as a result of significant concrete 
developments in the Korean independence movement. FE also feels that the 
Department should take no action for the time being with regard to recognition of 
any Korean group as the ―government‖ of Korea in view of (1) the present 
reluctance of the National Government of China to recognize the ―Provisional 
Government of Korea‖ (2) the fact that information available to the Department 
indicates that the recognition of one group by this Government might result in the 
establishment of a rival “government” of Korea (see attached memorandum of 
conversation); and (3) the existing possibility that current efforts of certain 
Koreans might achieve unification of the various disunified Korean groups in the 
not distant future.68 
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Using the same expression as Hahn, Salisbury cited the rivalry among Korean groups as 
one of the important reasons the U.S. government should not recognize the KPG, or any 
group of Koreans, at the time.69 
 The State Department also received much information from Kilsoo Haan, of the 
―revolutionist group,‖ especially about the conditions of Korean nationalist groups in 
North China; meanwhile, it obtained other information showing suspicion about Haan‘s 
credibility. The KPG‘s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cho So-ang, informed the American 
Embassy in Chungking that Kilsoo Haan, in the United States, and Kim Yak San‘s group 
in Asia constituted only a small minority group of the Korean independence movement. 
The KPG informed the State Department that, because Haan had served as a Japanese 
agent in Hawaii for seven years before, he was not a person that other Koreans trusted. 
Cho stated that the KPG desired to unite all Korean groups and argued that Haan‘s own 
aggrandizement manufactured a false impression of leading an opposition group and that 
Kim Yak San‘s group was now technically part of the KPG.70 In November 1942, Haan 
approached the State Department to request written assurance from the U.S. government 
that it would assist Koreans in setting up an independent government in Korea after the 
war, in order to encourage Korean agents in Japan and Korea. Regarding this request, the 
FE Division recommended not to comply with Mr. Haan‘s request, ―not only because of 
the various difficulties involved from the viewpoint of policy but also because of the 
likelihood that Mr. Haan would make use of such assurance to gain prestige for himself 
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as a leader among Koreans and because there is doubt as to whether Mr. Haan in fact has 
agents in Japan proper and in Korea [Italics added].‖71 This statement demonstrates that 
the U.S. government suspected Kilsoo Haan‘s activities were more inclined to winning a 
power struggle than to uniting various groups. 
 Syngman Rhee‘s group employed similar rhetoric to criticize Kilsoo Haan‘s 
group. The State Department noticed in December 1942 that Rhee desired to make a 
public denunciation of Kilsoo Haan, accusing Haan of ―undesirable character.‖72 In a 
meeting of the Rhee group and the Division of Japanese Affairs in April 1944, Rhee 
asserted that all Korean groups not affiliated with the KPG were insignificant. The 
rhetoric that the Rhee group often used in denouncing the opposed party was to call it 
communist. They also condemned Kilsoo Haan as ―undesirable‖ on the grounds of his 
past association with the Communist party,73 and stressed that they were strongly opposed 
to any compromise with radical Koreans.74 On the grounds that the rivalry among Korean 
groups, especially those in the United States, was heating up and that exaggerated 
information about representation and ability was coming in, the State Department even 
censored internal cablegrams among Korean political leaders, including Syngman Rhee 
and Kilsoo Haan, to determine credibility of their words and deeds.75  
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 Although the State Department basically believed that fostering unity among 
Koreans in the United States was primarily the Koreans‘ own responsibility,76 it made 
efforts to mediate unity between groups. For example, in May 1942, the FE Division 
supported the idea of mediating a meeting between Kilsoo Haan and Syngman Rhee in 
order to end their rivalry and to coordinate the efforts of Korean organizations in the 
United States.77 The suggestion was not acted upon. In 1943, in support of the idea of two 
Koreans, J. Kyung Dunn and C. Ho Kim, travelled from the United States to Chungking 
to unify dissident Korean groups in the United States, the FE Division took ―the position 
that every effort should be made to facilitate their travel.‖78 However, the effort was a 
disappointment, as the Chinese Foreign Office expressed the opinion that ―the visit of 
those two Koreans might lead to further dissension among Koreans in Chungking.‖79 In 
1944, the U.S. government learned that the KPG was reorganized to unite conservative 
and radical groups. Again, the U.S. government obtained information that the 
reorganization was a result of the Chinese government‘s threat to stop subsidies unless 
unity was reached, ―but that same bickering continue[d] under [the] surface.‖80 Five KPG 
members planned to visit the United States in 1944 in order to unite Koreans there, but 
this plan also turned out to be discouraging, as the group desiring to go to the United 
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States was not representing the KPG.81 After observing a series of debates between 
Korean groups, the State Department concluded that the KPG did not represent all 
Korean people, but was only one of many political groups.82 Noticing the KPG‘s division 
and rivalry with other political groups, it had less confidence in the KPG. 
 The second condition of interest to the U.S. government when considering the 
possibility of recognizing the KPG or other groups was how much these exiled groups 
could represent all Korean people, both in and out of Korea. Based on the U.S. 
government‘s knowledge from the 1920s and 1930s, officials knew that political and 
assembly activities were extremely restrained in Korea, and they therefore believed that, 
as long as Japan‘s successes in the war continued, ―any formal declaration or recognition 
on the part of the U.S. or Britain would be unlikely to arouse a response on any effective 
scale among Koreans generally in areas under Japanese control.‖83 American Consul 
General Johnson, in his report on conditions in Korea, which was written after his 
repatriation from Korea,84 also predicted that ―there [was] practically no possibility of 
effective Korean hostile activity against Japan until such a time as Japan suffer[ed] a 
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defeat by an outside power of such proportions as to necessitate a very material 
weakening of military and police forces in Korea.‖85 It implied that Korean nationalist 
groups outside of Korea had little association with the people in Korea.86 In addition, the 
State Department noticed that the KPG was never in control of any part of Korea. State 
Department officials wondered, ―how widely known this group [KPG] may be in Korea, 
what effective connections they have there, and how they are regarded there.‖87 
 The U.S. government‘s third question regarding recognition of the KPG was 
whether or not Korean leaders had the political ability to maintain self-government. Due 
to their perception of Korean leaders‘ factionalist moves, U.S. officials concluded that the 
KPG lacked able men.88 Chapter 4 demonstrated that American officials thought Koreans 
lacked political and administrative experience, as nationalist Koreans refused to 
collaborate with Japan to form a self-government policy in the 1920s and 1930s. 
American officials during the wartime considered the Korean nationalists‘ lack of 
experience with self-government to be one of the factors key for the recognition of the 
KPG as the government of Korea. Officials at the American Embassy in Chungking 
called the KPG‘s idea of government ―most vague and unsatisfactory‖ and described its 
financial sources and possible military aid to Korean independence as ―unenlightening.‖89 
They interpreted the evasiveness and vagueness of KPG leaders as being ―in part due to 
the absence of organization for and correlation of independence activities on the part of 
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the Korean regime at Chungking, as well as to a seemingly basic inchoate condition of 
the Korean movement.‖90 American officials also suspected that the KPG usually 
exaggerated the Korean population numbers in Manchuria, China, Hawaii, and Siberia, 
and the KPG‘s influence among Koreans abroad. In general, KPG leaders were seen as 
being somewhat out of touch with the real situation and lacking concrete organization 
and programmatic precision.91 State Department officials also perceived that the KPG‘s 
organization was dated and unrealistic, based on the fact that the average age of the nine 
KPG leaders was 62.  
State Department officials confirmed the view of the Korean nationalists‘ 
incompetence after observing the Korean Liberty Conference, which was held in 
Washington D.C. in February and March 1942.92 The Department saw that the conference 
served, to some degree, to focus public attention on the question of Korean 
―recognition,‖93 but hardly anything more. Langdon, from the FE Division, had the 
following impression [Italics added]: 
The Koreans in the audience gave a favorable impression from the point of view 
of physique, alertness and bearing. Outside of this feature, however, there was 
little about the meeting to encourage hope of Korean independence. In the 
meeting under discussion not a word was said of plans or organization for 
resistance to Japan or for independence. The meeting was well attended by 
professional publicists and by press representatives, and impressed one as a 
publicity stunt. As for the addresses, they dealt with the past and showed no 
knowledge of the problems of the present and were totally lacking in 
constructiveness. Moreover, not a note of self-help was sounded. In fact, there 
were many allusions to the opportunity which was now presented to the United 
States for ―atoning‖ for its failure in 1905 to defend and save Korean 
independence. An objective stranger would have gathered the impression from the 
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meeting that the independence of Korea is entirely an American problem and not 
one with regard to which Koreans need put forth concrete efforts to assist in 
winning the war and thereby gain independence for themselves.94 
 
Langdon observed that the conference was organized by major Korean nationalist figures, 
including Syngman Rhee and Sô Chae-p‘il, yet failed to show a specific and constructive 
plan for Korean people to secure their national independence. In particular, he criticized 
that the organizers and speakers highlighted only the United States‘ role in solving the 
problem, rather than stressing Koreans‘ will to help themselves gain independence. This 
perception of Korean leaders as dependent on powerful countries also fit into the 
American perception of a weak and dependent Korean government right before Korea 
became a protectorate in 1905. American officials‘ view of Korean groups as 
factionalized, weak, and exceedingly dependent on the United States during wartime led 
them to avoid concurring with Koreans‘ request of ―recognizing‖ the KPG. 
 The last factor contributing to the U.S. government‘s decision not to recognize the 
KPG was the response of other countries, in particular Britain and China, to the question 
of Korea—in part because Korea had historically been a subject of interest for several 
countries, and also because it was wartime, the Allies were fighting together against the 
Axis Powers. The FE Division was of the opinion that it should take into account China, 
Russia, Great Britain, and other wartime associates‘ attitudes toward Korean 
independence. It argued, ―isolated action on our part might involve responsibilities which 
in the light of later events it might have been better for this Government not to have 
assumed.‖95 Another FE report said, ―recognition [of the KPG] might also, unless we 
have worked out arrangements with the Governments of China and the Soviet Union, 
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cause displeasure to one or both of those governments.‖96 Were the Chinese government 
inclined to accord recognition, the position of the U.S. government would have been 
influenced by the fact.97 However, the State Department had information that the Chinese 
government‘s general attitude on the matter was not enthusiastic.98 Chinese officials in 
London expressed the opinion that, until the factional differences of the Korean groups 
were ironed out, there could be no question of recognition of any sort of free Korean 
movement.99 According to Department communications, the British government was also 
concerned about disunity among Koreans and took the position that the response to 
Koreans outside the Japanese area should be confined to ―assurances of sympathy with 
attempts of Koreans to realize their aims for independence and national freedom.‖100 On 
the other hand, the British Foreign Office saw Korea‘s case as an ―extremely useful field 
for publicity,‖ presenting a long series of violations of Japanese assurances in Korea‘s 
history under Japanese control. Korea‘s case, it added, supplied ―an excellent object 
lesson of what Japanese domination means.‖101  
 In connection to the attitudes of other powers, the question of other Asian colonial 
peoples was another issue to consider. British Foreign Service officials suggested that an 
American statement on Korea with no indication of the American attitude regarding other 
Asian colonial peoples might be inopportune,102 as Indian independence was in ―an active 
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state of flux,‖103 and the Chinese government seemed to be sympathetic toward it.104 The 
issue of decolonizing Asian peoples became a significant factor of disagreement among 
powers during the discussion of postwar plans and trusteeship in later years.105 
 
2. Plans for Post-colonial Korea 
 As the war was coming to a close, the great powers began to plan a postwar order. 
In particular, the disposition of former colonial areas became a central issue: for postwar 
Korea, a trusteeship idea appeared as a resolution. The idea, partly stemming from 
Franklin Roosevelt‘s ―transnational, incorporative and global‖ ideals,106 guided the 
Americans‘ postwar policy toward Korea until American officials realized the idea was 
no longer feasible, in early 1946. In the post-World War II years, the Korean problem 
was one of many issues to be resolved through the cooperation among Allied Powers. 
International conferences and subsequent declarations about Korea implied that the 
problem would be dealt with in the Allied Powers‘ blueprint for a postwar world order, 
especially that of the United States. Still, relations among the group, the United States, 
Britain, China, and the Soviet Union, were crucial for shaping the direction of Korea‘s 
fate. The United States, Britain, and China pledged support for Korean independence on 
December 1, 1943 at the Cairo Conference. The conference‘s declaration said, ―the 
aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are 
determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent [Italics 
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added].‖107 This was the first official sign of support for Korea‘s independence by the 
great powers since 1910. However, Korean nationalist groups complained about the 
phrase ―in due course,‖ calling for a promise of immediate independence. At the Yalta 
Conference in February 1945, Roosevelt and Stalin informally agreed to a trusteeship 
plan for Korea. When FDR died in April 1945, Harry S. Truman ascended to the 
presidency. Although Truman kept the deal for trusteeship plan, he approached to the 
plan from a more anti-communistic view than Roosevelt. 
 Meanwhile, from early 1944 on, State Department planners ―began to plan for a 
partial or full military occupation of Korea.‖108 Around February to April 1944, the State 
Department ―envisioned an American occupation of Korea and noted the importance for 
American postwar aims of United States participation in whatever military operations 
took place in Korea.‖109 At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the invasion of 
Manchuria and Korea was left entirely to Soviet military operations. The Soviet Union 
declared war against Japan on August 8, 1945. After the United States dropped atomic 
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan on August 6 and 9, Soviet forces engaged 
Japanese forces on the Asian mainland, and Japan finally surrendered. As soon as the war 
ended and Korea was liberated, Korea was divided at the 38th north latitude line into 
American and Soviet occupation zones.110 
These two official decisions, the trusteeship plan and the U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint 
occupation of Korea, constituted the core of America‘s wartime Korean policy. Both 
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decisions were essentially the opposite of what the Korean people and nationalist groups 
had hoped for. Many factors, such as relations among the great powers, different opinions 
within the U.S. government, and the emergence of the Cold War setting might have 
influenced these decisions. Rather than repeat the existing scholarship on how wartime 
strategies and discussions among the powers led to these decisions, the present section 
will concentrate on how Americans‘ perception and understanding of Korea throughout 
its colonial period and interaction with Korean groups interplayed with their idea of 
postwar order and resulted in decisions for trusteeship and the occupation of Korea. 
 
(1) The Idea of Trusteeship 
The idea of an international trusteeship for postcolonial Korea was first broached 
within the State Department in early 1942. Many studies on America‘s Korean policy of 
the 1940s have focused on the origins and background of the idea,111 which, according to 
Cumings, ―foundered almost from the first day it was broached in international 
discussions.‖112 In a meeting between President Roosevelt and British Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden in Washington on March 24, 1943, ―Roosevelt mentioned Korea and 
Indochina as areas for which postwar trusteeships would be particularly appropriate,‖ for 
the first time.113 Although the British and the French governments were not positive about 
the implications of trusteeship for their colonial holdings, Roosevelt and the American 
planners proceeded to prepare proposals for postwar trusteeships.114 According to 
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documents drafted in early 1943, the trustee powers would ―prepare and educate‖ the 
―dependent peoples‖ for self-government. The powers would protect them from 
exploitation and ―promote their economic development and social justice.‖ For Korea, 
the trustee powers would be China, the United States, and the Soviet Union.115 
Since outbreak of war in the Pacific, contact between the U.S. government and 
Korean groups had increased dramatically, however government‘s trust of information 
and outlooks on Korea provided by Korean groups declined as time went by for the same 
reasons that the U.S. government did not recognize the KPG as a governmental 
organization. For information about Korean society, the U.S. government turned to 
Americans in Korea and other parts of East Asia. One of important sources was the State 
Department‘s survey of the Americans who were repatriated from Korea via the MS 
Gripsholm, in the middle of 1942. Officials from the Department believed that the survey 
would give the U.S. government an ―idea of the current political thought and temper of 
the Koreans, both for our own war planning and for evaluating… claims of expatriated 
Korean national groups in this country and in China.‖116 American Consuls General and 
missionaries in Korea were the survey‘s main respondents and their answers provided 
useful information, even these Americans had been almost entirely restricted from direct 
contact with Koreans since around 1939.117 The survey of repatriated Americans from 
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Korea on the Gripsholm and internal State Department reports suggested that several 
conditions provided an empirical background for the initial idea of trusteeship for Korea 
in early 1942. Along with the Gripsholm survey, a report on Korea‘s conditions and 
future, prepared by William R. Langdon of the FE Division in February 1942, was one of 
the most important references for the idea.118 Historians have regarded Langdon‘s memo, 
entitled ―Some Aspects of the Question of Korean Independence,‖ as a historical 
document that formed the basic structure of U.S. policy toward Korea during World War 
II,119 as it suggested an idea of trusteeship for Korea and steps to take for making a new 
Korean government for the first time within the State Department.120 Based on the 
Gripsholm survey and the Langdon‘s 1942 memo, this study suggests the following as 
major factors that led State Department officials to make a trusteeship plan for Korea.  
One of the most obvious factors influencing the idea of trusteeship for Korea was 
the image of Korea as incapable of self-rule, and image that had remained intact since the 
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nineteenth century. American officials saw factionalism, in particular, as evidence of 
Korean political instability. Johnson, the American Vice Consul in Seoul, wrote, 
―because of the notorious inability of Koreans to cooperate even in small groups, and the 
apparent lack of any potentially strong leadership it is my belief that the most serious 
consideration should be given to making unconditional promises of support for 
immediate Korean independence in the event of an Allied victory as a means of 
alleviating the present unhappy plight of that people.‖121 A premise of this evaluation of 
the ―notorious inability of Koreans‖ was Americans‘ negation of the old, pre-annexation 
Korea. American officials such as Arthur B. Emmons III, a Vice Consul in Seoul as of 
1942, stated that ―Korean self-government prior to 1905 was marked in general by mis-
rule and chaos, engendered partly by interference and pressure from sources outside of 
the country, but perhaps to a greater degree by the inherent weakness and cupidity of the 
Korean leaders and aristocracy of the time, as well as by the great ignorance and poverty 
of the general mass of the Korean people.‖122 As was demonstrated in Chapter 1, in the 
late nineteenth century, the Western view conceived Korea as uncivilized, backward, and 
deserving of colonial rule by foreign powers. This view remained in the American 
perspective a half century later, given that American officials in Korea assumed that 
Korea, prior to the period of colonial rule, had no proper self-governing system or history 
of a politically sustainable system. At the same time, the American officials‘ new view 
that Japan was not a proper and good colonizer, by American standards, as seen in 
Chapter 4, was also influential. American officials concluded that Japanese colonial rule 
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could not develop a structure for Korean self-governance, while the United States could 
in the Philippines, for instance. As we would soon explore, only the negative aspects of 
Japanese colonial rule in Korea now stood out in wartime discussions, in contrast to the 
earlier American recognition and hopeful gaze of a civilized and developed Japan as an 
emerging power. 
This view was demonstrated in American officials‘ usual comparison of Korea to 
the Philippines, especially when suggesting a trusteeship for Korea. President Franklin 
Roosevelt, in one address, ―pointed to the Philippine experience as a model for the future 
development of small nations in Asia.‖123 Conditions in Korea were compared to those in 
the Philippines before the American colonization, when the country was recognized as 
inexperienced in democracy and self-government. The parallel American views on Korea 
and on the Philippines had been displayed in a speech by Theodore Roosevelt in 1900, 
when he mentioned that much of the Filipino population was ―utterly unfit for self-
government,‖ but that he believed the people might ―in time become fit but at present can 
only take part in self-government under a wise supervision, at once firm and 
beneficent.‖124 It is obvious that American officials and President Franklin Roosevelt 
perceived America‘s experience in the Philippines as successful in disciplining the 
Filipinos to the point of fitness for self-government and independence, and that a similar 
process would be proper for liberated Korea. As Matray noted, Roosevelt said that 
American policy toward the Philippines had been based on two important factors: the 
first was that ―there be a period of preparation, through the dissemination of education 
and the recognition and fulfillment of physical and social and economic needs‖; the 
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second was that ―there [had] be[en] a period of training for ultimate independence 
beginning with local government and passing on through various steps to complete 
statehood.‖125 Immediately after the Cairo Conference, Franklin Roosevelt, speaking to 
Stalin in Tehran, told him about the Cairo discussions. When mentioning the education of 
the people of the Far Eastern colonial areas in the arts of self-government, ―he pointed 
with pride to the American record in helping the people of the Philippines to prepare 
themselves for independence.‖126 Again, at the Yalta Conference, during discussion of the 
length of trusteeship in Korea, Roosevelt said that, since the Philippines had required 50 
years of tutelage, Korea should have a trusteeship of 20 to 30 years. On this point, Stalin 
argued that the shorter the period of trusteeship, the better.127 These comments indicate 
that Roosevelt thought of a trusteeship for Korea as quasi-tutelage, or even colonialism 
with a paternalistic and benevolent approach, inspired by ―his perception of fifty years of 
American benevolence toward Filipinos.‖128 In short, American officials felt that the 
Korean people had not been given the opportunity to learn to manage modern social 
conditions and to administrate political and governmental matters, not only during the 
colonial period but also before the annexation. Therefore, they concluded, outside 
powers, and especially the United States, should teach and train local people to fill the 
―empty‖ space with the capability to sustain independence. 
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Critical views of the harsh and discriminative Japanese rule in Korea were 
common among responders to the survey of Americans conducted on the Gripsholm and 
among State Department officials. Japan‘s rule was frequently contrasted to Koreans‘ 
persistent patriotism. Most repatriated Americans agreed that nationalism and hope for 
independence had always existed in Korea throughout the colonial period; Koreans‘ 
friendship with Japan seemed forced and superficial,129 and the great mass, ―at least 99 
percent,‖130 of the Korean people ―undoubtedly ha[d] an extreme dislike for the 
Japanese.‖131 ―Even the most cooperative Korean‖ to the Japanese authorities, it was 
predicted, ―would welcome independence.‖132 Most responders to the Gripsholm survey 
agreed that the nationalist spirit was always there and needed only to be rekindled along 
practical lines, such as war.133 
At the same time, American observers during World War II saw that the Japanese 
administration, which did not allow Korean participation, produced inexperienced and 
unable Koreans in terms of politics, economy, and defense. Since the 1930s, American 
officials had accused Japanese authorities of creating bad conditions in Korean society 
and also indicted Koreans‘ lack of experience in every field of modern society. Korean 
inexperience with the modern system became the biggest reason for American officials to 
devise the trusteeship plan. American officials and missionaries residing in Korea 
witnessed Japanese control of food, commodity, and prices, in addition to overtaxation 
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during the war period, all of which caused widespread discontent among the Korean 
people.134 Langdon, in his 1942 memo, concluded that the ―Japanese excluded Koreans 
from all banking, big business, mechanical manufacturing, engineering, importing, 
exporting, wholesale distribution, and shipping, so that the Korean population has no 
training for [a] modern economy.‖ Furthermore, as the Korean economy became 
thoroughly integrated with the Japanese economy, he warned, ―separation of [the] Korean 
from [the] Japanese economy and adjustment to competitive status would involve 
difficult and painful processes.‖135 
Politically, American residents in Korea felt, ―the Japanese military authorities 
and the police in recent years have been so severe that these organizations cannot work to 
any degree openly in Korea.‖136 The number of arrests for ―thought control‖ was very 
large, especially among prominent men.137 Americans also observed that the Japanese 
police were very worried about ―communist activities,‖ which included any kind of 
unrest or non-totalitarian and non-Japanese ideas.138 Although it was known that Korean 
nationalist movement groups existed in Los Angeles, Honolulu, and Shanghai, as well as 
underground activities, secret societies, and hopeful plans,139 Americans in Korea 
observed that Koreans had not been strongly organized and that the great majority of the 
population did not know the active leaders in any of the revolutionary centers.140 The gap 
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between Koreans‘ hope for independence and their practical organization was huge, 
observers agreed. F. W. Koon mentioned: 
―Readiness?‖ I think that thousands of men and women would jump at a chance to 
―engage in activity against Japan,‖ whether they knew it would be ―effective‖ or 
not, if they had a chance and the needed means. ―Capacity?‖ No Korean force 
could meet the Japanese Army, but given some reason for action, some hope that 
action would get a reward, and supplies, every tunnel and bridge in Korea—and 
they run into tens of thousands—would have to be heavily guarded by soldiers 
who might well be needed against Russia.141 
 
Horace H. Underwood agreed that the strength of the Korean movement was not great. 
He commented that the readiness in terms of will was considerable, but very little had 
been done in terms of actual preparation: ―neither arms, nor training nor any effective 
close knit and well led organization.‖142  
Langdon summarized that the Korean people had been politically 
―emasculated.‖143 ―Long excluded from any participation in [the] administration of central 
and local government, diplomacy, justice, law, police, finance, banking, education, 
communications and shipping, they would have no experience in managing a state if 
given their independence.‖144 He pointed out that Koreans had never been allowed to 
perform military service or possess arms. During the colonial period, they had ―no 
concept of or deep will to self-defense.‖145 He concluded [Italics added], 
… because of [Korean people‘s] ―political inexperience and defenselessness, the 
Korean people at first would neither know how to run their country nor be able to 
defend it from reconquest, and that for a generation at least Korea would have to 
be protected, guided, and aided to modern statehood by the great powers. It 
would seem to be no more than essential justice, however, that the Korean people 
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should be so protected, guided, and aided, and given opportunity they never really 
had to be independent and develop along their very distinctive cultural lines. The 
Koreans are intelligent, quick and willing to learn, progressive, and patriotic and 
it is believed that, given disinterested protection, guidance, and aid, they will in a 
generation be able to stand on their own feet and contribute to world prosperity 
and advancement [Italics added].146 
 
In this conclusion of his 1942 memo, Langdon suggested the idea of putting 
Korea under the guidance of the great powers instead of admitting immediate 
independence for the first time. Regarding a specific procedure to exercise trusteeship 
and finally establish a new Korean government, Langdon proposed several steps: 
organization should be prepared with Koreans abroad in liaison with leaders within 
Korea. When it was ready and capable of helping itself and the cause of the United 
Nations in positive ways, ―the sponsoring government might consult with the American, 
British, Chinese, and Soviet governments.‖ Following victory of the United Nations, the 
provisional government could be installed in Korea and ―could administer the country 
with the aid of an international commission pending the adoption of a national 
constitution and the setting up a constitutional government. The sponsoring governments 
from the very beginning should make provision for the functioning of the international 
commission until such time as they, and not the Koreans, might decide it to be no longer 
necessary [Italics added].‖147 
Trusteeship was an alternative idea to colonialism. Because it was the issue of 
colonies that had brought about two world wars, American policy makers felt that the 
problem should be solved internationally, not nationally. In this sense, the U.S. 
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government devised a resolution for the Korean problem in the form of an international 
trusteeship from the outset, rather than a trusteeship solely by the United States, partly 
because of Roosevelt‘s inclination toward internationalism,148 and partly because of 
divergent interests in Korea among the great powers. Moreover, the country had been ―a 
battleground between [the] conflicting influences of China, Russia, and Japan.‖149 The 
general understanding was that there was still considerable jealousy between the friendly 
influences of Russia and China. Quarton suggested that policy makers should carefully 
study the U.S. and British aims not to conflict with other powers.150 Ko argues that, as the 
United States allied with the Soviet Union in attacking Japanese troops in mainland 
China from 1943 on, it intended to prevent Soviet domination of the Korean Peninsula 
after the war by suggesting an international trusteeship for Korea.151  
As the great powers, and especially the United States and Britain, began to 
discuss an international trusteeship for Korea in diplomatic meetings beginning in March 
1943, the KPG and other Korean groups publicly opposed proposals that Korea be put 
under any form of international or mandated control. The KPG opposed an international 
guardianship for Korea, reasoning that it did not accord with the Atlantic Charter;152 
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however, its opposition did not much affect the U.S. officials‘ decision-making process. 
Notably, American government officials had no worries that an international trusteeship 
for Korea would be incompatible with the Atlantic Charter‘s clause that all peoples have 
a right to self-determination, in contrast to what Korean nationalist leaders assumed. 
Rather, trusteeship was considered the embodiment of the UN declaration on national 
independence.153 For example, Jurkin, of the FE Division, suggested that an international 
committee be set up to investigate problems in Korea and let the committee present 
conclusions to the Pacific War Council and the United Nations for consideration. 
Probable conclusions included: that it be declared that ―the people of Korea should, when 
their native land is freed from Japan‘s oppression, be given opportunity to select freely 
their own government‖; and ―that it be declared that because the people of Korea had not 
since 1910 had experience in government processes… the United Nations would be 
prepared to cooperate with the Korean people in setting up and establishing a national 
government of Korea and for this purpose to assist in forming a temporary international 
trusteeship under which there would be given advice and technical assistance to the 
people and government of Korea.‖154 In other words, American officials planned a 
trusteeship for Korea as an initial step toward the ultimate goal, namely absolute 
independence and self-government, rather than opposing the concept of independence. 
They believed that an international trusteeship would help the process for Korean people 
to choose and set up the form of a new, stable Korean government. In contrast, Korean 
nationalist leaders understood the concept of trusteeship as another form of colonialism. 
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As Cumings points out, ―what FDR failed to grasp was the mood of colonial peoples, 
especially those in Asia, as liberation beckoned.‖155 The chasm between American 
planners and the Korean people in understanding concept of trusteeship lingered from the 
outset until the U.S. government completely abandoned it in late 1947. 
 
(2) The Joint Occupation of Korea 
 After Japan surrendered to the Allies, Korea was finally liberated on August 15, 
1945. However, it was soon divided into northern and southern zones and occupied by 
Soviet and American forces, respectively. As historians have examined, the initial 
decision to divide Korea at the 38th parallel was ―wholly an American action, taken 
during a night-long session of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), 
on August 10-11, 1945.‖156 A partial or full military occupation of Korea began to be 
planned in early 1944, especially by territorial subcommittees of the State Department.157 
As Cumings argues, from this time, American policy makers considered Korea important 
to postwar American security concerns in East Asia and a Korea entirely in hostile hands 
was a threat to that security.158 Studies have concluded that two changes at the last stage 
of the war led to the decision for a joint occupation of Korea in 1945. The first change 
was increased anti-communism among American policy makers since Truman‘s 
assumption of the presidency after Roosevelt‘s death in April 1945. Matray contrasts 
Roosevelt‘s hope for postwar peace and security in Korea, which ―depended entirely 
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upon the maintenance of Allied cooperation and mutual trust,‖ to Truman‘s preference of 
viewing ―Soviet expansionism as an unchanging force‖ in Eastern Europe and Asia.159 
The second change was that the war ended earlier than policy makers expected: Japan 
surrendered on August 15, 1945, seven days after the Soviet Union entered the war. As 
the Americans left operations in Manchuria and Korea to the Soviets, American officials 
assumed that the Soviets would want territory in Manchuria, Korea, and possibly part of 
North China.160 Matray argues, ―Stalin‘s decision to intervene prematurely in the Pacific 
war had ruined Truman‘s strategy for excluding the Soviet Union entirely from 
participation in Korea‘s reconstruction.‖ As a result, the United States had to settle ―for 
half a loaf.‖161 With the joint occupation by these two competing powers in the new world 
order, Korea, along with a partitioned Germany, would become symbol of the upcoming 
Cold War. 
 There was another dimension to the decision-making process behind the joint 
occupation of Korea, related to how American officials had perceived the prospective 
influence of the Soviet Union or communists in Korea even before these two somewhat 
sudden changes occurred. Syngman Rhee‘s comments about communism during the 
Pacific War period are notable in this sense; in a correspondence to the Secretary of State 
in February 1943, an appeal for American help and recognition of the KPG, he concluded 
by invoking ―Russian aims to establish a Soviet Republic of Korea,‖ a warning he and 
American friends of Korea had already made more than a year prior. He stressed that 
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American actions ―spurning the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea—a 
government conceived in the ideals of Democracy—would result in the creation of a 
communist state.‖162 Rhee‘s rhetoric provoking ―red fear‖ among Americans was not an 
uncommon tactic in his attempts to persuade American officials to recognize and 
cooperate with the ―democratic‖ KPG. In a letter to Gauss, the American Ambassador to 
Chungking, he mentioned that ―Korean divisions trained and maintained under the Soviet 
government as a part of the Soviet Far Eastern Army will be used by Soviet Russia 
eventually to invade Korea and to set up a Soviet Republic there, affiliated with the 
USSR‖ and therefore urged recognition of the KPG.163 State Department officials were 
well aware that Rhee‘s group indicated that it was ―strongly opposed to any compromise 
with radical Koreans.‖164 
 Rhee‘s anti-communist activities before the end of the war reached their peak at 
the Yalta Conference, where he campaigned against the conference, charging that 
Roosevelt and Stalin had divided Korea during their talks.165 As Ko analyzes, Rhee‘s 
campaign against the ―secret agreement‖ at Yalta had no actual grounds; Rhee raised the 
possibility of a secret agreement on Korea out of fear for the Roosevelt Administration‘s 
appeasement policy toward the Soviet Union. By raising the question through the 
American mass media and heightening American public attention to foreign relations, he 
intended to induce American policy in the direction of establishing a new Korean 
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government based on Christianity and democracy, while restraining the influence of 
communist Korean groups in the Soviet Union, Manchuria, and North China.166 
 
3. Langdon’s Report (1945) 
On August 15, 1945, Korea was finally liberated from its 36-year colonial rule by 
Japan. The Korean people, overjoyed at the news of liberation, soon had to receive new 
occupying powers—the Soviet Union and the United States. The powers‘ armed forces 
arrived in and occupied the northern and southern zones of the Korean peninsula in 
August and September 1945, respectively. Furthermore, according to official occupation 
sources, the American occupation of Korea was ―modeled upon the experience in enemy 
countries and on the usual instructions and training of an army in a hostile country,‖167 
although Korea was a liberated, not defeated, nation. 
Because of many unexpected factors, the American wartime plans for post-
colonial Korea had no choice but to change. Those factors included: growing American 
fears of Soviet expansion and the emerging Cold War sentiment; the change in American 
policy from containing the Soviets and anticolonial nationalism through multilateral 
means to ―a unilateral policy of a rushing troops into a peninsula‖168; a gap between the 
State Department and American military government officials in viewing the conditions 
of Korea; and the Korean people‘s surprisingly strong desire to initiate the building of a 
new and immediately independent government, which a State Department official in 
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Korea, H. Merrell Benninghoff, described as ―a powder keg ready to explode at the 
application of a spark.‖169 The biggest change was the U.S. government‘s discarding of 
the trusteeship plan for Korea. William Langdon‘s report in late 1945 reveals a critical 
clue behind this change. Langdon, who had served as a consulate officer in Korea in the 
mid-1930s and was a member of territorial subcommittees in postwar planning agencies, 
returned to Seoul in October 1945, this time as a political adviser to the U.S. Military 
Government in Korea (USAMGIK)‘s Commanding General John R. Hodge. Because of 
his long experience in Korea and Korea-related works, Langdon was one of the experts 
on Korean problem employed by the State Department. He was also the first official to 
propose a trusteeship idea for Korea. This section examines how Langdon, who had 
suggested a trusteeship for Korea in 1942, came to reverse his position into abandoning 
the trusteeship plan in 1945. To understand this critical change, we first need to examine 
the general conditions of post-liberation Korean politics. 
Conditions in liberated Korea were somewhat different from what American 
officers of the military government in Korea had predicted before arriving in Seoul. 
Although American officials had known that socialism had gained popularity among 
some Korean people, the Korean leftists actually turned out to be much more systemic 
and popular than the rightists. The Korean People's Republic (KPR, Chsôn inmin 
konghwaguk) and the People's Committees (PC, Inmin wiwônhoe) and their leftist 
leadership emerged even before the American troops arrived, and this alerted American 
officials to the possibility of a communist regime in Korea. The Korean Democratic Party 
(KDP, Han'guk minjudang) and its rightist leadership was a much weaker organization 
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and had fewer supporters than the leftist groups. According to USAMGIK‘s analysis, the 
leftists took the initiative to get political support because of many factors, including: the 
rapid formation of the KPR and PC; the socialists achieved leadership and support among 
Koreans through the underground anti-Japanese movement during the colonial period; the 
support from northern Korea and the trained communist cells; and the absence of 
prominent rightist leaders in the peninsula prior to the establishment of the 
USAMGIK.
170
 The U.S. military government noted the leftists‘ activities, especially the 
―communist-looking‖ People‘s Committee activities from the outset. USAMGIK rejected 
any recognition of the KPR as the governmental body, with an announcement on October 
10, 1945 that ―there is only one government, USAMGIK, in southern Korea.‖171  
The U.S. Military Government‘s policy in general aimed to curtail the Soviet 
Union‘s influence on Korea and to build a bulwark against communism. The military 
government was worried that, if the United States allowed free political activities, the 
leftists and the Soviet Union would link directly with one another and establish 
communism in Korea. For this reason, the military government‘s policy favored the 
rightists and restrained the leftists, all the while claiming a neutral position as early as 
October 1945. The employment policy of the USAMGIK, which was to fully but 
temporarily utilize local, regional, and national agencies of the government-general‘s 
administration and the Japanese officials of the colonial system, demonstrated the 
military government‘s political inclination. However, as this policy ran into strong 
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opposition from Koreans, the dual officer system was set up, employing both American 
and Koreans in the same department from December 1945. The policy of employing 
Korean officers exposes the government‘s inclination more clearly. The requirements for 
Korean officers were the ability to speak English, a pro-American disposition that 
supported American democratic ideology, and no connection with any communists. 
Those who were qualified were pro-Japanese bureaucrats, former police and servicemen 
in the colonial system, and pro-American conservatives from the landlord stratum. As a 
result, the rightists, who supported the conservative KDP, came into power in the main as 
well as local offices of the USAMGIK, the Bureau of Judicial Affairs, prosecutorial 
authorities, and the police forces. 
In December 1945, the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, and the 
Soviet Union met at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. Concerning Korea, 
they agreed to set up the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission. A provisional Korean 
government would be established, and the government as charged with consulting with 
the Joint Commission for the trusteeship of four countries, the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Britain, and China for up to five years. Cumings comments that the result of the 
Moscow Conference was ―a compromise agreement that reversed the sequence of 
American wartime planning‖ in the sense that ―now a Korean government would come 
before, not after, trusteeship.‖172 Nevertheless, news of the agreement brought out a 
strong anti-trusteeship movement among Koreans, especially rightist groups. 
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Furthermore, officials of the USAMGIK were already against the State Department‘s 
trusteeship idea for Korea.
173
 
Meanwhile, Langdon wrote a report in November 1945. Although his opinion in 
the report was not met with wide agreement within the State Department at the time, the 
report forecasted the direction that the United States would take regarding Korea until the 
Republic of Korea government was established in 1948. The notable part of this report is 
that Langdon, now serving as a representative of the State Department, rejected the 
trusteeship plan, the State Department‘s official policy, which he had suggested for Korea 
for the first time in 1942 [Italics added]: 
After one month‘s observation in liberated Korea and with background of earlier 
service in Korea, I am unable to fit trusteeship to actual conditions here or to be 
persuaded of its suitability from moral and practical standpoints, and therefore, 
believe we should drop it. It is thought wrong because the Korean people have 
always been a distinct nation except for 35 years of Jap rule and have high 
literacy, cultural and living standards judged by Asiatic and Middle Eastern 
standards. It is thought unpractical because it certainly will not be accepted by the 
Koreans and perhaps will have to be maintained by force […] Out of the 
Department's recent press release concerning trusteeship for Korea, connoting that 
Koreans would continue to be somebody's wards after MG, agitate all literate 
elements beyond anything since the surrender. The fact seems to be that all 
Koreans want their country to themselves in their life time and will not have any 
form of foreign tutelage to attain an alien standard of nationhood. In the Korean 
people are certain bad traits that cannot be overcome except by actual experience 
of their evil consequences: Division, obsequiousness, inordinate self seeking, 
strong sectional rivalries and intolerance of opposition […] A trusteeship would 
also have to repress these faults in order to function. True at the end of the 
trusteeship the natural process of self improvement would still lie before the 
Korean people as it does now. For the foregoing reasons I favor another plan 
instead of trusteeship…174 
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This was perhaps a surprising suggestion, given Langdon‘s history with the 
concept of trusteeship. Now, however, he believed that it would be difficult for the 
United States to lead the process if it negotiated with the Soviet Union for the 
international trusteeship plan or completely committed the process to the hands of the 
Koreans. Langdon‘s alternative to trusteeship was for the United States to intervene 
actively and establish a Korean government. The plan had six steps. First, the military 
government would direct Kim Ku to form a Governing Commission. Second, the 
Governing Commission would be integrated with the Military Government. Third, when 
the Governing Commission succeeded the Military Government as an interim 
government, the Commanding General would retain the power of veto and would 
continue to appoint American supervisors and advisors as he deemed necessary. Fourth, 
the Governing Commission would be provided with three other nations' supervisors and 
advisors. Fifth, the Governing Commission would conduct the election for the head of 
state. And sixth, the government formed by an elected head of state would receive 
approval from the United Nations. In addition, the more problematic part was the 
footnote [Italics added]: 
  Somewhere in the transition, perhaps between [the fourth] and [the fifth], 
negotiations [need] to be signed with Russia for mutual withdrawal of troops and 
extension to Russian zone of Governing Commission's authority. Russia should 
be informed in advance of above plan and invited to further it by allowing persons 
in Russian zone nominated to Governing Commission by council to proceed to 
Seoul, but if Russian participation is not forthcoming the plan should be carried 




As Cumings comments, in retrospect this procedure was embodied in the creation 
of Representative Democratic Council (Minjuwiwôn) in February 1946, the South Korean 






Interim Government (Namjosôn kwado chôngbu) in 1947, and the eventual assumption of 
power by Syngman Rhee‘s separate government in the South in 1948, except that the 
United Nations was brought in at step five rather than at step six, when it was used to 
sanction the National Assembly elections of May 1948 and that the Rhee group, rather 
than Kim Ku‘s group, assumed leadership after all.176 When the State Department 
criticized his plan, Langdon suggested another alternative idea in December 1945, ―a US 
trusteeship for South Korea and a USSR trusteeship for North Korea, both under UNO 
[United Nations Organization], to end mutually with reciprocal withdrawal of troops and 
invitation to UNO membership say after 5 years,‖ but he faced opposition again.177 
Langdon‘s proposals for forming the Korean government in late 1945 show the 
characteristics of the U.S. policies regarding Korea not only at the time, but also for the 
coming years. First, he claimed that the United States needed to have a strong influence 
on solving the Korean problem. Studies have noted the fact that Langdon opposed 
trusteeship and suggested the separate governments plan only. However, to question only 
whether he supported or opposed the trusteeship plan itself may limit the meaning of his 
suggestion. A point to note is that he proposed the leading role of the United States in 
establishing a South Korean government and a divided trusteeship system. The plans that 
Langdon suggested were connected to the plan for separate governments. This idea of 
American initiative in solving the Korean problem had been American officials‘ views 
since the late 1930s, as we have examined earlier. 
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Second, his ideas overlooked the Korean people‘s strong desire for autonomy. 
Langdon‘s report in November 1945 suggested that the United States had a veto and the 
authority to appoint American supervisors and advisers to the interim Korean 
government. This authority would be maintained until the United States (not Korea) 
decided it was no longer necessary.
178
 Both Langdon and other State Department 
agencies‘ suggestion for a trusteeship in 1942, and Langdon‘s new proposal for a separate 
trusteeship in Korea in 1946, shared the same view. In this sense, even though Langdon 
and the Korean rightists did agree on the point of cancelling the trusteeship plan, they 
were not compatible in the essential aims behind the move. 
The U.S. military government's civil policies from the early days reflected the 
procedure and intent of Langdon‘s ideas. The ―Koreanization‖ of the USAMGIK, the 
Korean bureaucratic employment policy, economic policy, and especially policies 
regarding the land problem were not impromptu, but were rather carried out as premises 
in the establishment of a Korean government.
179
 Also, there seemed to be a tacit 
agreement to Langdon's plans in the military government. For example, when 
Benninghoff, another political adviser to General Hodge, visited the United States and 
met officials of the State Department and the Department of the Army in late 1945, he 
emphasized that the plans in Langdon‘s report from 1945 should be considered as 
important. In short, Langdon‘s plan was not just a personal opinion, but instead a 
reflection of the fundamental perceptions of the American military government. This is 
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how the suggestions of Langdon and the military government affected the United States‘ 
formal policy thereafter.
180
 When the Joint Commission finally ruptured in October 1947, 
so did the American plan to use moderate Korean groups to establish an interim 
government. The American policy toward Korea was concluded with the establishment of 
a separate government of Korea in South Korea, and the U.S. government referred the 
Korean problem to the United Nations in 1948.  
 
Conclusion 
 Korean nationalists thought that the outbreak of war in the Pacific was an 
inevitable result of the expansionist Japanese imperialism in the Asian region. For 
Koreans, while the war was a tragedy, it was also an auspicious sign for Korean national 
independence after the 36-year-long colonial rule. In line with Koreans‘ expectations, the 
Pacific War gave Korean nationalist groups another chance to interact actively with the 
U.S. government. If Korean nationalist activists in the 1920s appealed to Americans‘ 
moral sense and humanism in claiming to Korea‘s independence, Koreans during World 
War II had a more realistic view, assuming the United States to be the new great power of 
the postwar world order. Simply put, what constituted the main issue for American 
officials dealing with the Korean problem during the war was the extent to which the 
Korean people‘s representation should be recognized. Korean nationalists‘ strategy 
during the period successfully convinced American officials of the Korean problem‘s 
importance for postwar security and Koreans‘ ethnic national identity and will of national 
independence. During this process, Korean leaders expressed a strong confidence in 
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securing a diplomatic resolution of the Korean problem with the help of the U.S. 
government. 
 At the same time, a schism between Korean nationalist leaders‘ outlook and that 
of American officials was clear. Although Korean leaders expected to initiate the process 
of liberating their country and establishing a new government with help from the United 
States, the U.S. government positioned Korea in the broader postwar world order in its 
wartime planning based on the premise of its initiative of solving problems in the region. 
Differences between these two views existed from the earlier period and both directly and 
indirectly influenced America‘s official decisions on Korea during the war and persisted 
in Korea‘s post-liberation politics. Langdon‘s report in 1945 is critical evidence that an 
earlier schism between Koreans and Americans and misunderstandings on the both sides 














This study aims to examine how the perceptions of American observers of colonialism in 
Korea reflect the intertwined and interactive relationships among the U.S., Japan, and 
Korea. It contends that the development of a specific American policy towards Korea 
after 1945 cannot be discussed without looking at the making of American perceptions of 
Korea in the earlier decades. Despite the fact that the U.S. had no official policy about 
Korea or, superficially, any diplomatic relations with the colony of Japan, both private 
writings and State Department documents indicate that American attention to Korea did 
not cease throughout the colonial period of Korea (1910-1945). Korean diaspora groups, 
especially those in the U.S., worked as agents for Korea‘s nationalist claims. It is my 
contention that the belief of Korean nationalists in a ―special friendship‖ in relations 
between Korea and the U.S. and reliance on American ideals in proclaiming their 
nationalist cause led the U.S. to disclose its unique position in foreign relations in the first 
half of the twentieth century—a moral and ―exceptionalistic‖ perspective of itself as well 
as an imperial power. 
 This study has analyzed how the American view on Korea has changed from the 
late nineteenth century to the post-liberation period after 1945. In this process, different 
groups of American supporters of the Korean nationalist cause discovered different forms 
of hope in Korea‘s future—a hope in the peaceful way that Korean demonstrators used to 




hope in Korean-Americans who admired American-style democracy and were opposed to 
communism. By examining the rhetoric and means that Korean nationalist leaders used in 
appealing to the American public and government, this study also emphasizes that these 
different images resulted from interactions among American observers, Korean 
nationalists and Japanese authorities throughout the Korean colonial period. We have 
investigated that changes in American understanding of the Korean colonial period 
corresponded to the Japanese ruling style in Korea of each phase, roughly classified as 
the military rule (1910-1919), cultural rule (1919-1930) and war mobilization (1931-
1945). American responses to the Korean problem began in the nineteenth century with a 
typical Western view on the Other spheres of the world. American commentators were in 
general indifferent towards Korea‘s nationalism and colonialism until the annexation of 
Korea in 1910. In 1919, when Japanese military rule in Korea reached a peak, the 
American response changed from indifferent into emotional, sympathetic and personal 
towards the Korean people. The March First Movement (1919) was a turning point that 
attracted American public attention to the Korean problem and provoked the formation of 
many Korean nationalist organizations, as well as pro-Korean activities in the U.S. As the 
Japanese authorities decided on a ―cultural rule‖ in Korea in the 1920s, radical and 
violent conflicts between the colonizer and the colonized diminished considerably. 
American attention to the Korean problem decreased accordingly during this period. 
From the mid-1920‘s and in the 1930s, with the growing anti-Japanese sentiment of the 
American public due to the immigration issue and Japan‘s expansionist moves in the 
Chinese continent, American opinion makers and State Department officials found 




transformed into American interest in the Korean people for wartime use during the 
Second World War years (1937-1945).  
 As examined in Chapter 1, representing their ―invisible‖ nation was a challenge 
for Korean nationalists from the beginning in the late nineteenth century. Since the 
Chosôn government lost its diplomatic sovereignty to Japan amidst a power game among 
the great powers, various ideas for reform and national independence for Korea were 
generated. These different voices of Koreans converged in the form of shouting for 
national independence and accusing Japanese colonial rule of being illegal and immoral 
during the March First Movement in 1919. From 1919, Korean nationalist leaders 
appealed to the moral values, humanitarianism and Christian values of American ideals in 
order to call for American aid for Korean independence. In particular, Syngman Rhee and 
others tried to enlighten the American public and intellectuals about the unfair conditions 
of the Korean people, seeking the U.S. government‘s intervention in resolving the Korean 
problem. The present study has demonstrated that Korean leaders succeeded in claiming 
the Korean people‘s distinctive and strong national identity and in provoking American 
interest in the Korean case of colonialism in the early 1920s. As foreigners, legally 
ineligible for citizenship, Koreans in the U.S. made lobbying efforts to appeal to the 
American public to support Korea‘s independence. The Korean nationalist claim to 
independence was articulated in uses of the rhetoric of justice, humanitarianism, morality, 
and self-determination, whose virtues were alleged to be closely linked to American 
ideals. Nevertheless, Korean nationalists witnessed the fact that great-power politics, 
rather than international justice and morality towards small peoples dominated post-First 




towards sentimental and emotional provocation faced challenges when Japan‘s harsh 
oppression of Koreans decreased during its ―cultural rule‖ of the 1920s. In a sense, 
Korean leaders failed to some extent in convincing American observers and policy-
makers with opposition against colonialism per se, rather than against the failures of 
Japanese colonialism in fostering modernism in Korea. In addition, the controversy over 
Korean participation in the Institute of Pacific Relations in the 1920s and 1930s shows 
that Japanese lobbying activities to persuade of the importance of friendly U.S.-Japanese 
relations worked more powerfully than Korean nationalist claims on the international 
stage and at a private level as well.  
Our observation of the American perception of the Korean problem has shown 
that there existed a gap between American and Korean views. On the one hand, for 
American observers, Korean colonialism was a result of conflict between the civilized 
and the uncivilized: Japan as the former and Korea the latter. On the other hand, for 
Korean nationalist leaders, especially for Syngman Rhee and others, being civilized 
meant being Westernized; especially being close to American ideals, such as democracy 
and morality based on Christianity. Therefore, they framed their nationalist movement as 
a struggle between the civilized, including Korea and the U.S., against the uncivilized, 
that is oppressive and immoral, Japan. The activities of American missionaries in Korea, 
evangelical and philanthropic activities and personal interactions with Koreans, 
contributed to the building of those Korean nationalist leaders‘ idea of a ―special 
relationship‖ with the U.S. The fundamental gap between different views of Americans 
and Koreans lingered and came to the forefront at the end of Korean colonialism. During 




still inexperienced, undeveloped, and unskilled in modern systems of self-rule. This idea 
served as the foundation of the American government‘s trusteeship plan for Korea. This 
was also a result of looking down upon Japan‘s colonial rule and imperial administration 
in Korea. 
 For American commentators and policy makers, geopolitical concern was usually 
the factor with the highest priority in determining the American official attitude regarding 
Korea. The relationship with Japan was especially essential here. For most of the time 
until the Pacific War broke out, American observers and government officials prioritized 
a friendly relationship with Japan over interest in any Korean nationalist claims. In the 
nineteenth century, the American view developed from an Orientalist and modernist view 
that Korea was backward and needed help from an outside power to develop. American 
observers described Korea as a far distant land, filled with strange customs and politically 
indifferent people, often contrasted with the fast and fulfilling modernization in Japan. 
Japan‘s propaganda efforts on its modernizing ―mission‖ in Korea toward the English-
reading international audience were effectively received. As Chapter 1 explored, the 
Japanese successfully convinced Western observers of the legitimacy and inevitability of 
Japan‘s annexation of Korea for security and peace in East Asia, as well as for an outlet 
for Japan‘s surplus population in 1910. In the 1910s, both Japan and the U.S. were highly 
sensitive to respecting each other‘s ―domestic jurisdiction.‖ This was the fundamental 
idea on which the U.S. justified its restriction of immigrants based on race. As Brawley 




to ―guilt over the fact that Japan‘s problems had been worsened by North American and 
Australasian exclusion.‖1   
From 1919, a rising Korean voice aimed at international society accusing the 
Japanese of a harsh rule in Korea changed these positive images of Japan‘s new 
imperialism to a view that Japan‘s way of controlling Korea should be reformed. Chapter 
2 has shown that American missionaries functioned as personal agents in spreading hope 
for an optimistic future among Koreans and also in convincing an American audience in 
the U.S. that Korea was a hope for spread of evangelism in Asia during this period. The 
unique American view on foreign relations and American exceptionalism, which is a 
belief in America‘s moral superiority with its exceptional ideals in politics, economics 
and religion, also contributed to a growing American sympathy for Korean people.  
In the mid-1910s and the 1920s, a series of decisions to restrict Asian immigration 
to the United States increased the conflict between the U.S. and Japan. Just as Japan was 
almost obsessed with abolishing the extraterritoriality rights of European and American 
citizens in Japan, a symbol of the unequal treaties that Japan had with Western countries 
in the late nineteenth century, it struggled to achieve ―racial equality‖ in terms of 
migration in this period. Japan felt insulted by the Immigration Act of 1924 and its 
implication that those excluded from immigration based on race were inferior. These 
worsened relations propelled Japan‘s sophistication of its pan-Asian doctrine, as well as 
its proclamation of the Asian people‘s war against the West. Along with a worsening 
U.S.-Japanese relationship during this period, American officials began to raise the 
question of whether Japanese colonial rule in Korea and other parts of the East Asian 
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region was a success and to understand the serious problems of colonial Korean society 
stemming from Japan‘s inefficient ruling system. In analyzing the serious economic and 
social problems of Korea, now American observers thought that the Korean people were 
victims of an immature and backward Japanese imperialism. Nevertheless, this view did 
not go as far as criticism of colonization of Korea, per se. Rather, their agreement was 
that Korea still deserved to be colonized, but Japan was not a qualified colonizer. Writing 
which admired material developments in urban cities and technologies in Korea in this 
period shows an admiration for the modernistic progress that the colonialism had 
achieved, in contrast to Japan‘s discriminative and ruthless control. As Krenn points out, 
American opinion makers came to see that the Japanese might be at the apex of the 
―Oriental racial variety of humanity, but that merely meant that they were the best of an 
inferior…race‖2 From the 1930s, American commentators did not equate themselves as 
being on the same level of colonizers as the Japanese. American diplomatic officials 
often contrasted harsh Japanese colonial rule to American colonizers who had 
paternalistic sympathy toward Filipinos.  
From the late 1930s, Japan insisted on Japan‘s Monroe Doctrine for Asia and the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, declaring an Asian block led by Japan and free 
of Western powers. For the Americans‘ part, although the racial issue was beneath the 
surface in the earlier years while the U.S. maintained a friendly relationship with Japan, 
once the Pacific War broke out, military conflict in the war soon entailed cultural and 
ethnic hatred towards Japanese people, as John Dower has pointed out.3 Conflict between 
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the U.S. and Japan provided a space for Korean diasporic groups to emphasize their 
identity as being familiar but hostile to Japan and loyal to American ideals—democracy 
and Christianity—which was strategically useful and effective. In the 1940s during 
wartime, Korean activists gained some achievements, such as the U.S. Justice 
Department‘s decision in 1942 to exempt Korean immigrants from the category of 
―enemy aliens‖ and the OSS‘ plan to train and use Koreans in the war against Japan 
during the Pacific War. However, they failed to convince the U.S. government of Korean 
political leaders‘ ability for self-rule. The factionalism and immature anti-communism 
that some nationalist groups displayed contributed to the creation of an image for the 
American officials that the absolute and immediate independence of Korea was 
premature. As the end of the Second World War was approaching, American policy 
makers again decided their official policy towards Korea in the context of geopolitics. 
During the wartime policy making, the notion that powers should ―guide‖ Korea even 
after the liberation because of the Koreans‘ lack of experience in self-rule became the 
basic idea of the international trusteeship plan for Korea.  
 
Our examination of the course of American understanding related to Korea 
throughout its colonial period has shown that American policy from 1945 was in the 
context of action, reaction and interaction among different voices, especially those of 
American observers and Korean nationalist activists. The basic view of American 
observers about Korea was framed in Orientalism and modernism, closer to the 
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colonizer‘s position, rather than to the colonized. Korean nationalists constantly 
challenged the colonialists‘ perspective, claiming fair treatment of the colonized people 
and to American aid to liberate the people based on universal humanism. Although a 
concern about geopolitics swayed American policy-making for the most of the time, 
these reactions made by Korean voices at times obscured the existing American view. 
Especially when there was a common enemy, the U.S. and Korean nationalists who 
believed in special relations with the U.S. could compromise and be in a cooperative 
relationship. The first case was when the U.S. came into confrontation with Japan from 
the mid-1930s, and the second case was when both the U.S. government and Korean 
rightists opposed communist influence on the Korean peninsular at the end of the Second 
World War. The main figure in the Korean nationalist group that tried to use diplomatic 
means based on the special relationship with the U.S. to achieve Korean independence 
was Syngman Rhee. After Korea was divided into Northern and Southern zones under the 
U.S.S.R. and the U.S. rules, the conditions in Korea compelled the U.S. policy makers to 
reconsider the feasible options. Officials of the U.S. military government felt that there 
was no room for Koreans to compromise on any type of trusteeship. From a realistic 
perspective, American officials in Seoul actually discarded the trusteeship plan from late 
1945, much earlier than the State Department officially determined to give up trusteeship 
for Korea and to transfer the Korean issue to the United Nations in 1947. More 
importantly, officials in Korea witnessed that the leftists were more organized and had 
more supporters than the rightists in liberated Korea. Based on knowledge of 
communistic Korean groups during the 1930s in Manchuria and North China, they 




emerging Cold War sentiment and fear of communist expansion required American 
policy-makers to proceed with the immediate establishment of a Korean government, 
which would build a bulwark against communism in the East Asian region. When the 
U.S.-U.S.S.R Joint Commission came to an end with a rupture in 1947 and the U.S. 
military government failed to use moderate politicians in forming an interim 
government,4 American officials in Seoul were left with a realistic choice: despite some 
disagreement, Rhee‘s past reputation as a nationalist activist, strong belief in American 
ideals and anti-communism demonstrated throughout the colonial period made the 
American authorities chose to cooperate with Rhee in establishing a Korean government 
in the South that was friendly to the American sphere in the Cold War competition. 
This dissertation has demonstrated that the Korean colonial years were an essential period 
when the American attitude towards Korea and East Asia was shaped and experienced 
significant changes. As opposed to conventional assumptions, this study proves that 
Korean nationalists‘ presentation of their desire for national independence actually had an 
influence in changing the American view of Korea. Moreover, unceasing interactions, 
including both common goals and ruptures, between American observers and Korean 
activists throughout Korea‘s colonial period determined the direction of the U.S. 
government‘s decision-making about post-colonial Korea after 1945. 
 
                                               
4 For details about the U.S. military government‘s interim government idea and policy regarding the 
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